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PREFACE 
This thesis studies processes underlying structural change m the agncultuial 
sector of Kenya My interest in Kenya dates back to 1979/1980 when I formed 
part of a student-team carrying out an urban research project m Kisumu Later 
on, as a lecturer at the Third World Centre of the Catholic University of 
Nijmegen, my research acbvibes shifted to the complex dynamic of agrarian 
change in Africa as a whole, and Kenya m particular 
The subject agranan change has, however, a very wide scope, so 
necessitating a certain restriction of the research project Focusing the study, 
though, was not easy It appeared to be a process taking more bme than I ever 
expected Chapter 1, containing a theoretical outline of how to analyze 
agranan change, is proverbial for this statement 
Doing research and writing a thesis have also other aspects working, 
discussing and arguing with a wide variety of people, whether they be Kenyan 
farmers, colleagues and friends or bureaucrats The various visits to Kenya, 
between 1985 and 1988, were not only in a scientific sense interesting The 
different people I met and the friends I made during my stay had a energising 
effect on me Energising ranges in this respect from scientific discussions and 
exchanging political ideas which broadened on many occasions my own 
views, to pleasant gatherings and being part of the bubbling nightlife of 
Nairobi, Kisumu and Kapsabet There are so many people in Kenya to thank 
that I cannot name them all A few people/fnends cannot be left unnamed 
First there are Jan Vossen and Ria Olofsen who invited me to stay, live and 
work in their house during the bme I was m Nairobi I enjoyed staying with 
them very much, as they brought me into contact with Allart, Píen, Jan, Mieke, 
and so many others Jan and Ria in particular showed such a lot of enthusiasm 
for African music that smce then Franco, Simba Wanyika, etc are in my ears It 
was also pleasant to meet my old fnend John Ndegwa agam Thanking people 
in Kenya, I must not forget James and Tnaa in Kisumu sharing with me 
several pleasant social gatherings and giving me support 
The Insbtute for Development Studies of the Nairobi University assisted 
me in receiving a research permit for Kenya and put a working room and their 
library at my disposal 
In the Kapsabet region, I want to express my gratitude towards the people 
who assisted me in my research endeavours First of all Jan Helder, whose 
help and knowledge were indispensable He assisted me m drawing the 
sample while I was m Kisumu repairing the car, conducbng interviews and 
made the evenings in Kapsabet less dull Jan's input in processing a first 
analysis of the research results was a great contribubon Linet Chagwira and 
Faith Kogo were the best interpreters I met m my life Gratitude also for the 
people who worked at that time in Kapsabet Hotel, the District Agricultural 
Officers' bureau and the Land Registration Department in the District 
Commissioners Office I am also thankfull to William Ambani and his family 
in Kapkangaru sub-location who, without any restrictions, introduced me to 
V 
the world of the middle peasantry in Nandi district He truly proofed to me 
that farmers are 'knowledgeable' and 'capable'. 
It seems to be a customary for Ph.D candidates to refer to the support of 
their own family in the last lines of the preface. Since my wife Monique and 
my children Bram, Maarten and Aniek probably suffered the most of my 
moods and of my long days during the week and the week-ends I spent in my 
working room behind the computer, I would make a serious mistake to follow 
that custom. Their enduring support cannot be expressed in words. One thing 
is obvious, however, they informed frequently about the progress and were 
glad that the book was finished. 
Back home, in the Netherlands, various other people also contributed, 
willingly and unwillingly, their share. I highly valued comments of my 
colleagues of the Third World Centre of the Catholic University of Nijmegen 
and of the Department of the Sociology of Rural Development of the 
Wageningen Agricultural University. My promotor, Gerrit Huizer, and co-
promotor, Detlev Haude, appeared to be very good readers and commentators 
on the various drafts of the different chapters. They pointed at many 
ambiguities thereby forcing me to reformulate and to reconsider certain 
sections. Paul Hoebink, Frans Schuurman, Hans Siebers, Wilma Roos, Francien 
van Driel and Luuk Knippenberg of The Third World Centre, and Jan Douwe 
van der Ploeg, Chris Martin and Jan Kees van Donge of the Department of 
Sociology of Rural development also had their share in this process, as 
commentators, friends and colleagues. A particular kind of acknowledgement 
is directed to the chairman of the Wageningen department, Norman Long, 
enabling me to finish my thesis. 
Chris Visscher of the Research Technical Department of the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen deserves credit as he assisted and taught me how to 
undertake regression analysis and to interpret the results. Dick Foeken of the 
African Study Centre in Leiden complied frequently with my requests for 
additional statistics. Maarten Slooves and Paul Wissink showed their talents of 
drawing the maps and figures incorporated in this book. 
Finally, last but not least, although she really was the last person who has 
contributed, I must thank Catherine OOea for her excellent editorial work. 
Despite the time pressure, forcing her to alter her normal editing procedure, 
she managed to transform my Dutch-English into English. She did a great job, 
also by pointing at many ambiguities in the text. The final responsibility for 
the text English is, of course, completely in my hands. 
The pressure unwillingly exercised on me by the director of the Nijmegen 
Institute for Comparative Studies in Development and Cultural Change 
(NICCOS), to meet the deadline, was after all not experienced as unpleasant. 
Paul Hebinck 
Cuyk, October, 1990 
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CHAPTER 1: 
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
AGRARIAN CHANGE 
Introduction and presuppositions 
The research theme of the thesis - agrarian change - was delineated by the 
following recognition: the agricultural sector as a whole, together with the 
farm enterprise and the agricultural population, is increasingly embedded in 
an extended network of economic, political and cultural relations evolving 
between various institutions and enterprises, markets as well as between 
sectors of the economy. The state, or rather state institutions, the farm 
enterprise and the household living and working on it, are considered as 
agencies of change playing an enormously important role in the establishment 
of this highly interlinked system. The historical, and often discontinuous, 
processes elementary for the understanding of the nature of the evolving 
relations between the farm enterprise, the agricultural population and the 
wider economic and institutional environment have been recognized as 
commodiüzation, institutionalization and intervention. 
Two major presuppositions inspired the search for an adequate analytical 
framework and influenced the above formulated starting point. Both are to the 
forefront in theoretical and empirical research by several scholars and in 
various strands of development theory. The first is the necessity to start from 
the paradigm of the incorporation of agricultural production, the agricultural 
population, and countries and regions into the broader world-wide political, 
economic and cultural environment. The underlying rationale behind 
incorporation processes has been ascribed to the expansion of capitalism on a 
world scale gradually encapsulating the Third World countries in the 
international capitalist division of labour. This process has been carefully 
examined by a.o. Lenin (1917) and more recently by Jalee (1968), Frank (1971), 
Magdoff et al. (1972) and Amin (1973).l Amin (1972), Berry (1984), Cooper 
(1981), Bernstein (1979), Mabogunje (1980) and Onimode (1988) analyzed this 
in the African context. There is no need to summarize in detail their findings 
here. The acceptance of this presupposition means that agrarian change cannot 
be understood without envisaging incorporation and the processes set in 
motion by incorporation: commoditization and institutionalization. These 
concepts shall be defined later on. 
The second presupposition arises out of experience with incorporation 
processes. A conscientious examination of the processes of incorporation 
indicates that these are historically specific and discontinuous. In addition it 
became clear that incorporation resulted in regionally and socially 
differentiated development patterns.2 Incorporation processes do not proceed 
according to universally operating laws of motion and do not follow pre-
determined linear patterns of development. 
The implications of this particular presupposition are manifold. A 
considerable scope for variation in development patterns must be built into the 
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analytical framework. This is notably relevant for understanding the 
heterogeneity of agriculture and the vitality of various operational units in the 
agricultural sector such as plantations, large- and small-scale production units, 
various styles of fanning, and capitalist farm enterprises and family farms. 
This requires the adoption of an approach beyond the 'logic of capital' 
framework of analysis in which capital is conceded as an active actor 
subsuming other different actors under general economic 'laws'. 
Simultaneously, an approach is needed which goes beyond interpretations 
which reduce development patterns to specific 'economic-corporate' struggles 
among various factions and dasses.3 We must encompass other 'laws' and 
levels as well, such as political and cultural 'laws', the life-world of the 
peasantry and the ways in which the agents who are part of the process of 
development interpret and manage their life-worlds. 
Long (1977, 1984b, 1988, 1989) in particular calls for an actor-oriented 
approach to incorporate these aspects. Essential to this approach is a politico-
economic analysis which focuses upon showing how socio-economic 
developments and patterns of social organization are structured by the larger 
framework of economic and power relations, including the ways in which the 
state attempts to manage development. It focuses on the perceptions and 
strategies unfolded by those staffing the state apparatuses, farmers, industrial 
entrepreneurs, traders and bankers acting collectively through various interest 
groups, organizations and networks. Such an analysis also pays attention to 
sodal and ideological mechanisms by which particular economic systems and 
forms of production are reproduced. Such a framework avoids reducing the 
farming population to powerless subjects, to puppets on a string held tight by 
capital and the state. In addition, sectors of the state bureaucracy are not 
viewed as passive representatives of an ensemble of institutions mandated to 
carry out various tasks solely to facilitate capitalist expansion. Structural, 
social, political and economic developments - such as changing market and 
international economic conditions, shifts in-the power base of the state, crisis 
in the legitimacy of the state vis-à-vis the peasantry and international 
development ideology - effectuate and lead to changes in state policy and 
sodo-economic development patterns Moreover, intervention, 
commoditization and institutionalization are not disembodied processes. 
'From an actor perspective, commoditization and institutionalization only 
become real in their consequences when introduced and translated by spedfic 
actors'.4 
Long (1989) perceives social actors as 'knowledgeable' and 'capable'. Actors 
attempt, according to Long, 'to solve problems, leam how to intervene in the 
flow of sodal events around them, and monitor continuously their actions, 
observing how others react to their behaviour and taking note of various 
contingent drcumstances'.S They exerdse some kind of 'power', even those in 
subordinate positions. In these ways they actively engage in the construction 
of their own sodal worlds, although the drcumstances they encounter are not 
merely of their own choosing. The embedding in a wider economic, political 
and cultural institutional framework, or the structural location in sodety, 
certainly constrains social behaviour. Dedsions and actions of actors, may, 
according to Hindess (1986b), 'well be affected by what happens elsewhere, 
but it does not follow that they are determined'6, and thus not simply 
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reducible to the expression of the actor's position within a system of social 
relations. 
In addition to that, both Long and Hindess point out that the reaching of 
decisions entails the deployment of some 'discursive means' whereby 
objectives, arguments and analysis are formulated for the decisions taken. 
Long stresses therefore that 
'all societies contain within them a repertoire of different life styles, 
cultural forms and rationalities which members utilize in their search 
for order and meaning, and which they themselves play a part in 
affirming or transforming. Hence the strategies and cultural 
constructions employed by individuals do not arise out of the blue but 
are drawn from a stock of available discourses (verbal and non-verbal) 
that are to some degree shared with other individuals, contemporaries 
and even predecessors. It is at this point that the individual is, as it 
were, transmuted metaphorically into the social actor, thus signifying 
that 'actor' is a social construction rather than simply a synonym for the 
individual person or human being.'7 
This delineation of actor goes thus beyond the notion that actors are simply 
reducible to human individuals and/or to their structural location in society. 
Hindess (1986b) argues convincingly that human individuals are actors, but 
they are not the only entities that reach decisions and act accordingly. 
Capitalist enterprises, state agencies, political parties, church organizations, 
farmer organizations and unions are examples of social actors; they all have 
means of reaching and formulating decisions.8 In other words, social classes, 
capital, peasantry, society and state are not to be treated as actors. 
Accordingly, as Hindess (1986a) takes the argument a step further, interests 
upon which actors supposedly act are not necessarily given by their social 
location, although, he recognizes several aspects by which they may be 
connected with actors' location in sets of social relations. The connections are 
to do with the discursive means available to the actors, the differential access 
to means of action by organizations supporting actors in their assessment of 
interests and the differential impact of social conditions on actors and changes 
in such conditions.9 
It is obvious that the notion of actor does not exclude a differential degree 
of access to power on the part of the different actors. Simultaneously, decisions 
of one actor involve reactions from several other actors, and conflicts emerge 
between actors when one of them makes a decision and acts accordingly. This 
is particularly evident when the social conditions of certain actors are affected 
by decisions of other key actors. Massive evasion of tax and/or crop 
regulations by peasants during the colonial period in Africa, reactions of 
peasants or peasant organizations to certain price regulations of a state 
institution and workers' strikes resulting from a reorganization of an 
enterprise evoked by the board of directors are examples of these kinds of 
actions. 
Peasants have been analyzed in a variety of ways, as active agents of 
change ('revolutionaryO and as powerless ('conservative') actors. In various 
historical settings peasants may indeed be viewed as powerless, being subject 
to a ruling elite or to war lords trying to establish their political power. Marx's 
(1962) analysis, which is perhaps his most frequently quoted work in relation 
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to agrarian change. The Eighteenth Brumaire of the French peasantry during 
Bonaparte's rule, established this clearly. Marx, at any rate, describes next to 
the conservative peasant also the peasant who is engaged in struggles to 
overthrow the old order. The famous 'potato-bag' image, which Marx 
expressed in the Eighteenth Brumaire, has gone a long way, however, and has 
strengthened the idea that Marx was anti-peasant and that peasants are 
powerless and intrinsically reactionary. Only under specific conditions, such 
as the Mexican and Bolivian Revolution, during the Mau Mau rebellion in 
Kenya, the Maji Maji rising in Tanzania, are peasants regarded as powerful 
social forces capable of demanding reforms which affected state policy, despite 
that they were eventually calmed down and lost impetus and impact while 
different social forces took over.W 
This perspective is one way of analyzing peasants. A different perspective 
is to view peasants from the notion of actor discussed above. Peasants as 
actors refers also to the day-to-day negotiations to maintain control over their 
own means of existence and struggles of peasants to obtain favourable 
preconditions for agricultural production and welfare. Huizer (1972), Huizer & 
Manheim (1979), Scott (1985), Mamdani (1987), Long (1989) and Van der Ploeg 
(1990) clearly demonstrated the 'view from below' and the capability of 
peasants to carry out their projects according to their outlooks. They are, as 
such, not powerless. Long (1986) points out that: 
'the market and other 'external' forces enter the life-worlds of peasant 
households, opening up or restricting economic choice, but such new 
factors are, as it were, processed by the peasants themselves. That is 
they integrate them into their own farming strategies, and in this sense 
they retain a degree of independent decision-making. (Accordingly it 
still is the farmer who) continues to control how they organize their own 
labour and how they draw upon various non-commoditized factors of 
production'.11 
A second major implication is that the classic and neo-Marxist contributions to 
the debate on agrarian change become increasingly less relevant. This is not to 
deny the paramount importance of the Agrarian Question, nor that capitalism 
has brought a series of mechanical, chemical and biological innovations, nor 
that future social, economic and cultural developments in the countryside do 
not depend on the manner in which capitalists try to resolve the problems 
inherent in agrarian development.12 
Instead, the intention here is to argue that the classical Marxist formulation 
of the agrarian question - which is framed in terms of explaining the survival 
of family farms and how capital is taking hold of agriculturel3 - needs 
revision. The history of agricultural development in many countries and 
regions has established that form of production other then capitalist 
production exist. Marx afterall indicated in Capital, Volume III, that 
agriculture 'needs either the hand of the small farmer living by his own labour 
or the control of associated producers.'!* in the same volume he dearly draws 
attention to the heterogeneity of production processes and co-existence of 
several labour processes. Within the historical, specific context of England, he 
distinguishes between labour processes linked to specific commodity circuits 
and those founded upon a complete circulation of commodities. The originally 
question as to whether the family farm (or petty commodity production) will 
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disappear within the capitalist economic system, based upon the view that 
gradually all production will be capitalist production, becomes therefore 
irrelevant In other words, 'capital' is apparently not able to solve the Agranan 
Question according to the logic of the law of value A more relevant and more 
meaningful question is under what concrete conditions of production and 
reproduction petty commodity production exists under capitalism and how 
these conditions are established and reshaped during processes of 
intervention, commodibzabon and institutionalization in the past and in the 
present 15 
In line with both presuppositions, we propose to analyze processes of agranan 
change in the context of what we have learned to understand as an agrarian 
structure However, before giving a définition of an agranan structure, we shall 
danfy in the following sections the three central concepts commodihzation, 
institutionalization and intervention which are considered to be essential for 
its understanding In section 3 we will delineate the concept of agrarian 
structure and its properties In the following two sections, we shall set the 
focus of the study and present an outline of the thesis 
1.1. Commoditization, institutionalization and intervention 
A retrospective view on the course of the process of incorporation reveals that 
changes have occurred in the agricultural sector On the one hand we witness 
the transformation of relatively autonomous and self-sufficient production 
often in combination with a modest surplus for regional trade, to production 
oriented towards 'unknown', often distant, markets The rural economy 
gradually commences to realize regular surpluses out of agnculture on the 
basis of which growth outside agriculture takes place, m rurally based 
industries and commerce Rural populations increasingly become both 
producers of commodities for the market and consumers of mdustnal or 
otherwise manufactured production and consumption goods 16 An 
intensification of rural labour and/or mdustnal developments and 
technological (mechanical, chemical and biological) innovations contnbute to 
an increase in productivity in agricultural production systems 
Simultaneously, as produchon becomes more integrated into markets and the 
innovations are integrated into agricultural production processes, profound 
changes take place in the vanous agricultural labour processes 
In such aggregate and abstract reasonmgs we have to realize, however, that 
these processes are neither completed, nor commenced at the same time Rural 
producers remain, for instance, producers of consumption goods to satisfy the 
needs of the household outside the realm of the market Simultaneously they 
reproduce vanous farm inputs to a certain degree dunng agncultural 
production The degree of incorporation of vanous regions and peoples m the 
market economy differs significantly in time, impact and intensity by country, 
regions and continent as well as by producers I7 
Generally, the start of the above transformation processes in Africa is traced 
back to the establishment of colonial rule This is signified by the gradual 
building of a colonial state apparatus and the entrance of productive, finance 
and merchant companies and institutions This process started roughly at the 
end of the 19th century From that particular point in time Africa is considered 
as having become integrated into the international capitalist division of labour 
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The pre-colonial (or pre-capitalist) soaal formations m Africa are generally 
portrayed as societies where production of use-value is the predominant 
pattern of development This view neglects, however, two important features 
of pre-colomal Africa Destruction and disintegration in Africa had begun long 
before colonization was effectuated (slave trade, simple collection of natural 
products, coerced labour and plunder) 18 Furthermore, in pre-colomal Africa, 
exchange relations, periodic markets and socio-economic differences between 
people were not totally absent19 There was some degree of commodity 
production, and regional specific patterns of development emerged which 
gave rise to inter- and intra-regional and continental trade relations What is 
stressed here is merely that the necessary soaal, economie and spatial 
conditions for an expansion of commodity production to satisfy the demands 
of Europe's colonial powers and mdustnal enterprises for raw materials and 
import/export trade opportunities, hardly existed or did not exist at all These 
conditions had to be created in the colonial and other terntones of Afnca 20 
Here we want to start our analysis 
Two highly correlated and interacting, though not necessarily 
simultaneously operating, development processes are taking place in the 
agricultural and other sectors of the economy commoditization and 
institutionahzatton A synthesis of both concepts in its turn leads towards the 
notion of intervention in the conditions for agricultural production 
1.1.1. Commoditization 
In the following, we shall first clarify the process of commoditization 
Commoditization denotes according to Long (1986) 'the historical process by 
which exchange value comes to assume an increasingly important role in 
economies '21 Commoditization of production in agriculture and other sectors 
of the economy implies the expansion of commodity production and exchange 
relations, and, at the same time that the conditions of production in agriculture 
and of reproduction of farm enterprises and the household working on the 
farm are becoming increasingly ruled by the logic of the market The concept 
of commoditization encapsulates thus commercuihzation and capitalization of 
production 22 Commercialization is understood here as the process by which 
production is increasingly onented toward the market in exchange for money 
Capitalization refers to the process whereby production factors increasingly 
appear as exchange value in production processes, on the farms and in the 
fields The market gradually comes to serve as a place to purchase means of 
production (land), labour (wage-labour), material prerequisites for production 
(objects and implements of labour), capital and services (extension and 
recommendations) Capitalization involves a transformation of the agricultural 
labour process which thereby increasingly becomes founded upon exchange 
value rather than use value The further exchange relations penetrate the 
labour process, the more production and reproduction require at least some 
involvement m commercial agncultural production and/or other cash 
generating economic activities off the farm by members of a household 
Furthermore, capitalization incorporates also the creation of the conditions 
under which production for surplus value may be realized 
Both notions are useful for a number of reasons Both are helpful in the 
delineation of the different periods of commoditization which can be traced in 
Africa's history In addition, both notions can be used to examine the process 
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of institutionalization which accompanies commoditization. Finally, by 
stipulating the twin processes of commercialization and capitalization we are 
able to examine the administrative and technological conditions of production 
in agriculture and how these are created as producers are increasingly 
incorporated in the market.23 
African history reveals two broad periods.24 One was a time of increasing 
commercialization of agricultural production. The second period is one of 
capitalization, which generally commences later than the first. 
The gradual commercialization of agricultural production under colonial 
conditions coincides in many cases with the disintegration of relatively 
autonomous, self-sufficient production and reproduction cycles of pre-
capitalist societies. Production for the market was encouraged as well as 
enforced by the implementation of a combination of several types of 
intervention facilitated under colonialism by the colonial state. The means 
employed by the colonial state are well known and frequently spelled out: (1) 
imposition of taxes (per hut and head), (2) use of forced labour for the 
construction of the necessary infrastructure (roads, means of communication), 
(3) (often violent) recruitment of labour for production enterprises like 
plantations, farms, ranches and mines organized by white settlers, by 
international agro-firms or by the state itself, and (4) the imposition of cash 
crop production on the rural producers which in many occasions coincided 
with coerdon.25 Labour was gradually withdrawn from use-value production 
(in agriculture, hunting and fishing, animal husbandry, craft activities such as 
house building, manufacturing of tools, weapons and other artifacts). Other 
important patterns of development and life-styles of pre-colonial Africa (such 
as warfare and raiding of cattle and women) had to be abolished under the 
pressure of military pacification campaigns organized by the colonial state. In 
several cases, i.e., in the white settler colonies in Eastern and Southern Africa 
and in the 'Africa of the concession keeping companies', land was simply and 
forcefully alienated from the Africans. The confiscation of land severely 
limited the choice of the local population to continue to live and work as 
independent producers and/or to maintain 'traditional' life-styles. 
An important social condition for commodity production by indigenous 
producers was created: cash income. Access to cash (the so-called hunger for 
cash) was increasingly viewed as the means to pay taxes and to satisfy other 
demands which were previously realized outside the realm of the market. The 
need for cash became an impetus behind some involvement in commodity 
production. Rural African producers were increasingly drawn into the market 
economy, either through production of cash crops and/or through the exchange 
of their labour power for wages. The alienation of land and the African labour 
force formed thereby facilitated the creation of conditions conducive to the 
expansion of commodity production organized by international firms and 
white settlers. Commodity production in agriculture and commodity relations 
expanded gradually, in some regions very rapidly, in others only slowly. 
The second stage in the process of commoditization in Africa refers to 
capitalization. With the gradual expansion of commercial agricultural 
production, productivity increases in the agricultural sector were envisaged in 
colonial development plans. These objectives were in line with both agro-
industrial and merchant interests. Similar to European agriculture, in Third 
World countries a start was made with the introduction of new technologies in 
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agriculture Scientific plant and cattle breeding programmes (research on new 
crops and higher yielding varieties, graded cows, the use of fertilizers and 
mechanization) created opportunities to enhance productivity of land and 
labour New improved husbandry practices were encouraged by colonial state 
officials and subsequently actively integrated by the agricultural population 
into their labour processes In addition to that, as noted by Bernstein (1979), 
the colonial state together with agro-industnal and merchant companies 
combmed attempts to regulate what was grown and how it was grown These 
attempts coincided with the establishment of monopolistic marketing and 
pnang arrangements 26 
These technological improvements created a foundation for a more capital-
intensive agriculture In the course of the process of capitalization, the objects 
of labour (seeds, fertilizers, cattle) and the instruments of labour (hoes being 
replaced by purchased hoes and tractors) increasingly appear as commodities 
on the farms and in the fields The factor labour power also becomes 
increasingly commoditized The employment of wage labour is now an 
indispensable phenomenon in African agriculture 
This short overview of commoditization would be senously flawed if we 
did not pay attention to acts of peasants resisting commoditization African 
history - and particularly colonial history - shows several cases of peasant 
resistance which became manifest in a number of ways Resistance ranged 
from refusal to adopt new technologies and husbandry practices to sabotage, 
from peasant 'strikes' involving refusal to grow certam crops to a withdrawal, 
at least partial, from commodity exchange, from the evasion of crop 
regulations to evasion of terms of exchange (by smuggling) and political 
actions against the state and the state bureaucracy 2 7 Peasant strikes and other 
forms of resistance were, however, mainly directed against the specific nature 
of colonization and not agamst commoditization Resistance to colonization 
involved а о actions directed against attempts by the colonial state to alienate 
land, to levy taxes and to abolish previous life-styles and production systems. 
These acts of resistance are not necessarily equal to 'resistance to change'28 and 
can therefore also be interpreted as demands to make way for an integration 
into the commodity economy under favourable conditions The struggle for 
good prices for their products, the demand for the nght to commeraalize 
production and the refusal to grow cash-crops interfering with food 
production can be mentioned as examples Kenya's history, where the African 
farmers demanded the nght to commeraalize agricultural production, is very 
illuminating in this respect 
1.1.2. Institutionalization 
Institutionalization is a histoncal process of an evolving soaal division of 
labour and speaalizabon between the a gn cui turai sector and the industrial, 
service and commerce sectors of the economy as well as between producers 
and productive units During this process vanous actors establish themselves 
in that division of labour and accordmgly perform specific roles The actors 
may include farmers, traders, marketing organizations, farmer organizations 
and cooperatives, extension services, banks, agnbusmess enterpnses, input 
suppliers and vanous state apparatuses The set of relations that binds them 
forms what Benvenuti (1975, 1982, 1985) has labelled as the techmco-
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administrative task-environment for farming (TATE) TATE may be 
considered as the structural environment of social interaction in agriculture 29 
TATE is a strategic concept for the analysis of how and under what 
conditions farm enterprises become integrated into a wider environment and 
network of relations between the various actors TATE discloses specific 
aspects of both commodibzabon and institutionalization Seen in historical 
perspective, the systematic network m which farm enterprises and rural 
households earning a living from it, become gradually embedded, is getting 
more complex The notion of complexity discloses two cruaal aspects 
In the first place, there is an increase m the number of 'external' actors The 
expanding production for the market coincides with the building up of an 
administrative and marketing structure In the African setting, this 
institutional structure consists of state owned marketing boards, producer 
marketing cooperatives and private trading companies as well as transport 
enterprises, banks, processing industries and retail and wholesale distribution 
networks The above-named techmco-admimstrative environment for 
agriculture is resulting from the establishment of specialized research stations, 
mput producing industnes and/or compames importing these inputs as well 
as a network of distributors and local traders 
In the African context, it is cruaal to note that the historical development of 
TATE involves state administrative and political control as well as capital 
investment by the state The terms of exchange for majority of the agricultural 
commodities and production inputs are fixed by the state The technological 
foundation upon which capitalization could proceed was not achieved by 
individual farmers but by the public sector It was already emphasized earlier 
that this coincided with attempts by the state to regulate and supervise 
production 
In addition to that, one of earliest functions of the colonial state was to plan 
and to build up a physical infrastructure consisting of roads, railway lines and 
communications networks to facilitate the expansion of commodity 
production The historical development of TATE coincided thus with the 
building of state apparatuses mandated with various legislative powers and 
equipped with vanous instrumentalities The realization of TATE may be 
regarded as an essential function of the state This requires some notion of the 
state and a delineation of state functions to which we shall return later on in 
this chapter 
Of particular relevance is the fact that besides the local state, multilateral 
and bilateral aid institutions play a crucial role in the realization of TATE It is 
clear that the local state experiences shortages of investment funds as well as 
lacking technical and managerial expertise to facilitate the further 
development of TATE and the relations it embodies This particular situation 
forces the state to call upon various international agencies for development 
assistance and/or to accept foreign aid 
Generally, foreign aid from multilateral (World Bank, FAO) and bilateral 
sources moved into projects such as rural integrated development schemes 
which provide for the development of commodity relations and into the direct 
planning and financing of production schemes, agricultural R&D and 
dissemination of research results, import and balance of payments support 30 
In addition to foreign aid relations, the state maintains commercial bes with 
private consultants bureaus and agribusiness companies These companies 
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frequently offer ready made technological and managerial solutions (the so-
called turn-key projects, contract farming arrangements and input package 
deals) for the problems which the agricultural sector faces 
In the second place, the notion of complexity reflects a condensabon of the 
network as a gradual intensifica bon of the relations between the farm 
enterprises and the external institutions takes place Empirically, this is 
mirrored in the tendency for farm tasks, which at earlier conjunctures were 
regarded as integral elements of the rural producbon process, to be reallocated 
to external agenaes Seed, fodder and manure production, processing, 
marketing and distribution is increasingly organized m other sectors than 
agriculture 
The consequence of the reallocation of farm tasks has also been labelled as 
extemalization 31 Extemalization is at the same time the foundation for 
commodibzabon and insbtubonalization for a continumg integrabon of 
agriculture and industry, for a division of labour between agriculture and 
industry as well as between producbve units withm the agricultural sector 
itself The more the farming population reallocates farm tasks, the more the 
coordination of these tasks is now consbtuted through TATE-relations and 
through commodity relabons32 Benvenuta (1975, 1982, 1985) and Van der 
Ploeg (1985, 1986, 1987, 1990) stress that the different agricultural labour 
processes which can be distinguished in agriculture, become increasingly 
determined and prescribed m harmony with and as a function of TATE Farm 
labour is increasingly becoming responsive to external stimuli, restraining the 
choices and independence of the farmer and condì bomng the process of 
reproducbon In this respect, commodibzabon and institutionalization involve 
control over farm labour by external agents 
1.1.3. Intervention 
A good example of how commodibzation and insbtubonalization fuse into the 
concept of intervenhon is provided by the Green Revolution In our 
explanabon we lay particular emphasis on the replacement of local maize 
cultivare by higher yielding, hybrid maize vanebes 
The Green Revolubon can be considered as a world-wide strategy aiming 
to increase food producbon and alleviate poverty in the rural areas in the 
developing countries Various actors took part in outlining the strategy In the 
beginning it involved primarily bankers and industrialists, who were later 
followed by intemabonal organizations (World Bank, FAO) and private 
research institutions 33 These institubons, as well as a large number of 
scientists*4, were convmced that Third World agriculture lacked productive 
factors of production and adequate skills to exploit them Therefore, they 
called for an action programme aiming at a major transformation of traditional 
agricultural production systems In close cooperation with agribusiness 
companies, much effort was put into agronomic research on new and high 
yielding cultivare, seed tesbng and seed cerbftcabon Given the tremendous 
variability of ecological conditions the best strategy appeared to be to 
'develop a fairly standardized package of seeds and other inputs that 
would be relatively insensitive to soil and climate variation while still 
giving good results The package that did result includes the Hyvs only 
as the most dramatic and visible element Other necessary parts of the 
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package are precisely those that are associated with industrial 
agriculture irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, increased mechanization 
and a complex support and marketing system' 35 
In addition, the need to combme all this with the provision of extension 
services and credit to the farming population to secure adoption of 
innovations was emphasized Common to all the practices and ideas of these 
institutions was the notion that these new technologies, and particularly the 
new grain/ferbhzer technologies, were highly divisible and scale-neutral This 
feature would allow them to be integrated into existmg systems of small-scale 
agriculture In the second place, proponents were strongly convinced that it 
provided productive employment for the rapidly growing rural labour force 
Simultaneously, it could produce wage goods needed for an expanding 
industrial labour force 36 
The implementation of the Green Revolution strategy required a radical 
reorientation and revision of the technological and institutional environment 
for farming in the developing world It required a condensation of relations 
between the agricultural population and the institutional environment A 
major outcome is that, increasingly, the breeding of 'tradiüonal' maize 
varieties as well as 'traditional' selection and distribution systems are 
disappearing - here slowly, there rapidly These systems were gradually 
replaced by 'modem' hybrid maize breeding programmes and sophisticated 
distribution systems This transformation process does not only enhance the 
increasing importance of commodity relations but it strengthenens also 
another process which elaborates on the nature of the linkages between farm 
enterprises and institutions 'Give me a laboratory and I'll raise you a world' 
wrote Latour (1983) He pointed out with this phrase that the results of work 
m laboratories are transforming society, that is, that science, and particularly 
agricultural and biochemical science, is playing an important social role in the 
release of the productive forces in agriculture and in the remodelling of 
agricultural practices 
Van der Ploeg (1987) calls this the process of 'seien tifica bon of agricultural 
practice' 37 The introduction of new technologies and their integration into 
farming practices is thus not only accompanied by the development of 
sophisticated production and distribution systems Simultaneously we witness 
the development of a new knowledge system with new agents scientists 
mstead of farmers Additionally, it claims superiority over 'tradihonar 
systems This scientific knowledge system may be considered as the 
institutional and technological breeding ground of sophisticated plant 
breeding programmes and associated programmes mentioned earlier The fact 
that farming practice and state policy are increasingly oriented towards 
adoption of these new technologies, implies at the same time that farm 
practices are progressively modelled by scientific agricultural designs, 
developed in laboratories and on drawing boards by scientists This will be 
highlighted briefly by the following 
Hybrid maize is introduced by reason of its higher yields compared with 
traditional varieties An important feature of hybrid maize is that, in order to 
produce these higher yields, it requires the adoption of bio-chenucal inputs 
(fertilizers and preferably also pesticides) The use of these inputs is more or 
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less compulsory and prescribed. It is generally accepted that hybrid seeds do 
not grow well without fertilizers. 
A second major characteristic is that multiplication of the seeds can no 
longer take place on the farm.38 The fanner is compelled to maintain 
commodity relations in order to obtain seeds and fertilizer. A third important 
feature of hybrid maize is that it depends on reliable rainfall patterns 
(particularly where maize growing is rain fed) and relatively good soils. No 
rain, no good harvest. A major implication hereof is that the correct timing of 
farm tasks, such as land preparation and particularly of sowing, is needed in 
order to coincide with specific phases of rainfall. The more accurate the time of 
planting of hybrid maize and the closer to the technological optimum, the 
higher will be the yield. Seasonal labour peaks are intensified accordingly.39 
Labour peaks and the correct timing of the employment of labour become a 
major determining factor in agricultural production. More importantly, 
perhaps, both factors increasingly determine the organization of the labour 
process. 
Contrary to hybrids, traditional or local maize varieties are generally more 
resistant to drought. They are less subject to time consideration and can be 
reproduced on the farm. These varieties can be exchanged on a local basis and 
this will contribute to a maintenance of the genetic resources of a region. 
The speed of adoption of HYV maize seeds and the trend for the areas 
planted with high yielding varieties, fertilizer application and mechanization 
the increase, demonstrates that the farming population actively integrated 
these new opportunities into their labour process.40 Zimbabwe and Kenya in 
particular demonstrate that the adoption rate of hybrid varieties by large and 
small-scale farmers was high and remarkably fast. 
The Green Revolution example shows that the drive behind processes of 
commoditization and institutionalization can be delineated as the motivation 
of various actors to create infrastructural conditions for agricultural 
(commodity) production by which productivity of land and labour could be 
enhanced. The leading think-tank among the development institutions, the 
World Bank, clearly considers both aspects as the vehicle of development. The 
explosion of population growth in Africa (approx. 3 % a year), together with 
the low and backward technological and managerial development level of the 
agricultural sector, can be held accountable for the general persistence of 
poverty, decreasing productivity, non-sustainable growth and the absolute 
decline in per capita food production.41 
Modem production-, marketing- and other post-harvest technologies, the 
use of higher yielding improved crop varieties, fertilizers, pesticides and the 
application of irrigation have to become general property of the agricultural 
sector. Agricultural development schemes, project planning, foreign aid, a 
proper agricultural extension service and agricultural R&D programmes, and 
the right incentives to producers have to accompany and synchronize these 
innovations.42 If these objectives, to use Trigo's (1986) words, are put in 'the 
optimal format, the job gets done.'O New attitudes towards management, and 
changes in policy and development planning, are viewed by the World Bank 
as the necessary development instruments for a successful transformation of 
the agricultural sector. This would benefit the economy as a whole and the 
people who work and live in agriculture - and who will eventually leave it.** 
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Insbtutionalizabon of these tasks together with monebzabon of the 
economy are viewed as among the most essenbal vehicles of economic growth 
The technologies and husbandry methods to raise agncultural produchon are 
available - experiences in other parts of the world have after all demonstrated, 
m the eyes of the proponents of the Green Revolution, the viability of these 
new technologies - but the institubonal format as well as the 'pnces are not 
nghf 45 if these condibons are fulfilled, a 'take-off' for an 'accelerated growth' 
will be accomplished The 'tnckle-down-effecf, which is assumed to be 
operating automatically, will assure that the fruits of modernization will 
percolate to all strata of peasant soaety and even to the lower strata 46 
The Green Revoluhon strategy demonstrated that such a development 
outline for the agncultural sector requires the development of a solid TATE 
and, simultaneously, an expansion of commodity relations in the agncultural 
economy Agro-industries and related agro-insbtubons function as the 
generators of the process of commoditizabon, that is, agricultural 
modernization 47 The rural popula bon m this view simply has to adopt and 
integrate innovations and modem inputs into the agricultural production 
process Theoretically, these development outlines are rooted m 
modernization theory of 'mduced' innovation for technical and institutional 
change m agnculture In other words, 'external' intervention in the conditions 
of agncultural production is emphasized as crucial and legitimate to trigger off 
the development process 48 
Intervention m agnculture is understood m this book as the process by 
which vanous actors according to their perspectives (knowledge, norms and 
values) and opportunities (capabilities) attempt to create the preconditions for 
agncultural production and socio-economic growth Intervention, as a strategy 
to approximate to the speafic development model, contains, thus, thus vanous 
non- and/or extra-economic conditions and outlines the general approach 
appropriate for its realization 49 it involves, as recalled earlier, intra-society 
relationships existing among individuals, groups, organizations and 
insbtubons The vanous actors have various strategies to intervene and 
operate from different power positions Therefore, intervenbon also involves 
power differenbals between actors, and negotiations and representation 
Intervenhon embraces thus a contmumg political, economic and ideological 
struggle about the conditions of producbon However, intervention is not 
necessarily planned with intended outcomes Intervenbon can also be 
unplanned with unintended effects on social change 
Planned intervention by the state takes the form of a soaal policy which 
may be defined as a plan, a guide-line or principle complete with the 
institutions mandated with legislative and executive powers for a course of 
action Programmes and projects are both operabonalizations of particular 
policies Programme refers to actual implementation of a policy across various 
sites and perhaps times, ι e, such as the Green Revolution Projects on the 
other hand refer to the actual implementation of a policy in a single tune and 
setting, ι e, such as foreign aid sponsored integrated rural development 
projects 50 Policies, programmes and projects are all forms of social 
intervention 51 In this respect, we can interpret state agricultural policy as a 
speafic form of planned intervention 
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1.2. The outcome of intervention in agriculture in Africa: competing 
views and cures 
Numerous external interventions m agriculture have taken place in Africa, 
particularly smce the beginning of the sixbes when most of the African 
countnes gained independence These interventions comprise policies, 
programmes and projects implemented and financed by various agencies the 
state and multilateral and bilateral aid institutions 
Despite the numerous efforts, rural poverty still persists in Africa Levels of 
income m the countryside are still low, in some countries even lower than 20 
or 30 years ago Rural households cannot make a livelihood from agricultural 
production alone, and the prices and the institutional formats are (still) not 
adequate 52 In addition, 'redistribution with growth' is not accomplished as 
income and land are unequally distnbuted among the agricultural population, 
and soao-econonuc inequalities between regions are mcreasingW Food 
production is still insufficient, necessitating food imports to feed the nation 
Increases in agricultural production lag behind population growth 
Productivity in agriculture is generally viewed as low, although it varies 
enormously between countnes and regions as well as between various crops 54 
The latter may imply that some progress has been made It may also imply 
that, at the same tune, some distortions and frictions have emerged during 
intervention or are reproduced through intervention Several options and 
competing views are brought forward in development literature 
The critics of the Green Revolution strategy hold, for instance, the view that 
planned intervention was essentially 'a bethng-on-the-strong' policy and that 
it was the agribusiness companies, capitalist farmers, the rich peasantry and 
sections of the landlord class who have benefitted 55 They strongly question 
the scale neutrality of new technologies as argued by its proponents 56 
Various other studies, such as undertaken by several UNRISD research 
teams, revealed that developments set in motion by intervention, 
commodibzation and institutionalization created at the same time both food 
security and food insecurity Some sections of the population gamed 
substantially dunng the course of development, while others were left out m 
the cold 57 Whether this is part of a planned strategy or an element of a 
unforeseen and unwanted process remains a en heal issue 
Others claim progress has not, or has only partly been achieved because the 
farming population is resistmg commodibzation while local farming systems 
are considered as ineffective Ignorance, lack of adequate skills and traditional 
attitudes towards land and cattle constrain development The state is 
frequently accused of being ineffective m the fulfilment of its tasks 
It is, furthermore, claimed that the impact of foreign assistance on 
agricultural production is probably small and possibly counterproductive To 
make matters even worse, coordmation amongst the vanous donor initiatives 
in agnculture and related sectors proved to be difficult, while the influence of 
such agencies on policy development has only been significant in the last 10-15 
years 58 
Again, others claim that fnctions occurred because capital penetrated the 
African pre-capitalist social formation - an historical process whereby the 
capitalist mode of production articulated with non-capitalist 'modes of 
production' The latter have been transformed and conserved at a certain stage 
in which ' t he / facilitate for capitalist accumulahon Small-scale peasant 
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production serves as a cheap labour reservoir and a producer of cheap wage-
goods. In this view, as long as the capitalist mode of production is dominant in 
Africa, development and major socio-economic transformation will not occur 
and surpluses continue to siphoned off to the centres of the capitalist world 
system.59 
Orthodox Marxists claim more or less the opposite: that is that capitalism 
did not penetrate far enough into the agricultural sector and that it is, 
therefore, unable to complete its historical tasks.60 Chambers (1983) and 
Richards (1985) have put forward the thesis that as long as local knowledge 
and skills are not part and parcel of intervention packages, development 
remains stilted and will proceed only slowly. Furthermore, recently-expressed 
environmental concern about land degradation and genetic erosion raises 
questions about the sustainability of contemporary development trajectories.61 
When all of these views are taken into consideration, it appears that the 
reality of intervention and of the materializing relations between the so-called 
intervening parties (agro-industrial enterprises, merchants, the state apparatus 
and various other organizations) and the target or recipient groups (peasants) 
is more complicated, problematic, diversified and dynamic. This statement 
contains various issues and raises several questions which are related to the 
nature of intervention, commoditization and institutionalization. 
An examination of the reality of and the problems related to intervention, 
commoditization and institutionalization requires an adequate level of 
analysis. Following Godelier (1978) and Long & Roberts (1984) we suggest to 
analyse these process in the context of an agrarian structure. 
1.3. Agrarian structure and heterogeneity 
Godelier (1978) defined structure as shaped by a specific combination of at 
least three series of sodal and material conditions that enable a agrarian 
society and members of that society to produce and reproduce the material 
conditions of their sodal existence. These sets are a spedfic combination of 
ecological conditions, the productive forces in agriculture and sodal relations 
of production.^ Long & Roberts (1984) operationalized a similar agrarian 
structure. They understand it as a 'regionalized system of production' 
composed of various forms of production supported by a complex inter-linked 
and dynamic system of technico-administrative institutions, existing natural 
resources and other production factors as well as the relations between various 
economic sectors, the legal and political institutions and the sodal dasses and 
categories (traders, state offidals, ethnic groups and the various peasant strata) 
present in the region.63 Long & Roberts' socio-spatial and methodological 
delineation dearly mirrors that an agrarian structure is shaped by processes of 
commoditization, institutionalization and (planned and unplanned) 
intervention as well as shaped by the struggles of actors. 
An essential ingredient for the understanding of an agrarian structure is 
heterogeneity. Both definitions accentuate that quite dearly. An adequate 
notion of heterogeneity is, in addition, crudally important for the 
understanding of the regionally spedfic impact of commoditization, 
institutionalization and intervention. 
Heterogeneity in agriculture does not represent a coinddental phenomena, 
nor a temporary aspect of development. It is a feature which is frequently 
misconstrued by policy makers. Heterogeneity is generated by three structural 
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complexes which are constantly being reproduced through intervention and 
through processes of institutionalization and commoditizaüon. All three 
complexes shall be examined below. 
1.3.1. Heterogeneity is inherent in agriculture 
The first dimension of along which heterogeneity emerges is that the labour 
process in agriculture is locally specific and conditioned by ecological 
circumstances. Lacroix (1981) argued that even within the boundaries set by 
ecological circumstances and by externally and internally conditioned 
relations, heterogeneity in agriculture is based on the specific organization of 
the agricultural labour process. Every agricultural system has its own 'l'art de 
la localité' according to Mendras (1970). 'L'art de la localité' signifies that 
production in agriculture originally involves artisanal and diversified 
knowledge. Farmers are viewed in this sense as 'knowledgeable' and 'capable' 
actors. In and through farm labour, knowledge is constantly produced and 
reproduced, transformed, exchanged and enriched through mutual 
communication. 'L'art de la localité' often contains an extremely detailed 
knowledge of the exploitation of local natural resources. In addition, 'l'art de 
la localité' is an intrinsic element of local cultural domains and identities.64 
Heterogeneity must, therefore, be viewed as a property of an agrarian 
structure. It is being produced and, at the same time, reproduced, though it 
takes different forms (see section 1.З.2.). Heterogeneity does not 'emerge as 
something casual but rather as an outcome of development being designed 
and realized from "below" and within the local setting/óS 
From an analytical perspective the specific local body of knowledge forms 
at the same time one of the essential mechanisms through which the direct 
producers retain control over and manage their production process. An 
understanding of Ί ' art de la localité' is thus essential for the party who 
decides for whatever reason to intervene, whether it is the state, non-
governmental organizations, or foreign aid institutions. 
1.3.2. Differential degrees of commoditization 
A second dimension of heterogeneity can be traced to the fact that in 
agricultural labour processes are not just a simple function of market relations 
and terms of exchange. Farm labour involves more than just market relations. 
Chayanov (1966), for instance, recognized this clearly in the Russian 
countryside during the first part of this century. Within agricultural 
production, it is still possible to choose to obtain the basic elements of the 
labour process (labour, objects and instruments of labour) and the means of 
consumption, through production and reproduction on the farm, i.e., outside 
the sphere of the market, or to obtain (some of) the elements through market 
relations. In the first case they appear as use-value in the production and 
reproduction process. In the second case, they appear as exchange-value, as 
commodities. Reproduction of the farm enterprise and the peasant household 
is thus founded neither upon a complete circulation of commodities nor on a 
systematic relation with the labour market. Expressed metaphorically, 
peasants stand with one leg in a network of commodity relations and with the 
other in a network of non-commodity relations. 
Every productive unit in agriculture, whether it is the family farm or a 
large-scale farm, is supported by a strategic balance: a certain relation between 
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exchange-value and use-value a balance between the logic of market relations 
and a cultural, soao-pohtical rabo reassured by non-commodity circuits of 
exchange and production The connotation 'degrees of commodibzation' is 
one way to express The degree of commodibzabon reflects the extent to which 
production and farming strategies are oriented towards the market It 'can be 
measured in terms of the proportion of resources mobilized through the 
market as against the total of these resources applied on the farm '66 
The maintenance of the strategic commodity - non-commodity balance, a 
cruaal element m a farming strategy, is strategic in two respects It is part of a 
defence line m household or peasant economies vis-à-vis capital and the state 
Simultaneously it is part of the strategy of the agricultural population to 
arrange and regulate production and reproduction and their relations to the 
market according to their interests, opportunibes and perceptions Chayanov 
(1966) for instance emphasized the strategic and precanous balance between 
labour and consumers within a farm enterprise as a major regulatory device 
for household production 
Farming strategies are, however, not only based on agricultural producbon 
Various researchers stress the tendency for rural producers to rely increasingly 
on off-farm income Cowen (1983,1986) defines this as 'straddling' It denotes 
a certain combinabon of involvement in agricultural commodity producbon 
and non-agricultural activities, although the rationale and the social meaning 
of straddling differs among rural producers For the poor peasant households, 
it is a crucial element in their strategy to protect the means of consumption 
For others, notably the capitalist farmers and rich peasants, involvement in 
non-farm activities is an essential ingredient of their entrepreneurial strategy 
to diversify their economic base 67 Straddling, as a significant property of an 
emerging agrarian structure, reveals the nature of and different effect of 
commodihzabon, institutionalization and intervention on agricultural 
development patterns It involves different relations between the agricultural 
sector and other sectors of the economy as well as between productive units 
within the agricultural sector In the case of poor households straddling means 
the transfer of money from other sectors of the economy to the agricultural 
sector This indicates that developments set m motion by intervention and 
commodibzabon appear at least for a proportion of the agricultural population 
as unproducbve In the case of capitalists farmers and rich peasants, straddling 
a gn cui turai producbon and non-farm economic acbvibes encompasses the 
transfer of capital m either direction 
Long (1984, 1986) stresses that in addibon to straddling, farming or 
livelihood strategies contain a wide range of other possibilities 
'although integration into markets and external institutional structures 
may reduce the range of economic alternatives available to the farmers, 
the availability of non-wage household/family labour and resources, 
coupled with the maintenance of local networks based on kinship, 
friendship or patronage, allow farmers to contmue to resolve certam of 
their livelihood and consumption problems outside the market '68 
Hence, farmers' strategies vary considerably m the way fanners maintain 
locally specific, soao-culturally defined relations There is also a considerable 
variation m the way farmers commercialize production, m time as well as in 
the share of produce sold on markets A commodity may be produced for sale 
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at one period of time but for direct consumption during another period. The 
proportion of any commodity output that is marketed, rather than directly 
consumed, may change in response to changes in climatological conditions 
(drought periods for instance) and conditions which are related to the 
functioning of the market. It may also change, however, in response to changes 
in relative consumer prices rather than in relative producer prices.69 The barter 
terms of exchange for consumption and production goods are closely related. 
Analyzing an agricultural economy as is proposed here, has far reaching 
implications for further theoretical investigation: we have to reject the 
frameworks which emphasize linear patterns of development guided by the 
law of value. These frameworks either reject any degree of commoditization^O, 
or analyse household or petty commodity production and other forms of 
commodity production as regulated by the same laws of competition and 
accumulation as all commodity-producing enterprises under capitalism.7l 
In our understanding of an agrarian structure, non-commodity circuits are 
essential properties. It is a circuit of production and exchange unfolding itself 
outside the domain of capitalism despite the omnipotence of external 
institutions and markets. Athreya et al. (1987) claim that non-commoditized 
and commoditized forms of production and reproduction are both necessities 
for production and reproduction of the peasant household.^ Equally, Long 
(1986) maintains that one may argue that the viability and strength of 
commodity production rests upon a set of non-commoditized relationships. In 
this view commodity and non-commodity circuits of production support each 
other. Indeed, it can be questioned whether the agricultural sector ever can be 
characterised as 'generalised commodity production' as was envisaged by 
Marx in Capital, Volume I. 
Van der Ploeg (1986, 1990) summarizes the world of the farm enterprise 
and the peasant household as the ongoing coordination of four crucial domains 
of farming. These domains are, not in hierarchical order, those belonging to 
family and local community, of production, of reproduction, and of the 
technological and institutional relations.73 Mamdani (1987) depicts the 
Ugandan peasantry in a similar way. He situated peasant households in the 
midst of the 'dull compulsion' of market forces, competition for land and 
labour between households and the various sorts of pressures imposed on 
them from 'above' (the state and the local feudal landlord).74 
The specific way in which the farmer coordinates these domains gives rise 
to various specific relations between sectors of the economy as well as between 
producers (see the following section). Simultaneously, a wide range of farming 
strategies and styles of farming emerged in the fields. The underlying dynamic 
balance of commodity versus non-commodity relations and the ongoing 
coordination of the domains of farming are translated in the fields into various 
agronomic practices. Bolhuis & Van der Ploeg (1985) classified several styles of 
farming which are related to different rationalities for production and 
reproduction.'' 
The emerging styles of farming may be portrayed as land/labour-intensive 
agriculture and machinery/capital-intensive agriculture. They must also be 
related to the introduction of new crops in the agricultural economy in Africa. 
In the first case, an extended amount of manual labour is applied in a land-
intensive direction. This was classified by Bolhuis & Van der Ploeg as the so-
called I-calculus. In the second style the capital-land ratio was increased, with 
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a diminution in the use of labour. Bolhuis & Van der Ploeg classified this as 
the so-called Ε-calculus and characterized it as an 'entrepreneurial' strategy. 
Common to both farm styles is the demand for investment, a reallocation of 
certain farm tasks and a certain degree of commodi tiza tion. In the first case, 
investment is required in manual labour and - if a farmer decides to integrate 
new technologies into his production process - in 'new* objects of labour (tea 
and coffee trees, graded cows instead of indigenous cattle, hybrid maize 
instead of local varieties, the application of fertilizer). In the second case, 
production also involves considerable investment in modem implements of 
labour and wage-labour. 
It must be stressed that social forms of production (see following section) 
are not necessarily associated with a particular style of fanning. 
1.3.3. Heterogeneity and differentiation 
A third dimension of heterogeneity is related to the processes of social 
differentiation taking place in agricultural economies. The African agricultural 
population cannot be treated as a homogeneous category. This is increasingly 
accepted among scientists from various strands of development theory and 
policy makers. Various concepts are used to denote the differences in the 
quality of life and conditions of production and reproduction of the rural 
population. Concepts and epithets such as 'rich peasants', 'middle peasants' 
and 'poor peasants' are used to stipulate the differences in the distribution of 
wealth. 'Capitalist farmers' and 'petty or 'household commodity producers' 
are concepts drawn from the Marxist framework. These are employed to refer 
to the social relations under which production is realized and social wealth is 
distributed. 
The patterns of social differentiation are generally seen as shaped by two 
sets of forces as a result of trends set in notion by a combination of processes of 
commoditization, institutionalization and intervention which reinforce the 
unequal socially-differentiated structure of the pre-existing locally or regional 
specific social formation.7^ Social differentiation is thus not merely an intrinsic 
phenomenon or a left over from previous conjunctures. 
In the course of commoditization in Africa, two social forms of production 
emerged. Both forms of production are founded upon different rationales. The 
forms of production can be characterized as capitalist and household 
commodity production. In the first form, production is based on the 
employment of wage-labour. The rationale for production is accumulation of 
capital, invested in agricultural means of production and/or in other sectors of 
the economy. This social form of production has been delineated by Marx as 
the capitalist mode of production, although he stipulated that differentiation 
takes place within the capitalist mode of production. 
The second form, household production,?? is mainly founded upon family 
labour input working on family owned land. A further differentiation is 
usually made to indicate that within this production form the relations of 
production and distribution of wealth as well as the motive behind commodity 
production, differ significantly. The following differentiation of peasant 
households or peasant strata is usually made in development theory. 
In the first place, there are rich peasant households. These are households 
having a regular marketable surplus over and above the needs of simple 
reproduction. The family or the separate members of these households are able 
19 
to combine returns from their labour with those from small-scale exploitation 
such as renting out land and implements and/or hiring agricultural labour. 
In the second place, we have middle peasant households. These are able to 
reproduce themselves through family /household labour and family land. 
Reproduction is mainly mediated through market relations.78 
In the third place, there are the poor peasant households. These are unable 
to reproduce themselves through agricultural production only (because they 
lack sufficient means of production and/or family labour). Increasingly, they 
have to exchange their labour power on a more or less regular basis. Many 
poor households only sell their labour power periodically and for the rest of 
the year, are they not (necessarily) engaged in commodity production. 
In the fourth place, there are landless peasant households. These are those 
households whose organic relation between land and labour has been broken. 
Consequently their reproduction is solely based on entering (unequal) labour 
relations with one or other member of a propertied class to get access to means 
of consumption. 
The agricultural population is thus highly differentiated in terms of social 
relations and social conditions. Apart from being 'rich' or 'poor', they maintain 
different kinds of relations with the market, produce surpluses or (occasional) 
deficits and have differential access to the means of production (land, labour 
and instruments). Heterogeneity in agriculture is also in this respect produced 
and at the same reproduced in the process of commoditization. 
Eventually, the process of rural differentiation will lead towards new 
agrarian class structures. The outcome of this process is, however, much 
debated in academic circles. One strand of theory, the Leninist and linear 
interpretation stresses that economic differentiation generates a tendency 
towards polarization of classes: between, on the one hand, a small capitalist 
owner class and, on the other, an increasing and numerous mass of 
agricultural proletarians and marginalized peasants.79 The strategy of farmers 
to diversify their economic activities, represents, in the eyes of Lenin, the 
argument that peasants become marginalized 
The other strand of analysis brought forward the so-called middle peasant 
thesis: that is, that small-scale peasant production and petty commodity forms 
of production often survive and come to play a central role in capital 
accumulation, despite internal differentiation.80 Diversification of farming 
strategies is interpreted by Chayanov (1966) as the sustainability of peasant 
forms of production which prevent marginalization. In this view, it is unlikely 
that the pattern of social-economic differentiation will consolidate itself in the 
short term into a firmly established class structure. Classes in developing 
countries are important but their membership is ambiguous, insecure and 
fluctuât0 considerably .81 
Apart from its social content, differentiation has, increasingly, geographical 
significance. We refer to processes of regional differentiation and the 
regionally differentiated manifestation of commoditization and 
institutionalization.82 We must recognize that economic potentials of a country 
and the opportunities for agricultural commodity production, are conditioned 
by existing and diverse ecological and infrastructural conditions. 
Processes of commoditization are often differentiated and uneven in their 
regional effect. They lead to the development of regions specializing in the 
production of specific commodities (sudi 'cash crops' as coffee, tea, cotton, 
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sisal, maize). These areas have become highly commercialized agricultural 
production zones. In these zones, production is supported by a well-
developed technological and administrative infrastructure. In addition, there 
are regions in Africa, as well as within countries, which became predominant 
labour exporting areas. For the people living in these regions, labour migration 
to urban areas and highly commercialized agricultural regions appears to be 
the major source of cash. A third type of region exists which can be 
characterized as a combination of subsistence production with a modest 
agricultural surplus and/or labour migration. In the latter two regions, 
contrary to the first, infrastructural developments are of a low level. 
1.3.4. The reproduction of heterogeneity through intervention, 
commoditization and institutionalization 
The previous sections emphasized that heterogeneity in agriculture is an 
essential feature which cannot be neglected either for theoretical or for 
practical purposes. A synthesis of the three dimensions of heterogeneity 
demonstrates that heterogeneity is constantly being reproduced through 
intervention and through the underlying processes of commoditization and 
institutionalization. 
The first dimension along which heterogeneity is profiled is the 
enormously detailed, complex and diversified body of local knowledge of the 
farming population. Long & Van der Ploeg (1989) emphasize in this respect an 
essential feature of 'external' intervention in agriculture. 
'Yet, because of its own internal dynamic, externally planned 
intervention aimed at central control of development cannot take into 
account this detailed knowledge and mastery of the local situation: 
hence the tendency towards standardization (italics mine) and the 
consequent problem that newly-introduced models often do not concur 
adequately with the situation, thus produang 'underdevelopmenf 
rather than 'developmenf .'83 
'Input package deals' and 'contract farming' or commodity production 
schemes are two predominant modes of intervention in agriculture which 
reflect the tendency towards standardization quite clearly. 
'Input package deals', such as the Green Revolution, are intervention 
programmes centred around the introduction of new technologies. They are 
premised on a sort of corporate agrarian structure in which the various state 
institutions act as the provider of credit, extension and marketing facilities. 
The agro-input industry appears in this structure as the manufacturer of 
technologies. Finally, the peasantry are the consumers of technology, credit 
and knowledge which are provided by external actors and with which they 
produce commodities for the market. 
'Contract farming' schemes are programmes in which the state, capital and 
the peasantry are highly interlinked.*1 They involve the realization of an 
agrarian structure with dose supervision over peasant production by external 
actors: the state and/or agro-industrial companies. The latter control at the 
same time the marketing, processing and distribution of commodities. The 
actual producers are the owners of the agricultural means of production (land 
and implements) and have to act according to the regulations set by capital 
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and the state In addition, the terms of exchange are negotiated and/or fixed 
by the state m advance 85 
By implementing these programmes through the establishment of a 
particular agranan structure, the state hopes that production will increase and, 
for instance, that imports will be substituted by local production Inherent m 
these programmes is the fact that the vanous problems m the agricultural 
sector tend to be identified by the intervening party with reference to 
'external'. Western scientific bodies of knowledge and experience From these 
perceptions, a programme intended to cure the problems is proposed and 
implemented This bnngs us to a second aspect of intervention which is closely 
related to the first that intervention programmes tend to neglect the local 
bodies of knowledge In stead, this kind of useful and 'capable' knowledge is 
vanishing and frequently appropriated from its producers m the process of 
intervention 86 
A 'simple' comparison between local, indigenous and saenhfic bodies of 
knowledge reveals that problems are perceived differently Consequently, the 
reasons for action as well as the action themselves are different A scientific 
body of knowledge identifies problems m agriculture in terms of productivity 
Productivity increases are propelled by the introduction of new higher 
yielding technologies and unproved husbandry practices (such as planting in 
rows, the correct time of application, monoculture) Local, traditional farm 
practices other than productivity increases, are also concerned with vanous 
other issues which influence the decision-makmg process on the farm Socio-
cultural relations and conditions and security are perceived as important The 
attitude towards land, availability of labour, taste of varieties, variability in the 
timing of planting, the preference for maintaining a huge collection of genetic 
resources and mixed cropping patterns can be put forward as essential 
elements of local bodies of knowledge 87 
From this perspective, it is understandable that in the process of external 
intervention, misunderstanding, mutual incomprehension and even conflicts 
arise out of the interaction between these different bodies of knowledge 
Intervention is often accompanied by resistance on the part of the 'target 
group' 88 The transfer of new technologies and/or the introduction of specific 
agricultural management systems and husbandry practices may not appeal to 
local experiences and cultural identities 
The technology factor and the pursuit of improved husbandry practices is 
an essential ingredient of external intervention programmes, policies and 
projects m agriculture The concrete choice as to which kind of technology or 
husbandry practice should be introduced is, however, not a neutral choice 
based on universally applicable norms and values Technologies are soaal 
constructions or artefacts which operate under a specific code of conduct in 
order to be effective Earlier we emphasized the prescriptive nature of 
technology Technology transfer, as is the case with Green Revolution 
technologies, implies that farming strategies have to be oriented towards the 
market Hybrid maize seeds and other elements of commodity packages 
appear as commodities m production processes The strategic defence-hne of 
small peasants vis-à-vis capital, the state and the market based on mam taming 
non-commodity relations must give way to a further penetration of 
commodity relations The producers and distributors of technology, rich and 
capitalist farmers and the state also have some interest m the successful 
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adoption of new technologies by the farming population and, therefore they 
favour a general expansion of commodity relations in the countryside. These 
actors do not, however, guarantee the success of the adoption process despite 
their command over considerable economic and political power. They tend to 
push for the realization of a particular kind of agrarian structure, of particular 
kinds of relations between peasants and between capital-state and the 
peasantry.89 
Technology transfer is to a certain degree founded upon favouring specific 
economic interests, while marginalizing or neglecting other interests. In this 
way, the technology factor emerges in the fields as a production relation. 
The fact that through the introduction of new technologies heterogeneity, 
development and underdevelopment will be reproduced continually in the 
fields and on farm enterprises does not need to be stressed. Heterogeneity in 
terms of unequal distribution of wealth and resources, relations between 
peasant strata as well as the various styles of farming, is reproduced 
constantly and even reinforced by the regional agrarian structure. Hence, as 
stipulated by Long & Van der Ploeg (1989) heterogeneity in agriculture 
'emerges as the logical accompaniment of commoditization and 
institutionalization'.^ Nor is it necessary to point out that the objective of the 
state to intervene may not be fulfilled in the end after all, either because of 
resistance from the 'target group', and/or because particular social forces are 
able to misconstrue the implementation of interventionist policies. 
In addition to intervention, the processes of commoditization and 
institutionalization tend to perpetuate the dimension of heterogeneity linked 
to rural differentiation. Two different but related processes operate in this 
respect. On the one hand, there is the process which results because some 
peasant households or enterprises are more inclined than others to have closer 
relations with the market, i.e., differential degrees of commoditization. Some 
sell a large part of their output and integrate technological innovations into 
their labour processes. Other households are only marginally involved in 
commodity relations. The productive gains which may be part of this network 
of technico-administrative relations varies accordingly.9! 
On the other hand, the institutions which mould the network of relations 
with the farm enterprises do not perceive the agricultural population in similar 
ways. In their perception of farming, certain enterprises or peasant households 
seem more rewarding and more promising than others. Especially enterprises 
with farming styles corresponding more than others to the ideal perspective of 
the institutional environment of farming (high output levels, modern 
technology and receptive to new ideas) will become focal points of attention. 
This suggests, as Benvenuti (1982) has put forward, that the institutional 
environment for farming is 'biased'. The matrix of relations between the 
institutions and the agricultural population shows a considerable variance. 
The technology factor plays a crucial role. For many actors which are part of 
the agrarian structure, technology transfer is the main rationale for 
intervention in agriculture. 
The third dimension of heterogeneity, the existence of different styles of 
farming, is a recognition that commoditization, institutionalization and 
intervention generate different patterns of agrarian growth. Farming styles 
express specifically the considerable variation in yields of the different 
agricultural systems.'^ Variation in yields is to a considerable degree, 
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conditioned by ecological circumstances and the infrastructural development 
of the region and by the different ways in which the labour process is 
structured, ι e , based on the different degree of commodihzation and 
differential relations with ТАТЕ'З This does not exclude, however, the 
generabon of different levels of productivity of land and labour The 
underlying thesis will show that each farming style raised the yield of each 
unit of land 
Heterogeneity expressed m terms of soao-economic developments based 
on regionally differentiated degrees of commoditizabon is reproduced under 
vanous circumstances This may partly be explained as a result of existing 
unequal dis tribu bon of natural and economic resources 94 
The exact outcome of the dynamic process of differentiation of the 
peasantry is, therefore, hard to assess It is determined by several factors which 
depend on local or regional circumstances According to Mamdaru (1987) it 
may develop around any of the elements of the labour process land, labour 
and its implements Access to cash, either by way of straddling and/or 
agricultural credit and income from selling marketed produce, enables peasant 
households to acquire these elements and opens up the opportunity to enlarge 
the holdmg and continue to commercialize and capitalize production Another 
basic factor m this process is the capabilities of a household to cope with the 
logic of the market, not only in terms of a market determining terms of 
exchange and of competition between producers, but increasingly with the 
factor technology We must acknowledge that not all peasant households have 
equal ability to cope with these conditions The cutting edge of this 
differentiation process is probably a combination of these factors If we add the 
different ecological conditions for agricultural production, the picture becomes 
even more complicated 
The regional differences in wealth, infrastructural developments and 
degree of commodibzabon are, however, also partly set in motion by state 
intervention and development policies Some regions appeared to be 
(completely or partially) unsuitable for agricultural commodity production, 
such as the and and semi-arid regions m Africa in which pastorahsts are 
predominant 95 The colonial states in Africa clearly favoured certain areas at 
the expense of others The alienation of the best land in some parts of Africa 
for white settlement and plantation production aeated regional imbalances 
which are still visible today Remote areas were hardly incorporated, and 
other regions less suitable for commodity production were severely neglected 
The impact of various phases of pnmihve accumulation m Africa long before 
colonization began is still visible too One element is the massive dislocation of 
populabon due to the slave traffic to the Americas and the Arabian sub­
continent which lasted from the 17th century until at least the beginning of the 
20th century Other elements are the changing trading patterns and the 
territorial division of Africa which disrupted migration patterns of senu-
pastoralists and pastorahsts After independence many states inherited this 
regionally unbalanced economic structure Colonial state intervention appears 
to have created ngidibes which were inherited, extended and reproduced by 
many states 
A third element which reproduces regional differenbabon involves 
responses of the farming populabon to increased populabon pressure on the 
land due to the high demographic growth rates and the deteriorating 
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international and national terms of exchange. In the first case, degradation of 
agricultural land as a result of intensive cultivation and soil erosion will 
contribute to a general decrease in productivity of the land and thus to less 
output. In the second case, deteriorating terms of exchange may lead towards 
a decline in marketed production. 
This and the previous sections have outlined that external intervention in 
agriculture, and particularly state intervention and the underlying processes of 
commoditization and institutionalization, created different rhythms of 
agricultural growth and change. In the course of these processes, a foundation 
for an agrarian structure was laid down for the introduction of new 
technologies, for knowledge generation and dissemination, for marketing, 
processing and distribution. This structure generated and materialized 
relations between the state-capital and the peasantry with prospects for 
agricultural growth and increasing productivity of land and labour. This 
section also demonstrated, however, that intervention introduced and 
reproduced relations which increasingly impede the maximum utilization of 
these new technologies. Berry (1984) reached more or less the same conclusion: 
agrarian change in Africa 'promoted patterns of accumulation which militated 
against the development of enhanced productive capacity.'96 
1.4. Focusing the study: state intervention in agriculture 
In the light of the above, it is not surprising that the central theme of the thesis 
is formulated in terms of commoditization, institutionalization and 
intervention. The particular focus on state intervention in agriculture is 
justified by the important role the state played - and still plays - in the 
realization of a concrete agrarian structure. In this sense, the state, or rather 
state institutions, may be viewed as a formally organized, intervening force in 
agriculture. State intervention in agriculture materializes in what is usually 
called agricultural policy. 
Conducting research along these lines not only requires a theoretical 
examination of the central concepts of agrarian structure, commoditization, 
institutionalization and intervention, but requires also some notion of 
agricultural policy and the state. 
Agricultural policy is understood here as the totalling of measures taken by 
the state to direct, supervise and regulate developments in agriculture in order 
to facilitate the expansion of (commodity) production in agriculture. 
Agricultural policy development and implementation as such are, however, 
neither one single policy nor tangible. It is crucial to highlight the following 
aspects of agricultural policy. 
In the ßrst place, agricultural policy is the result of various policies 
stretching out over a whole series of political and economic spheres (in 
production, circulation, ideology and legislation) covering several other 
economic sectors (industry, commerce and the service sector). Non-
agricultural policies, such as exchange rates, currency devaluation and 
protection of the industrial and commerce sector through tariffs and retail 
price fixation, also have repercussions on agricultural development. 
In the second place, the state is mandated to regulate markets and to manage 
technological developments, to facilitate the expansion of agricultural 
commodity production and to determine the concrete conditions of 
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production. In this way, the state became a powerful intervening party and an 
important mediator of the social relations between the actors who shape the 
agrarian structure of the country. This also means that, in practice, various 
other state apparatuses covering several economic sub-sectors, rather than 
only a ministry of agriculture, are involved in agricultural policy development 
and decision-making processes. 
In the third place, agricultural policy is also an ideological expression of 
society upon which the state rests as an organizing entity. This requires, before 
we continue to reflect on state intervention, an outlining of how the state will 
be viewed in this thesis. Here we shall start from a 'flexible' image of the state. 
Following Skocpol (1979), Young (1982) and Shanin (1982), we may picture 
the state as existing on two levels. The state, is on the one hand, a concrete 
matrix of institutions (or apparatuses) through which rule is exercised with 
three branches of governance: legislative, executive and judicial. The state is an 
organization, an ensemble of administrative, policing and military institutions 
coordinated by an executive authority controlling (or attempting to control) 
territory and people.97 The state as the organized public sector of society takes 
shape when we include instrumentalities such as political parties, regulatory 
bodies, parastatal companies, social agencies (media, schools, medical 
facilities), regional administration and local government bodies. 
On the other hand, the state is an ideological expression of a public doctrine 
of rule and authority, of social order and stability. The latter finds formal 
expression in constitutions and jurisprudence, through which its structures are 
specified and its commands concealed in a code of prescriptions. Its public 
doctrine tends to incorporate the values that prevail among the dominant 
sodal strata. The state bureaucracy is likely to be disproportionately recruited 
from these groups.98 
Central to the flexible state view is that political processes may be relatively 
autonomous from the economy; the state as such occupies a relatively 
autonomous position vis-à-vis the economy. The interests of that economy are 
internalized in the state, but other interests in society operate upon the state. 
State-society relationships reflect and embody class structure and ethnic (or 
religious) configurations, and the state is at the same time an organizer of an 
unstable equilibrium of compromises reflecting the power and weakness of 
various classes and social categories in society." 
The state is, thus not solely seen as a vehicle structured to facilitate 
accumulation of capital by the all-powerful international and/or national 
ruling classes-TOO By doing so, we would exclude a relatively autonomous role 
of the state bureaucracy. Moreover, because of that equilibrium which must be 
maintained, state-society relationships exist in which the state regulates 
markets and supplies public sector goods in order to coax private sector 
compliance with national goals articulated at the highest levels of the state 
apparatus.1"! Decisions are made by the state which may not correspond with 
the power or the short-term interests of the ruling class. Such state autonomy 
vis-à-vis private interests results in an intervention practice of the state that 
responds to the preferences of state officials rather than to preferences of 
farmers or other key actors in society.^ 
Hence the importance of stressing the practice of 'labelling' by state 
officials. This refers to the tendency for individuals or groups of individuals to 
use different category systems to reduce the complexity of their environment 
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and to organize their behaviour 103 Based on these category systems, problems 
and target groups are identified as well as possible solutions arrived at It is 
quite common for state officials to assonate 'peasanf with backwardness, 
resisting commodibzabon and engaging m subsistence production 'Farmer', 
on the other hand, is associated with modernity, receptivity to new ideas and 
highly commodibzed production 10* The state bureaucracy acts also 
frequently accordingly, as it tends to give preference to the so-called 
'progressive farmer' Labelling therefore legitimates the diagnostic and 
therapeutic measures undertaken by public bodies 105 Benvenuti (1982) linked 
this with a certain bias of the institutions vis-à-vis the farming population 
Byres (1977), for instance, highlighted in the fact that technological innovations 
have been legitimated politically with egalitarian ideologies Institutional 
change has been moulded in such agncultural production forms as 
cooperatives, community development, ujamaa villages Technological 
improvement has been covered by its proponents with a sauce of scale-
neutrality 106 
In addition, it is important to stress that state intervention is not based on a 
speafic mode of organization in agnculture The state is, so to say, not 
attentive to the organization of the labour process The decision on how to 
organize the labour process on the farm by self-regulation of work through 
family organization or by employing wage-labour imposes no necessity for the 
state to implement a public doctrine of authority, rule and social order 107 
State intervention in agnculture, that is, agricultural policy, also involves 
ideological aspects in order to secure the economic and political integration of 
the agricultural population in a development strategy 108 
The functions of the state are generally summarized as follows 109 
In the first place the state must secure consensus by secunng the acceptance 
of the general objectives of a development strategy by all ethnic groups and 
classes m soaety 
In the second place it must secure the conditions for production and the 
development of productive forces by legislation and regulation and by 
investment in agncultural R&D The state must guarantee the operation of 
various commodity markets (m land, labour, inputs, output) This is reflected 
а о in the development of TATE and the relations it embodies As is the case 
of the colonial state, the rationale behind the contemporary state's intervention 
m the economy is to guarantee the (enlarged) reproduction of commodity 
production and exchange In addition, the representation of the nation abroad 
and the maintenance of foreign aid relations are perceived as specific state 
functions It was already indicated m section 112 that foreign aid plays a 
crucial role in the realization of TATE As a result of foreign aid relations, the 
state can be found in a rather uneasy position because particular demands of 
foreign aid institutions The state may be forced to implement measures which 
do not correspond either with its own perceptions or with particular interests 
in society HO 
In the third place1 it must secure and maintain social order by means of social 
and political integration (by education), reproduction of labour power (health 
care) and redistribution of wealth and means of consumption in order to 
guarantee livelihood for all classes and groups, particularly of the subordinate 
classes and groups 
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The political and economic conflicts which may arise out of economic 
conflicts within society or out of the relative autonomy of the state vis-à-vis the 
ruling class necessitates, what Gramsci has depicted as consensus/hegemony 
and force/dictatorship. Both are reflected concretely in the state apparatuses. 
Dictatorship and hegemony are state forms; force and consensus are state 
functions. Force apparatuses are the army, police and judicial power. 
Hegemonic apparatuses are churches, corporations, foundations, political 
parties and education. Gramsci emphasized that both types of state 
apparatuses comprise elements of force and hegemony. The state is in other 
words not simply an instrument of force. Consensus, and with that hegemony, 
has to be organized constantly: through alliances and negotiations between 
classes and groups and through culture and ideology by means of adoption 
and integration of new ideas, values and philosophies. Culture and ideology 
become a sort of cement for the masses.Ul 
Hegemony and consensus require what Jessop (1983) ha$ characterized as 
the formulation of a 'national popular project and what Chamey (1987) 
delineated as 'politico-ideological leadership.' It is based on a development 
strategy the realization of which advances the interests of all groups and 
classes. Simultaneously, however, the state is in a position to resort to force. 
Force may also involve political intervention of the state in society. Force 
employed through the various branches of governance enables the state to 
repudiate alternative development strategies.'12 
Leadership and clientelism in particular are an essential ingredient, 
particularly in times of economic and political crises.ИЗ Leadership and 
clientelism in the African context may be connected with the function of the 
President as the head of state and father of the nation. The President as a 
leader is perhaps the only person who while using state power and resources, 
is capable of offering countervailing powers and alternative strategies. 
Leadership may be important to maintain unity (where it does not exists, to 
coax unity) among the ruling classes and in the state apparatus itself. 
Leadership and clientelism may also be crucial for ideologically cementing the 
relations between the ruling class, the state and the subordinate classes and 
groups. It is crucial to secure the integration of subordinate classes and groups 
into the nation-wide development project or strategy. Recently, it has been 
emphasized that the political and economic integration of the peasantry 
through patron-client relations and institutional relations may result in 
contradictory relations. Holmquist (1984), Scott (1985) and Long (1989) 
maintain that integration creates at the same time political space for the 
peasantry to carry out their own projects.iw Huizer (1972) argued that the 
peasantry's creation of their own room to manoeuvre may be interpreted as a 
specific expression of class struggle. 
The state may, to summarize, be treated as an ensemble of different 
institutions, defining policy objectives, providing services and highly involved 
in agricultural R&D programmes. In addition, the state highly regulates 
production activities and is very committed to the operation of markets for 
inputs and various commodity output markets. The expansion of commodity 
production and commodity relations may be delineated as the economic basis 
of state policy. Institutionalization of crucial administrative and technological 
tasks appears then to be the necessary and appropriate vehicle to implement 
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the stated objectives. While implementing policy and fulfilling its economic 
functions, the state bureaucracy appears responsive to the demands of 
particular pressure groups in society. Simultaneously, the state is attempting 
to control and manage development according to the perceptions of its cadres. 
A useful way to analyse state intervention is to distinguish objectives or 
principles from policy formulation and policy implementation.115 (State 
formulated) objectives involve concepts of sodal order and stability and social 
and ¡xilitical integration. Successful implementation is either guaranteed by 
force or by maintaining a certain equilibrium in society and the general 
acceptance of the objectives of development by all classes and ethnic groups. 
Policy objectives belong to what has earlier been labelled as the ideological 
expression of a public doctrine of social order and stability. These objectives 
are usually articulated at the highest level of the state apparatus, by the 
political leadership of the country. 
Policy formulation and policy implementation involve actions through 
members of the state bureaucracy and state-institutions. Some of these 
institutions are closely connected with the exercise of state power. Others may 
be only remotely connected.116 
By studying policy formulation and implementation we are able to 
determine whether these reflect the specific compliance with or determination 
of objectives by the state bureaucracy, or whether they reflect the degree to 
which certain dass and/or ethnic interests are articulated at state level. During 
the policy formulation stage, various instruments and means are defined in 
order to reach the stated policy objectives. They contain measures (in the case 
of agriculture) on how to organize commodity production: legislation, price 
setting, promotion of a certain kind of agricultural technology, time schedules 
and the general identification of target groups. These policy objectives and the 
total package of measures to be taken are published in national and regional 
development plans. The implementation phase is the practice of state 
intervention: that is what can be 'measured' or 'observed' in sodety or in the 
fields. This level enables us to monitor and to question the effidency of state 
policy and the effectiveness of state intervention. 
Policy formulation and implementation must be flexibly interpreted in 
order to understand existing deviations between policy and the effects of 
policy as well as the variation in the effects of state policy. 
in the first place, it is crurial to recognize that policy formulation already 
involves compromises as a result of negotiations between the state 
bureaucracy and certain (often dominant) dasses and/or ethnic interests. At 
state-practice level we have to recognize that there exists 'space' or autonomy 
for the state bureaucracy to implement state pralicy. Hence, the imprartance of 
stressing 'labelling' in our theoretical and methodological considerations 
about the state, the ability of the state bureaucracy to grasp farmers' logic and 
strategies, the fact that state institutions may be closely or only remotely 
connected to the exercise of state power and the emphasis that state 
agricultural policy involves various state institutions. 
In the second place, a flexible interpretation is necessary to leave room for the 
influence of pressure groups and organizations such as traders, industrial 
entrepreneurs, large-scale farmers or small-scale farmers whose interests are 
not necessarily actively represented at state level. 
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¡η the third place, a flexible interpretation is needed to understand that 
despite the fact that state intervention may be a powerful instrument of the 
ruling class and/or state bureaucracy to order society according to their 
perceptions, peasants are able to manage developments according to their own 
outlooks and logic 
In all three 'cases', or a mixture of the 'cases', it is understandable that state 
intervention may possibly result in unplanned and unintended prachces 
1.4.1. Research questions, data collection and levels of analysis 
After this extensive exploration of the various theoretical fields of interests m 
which the research will be carried out, the mam research question may be 
summarized as follows what are the characteristics of Kenya's emerging 
agrarian structure, and, how were these characteristics shaped by the 
processes of commoditìzabon, institutionalization and intervention in 
agriculture 7 What kind of social forces spawned, m the past and present, 
Kenya's agrarian structure 
Since the vehicles for intervention in agriculture (in the context of our case 
study - Kenya - intervention in agriculture through enhancing 
commodibzation and institutionalization) became through time largely 
concentrated within various state institubons, the following quesbons 
appeared in the course of the study as parbcularly important-
CD What is the effect of state intervention 7 To what extent is state 
intervention effecbve and efficient as well as consistent with the formulated 
policy objectives ? 
(2) Is state intervention in agriculture guided by a dynamic conditioned by 
the state bureaucracy or is state intervention commanded by forces operating 
outside and upon the state 7 
Various policy fields can be idenbfied to examine these research questions 
Two parhcular policy fields which are important elemente of Kenya's National 
Food Policy were perceived as essenhal for an examination of the condibons of 
production and how these were laid down by state intervention 
The first parhcular 'test case' is related to the technological conditions of 
agricultural production What kind of technologies and related commodity 
packages are introduced by the state to increase production7 How is 
agricultural research and disseminabon of research results organized7 Does an 
analysis of technology transfer suggest that during the process fnchons of 
social and economic nature occurred which impeded the maximum utilization 
of new technologies Or is technology reshaped by the users in the fields and 
during production7 The producbon of maize, the staple food m Kenya, is used 
to examine this aspect 
The second particular 'test case' is related to state intervenbon in the 
circulation sphere of the economy How and why does the state regulate pnces 
and marketing, is it efficient and if not, why 7 Is it ineffective because the state 
is not able or does not want to understand the logic of farming strategies Or 
are pnce regulahons and market controls instruments of the state to further 
objectives which are as a rule not related to market supply and demand 7 
What kind of social forces operate in these policy fields 7 
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The research questions are examined on two spatial levels: the national level 
and the regional level. Data collection took place in various phases, between 
1984 and 1990, on these two levels. 
The national level analysis is required to address state policy development 
and orientation. It involves a historical analysis of the development of the state 
in the country. In fact, Kenya's history may be periodized according to the 
several stages during which the state was formed and structured. In addition 
to that, the centrality of the state and state-society relations can only be 
examined in an historical context on the national level, not only because of 
theoretical and historical considerations but also for practical reasons. On the 
one hand, this is so because policy formulation (such as crucial decisions 
related to technology development, dissemination and marketing 
arrangements) is still undertaken on the national level by the highly 
centralized state apparatuses - this despite that there is a tendency in Kenya to 
decentralise planning and policy implementation. On the other hand, a 
national level analysis may capitalize on the research endeavours of various 
authors and on the evaluation reports by various development institutions and 
state-installed working parties. In addition, various visits to Kenya were used 
to make a tour through the institutional environment for farming in the 
country, such as various ministries, development organizations, research 
institutions and companies in order to conduct interviews and collect data and 
reports which were in different stages of publication. 
The regional level is included because the specific regionalized agrarian 
structure elaborates the working of various historical processes and sodal 
forces which formed that structure. At this level, detailed information can be 
gathered in order to assess the regional specific outcome of intervention, 
commoditization and institutionalization. From this we are able to examine the 
complexes of heterogeneity generated by the agrarian structure. 
Kenya is divided for administrative purposes into various units. In 
hierarchical order these administrative units are provinces, districts, divisions, 
locations and sub-locations. The field work was carried out at district level: 
Nandi district which is situated in Kenya's largest province, Rift Valley 
Province. Within Nandi district six sub-locations were chosen to carry out a 
farm level survey conducted between August and November 1987. The details 
of the sample and the method of sampling are accounted for in Appendix I. 
The research concentrated on Nandi district for two reasons. (1) 
Characteristic for Nandi district - and from our analytical perspective, its 
advantage - is its dear history of commodi tization. Nandi became a major 
maize surplus producing area. (2) Nandi is labelled as a rich region endowed 
with fertile soils with constant rainfall patterns where an affluent peasantry 
predominate the picture of peasant differentiation. Nandi district was selected 
in close cooperadon with the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) of the 
University of Nairobi. 
1.5. Outline of the thesis 
Starting from these research questions and levels of analysis, the following 
outline of the book emerged. 
Chapter 2 comprises an historical analysis of colonialism and the colonial 
state in Kenya. An important element in the analysis is the politico-economic 
structure which emerged during the period of colonial rule. The colonial and 
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the British state played a crucial role in this respect. Although the white 
settlers represented a dominant political force in the first period, their 
influence was diminishing. The Great Depression during the 1930s as well as 
changes on the international and national level shortly before and after World 
War II, gave rise to political and economic reforms implemented in the early 
1950s. An understanding of the politico-economic events before and after W W 
II, which triggered of these reforms, is crucial. During this period in Kenya's 
history the basic politico-economic features of the country's contemporary 
agrarian structure were gradually laid down. This episode is particular 
relevant for tracing the origins of Kenya's ruling class and appeared to be a 
real watershed in Kenya's history, as is the case in many other former colonies 
in Africa. 
Chapter 3 examines the instruments and institutions created by the state to 
implement agricultural policy. It delineates the roots of Kenya's contemporary 
agricultural policies which can be traced back to reforms implemented by the 
colonial state in the 1950s. Essential for policy implementation are the 
financial-economic determinants and the high run expectations of that various 
classes and groups had from Uhuru. This chapter also highlights the 
importance of foreign aid. Maintaining foreign aid relations is essential to the 
state and the exercising of its economic functions. 
Chapter 4 deals with the rhythms of agrarian change after the transfer of 
state power to an independent government. The agrarian structure formed 
during the colonial period triggered off an enormous expansion of commodity 
production and relations in the countryside. This chapter pays particular 
attention to the impact of commoditizauon and institutionalization on Kenya's 
agrarian structure: the emergence of what may be called structural variance, 
i.e., various forms of production as well as socio-economic and regional 
differentiation. 
Chapter 5 contains an analysis of the history of commoditization and 
institutionalization in the regional context: Nandi district. An attempt is made 
to retrace that history from approx. 1850 onwards to the 1970s. The 
peculiarities of Nandi's agrarian structure will be examined and how it was 
formed by the non-involvement of the colonial state in economic 
developments up to the mid ISlffs. After that, the state intervened strongly 
with commoditization of agricultural production as a logical outcome. 
Chapter 6 describes the structure and dynamics of the peasant economy in 
Nandi district. Equipped with the methodological handouts outlined in 
section 1.З., we shall describe the essential features of Nandi's agrarian 
structure: forms of production, social heterogeneity, distinct farm styles and 
farming strategies. A quantitative analysis of data gathered at the farm 
enterprise level enabled us to assess (1) the impact on, and contribution of new 
technologies, to agricultural development and growth; (2) the patterns of 
agrarian growth generated by commoditization and institutionalization. 
Chapters 5 and 6 examine, how through state intervention, 
institutionalization and commoditization have a selective character. 
Chapter 7 attempts to identify the selectivities of state intervention. Based 
on various sources of literature we are able to evaluate the effectiveness of 
state intervention and to identify whether the instruments of state intervention 
are attuned to reality. The chapter concentrates on the technological and 
administrative components of Kenya's National Food Policy: marketing, price 
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fixation and the role of agricultural research, extensions services and credit 
Results from the Nandi survey and other surveys facilitate a portrayal of the 
nature of state intervention in agriculture in Kenya 
Chapter 8 is a retrospective chapter It involves an analysis of the state and 
state-society relations It emphasizes what kind of social forces have spawned 
the agranan structure in the country, on the national level An important 
aspect of state-society relations for future political and economic 
developments is whether the state bureaucracy is able to identify the 
properties of Kenya's agrarian structure 
Chapter 9 is an epilogue, an attempt to look back The results of the 
previous Chapters 2-8 will be confronted with some of the theoretical 
considerations in the first chapter In addition, future research fields will 
briefly be emphasized 
Appendix I is an account of the methodology of the Nandi survey 
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defines at the same bme the origins and the development of large agro-industnal complexes of 
international firms See also Arroyo (1980), Haude (1985) and George (1979) 
32 See also Lacroix (1981), Goodman & Rcdclift (1985) and Long (1988) 
33 Since 1971, the international efforts to raise productivity in Third World agriculture have 
been coordinated by the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
and is led by the World Bank and financed by Western countries and private institutions such 
as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundation Two of the first institutions emphasizing the need to 
introduce high yielding varieties are CIMMYT (mainly maize research, based in Mexico and 
sponsored by Rockefeller Foundation) and IRRI (псе research) in the Philippines CIMMYT 
started in the early forbes in Mexico, IRRI started somewhat earlier The start of the Green 
Revolution dunng the 1960s can be attributed to these two institutions See а o Oasa (1987) 
and Plucknett et al (1986) 
34 See Dahlberg (1979) and Staatz i Eicher (1984) for an overview of the literature concerning 
this subject and also The Trilateral Commission (Colombo, Johnson & Shishido, 1977) 
35 Dahlberg (1979), ρ 66 
36 Staatz & Eicher (1984), ρ 9 
37 Van der Ploeg (1987), ρ 1 conceptualizes scientificabon of agricultural practice as 'the 
systematic and ongoing reorganization of agricultural practices along the models created in 
and by agricultural soences ' 
38 For those farmers who have tried to retain seeds from previous hybrid maize production 
cycles in order to mulhply the seeds themselves on the farm, the result was rather 
disappointing yields went down dramatically 
39 See Lawrence (1988) ρ 60 and Byres (1982) 
40 See FAO Production Yearbook and World Development Report, various years. 
41 See a o Delgado et al (1987), Paulino (1987) and World Bank (1981,1984a) 
42 Word Bank (1982a), ρ 6 
43 Trigo (1986), ρ 38 He stresses that not all the institutional formats are equally effeebve 
44 World Bank (1982a), pp 6,39 
45 See for instance Sender & Smith (1986) for an analysis of World Bank views on pnces for 
agricultural commodities 
46 A crucial element in World Bank analysis is that the agricultural sector has to develop 
strong linkages with the rest of the economy through which the importance of agriculture, 
supposing that the linkages are sustainable, will diminish in the long run Agriculture, as is 
already the case in industrialized countnes, will generate a much smaller part of the net value 
added, net output, employment and income The international economy - by means of trade, 
technology transfer, private capital investment and foreign aid - will now as m the future, 
contribute to the transformation of the agricultural sector A number of changes recently made 
have already bome fruit, but in the eyes of the World Bank serious problems remain to be 
solved The Bank refers in this context primarily to the protecbonist agricultural policies of the 
industrialized countnes limiting the access to markets for producere from developing 
countnes (World Bank, 1982a, ρ 40) 
47 This is clearly recognized by the agro-industry lobby Pelosky (1983) reviews the 
opportunities for agnbusiness in Afnca in relation to the changing policy orientation of 
African countnes which 'are much more liberal and realistic than in the pasf He emphasizes 
that the drop in pnces for Africa's main export crops 'will require increased value adding 
through processing if countnes are to maintain their foreign exchange earnings Food 
processing possesses significant growth opportunities for agribusiness Other opportunibes 
exist in researching, developing, and implementing new technology packages for subsistence 
farming Firms with markebng expertise can assist indigenous private companies in 
developing appropnate markebng techniques Improved transport and storage systtms are 
required ( ) ' (Pelosky, 1983, ρ 20) The prospects for corporate development of agnculture in 
relation to increased use of modem technology is also emphasized by The Tnlateral 
Commission report (Colombo, Johnson Sc Shishido,1977) 
48 See Ruttan & Hayanu (1984), Delgado et al (1987) and Long & Van der Ploeg (1988,1989) 
This docs not mean that the World Bank, for instance, views state intervenbon and state 
control over the conditions of production as effective The Bank relates development failures in 
Afnca to the centrality of the state in input supply and in the organization of markebng 
(World Bank, 1981, ρ 58 ) The Kenya case shows quite dearly that the World Bank opts for 
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much less state involvement (privatization) and a smoother coordinating role for the state in 
the economy 
49 Long (1988) and Long & Van der Ploeg (1989), Seidman (1983), Jessop (1983) and 
discussions with colleagues were useful sources to define the notion of intervention 
50 See Baum & Tolbert (1985) who give a detailed theoretical and practical account of how and 
why projects are the best instruments for intervention in the agricultural and other sectors of 
the economy 
51 See Seidman (1983), ρ 12 ff 
52 See World Bank (1981,1984,1989) The latter report confesses what went wrong in Africa in 
the 1980s Vanous structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and IMF did not 
produce the radical changes which were supposed to be triggered off by these programmes. 
The African state appears to be an ineffective apparatus and the human element in 
development processes remained invisible 'Beyond adjustmenf is now the new slogan It was 
also the slogan of a congress on Sub-Saharan Africa held in Maastricht, July 1990, organized by 
the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation and vanous Non-Govemmental 
Organizations 
53 Bernstein, in a lecture held in Wageningen in 1985 stressed three aspects of development in 
Africa and other parts of the world which can be related to commoditization, 
insbtutionalization and intervention He predicts that in the course of commodihzation, socio­
economic differences between regions, differentiation of the peasantry and the importance of 
off-farm income for the agricultural population will increase Long (1986), pp 10-16 
summarizes Bernstein's lecture 
54 See, for instance, Hayami & Ruttan (1984) and World Bank (1982a) comparing countries on 
their agricultural jjerformances See also Bolhuis & Van der Ploeg (1985) 
55 See, for instance. Byres (1972,1977,1981), Gnffin (1979) and Galli (1981) 
56 A middle position is elaborated by Lipton (1989) He argues that as a result of the critique 
on the Green Revolution, the nature of the seeds has changed dramatically (he prefers to label 
them as modem seeds instead of high yielding varieties) The seeds have changed in the sense 
that the optimism of the 'modemizers' has been tempered and that at the same time the 
technicians did something with the socio-economic critique on HYVs 
57 See Pearse (1977, 1980), Barraclough et al (1986), Moore-Uppe i Collins (1977,1986) and 
George (1976,1979,1984) 
58 See, for instance. World Bank (1981, 1984a) on donor coordination and Lele (1987), Payer 
(1982), Kilhck (1984) and Wood (1980) about the influence of the international development 
agencies on policy development in Third World countries 
59 This strand of development theory, the articulation of modes of production theory 
(represented by а о Amin, 1973, Meillasoux, 1980 and Rey, 1973) has been admired for its 
contribution to a démystification of the 'dark, static and backward' African continent In 
addition, it helped to bring about the view that Africa is not a homogeneous continent and 
produced guidelines for the understanding of the mechanisms of state intervention and 
capitalist penetration in 'old modes of production' Simultaneously, this strand is heavily 
criticized for being structuralistic and mechanistic See Booth (1985) for a detailed analysis 
60 See, for instance. Hart (1984) Hart's position is very close to those held by modernization 
theoreticians 
61 See ол Lewis & Berry (1988), Glaeser (1987) and Timberlake (1985) 
62 Godelier (1978), pp 736,764 Godeher's full definition is as follows 'These sets are 
(1) The specific ecological and geographical conditions within which a soaety exists and from 
which it extracts its means of existence (2) The productive forces, ι e the material and 
intellectual means that the members of a soaety implement, within the different 'labour' 
processes, in order to work upon nature and to extract from it their means of existence, thereby 
transforming it into a "socialized" nature d e the ability to transform nature generally 
embodied by knowledge that a given soaety may have of nature, but also its body of technical 
processes, of rules governing the manufacture of tools, and the perception of the individual 
how to organise the labour process, etc ρ h ) (3) Social relations of production, that relation of 
any kind that assume one or another (or all) of the following three functions (a) determining 
the social form of access to recourses and to control of the means of production, (b) allocating 
the labour force of a soaety's members among the different labour processes which produce 
its material base, and organizing these different processes, (c) determining the social form of 
redistnbuhon of the product of individual or collective labour and, consequently, the forms of 
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circulation and non-circulation of these products. What Marx called "mode of production" or 
' social form of production" are in fact the various aspects of these combinations ' 
63 Long (1989), ρ 230, 231 This definition is rather close to Marx's (1975) description of 
economic system and economic structure which he made in the introduction to the Grundrisse 
See also Garcia (1984) for an exploration of similar geographical and methodological guide­
lines for research on food systems and society 
64 See for instance Van der Ploeg (1989) and Van Kessel (1990) 
65 Long and Van der Ploeg (1989), ρ 236 
66 Van der Ploeg (1986), ρ 43, op at See also Athreya et al (1987), Bernstein (1981) and Cleave 
(1974) The latter uses degrees of commercialization 
67 See Cowen (1986), ρ 364, Long (1986), ρ 16 and also Long (1984) We shall return to this 
issue in the Kenyan context in various chapters. 
68 Long (1986), ρ 19 
69 Cowen (1983), ρ 218 
70 Among the best examples of this kind of theoretical neo-Marxist and rather orthodox 
framework are Friedman (1980) and Gibbon & Neocosmos (1985) The latter reason as follows. 
' ( ) once peasants systematically produce commodities, they are all controlled by definite and 
precise forms of capitalist relations which acte as the absolute limits of their activity There are 
only two 'degrees' of commodi tiza bon systematic or generalized commodity production 
(which includes petty commodity production as well as capitalist producbon) or occasional 
and non-generalized commodity production ( ) but part of a different non-capitalist mode of 
production' Bernstein (1986,1988) gives a detailed account of the theorebcal presuppositions 
and implications of this framework 
71 See, for instance, Bernstein (1988), ρ 262 ff 
72 Athreya^t al (1987), ρ 160 
73 Van der Ploeg (1986), ρ 30, 31 Note that this notion of coordination of domains is an 
integration of two theorebcal strands of agranan sociological analysis, that of Chayanov (the 
internal structure of the family farm) and that of Benvenuti (the family farm m relation to the 
technological and institutional environment for farming) 
74 Mamdara (1987), pp 193 198 
75 See also Lacroix (1981), Van der Ploeg (1990) and De Steenhuijsen Piters (1990) 
76 Cliffe (1977), ρ 198, Mamdara (1987), pp 210, 211 and Bernstein (1979), ρ 431 See also 
Ennew, Hirst & Tnbe (1977) 
77 I do not use the much applied concept of 'peasant mode of production' After a lengthy 
discussion Enew, Hirst & Tribe (1977, ρ 310) conclude, to which we subscribe here, that 'there 
is no concept of 'Peasant Mode of Production' There are only specific forms (italics mine) of 
agricultural production, worked and managed to a greater or lesser degree by household 
units The condì bons of existence of such households units and their relations to other forms of 
producbon are specific to the mode of production in which they exist ' Bernstein (1979 ρ 437), 
too subscribes to their conclusion "There is no essential peasantry/ implying that 'it is 
impossible to talk about peasants as a class' in general terms ' 
78 Mamdara (1987) makes a further distinction between upper middle, middle and lower 
middle peasant households Upper middle peasant households are those who could marshal 
an occasional surplus to enter exploitative relations Lower middle peasant households on the 
other hand are those who are faced with an occasional defiat forang them to enter labour 
relations, however irregularly Middle peasants are those households whose reproducbon is 
based on family labour and family land and have no regular economic bes other than to the 
market 
79 Lenin (1982) 
80 See а о Cliffe (1976,1977), Bernstein (1979), Jorgensen (1981) and Mamdani (1987) 
81 Long (1986), ρ 16 
82 What Amin (1972) analyzed on the continental level, can also be witnessed within countries 
83 Long 4 Van der Ploeg (1989), ρ 236 
84 According to Arroyo (1978,1980) and George (1979), contract farming arrangements are an 
essential element of the world-wide strategy of international agro-industrial firms to control 
agricultural producbon and to direct the most profitable operations in agriculture to the 
sectors of the economy which they dominate processing and distribution These are the 
economic sectors where the largest share of value added is being realized This point is also 
made by Wessel & Hantman (1983) International agro firms increasingly abandon large 
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production units and transfer the production of agricultural commodities to independent 
producers The nsks involved m agricultural production (labour constraints, costly 
management of plantations, dimatological conditions) are shifted to the 'contracf fanner 
Contract farming arrangements are also quite common in Western European countries (see 
Mackintosh, 1977) Kirk (1987) stressed that this strategy avoids the negative images generally 
evoked by planta bons, even in countries where unh] recently plantation agriculture was rather 
strong (in Sn Lanka, India and Kenya for example) 
For detailed studies about the structure of world wide agriculture and the impact of 
agribusiness in local developments in agriculture see Feder (1977,1981, 1983), Clairmonte tc 
Cavanagh (1981), dairmonte (1981), Haude (1983, 1985), Dinham & Hmes (1983, 1984), 
Burbach & Flynn (1980) and Barker (1985) Kinsey (1987) provides ал account of how 
agribusiness projects and programmes may contribute to agricultural development m Third 
World countries 
85 Allen (1980) provides an example showing that contract farming arrangements are not 
always successful He describes a particular illustrative case for Nigeria where a state-Cadbury 
Schweppes managed tomato production scheme was abolished because peasants refused to 
participate The most obvious reason was the unfavourable terms of exchange 
86 See also Mendras (1970) and Arroyo (1978) 
87 See Van Kessel (1990), Van der Ploeg (1989), Ntagi (1990), Richards (1985, 1986, 1988), 
Drinkwater (1988) and Allan (1960) Although there may be limitations attached to indigenous 
knowledge systems - clearly ventilated by Drinkwater and Ntagi - the authors all view the 
farmers are viewed as 'knowledgeable' and 'capable' in designing their own life-worlds and 
livelihood strategies 
88 Drinkwater (1988), chapter IV, provides a detailed analysis and description of 
'misunderstanding' and 'resistance' in Zimbabwe in relation to the pursuit by the state of 
gaddock livestock management systems 9 See, for instance, Lawrence (1988), pp 61,62 
90 Long & Van der Ploeg (1989), ρ 238 
91 See а о Benvenuti (1982) and Bolhuis & Van der Ploeg (1985) 
9 2
 See a o Bolhuis* Van der Ploeg (1985), ρ 22 
93 It is for these two reasons that the sample survey was based on a certain distribution of 
farms situated in different ecological zones in the district and on a certain distnbution of 
landholdmgs according to size (which was taken as a start to delineate farming strategies and 
styles) See Appendix I 
94 For a detailed account of African environments and resources, see Lewis & Berry (1988) 
95 This docs not imply that those regions are not incorporated in the national market 
economy Several (forced) attempts were made to make them market cattle and/or to sell their 
labour power 
96 Веіту (1984), ρ % 
97 Skocpol (1979), ρ 29 Sharon (1982), ρ 316 ff and Young (1982), pp 72, 73 See also 
Poulantzas (1975) and Hoebink (1988) 
98 Sec also Brett (1986), Alavi (1982), Leys (1976) and Saul (1975) 
99 See Young (1982), ρ 73, Skocpol (1979), ρ 24 ff and Hoebink (1988), pp 39, 40 and 
Poulantzas (1975,1976) Long (1988) discusses the image of the state in three important schools 
of thought in agrarian sociology 
Recently the African state became the focus of much academic debate Doornbos (1989) 
provides an overview of several academic debates Doornbos tncs to delineate the roots of the 
crisis of legitimacy in the African state the state is out balanced and the state bureaucracy is 
not able to idenbfy all elements in society, that is relabonships are dichotomized and based on 
misunderstanding Certain interests in soaety are over-represented while others are not 
represented at all In addition to that, emerging conflicts (of an ethnic, gender and soaal 
nature) cripple state intervenbon Bates (1980, 1982) and IDS-Bullebn (1986) examine the 
developmental and regulatory role of the state in African agriculture Fatten (1988) challenges 
the view of the relative autonomy of the state Forrest (1988) finds the African state neither 
relatively autonomous from soaety (the soft version) nor solely achng in favour of the ruling 
class (the hard version) Forrest (1987) contests the nobon which perceives the state as a 'ruling 
class' Ergas (1987) provides a 'modest contnbuhon to add to the corpus of knowledge by 
including an analysis of both theoretical and pracbcal dimensions' Londsdale (1981 ) and Bates 
(1983) analyse the African state in the transibonal stage from the pre-colonial, colonial and 
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post-colonial penod Both authors stress the evolution of soaal processes and organizabons 
that have developed over time shaping state-society relationships Chamey (1987) provides, 
based on Poulantzas (1975), an account of the Afncan state in relabon to the speahc form of 
the neo-colonial state Chazan et al (1988) provide a forceful book on the nature on state-
society relations and political systems in contemporary Africa 
100 See Skocpoll (1979), Jessop (1982) and Shanin (1982) for a cnbque 
101 Burmeister (1987) provides a perfect example of state autonomy in agncultural research 
Çrogrammes in South Korea 02 Both Brett (1986) and Mars (1986) emphasize the need to pay attention to these aspects m 
the Afncan context also 
103 Arce & Long (1987), pp 5-8 
104 Cowen (1983), ρ 203 
105 Long & Van der Ploeg (1989), ρ 232 
106 Byres (1977), ρ 260 See also Oasa (1987), Lawrence (1988) and Dittoh (1981) 
107 See Cowen (1982b), ρ 260 
108 This aspect of state involvement in the African context is for instance highlighted by Chffe 
et al (1977) 
109 See Hoebink's (1988) overview, ρ 40 and Skocpol (1979) Contemporary implies that the 
state had to build up its functions and power, and that the functions of the state change over 
hmc See, for instance, Londsdale (1981) and chapter 2 
110 See, for instance, Seddon (1986) on the bread nots in Northern Africa after the state lifted 
food subsidies which as requested by the World Bank and IMF in order to receive structural 
adjustment loans See also Chapter 7 
111 See Hoebink (1988), pp 38 ff for an overview of Gramsci's contnbubon in the debate on 
the state, see also Skocpol (1979), pp 24 ff 
112 Jessop (1983), ρ 102 and Chamey (1987), ρ 49 Altemahve strategies may be strategies 
which threaten the realization of the interests of the subordinated classes and groups in 
soaety They also may demanded embrace strategies which appear inconsistent with the 
interests of the ruling class An example of the first may be unfettered capitalist accumulation 
and concentration of the means of production Socialist development strategics are an example 
of the second 
113 See Chamey (1987) Chentelism is a personalized relationship between two individuals or 
groups belonging to different classes or class factions, based upon reciprocal exchange of 
goods and services Clientelisi relations are frequently rationalized in terms of kinship, mutual 
obligations, redistribution and solidarity (Chamey, 1987, ρ 52 ) 
114 Sec also Holmquist & Barkan (1986) 
115 Cowen (1982b), Cooper (1980), Jessop (1982, 1983) and Hoebink (1988) advocate this 
approach 
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Chapters 2,7 and 8 these aspects will come forward clearly 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF COMMODIT1ZATION IN KENYA 
AND THE STATE 
Introduction 
Production of commodities, and in particular establishing the concrete 
conditions for its expansion, is a central theme throughout Kenya's socio-
economic history. An examination of the expansion of commodity production 
in Kenya, as well as the socio-economic and structural development patterns 
underlying it, has necessarily to start from two perspectives. 
¡n the first place, commodity production and exchange is not a phenomenon 
merely restricted to the period after colonial rule was established and the 
country became gradually incorporated in the international capitalist division 
of labour. Regionally specialized commodity production and exchange 
relations had already emerged in certain regions during the pre-colonial 
period. 
In the second pbce, from the time of the incorporation of Kenya in the 
international capitalist division of labour, effectuated by the establishment of 
colonial rule and the building of a colonial state apparatus, commodity 
production and exchange increased considerably. New forms of commodity 
production and styles of farming emanated. Commodity production became 
increasingly capitalist and household commodity production. Both forms of 
production gradually included new commodities for the international and 
national market. The technological conditions of production changed 
profoundly as new implements and objects of labour were introduced and 
subsequently integrated into the agricultural production process. 
An historical analysis is crucial to disclose the foundation for the 
contemporary features of Kenya's agrarian political economy. More 
particularly, an historical analysis discloses which social forces and institutions 
fostered the establishment of the conditions for commodity production. 
Central to the examination of the process of commoditization in Kenya is 
an analysis of the various strategies of the actors involved with agricultural 
commodity production: several state institutions created during the colonial 
episode (and after independence), and several enterprises operating in the 
commerce, financial, industrial and agricultural sectors. Ownership of these 
enterprises involved Africans and foreigners. The state as a set of 
administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less 
coordinated by, an executive authority, provides the instrument for a 
periodization of Kenya's history: its policies and practices, and its specific 
functions for facilitating commodity production in agriculture in particular.' 
This chapter is composed as follows. The first section examines the 
developments during the pre-colonial period. The following three sections 
deal with social and politico-economic developments since colonial state 
power was imposed in 1895 up to the transfer of state power in 1963. 
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2.1. Рге-colonial Kenya 
The area currently known as Kenya underwent several changes before 
colonization. East-Africa and Kenya in particular was not a region 
characterized by static developments. On the contrary, massive migration and 
settlement as well as changes in production systems and in trade patterns 
feature in the social and economic developments of pre-colonial Kenya.2 
One of the factors that strike anyone examining social, economic and 
cultural developments in Kenya during the 17th, 18th and 19th century is the 
incredible diversity which existed within that area. The multiplicity of ethnic 
groups and languages from different origins3 led to different ecological 
adaptations and, accordingly, different cultural and political institutions. Most 
economic, social and cultural developmenb took place in a restricted territory, 
in villages, ranging in size from a single family to several hundred people. 
Centralized political structures, as was the case in West Africa, emerged 
nowhere, and development was a localized process.* The peoples may have 
varied in their methods of production and crops grown. What they had in 
common was that life was essentially organized around subsistence 
production. Each individual member of society or family only produced 
enough to feed themselves, with a small surplus to exchange for other basic 
needs and to ensure against the risk of crop failures. Through time, they had 
carefully adapted to the (new) local environment, and various forms of social 
relations and beliefs emerged. Some pastoralists and herders settled down and 
became agriculturalists; others remained herders or hunters and gatherers. 
Hunting and gathering were the simplest economic activities. Production 
and reproduction were based on the g'fts of nature. In the hunter-societies, the 
social organization was rather loose because there was no great need for 
continuity, except when hunting took place. A close kinship bond, as in 
agricultural-based societies, was absent. Herders (pastoralists), on the other 
hand, had different economic and social requirements. They needed access to 
extensive pastures to support production and reproduction. The availability of 
good pastures was limited, however. The conditions for production and 
reproduction were rather precarious. Drought and diseases devastating the 
herds were constant threats. To ensure against these, pastoralists divided their 
herds, slaughtered excess male animals for food and kept the female animals 
for production of milk. Barter trade and the temporary seeking of shelter 
among neighbouring farmers or hunter-gathers was one way to deal with the 
constant threat of nature. The other way was to split up in small groups 
clustering around available water pools without overtaxing the land or 
restricting their mobility. 
Agriculturalists developed a more complex society. They were socially tied 
together by the need to obtain and maintain enough land (greatly in excess of 
their annual needs because of the slash and bum practice) to produce an 
adequate harvest year after year. This necessitated settlement in one place and 
the arrangement of social relations ensuring continuity. Fanning requires 
more work to produce a given amount of food than among hunter-gathers. 
This implied, on the one hand, that the organization of a labour force was 
necessary. The elders played an enormously important role in this 
organization. On the other hand, because it entailed the employment of more 
labour, agriculturalists could produce higher yields per each unit of land. They 
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could support a much denser population. As populations grew, production 
increased through greater inputs of labour, manure and stock. 
In the course of these centuries, the peoples of Kenya continued use-value 
production by farming and herding. Maize (introduced in Kenya by 
Portuguese merchants) gradually replaced sorghum and millet as a staple 
crop. More importantly, a certain specialization of production took place. 
Agricultural production gradually reached such stage of productivity that 
surpluses could be produced. This gave rise to trade relations between regions, 
ethnic groups and territorial organizations. Production of food and special 
products and trade were complementary: trade relations supplemented 
subsistence needs. The Kikuyu in Central Kenya exchanged surplus crops and 
crafts with other Kikuyu tribes. They traded foodstuffs for honey, wild animal 
skins and forest products with the Okiek; foodstuffs, pots, ironware and ivory 
for skins and cattle with the Maasai and the Kamba. The Luo in Western 
Kenya exchanged cattle against tools from the Samia blacksmiths. By 
exchanging fish, salt and cattle the Luo obtained grain from the Gussi.5 Most 
trade was conducted by local barter, periodically at special border markets. 
These markets were controlled by the elders of the lineage as they determined 
the general conditions for trade.6 
For East, Central and Western Kenya a (necessarily) general picture can be 
painted. Kinship, residence and age were the main structures upon which 
social organization was based. In most areas the family was the basic economic 
unit; production was primarily use-value production and surpluses were 
traded. Land and cattle - the basic requirements for production and 
reproduction - were usually passed on from father to son. Production and 
reproduction were almost completely controlled by the elders. They 
determined who enjoyed usufruct of the land as well as who had the right to 
dear new land or to occupy new pastures. Marriage and inter-clan marriage 
was decided by the elders of a lineage group who also set the bride prices. The 
crucial means of existence could be increased in two ways - either by 
migration to new land or by obtaining women and cattle through raids and 
warfare. 
Historical research conducted in Central and Western Kenya points out that 
development patterns during the 19th century increasingly generated 
differentiation of production relations. This was based on the formation of a 
ruling elite controlling the principal means of production.7 Migration to new 
land, raiding and looting and control over (long-distance) trade are considered 
as responsible for this process of differentiation. The tendency was for the 
means of production to become concentrated more and more in few hands, 
simultaneously excluding others from access. Increasing population pressure 
on the land because of demographic growth, subdivision by inheritance by 
sons of fathers' land and a general decrease in absolute terms of arable land, 
resulted in fragmentation of landholdings. The families who had no access to 
land were either forced to migrate to new and uncleared land (usually as 
labourers clearing land for others in return for cattle and a share of the new 
land) or to stay and work for others. It was not unusual for rich members of 
the clan, cultivating and controlling more land and cattle, to hire other labour 
within the dan.« This development pattern was, as a rule, not generated by the 
employment of 'foreign' labour. Only some ethnic groups employed slave 
labour captured during wars with other groups. 
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During the pre-colomal period, soao-econoimc development patterns can 
therefore be characterized by a certain degree of commodity production and 
exchange relabons There was also a trend towards the concentration of 
mechanisms of control over the means of production (land, cattle and labour), 
the means of arculabon (trade, markets) and reproduction (women) In other 
words the development of unequal soaal conditions of production and 
reproducbon in certam regions (Western and Central Kenya particularly) was 
on its way 
Throughout the 19th century, the patterns of development and 
accumulation of wealth remamed based on a combination of use-value and 
exchange-value production, trade continued to encourage specialization of 
commodity production 
It is crucial to note that all this took place relatively undisturbed by external 
forces This process of development was, however, increasingly blocked by 
intervention from abroad Two processes with slightly different impacts on the 
pattern and nature of development can be held responsible in the first place, 
the general effect of external trade-relations with Arabia, India and later with 
Europe, m the second place, incorporation within the expanding British 
Empire and colonization The first process will be reviewed briefly here, the 
second aspect will be addressed m the following section 
Kenya, or rather that part of East Africa which is now Kenya, had 
participated m the Indian Ocean trade for at least two thousand years before 
the imposition of colonial rule These trade relations led to the development of 
towns and a Swahili culture along the coast as well as to the eventual fall of 
these trading towns The evolving trade relations with foreign nations became 
gradually based on appropriation of surplus without the development of 
backward linkages The terms of trade between East Afnca and Europe were 
unequal Market-oriented trade in Kenya became increasingly important as 
East Afnca responded to increased demand m India, China, Europe and 
America for African products East Africa and Kenya supplied slaves and 
ivory m exchange for cotton and cloths (called merAani) The 'tradibonal' trade 
relabons encouraged development and specialization of production activities, 
the 'new' forms of trade had the effect of absorbing surpluses rather than 
generabng development9 Zanzibar became the headquarters of this trade 
Almost all European trading companies had a seat on that island The Imperial 
Bntish East Afnca Company, established in 1888, became the company 
apparatus faalitabng the trade The surplus appropriated from East Africa by 
Zanziban merchants represented only a fracbon of the share extracted by 
European and American traders The latter mvested minimally m East Africa, 
maintaining only a single agent, the greater part of the proñt was transferred 
to Europe and Amenca where it was invested m industry and trade W With 
the imposition of colonial rule, the effect of the 'new* trade expanded 
increasingly from the coast to the interior H 
2.Z The period 1895 to 19Э0 
Profound changes in Kenyan patterns of development m general, and of 
accumulation, production and reproduction in particular, took place after 
colonial rule was established Kenya became gradually incorporated m the 
international capitalist division of labour European and white South African 
fanners were encouraged by the colonial administration to settle in Kenya 
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From that time on, the colonial administration in cooperation with settlers and 
various sorts of foreign companies intervened in the economy, in production, 
trade and reproduction. The leading productive activities upon which 
development was founded in the 18th and 19th century were ignored in 
colonial development plans. This statement is significant for two reasons. 
Firstly, it must be considered as the preamble for commodity production 
under capitalist conditions in Kenya. Secondly, the implementation of these 
colonial development plans implied that the patterns of development, and the 
concentration of means of production in the hands of the pre-colonial elite 
during the preceding period were halted. Colonial settlement closed off 
further migration to new, uncleared and unoccupied land which was alienated 
and gazetted to become white settler land. The room for the pre-colonial elite 
to manoeuvre was from then on primarily restricted to the confined areas. 
Slave trade was forbidden (by the acceptance of the Universal Anti-Slavery 
Act) and raiding and looting was prevented by military pacification 
campaigns. 
In the year 1895 Kenya became a British Protectorate and later, in 1920, a 
Crown Colony.12 The colonial administration, was in the early days primarily 
interested in building an apparatus which could implement measures to 
establish favourable conditions for white settler and plantation production and 
to link Uganda with the world market. Uganda more than Kenya, was 
considered as a rich and productive area awaiting British exploration. When 
the conditions for the exploitation of Uganda's natural resources appeared less 
favourable^ and the imrastructural measures had already effected (such as 
the costly construction of the Uganda Railway from Mombasa to Kisumu on 
the shores of Lake Victoria), the British state decided to make the best of the 
opportunities existing in Kenya. In addition, the administration emphasized 
that indigenous agriculture could not be relied on as the main source of 
increased trade and output. The administration, therefore, viewed the 
encouragement of plantation agriculture and the settlement ( on a greater scale 
than initially anticipated( white farmers in Kenya as a serious alternative.1'' 
Plantation companies and European as well as white South-African and 
Rhodesian farmers settled in Kenya from 1900 onwards in order to grow crops 
which would help finance the Uganda railway.15 
Crucial to the understanding of the politico-economic developments in this 
and the following periods is that the colonial administration was not a 
monolithic apparatus. It represented, in particular during the interwar years 
(between World War I and II), a condensation of several interest groups in 
Kenya. Some of the interests were 'situated' outside the colony in the 
metropolis, and others within the colony itself. The administration was 
compelled to operate in several distinct spheres: it connected the metropolis to 
the colony at the same time as it was mediating between internal social 
forces.^ This is apparent on two closely related levels. 
In the first place, colonial state policy was concerned with maintaining a 
careful balance between various routes of accumulation. On the one hand, 
from the beginning the state favoured foreign estate companies for setting up 
agricultural production for the metropolitan market, and foreign merchant 
companies in its efforts to obtain import and export trade opportunities in the 
colony. On the other hand, the colonial administration strongly supported the 
development of a settler economy which would be economically viable. The 
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colonial state apparatuses encouraged, at the same time, the growth by 
Africans of economic crops which could not threaten the settler economy. 
In the second place, the concrete political setting of the colonial 
administration made it increasingly difficult to mediate between all these 
external and internal interest groups and their different development 
strategies. Foreign plantation companies and large settler fanners, represented 
the dominant political force during the early period of colonial rule. For an 
understanding of colonial policies in the early days it is crucial to note the 
structural difference between foreign estate capital and the large white settler 
farmers. The large white settler farmers' interests lay in Kenya, and the settler 
community constituted a group whose interests were bound up with internal 
accumulation. Their intention was to establish control over the means of 
production and exchange within Kenya. In the case of plantation companies 
which came to Kenya to produce (and in many cases also to process) 
commodities for the British and world market, ownership and control lay 
outside of the country.l? Their interests were primarily indirectly articulated 
by the British state and imposed on the colonial administration. The white 
settlers could - by manoeuvring themselves into strategic administrative and 
policing positions - emerge as the dominant political force within the colonial 
administration. Large settlers, such as Lord Delamare - a settler baron with 
large tracts of land and holding large shares in local agro-industries, and 
Captain Grogan - a large timber concessionaire and property speculator with 
various shareholdings in other companies, were prominent members of a 
number of committees and boards, responsible for policy-making in the 
colony.18 White settler politics had been organised around local producer 
associations. The Kenya Farmers Assoaation (KFA) was the largest association 
protecting settlers interests.1' 
The official colonial doctrine for economic development in Kenya was to 
establish a dual agricultural system which in theory safeguarded indigenous 
African and British interests. The result in practice of the doctrine was the 
development of a white settler economy and the facilitating of foreign estate 
production and import/export trade, simultaneously blocking both the 
development of commodity production in the African Reserves and the 
expansion of the wide spread development of commodity relations in these 
areas which would be of interest for merchants, banks and manufacturers of 
industrial products. 
The colonial state employed several policies to support settler and estate 
agriculture. One of the key functions of the administration from the early 
period of European settlement had been to ensure land and labour supply to 
the estates and settler farms. Land, and particularly private land ownership, 
and labour represented crucial preconditions for the plantation companies and 
settlers to explore the natural resources of Kenya. The first measures to 
implement a land policy were taken in 1897 by the High Commissioner of the 
East-African Protectorate. The High Commissioner was mandated to grant and 
sell land titles to white settlers and plantation companies.20 As a result of 
settler pressure, the competence of the colonial administration was extended 
widely. Several Land Acts and Land Ordinances were enforced by the 
administration to claim 'unoccupied' land (the so-called Crown Lands) for 
white settlement and plantation purposes. This implied that large tracts of 
land were alienated from the African population; the alienated land came to be 
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known as the White Highlands and the Scheduled Areas. African settlement 
was restricted to the Non-Scheduled Areas or the Reserves. 
As the essential preconditions for agricultural commodity production were 
established, the influx of white settlers and the number of plantation and 
trading companies increased with it. Around 1920, the European community 
in Kenya numbered approx. 20,000 people, of which 1,200 where farmers 
'occupying' 1.25 million hectares of land. By 1953 approx. 4,000 settlers 
'occupied' about 3 million hectares.2! The settlers embarked upon export 
agriculture. Coffee and sisal were introduced on these farms, followed by 
wheat, maize and tea. Livestock too became an important economic activity. 
Foreign estate companies were attracted to invest in Kenya from the early 
1910s to produce mainly wattle, tobacco, tea, meat, coffee and sisal for the 
international market. Land and labour were supplied for by the colonial state. 
The companies established plantations as well as processing plants. The plants 
were, in all cases, preceded by a trading branch through which the firms 
exported primary commodities. Processing industries were usually set up in 
response to conditions of international competition in that particular 
commodity. Within this framework of favourable local production conditions 
and international competition, British American Tobacco, Brooke Bond, Liebig, 
the Anglo-French Sisal Company, Socinaf, James Finlay, Forestal Land & 
Timber decided to invest in Kenya.22 
Several labour acts were implemented to empower the colonial state to 
regulate and control the movement of labour. Both the settlers and the 
administration were determined to force the Africans into the labour market. 
The formation of the Department of Native Affairs signified the 
administration's attempt to deal with the supply of labour to settler farms and 
plantations. Before 1925, by means of taxation and forced labour, Africans 
were forced either to sell their labour power to the plantations and settler 
farms or to raise cash crops for the market. The alienation of land from the 
Africans supplied the necessary 'free' labour for the settlers. Those with no 
land had no other option but to sell their labour power or to stay as squatters 
(termed 'resident labour') on the settler farms. In particular, the squatter 
families served as a cheap labour force for the settlers. The Resident Native 
Ordinance of 1918 was proclaimed to reduce the opportunity to escape from 
work on settler farms. The ordinance decreed that a squatter could not remain 
on settler land unless he had contracted to work for the settler owner for 180 
days in the year. In addition the Native Registration Ordinance was enacted to 
control absolutely the supply of labour. The ordinance required all Africans to 
cany a kipande, a labour record card showing periods of employment and 
unemployment The total effect of these interventions by the colonial 
administration in favour of the white settlers and plantation companies was 
that in the mid 1920s around 40 % of all African males worked on European 
farms.23 In chapter 5 we will deal with this matter in greater detail with regard 
to Nandi District. 
White settler dominance was also advanced by the colonial administration 
in many other ways. Firstly, Africans and other non-European population 
group» were prohibited from cultivating high-value cash crops for the (world) 
market. African agriculture was intended to be complementary to, but never 
competitive with, settler agriculture.24 Policies to promote commodity 
production by Africans was limited to the subsistence sector, which could 
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subsidize estate agriculture by providing food stuffs As a result of that policy, 
the production of commodities with high exchange value (tea, coffee) 
continued to be dominated by white settlers and foreign estate producers unbl 
the 1950s In addition to this kind of protection, the administration regulated 
African livestock production by imposing almost permanent quarantines on 
the movement and sales of African stock and by prohibiting Africans from 
owning graded dairy cattle 25 This measure was largely implemented to 
prevent the spread of diseases to livestock on European-owned farms 
Secondly, the settlers managed to control agncultural research, to gam 
privileged access to extension services and agncultural credit and exerted 
pressure on the administration to make sure that fiscal, transport and freight 
policies favoured settler agriculture 26 The revenue of the colonial state was 
used to provide an infrastructure to support the settler economy 
Control over state power was essential for the white settlers Although they 
owned the best agricultural land, they lacked the knowledge, funds and the 
labour force to cultivate the land In the beginning, the white settlers were still 
experimenting in the management of a viable farming system and their 
posibon was precanous 27 Control over the allocation of state resources on 
their behalf was the mainstay of KFA's political strategy 
White settler agriculture, as will be highlighted later, generated many 
conflicts It generated an embryonic conflict with British as well as mdigenous 
African interests in the competition for labour and land White settler 
agriculture appeared to be a conflicting agncultural system The paradox of 
white settler agriculture was created by the fact that in the begimung the 
colonial state apparatus was required to force Africans mto the labour market 
and to restrict African commercial agriculture, while it relied heavily m the 
early penod on the revenue raised from African-grown cash crops and taxes 
contributed by the Afncan population In 1913, about three-quarters of the 
country's export earnings ongmated from Afncan agriculture (mainly hides 
and skins, maize and sesame seed) 28 African agnculture supported much of 
the administrative effort being largely devoted to the expansion of the settlers, 
their direct compebtors for land and labour Despite this, the white settlers 
supported by the administration seized the most ferble areas of Kenya, the so-
called White Highlands, and transformed the non-occupied areas mto labour 
reserve areas, and little attenbon was paid to development in these areas m 
order to secure the flow of Afncan labour to white settler farms 
In spite of the enormous support for white settler and estate agnculture, 
colonial state officials staboned in the Reserves, m Nyanza and Kikuyu land m 
particular, encouraged cash crop production by Afncans The fact that some 
sections of the colonial administration were actively engaged in encouraging 
agncultural development m the Reserves is an indication that the colonial state 
was not a monolithic apparatus and that the colonial administration was 
capable m perceiving interests other than those of settlers Almost everything 
was tned, according to Kitching (1980), to introduce industrial crops (such as 
sesame m Nyanza) and improved varieties of food crops (such as the Hickory 
King maize and other vanebes onginating from South Africa which were 
meant to replace the yellow maize vanety) The purpose of this innovation 
was, however, simply to generate cash income for the African to pay tax in 
money instead of paying it m livestock, of which the administration then had 
to dispose 
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Opportunities for raising crop» for the market were actively integrated in 
the fanning strategies of the African producers.2' Export markets as well as 
the settler farms, plantations and the growing Nairobi-market provided the 
outlets for surplus production. Taxation levied in cash was the impetus for the 
commercialization of agriculture and the major reason for permanent and 
migratory wage-labour on settler farms and plantations or in government 
services. These well known factors created some of the social conditions for 
commodity production by Africans, although it was limited to certain regions 
(notably Kikuyu land). 
The social and economic development in the Reserves was primarily based 
on subsistence agriculture and livestock in combination with some cash 
cropping (mostly food crops) which was expanding rapidly in acreage. 
However, these developments could not endanger settler agriculture nor the 
regular flow of migrant labour to the settler farms and estates. The central 
government paid attention to the improvement and introduction of new 
cultivars solely to prevent famine in the African reserves. In the period before 
1930 there was little or no coordinated assistance from the colonial state. The 
general picture is that cultivation techniques and husbandry methods of 
African agriculture remained the same, despite increased access to cash 
through commercialization of production.30 The period prior to the 1920s was 
a period of relative stagnation for African agriculture. Between 1922 and 1938, 
there was no increase in the value of commodities from the Reserves; although 
the quantity certainly increased. Hides and skins, live animals, maize, cotton, 
groundnuts, sim sim, wattle and copra were the main products of the African 
producers. It has been estimated that African subsistence production in 1929 
accounted for 60 % of Kenya Gross National Product (GNP). This represented 
an uncomfortable reality for the settlers because African farmers were 
indirectly subsidizing their production.3l This fiscal base of the colonial state 
and Kenya's future as 'The White Man's Countr/ was put in danger by future 
developments. 
2.3. The Great Depression and its aftermath 
The international depression of the thirties, when the level of almost all 
commodities produced by settler farmers was extremely low and settler 
agricultural contracted severely, gave rise to profound changes in colonial 
Kenya and led to a gradual change in the attitude of the colonial state towards 
African agriculture. An interplay of several political and economic factors and 
conflicts were at work contributing to, and at the same time explaining, the 
gradual change in colonial policies. The explanation of the events centres 
around an analysis of the weakening position of white settler agriculture and 
the conflicts, generated by settler dominance, with competing interests inside 
the colony. Crucial for the analysis is, on the one hand, the position of the 
administration and international capitalist enterprises vis-à-vis white settler 
agriculture and African agriculture. On the other hand, the political and 
economic developments taking place among the African population, and 
within African agriculture in particular, play an important role. 
Firstly, a review will be presented of the developments in African 
agriculture centred on the commercialization of agricultural production in the 
Reserves and of the politico-economic developments in which the colonial 
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administration played a crucial role. Then white settler agriculture, and 
particularly the changing attitude of the administration, will be discussed. 
2.3.1. Politico-economic developments in the Reserves 
Generally it is assumed that the adjustment of the African population to the 
demands made by the colonial administration and estate agriculture went 
rather smoothly. African agriculture was less directly hit by the Depression 
than the settler farmers. Redistribution and intensification of labour time, 
quantitatively as well as qualitatively, created new patterns of production and 
it raised production levels. The marked increase in productivity allowed 
Africans cultivating the land to compensate for the transfer of labour power to 
other forms of production (settler farms, plantations) and to government 
service.32 Africans responded quickly to the new opportunities. Taking up 
wage-labour employment by outward migration was among one of the new 
opportunities. Around the mid 1920s, however, labour migration caused a 
shortage of labour, and particularly of male labour in the Reserves. It is 
estimated for that period that the percentages of male labour migration from 
the different districts to areas where there was a demand for labour was 
extremely high. It reached between 50 % and 62 % in Kiambu and over 30 % 
for many other districts.33 Cowen's research revealed that labour continued to 
flow between the Reserves and the White Highlands, and that, throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, wage levels did not differ between the Reserves and the 
Highlands.^ 
Cowen's and Kitching's analysis of the developments in African agriculture 
during this period is interesting because of their highlighting of two crucial 
trends. In the first place, both accentuate the trend towards commercialization 
of agricultural production despite the existing restrictions on African 
commodity production. More importantly, the early developments towards 
commercialization of production in the Reserves did not merely result from 
external pressure or action: market forces were operating upon the African 
population. A major impetus behind cash crop production was the 'hunger for 
cash' of the African population. Not only was this to meet the annual hut and 
poll tax burden, but cash was increasingly viewed as a means to acquire newly 
introduced western consumption items and to gain access to formal 
education.SS Money was obtained by a combination of wage-labour 
employment and labour migration, involvement in local trade and/or 
commercialization of agricultural production. Cowen (1981a, 1983) in 
particular underlines, however, that adverse market forces were also at work 
leading towards increased commerrialization of agricultural production in the 
Reserves. At least in the Central Province, wage levels could not guarantee the 
reproduction of the worker's household. In the depression years when settler 
labour demand and wages fell dramatically, workers attempted to 
commercialize their production activities in order to compensate for the 
reduction in wages. These adverse market forces caused more 
commercialization and more integration into the market with little or no extra-
economic coercion and resistance. Increasingly workers-peasants participated 
in selling produce, replacing wages from work on estates and thereby 
avoiding wage employment.3^ 
In the second place, Kitching and Cowen record that some sectors of the 
peasantry in Central Province, notably the so-called 'progressive' farmers and 
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'big men' (the 'watu wa mission' or 'athomi')37, were effectively expandmg 
agricultural producbon through the accumulation of land and livestock and 
were gaining access to improved labour instruments and objects of labour 
(new dairy cattle, tea) in order to raise productivity (i e capitalization) The 
scale of indigenous accumulation was, however, geographically restricted to 
the Reserves as a result of raaal prohibitions and parallel competition with the 
settlers for land and labour It was also economically limited because small-
scale peasant household production was protected and conserved as a source 
of direct food consumption Nevertheless, accumulation was taking place and 
was increasingly founded upon money obtamed from the sale of commodities 
and wages from salaried positions and trade That money was invested in 
agriculture, to purchase land, livestock, implements and labour as well as in 
other economic sectors 38 This was a capitalist form of commodity production 
based on the employment of wage-labour In this form of producbon, 
commercialization was increasingly accompanied by capitalization This was 
not the case with small-scale peasant household commodity production m the 
rest of the Reserves 
The trend towards commercialization and capitalization in African 
agriculture leads Heyer (1981) to suggest that African agriculture must have 
benefitted from the development of European agricultures? It seems, 
however, that Central Province benefitted the most from the contacts with 
European agriculture, directly through employment on settler farms and 
plantations Government research and extension services played a much less 
important role It was, therefore, in Central Province that the growth of output 
and income was most impressive, despite that outward migration of labour 
being among the highest m the country The Nairobi market and nearby 
plantabons provided a buoyant market for the Kikuyu producers In other 
African areas neighbouring European farming areas, such as North Nyanza, 
parts of Machakos, Nandi and Kencho, population pressure on the land was 
less severe and access to a market less easy than m Central Province The 
patterns and pace of development were very different from that m Central 
Province These regions developed maize and livestock production through 
the mtroducbon of ploughs which facilitated a significant growth of output in 
combination with high rates of outward labour migration It was in the areas 
further away from European farms that agricultural development appeared 
less impressive during this period Within these areas belonging to the 
traditional labour reserves regions (Central Nyanza, Maragoh area), economic 
development was marked by a combinabon of high outward labour migration 
without significant expansion of agricultural production and productivity 40 
There were also the so-called remote areas, hardly incorporated in the 
commodity economy In some of these areas, particularly the pastoral regions, 
development was severely hampered by restrictions on cattle movement, 
livestock trade and land alienation without adequate compensation 4l 
Despite the colonial administration's priority for sustaining settler 
agriculture and political supremacy, various state bodies initiated 
developments counter to settler interests m other sectors By implemenbng a 
nabve rule policy adopted in the mid 1920s and clearly aiming for co-optabon 
of the indigenous and emerging educated elite, the colonial administration 
also created opportumhes for some Africans to occupy poh beai posibons 
within the colonial state apparatus The state estabhshed the Local Nabve 
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Councils (LNCs) representing the colonial government's first attempt to 
provide an administrative agency through which a certain amount of African 
development could be secured without the resources for such development 
having to be drawn from central government revenue, most of which was 
expended in the settler areas. African chiefs and headmen were appointed by 
the administration as tax collectors and they had the additional functions of 
rallying for support and organizing labour gangs for public works (road 
construction in particular) within the Reserves. To secure central government 
control of the activities of the LNCs, District Officers acted as ex-officio 
chairmen of the Councils with an absolute power of veto.« 
The role of the LNCs was crucial in several aspects. First of all it was crucial 
in guiding the energies of the 'educated' and 'progressive' Africans emerging 
from the mission schools and working together with African associations (such 
as the Kikuyu Central Association and the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare 
Association). The LNCs in particular did much to expand the very limited 
educational facilities available to Africans. These mission boys (or 'watu wa 
mission') were seen by the district officers as the progressive forces in the 
districts and were taking up, also encouraged by the African population, 
positions within the LNCs. The LNCs encouraged a wide variety of 
progressive activities in the Reserves, among which, economic enterprise and 
agricultural and pastoral improvements. These included the construction of 
maize mills, small-scale dairies, drying sheds for hides and skins, 
demonstration plots and seed farms for the improvement of agriculture, the 
hire of veterinary extension personnel and the provision of loans to 
prospective businessmen. There is also evidence, according to Kitching, that 
the LNC extended loans for the building of maize mills, shops, hide sheds and 
the purchases of lorries. The precise mechanics of these processes are not 
known; in particular it is not known how these projects, once completed, were 
managed. Kitching (1980) argues, however, that there is evidence of projects 
funded by LNCs being turned over to private ownership and control. At any 
rate the Councils were an important source both of contracts and credits for 
African businessmen. There was a considerable degree of overlap between 
their membership and the first group of African entrepreneurs in the Reserves. 
Among the first group of businessmen were the government appointed chiefs 
and headmen and the 'watu ш mission'.43 
This process had strategic consequences and implications. At least some of 
the government-appointed headmen and chiefs were manoeuvred into a 
political and economic position which enabled them to appropriate surplus 
from their subjects by means of unregulated taxes and fines and to further 
accumulate land and livestock within the Reserves by engaging in costly 
litigation.44 Out of this ruling elite, of which at least some were members of 
the pre-colonial elite, a group of indigenous accumulators of capital and land 
began to emerge in the Reserves by the late 1920s an these gradually became 
involved in capitalist commodity production and increasingly engaged in 
competition with settlers and foreign estates over control of land, labour and 
markets. 
In the course of this process, the traditional land owning elite and their 
political authority in particular were, however, soon outstripped by a new 
indigenous class formed from the educated strata of the African population: 
the mission boys. They represent a different group of people whose economic 
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and political basis can be traced back to the sphere of commerce and salaried 
positions based on educa bon within the state apparatus This new 'educated' 
class consisted mainly of salaried workers Wages served as a means to set up 
trading companies In addition as pointed out before, loans from the LNCs 
were also an important source of credit for engagement m local busmess 
Members of this new 'educated' class became the leaders of the various 
African associations based on tribal or ethnic organization and increasingly 
nationalist in their political orientation and activities 
Various researchers such as Cowen, Leys, Swainson and Kitchmg, point 
repeatedly to the importance of 'straddling' It is a major component m the 
both process of class forma bon in and outside the Reserves and the increasing 
differentiation among African households For Cowen, straddling denotes 'the 
ability to gamer revenue from state and other employment and use that 
revenue in the pursuit of private enterprise, (it) is a historical form through 
which capitalist transformation has occurred m Kenya '45 It is the means by 
which both indigenous capitalists and wage labourers emerged 
An understanding of straddling is crucial for the understanding of future 
politico-economic developments in Kenya Cowen 'In the case of capital, 
revenue out of wage and salaried employment provided the means for setting 
accumulation m motion, m the case of labour, revenue from family and land 
holdings supplemented wages from wage employment to satisfy "the 
conveniences of life'" 46 
The opportunity to straddle increased steadily from the establishment of 
the colonial state An African wage labour force was emerging from the onset 
of colonialism and was engaged m Government service (teaching, clerking, 
service, transport, road construction), undertaking agricultural production on 
land alienated to white settlers (as resident squatters or as contract workers 
who got mostly low-paid jobs) and in African trade and busmess Government 
jobs in particular were new occupations to the Africans requiring some formal 
or informal education Some of these government positions were relatively 
highly paid 47 
The importance of straddling for the new, indigenous class during the 
1930s can only be understood in the colonial context It was a strategy mduced 
by the pohüco-economic setting of colonial Kenya In addibon, the educated 
sections of the African population were stimulated by the colonial 
administration to take this particular route 48 They increasingly shifted from 
the old forms of primitive accumulation (of land and livestock) to straddling 
wage income and commerce Two reasons are immediately apparent The 
opportunities to accumulate capital in agriculture were severely restricted by, 
on the one hand, the white settler monopoly over land, labour and the 
production of high value crops, and, on the other hand, by foreign estates 
involvement in plantation production as well as in commodity production 
schemes permitting the African smallholder to produce high value crops (we 
return to this particular issue later on) In other words, the white settlers and 
foreign estates deprived the indigenous capitalist farmers of the means to 
enlarge land holdings and control over the African labour force For some of 
them, commerce and wage-labour represented an increasingly - and perhaps 
the only - viable option to enable them to create conditions to accumulate 
capital 49 
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Thus during the 1930s we witness the gradual emergence of a class of 
wealthy African capitalist farmers, traders and those occupying salaried 
positions within the administration. These African were about to challenge 
colonial domination in general and white settler dominance in particular. The 
white settlers, above all, represented a countervailing force for the indigenous 
capitalist farmers, inhibiting their accumulation of capital. A further unfolding 
of their accumulation strategy in agriculture would imply at least a removal of 
settler interests groups from the apex of colonial state power. For the new, 
'educated' sectors, whose accumulation was confined to the circulation sphere 
where, however, confronted with severe competition from large and small-
scale Asian merchant companies. This implied that the struggle against Asian 
merchants, predominant in drculationSO, became increasingly nationalistic. 
Semi-political pressure groups (such as the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) 
and the Luo Thrift Union) were formed during this period to articulate their 
aspirations and to remove existing radal restrictions on the participation of 
Africans in trade. Pressure was exerted on the administration to channel state 
finance to the assistance (training, credit) of African traders. Although this 
demand had existed since the 1930s and had been effectuated through the 
LNCs, the schemes to assist African traders on a larger scale were not 
implemented until after World War 11.51 
2.3.2. White settler agriculture during the Great Depression and after 
Before 1930 nearly all settler production of food and other crops (e.g. coffee) 
found its way to export markets. With the slump in world prices, income on 
settler farms fell below production costs. Many settlers went bankrupt and 
acreages under wheat and maize (i.e. crops most affected by falling prices) 
decreased sharply. When settler agriculture contracted many farms were 
abandoned and the amount of underdeveloped white settler land increased 
dramatically. The financial institutions supporting settler agriculture with 
capital, such as the Land Bank and foreign commercial banks, seemed to have 
gained considerable control over the level of development on white-owned 
estates.52 The settler demand for labour fell and Africans found it increasingly 
difficult to meet their tax obligations. Moreover, as stressed before, the fiscal 
base of the colonial state, which relied heavily on taxes from Africans, was in 
jeopardy. Action was required to save the inefficient and bankrupt settler 
economy. 
The colonial state responded to this situation in two ways, with important 
consequences for settler and African agriculture. The administration 
recognized the problem of unoccupied and abandoned white-owned land but 
decided not to force them to develop their land or to return it to the Crown. 
That antagonisms between settlers and the colonial state should be averted 
was probably the reason for this decision. Instead, a marketing strategy was 
designed to give settlers a monopoly of the domestic food market, notably of 
maize - organized through the KJFA. At the same time it was hoped to divert 
increased quantities of African production to export markets. When the first 
element of the strategy appeared to be a complete failure, this arrangement 
was withdrawn in 1942 and was soon followed by the creation of the Maize 
and Produce Board.53 In addition, the colonial administration decided to 
subsidize white settler agriculture. A market with regulated prices was created 
and this gave the settlers a profit over production costs.54 
54 
At any rate, it quickly became clear that the costs of this operation would 
soon be beyond a government whose revenue was declining rapidly It was 
assumed that African producers with much lower production costs, would be 
able to carry export prices at less than the depression level and still show a 
profit Expansion of African production and its direction on to export markets 
was also thought likely to have a double pay-off African export commodity 
production would mcrease export earnings and foreign exchange reserves 
which could be used as a foundabon for further measures to rescue settler 
agriculture Simultaneously, increased incomes for African producers would 
allow settlers to sell them food at higher pnces This was an important 
prologue to a total reversal of pre-1930 policies Reviving or rather supporting, 
African production gradually became the leitmotif of the colonial state 55 
Anderson & Throup (1985) maintain that the future of the colonial state was at 
stake and the survival of the state was ultimately more important than the 
protection of inefficient settler fanners who anyway only compnsed one 
quarter of the European community in Kenya 56 
This situation together with the increasing commercialization of 
agricultural production taking place in African agriculture, the widespread 
occurrence of soil erosion and the famines that struck the African Reserves in 
1929,1930 and 1934 pressed the state to pay more attention to the development 
of these areas It forced the state to direct more funds and manpower into the 
improvement of African agriculture Plans were drawn up by the Department 
of Agriculture to streamline African agriculture, to expand existing crops and 
to introduce new crops, plant-selection and cross-breeding programmes were 
initiated and designed to increase yields In addition, programmes were 
designed to prevent soil erosion which was rampant in most of the Reserves 
Improved vanebes of maize, cotton and other crops have been promoted as 
cash crops since then The adoption by the African farmer of white maize (Zea 
Mays which replaced the Hickory King vanety) was surprisingly fast and, 
more importantly, African agriculture appeared to be highly productive and 
competitive to white settler production For instance, African-produced maize 
for the internal market appeared more profitable than the export maize 
produced by white settlers This led the administration to discover the 
comparative cost advantages of African cash crop production 57 in the course 
of this process, the colonial administration started to undertake developments 
contrary to white settler interests 58 ц commenced by allowing Africans to 
produce, at first on a small scale, and after World War II on a massive scale, 
cash crops (notably coffee and tobacco) which were formerly prohibited as a 
result of settler pressure Pilot coffee schemes were initiated m Central 
Province and in Kisu district of Nyanza Province In addition, the Africans 
were soon allowed to keep graded cattle 
The gradual reversal of the colonial state's agricultural policy contributed 
to a considerable expansion of cropped area in colonial Kenya, despite the 
depression and years of locusts and drought The expansion of the cropped 
area started from the early 1930s, particularly m Kikuyu-land, Nyanza, KJSU, 
Meru-Embu region, Machakos, Kipsigis area, Nandi and the Coast province 
The expansion was partly a continuation of earlier trends and partly based on 
the outbreak of World War II59, but from this on it was profoundly and 
increasingly affected by the intervention of the colonial administration into the 
commodi tiza bon of agriculture 
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The intervention took the form of raising the productivity of labour by 
ensuring the spread of improved instruments of labour, and, probably more 
importantly in this period, by improving the objects of labour. In addition, 
new crops were introduced (coffee, tea,) and others were expanded (cotton 
and wattle). The prerequisites for new styles and forms of commodity 
production and the expansion of commodity relations were there: production 
for the market which stimulated the expansion of the monetary economy and 
also the gradual incorporation of 'western' consumption items (clothes) and 
productive items (i.e. plant technology, jembes and ploughs) which had to be 
imported from abroad and could not be made locally.60 The colonial state's 
intention, and that of the agricultural population and foreign companies, to 
raise productivity on the farm and to extend the economy beyond subsistence 
levels became clear. The Ten Year Plan commencing in 1946, for instance, 
acknowledged that the African was becoming accustomed to satisfying his 
needs on a cash basis and emphasized henceforth that 'he' should be allowed 
to participate in commodity production. 
'He must be in a position to obtain some of his returns in the form of 
cash. It has been argued on the one hand that such crops should not be 
encouraged because of the possible effects on labour supplies and on the 
other hand that they should be increased in order to advance the 
standard of living. (...) The argument on which policy must be based is 
the effect on the land and the people'.61 
These and other policy changes were later formalized in the much-discussed 
agrarian reforms in the 1950s envisaged in the Swynnerton Plan (see 2.4.). 
The continuing reversal in colonial state policy cannot solely be attributed 
to the changing attitude of the colonial administration towards African 
agriculture. It is a two-way recognition of the fact that a removal of state-
imposed restrictions on African production was needed for a full-scale 
expansion of commodity production and relations. Some, but not all, sectors of 
the administration^ were willing to expand African agriculture because they 
saw its productive potential; consequently, for them there was less need to 
sustain settler agriculture as the only viable agricultural system.63 Parallel to 
the critical economic position of the white settlers, their political influence was 
declining. This implied that the settler cause could no longer be defended as 
strongly as before.64 But on the other hand, the colonial state was increasingly 
confronted with demands from certain sectors of the African population to 
reverse its policies, i.e. by the 'big' men who felt the frustration of the settler 
presence the most. Those who were most conscious of the lack of opportunity 
were precisely the embryo-indigenous capitalists who had made the most of 
what opportunities did exist. And it was in response to their anger - and in 
recognition of their productive potential - that the colonial administration 
embarked on its post-war agrarian reforms. In other words, the Kenyan 
producers started to push for the right to commercialize agricultural 
production on a much wider scale.65 
The position of the white settlers was, however, also assailed by foreign 
interests, i.e. estate, finance, merchant and industrial companies. Although 
foreign estates benefitted likewise from the ensured labour supply, they 
developed a different accumulation strategy. Foreign estates cared little about 
who produced the commodities for export and processing. They were willing 
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to develop a sector of peasant production as long as they could retain control 
and supervision over such production and over distribution and processing of 
that particular commodity Estate companies - such as British American 
Tobacco (in tobacco) and Forestal, Land & Timber (in wattle)** - started to 
experiment with small-scale peasant production and to allow Africans to 
produce cash crops provided that the company supervised production The 
exclusion of Africans from access to fertile land and capital hampered the 
expansion of small-scale commodity production under the aegis of 
international agro-firms Rather similar arguments were used by merchant and 
finance capital to challenge white settler dominance For merchant companies 
and banks, the ban on private land ownership by Africans and the prohibition 
on growing high-value crops frustrated the development of an internal market 
for international goods and restncted the demand for capital m the form of 
credit 67 Merchant companies such as British American Tobacco (BAT) 
commenced to operate through African traders to expand trade into the 
Reserves Estate, merchant and finance companies and institutions were 
willing as the African population to promote African participation in trade 
and agriculture and to raise productivity m all sectors of agriculture The 
immediate meaning of this strategy was not only that m the eyes of foreign 
enterprises the restrictions on African commodity production needed to be 
removed and that the settlers had to give up their privileged position The 
strategy of international capital to promote commodity production by small-
scale producers also prevented the further concentration of labour and land in 
indigenous capitalist production enterprises This constriction in its tum 
aggravated the demand by the indigenous capitalists for the acquisition of 
land in the White Highlands and/or represented a push for members of this 
class to find alternative ways to accumulate capital Straddling, as already 
stressed earlier, between agricultural production and wage-employment and 
trade was a commonly applied strategy 
2.4. Post-war policy reforms and the transfer of state power 
It became clear to the colonial administration that, in the wake of the Second 
World War and its aftermath, white settler dominance could no longer be 
sustained Pressure exercised by foreign capitalist interest groups and the 
indigenous capitalists, articulated in a variety of ways and on different 
occasions, on the administration to revise its policies coincided with a 
considerable build-up of political unrest m the colony after the endmg of 
World War II New political organizations were formed to channel and to 
articulate popular discontent Growing incidences of landlessness, 
unemployment, low wages, accelerating population growth resulting in 
increased pressure on the land and declining soil fertility in the Reserves, 
were part of the popular discontent Trade unions such as the African Workers 
Union (AWF) organizing the growing urban wage-labour force emerged to 
guide the widespread call for radical reforms m the colony The formation of 
the Kenya African Union (KAU) m 1947, replacing the KCA which had been 
banned m 1940 as a subversive organization, was aimed at secunng 
constitutional reforms KAU was a more moderate mass political organization 
led by the educated and landed sections of the African population (such as 
Kenyatta), while the leaders of the AWF were relatively uneducated men, close 
to the ordinary workers By 1950, widespread unemployment and landlessness 
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among a large Kikuyu population lent impetus to more militant and violent 
actions Militant groups of the KAU came to the forefront resulting in the Mau 
Mau rebelbon and in the proclama bon of the Emergency in 1952 The Mau 
Mau movement, fighting a guerrilla war against British troops which were 
called in to restore law and order, was more than just a struggle against 
colonialism and white settlers for land which was alienated to the white 
community Mau Mau was also directed against the landed Kikuyu 'loyalist' 
within the Reserve It was not an isolated movement as it received much 
political and material support from grass-root organizations of African town 
dwellers in Nairobi The squatters on the settler farms in the White Highlands 
who belonged to the most degraded and lowest paid African labour force, and 
particularly the Kikuyu squatters and the Nairobi dwellers, finally supplied 
the majority of the Mau Mau freedom fighters That they too pined the ranks 
of the Mau Mau is a reflection of impoverishment and frustration of the lowest 
paid and least secure sections of the African population 68 
The Mau Mau rebelbon accelerated the beginning of new policy thinking in 
the colony More importantly, perhaps, with the advent of Mau Mau when 
British troops intervened directly to rescue the colony, the British state was 
given the opportunity to over-rule settler mterests and displace their political 
authority over colonial affairs The British state moved itself in a political 
position of strength to decide whether to support the settlers militarily or to 
find a long term solution and to draw Africans into the economic and political 
structure of the country 69 The shift in state policy was accelerated by the need 
for a long-term solution rather than the maintenance of colonial order m 
Kenya m favour of the settler community It was hoped ι this way to channel 
and counter the political unrest in the colony, accelerated the shift m state 
policy The root cause of Mau Mau, detected by the administration itself as the 
loss of Kenyan land to Europeans, needed to be eliminated by economic and 
political reforms This policy shift was most certainly welcomed by proponents 
of African agriculture within the colonial administration who clearly saw the 
need for another policy which they had already remotely and marginally 
practised Far-reaching policy reforms were launched by the colonial 
administration launched with much vigour after World War II with the 
support of the British state and its reform-like sectors 
The adoption of the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 officially marked the 
definitive change m colonial state policy towards African participation m 
agriculture and mandated various development initiatives already 
implemented earlier 70 The Plan is named after the deputy-director of 
Agriculture in the Agricultural Department and chairman of a commission 
installed by the colonial administration to research the opportunities for 
increased production in the African areas as well as to initiate policy measures 
The Swynnerton Plan is a reflection of the struggle taking place within colonial 
Kenya It is above all, a response by the colonial administration to the 
demands of Africans to commercialize their production, to allow them to grow 
high-value cash crops and to permit them to hold title deeds on land, finally 
removing the racial constraints over property ownership 
The technical details of the Swynnerton Plan will be dealt with in Chapter 
3 Here we shall merely emphasize the political implications of the Plan 
The Plan contained a combination of various measures to increase 
commodity production by smallholders and subsequently to facilitate the 
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expansion of commodity relations in the rural areas/1 Restrictions on high-
value cash crop production by Africans were thereafter lifted and, in 
congruence to Swynnerton's ideas, Africans were permitted to own freehold 
land. The corollary of the latter was that all land had to be registered.72 For 
that purpose, a programme of land consolidation and enclosure of new land 
was implemented.73 
The Swyimerton Plan is of central importance for an understanding of both 
the development of African agriculture in Kenya immediately after its 
implementation in the 1950s and for the contemporary features of Kenya's 
political economy. The meaning of the Plan stretches far beyond than simply 
allowing African producers to grow high-value crops and the establishment of 
a sophisticated, modem technico-administrative structure upon which 
commodity production for the international and national market could 
expand. The Swyimerton Plan proclaimed an agrarian revolution finally 
destroying all elements of previous colonial agricultural policies. 
These post-war reforms had far reaching political consequences. The land 
tenure reform was intended to create a solid middle peasantry. The 
Swynnerton Plan is quite definite in this political intention. A middle 
peasantry would be invaluable as a buffer between the settler community and 
political trouble-makers demanding a general redistribution of land. As a 
counter-revolutionary measure, land reform in Central Province was used, 
during the Emergency years, essentially to reward the loyalists among the 
Kikuyu peasantry at the expense of the Mau Mau fighters and their 
supporters. As the security situation improved, land tenure reform was given 
a broader political objective, i.e. the creation of a stable sodal and political 
order. In order to achieve this, policy measures were taken, such as the pre-
independence settlement schemes, to absorb the dispossessed peasantry since 
they could become a source of political unrest in the future. In this respect the 
land reform arrested a further concentration of land into plantations and 
estates owned by foreign companies or into the hands of the indigenous 
capitalist farmer class, simultaneously creating opportunities for commodity 
production by independent small-scale producers. 
The policy reforms propelled various important politico-economic 
tendencies within Kenya. International developments and the quest by the 
African population for political and economic independence counterbalanced 
the possibility of maintaining colonial order in Kenya. From the late forties 
onward, i.e. before the reforms were effectuated in official policies, African 
participation in agricultural commodity production and trade rose 
significantly.75 The relative economic success created a political consciousness 
among the indigenous capitalists whose accumulation routes did not fit into 
the object of colonialism76 They were no longer satisfied with the status quo, 
although colonialism permitted some enlargement of their accumulation base. 
In order to compete with settler and Asian merchant companies in agriculture 
and commerce respectively, they started to press the colonial state to remove 
the obstruction on further accumulation in these and other sectors of the 
economy. It became increasingly dear that political independence was 
necessary to remove the limitations placed by Asian merchants and the 
growing weight of international capitalist enterprises upon accumulation by 
Africans. Leys (1978) pointed out that this politico-economic struggle was 
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dominated by the 'modem', educated elements among indigenous capitalists 
instead of the older, 'primitive' element T7 
The Bntish state stimulated production in the colonies m order to 
contribute to the solution of the dollar shortage which developed after Word 
War II Additionally, World War II created a shortage m consumption items 
This composite situation created both a conduave investment climate and the 
opportunity for investment in import substitution by settlers and Asians The 
settlers in particular started to build up ancillary services in the agricultural 
sector The dnve towards import substitution widened the industrial base 
which formerly concentrated pnmanly on agricultural primary processing 
The majority of the investments went into import substitution 78 
An important immediate effect of the expansion of African commodity 
production in agriculture and commodity relations, and a direct impetus 
behind the formulation of the Swynnerton Plan and other plans, was that 
British as well as Amencan compames were eager to invest in Kenya Bntish 
firms, m particular, tned to regain the position they had had in industry before 
World War II - a position which was lost during the war 79 After World War II, 
foreign investment increased sharply More than a third of private shares m 
industry in 1958 were controlled by foreign industrial firms, and mainly 
international firms The investment pattern was highly concentrated Almost 
every branch of the economy were dominated by one or two firms 80 
International, and, more particularly a British post-war concern arose for an 
increasing supply of food and raw materials from sterling area sources This 
interest was assona ted with a colonial desire to promote welfare through 
smallholder production in the countryside and resulted in the removal of 
racial and ethnic barriers against indigenous capital accumulation The British 
state intervened directly, as stressed earlier, in colonial development affairs in 
Kenya Just as military intervention was the form during Mau Mau and the 
Emergency penod, so the main arm of the British state in supporting 
development m Kenya was now the Colonial Development Corporation 
(CDC), a Britain based fmance agency The CDC fmanced, for instance, the 
expansion of tea production by small-scale Afncan producers In addition, the 
CDC subsidized industrial production in Kenya until it became profitable and 
was hived off to Bntish firms 81 
After the war, the undermining of the monopolies and privileges of the 
settler community became the leitmotif of the colonial state, the British and 
Amencan state as well of foreign enterprises The developments in Kenya after 
World War Π were thus shaped by an intermingling of mtemal and external 
forces, accelerating the process of independence for Kenya and the transfer of 
state power to an mdependent Kenyan government 
After the Emergency terminated and the Mau Mau rebellion was defeated 
by Bntish troops, the colonial administration removed the ban on Afncan 
politicai organizations The aforementioned economic reforms were 
implemented, while at the political level the colonial authorities began to 
negotiate with the modem, educated elements of the Afncan population 
Among these were prominent persons, such as Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap 
Moi, who had a lengthy history of engaging in representative politics m the 
LNCs and the colonial Legislative Council Thus, a new dass was not 
suddenly summoned up out of the mass of the Afncan population to fulfil a 
role m the post-colonial order 82 These people were organized in political 
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parties formed during 1960, such as the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) led by Kenyatta and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) led by 
arap Moi. These political organizations articulated the internal political 
pressure on the colonial state to establish a new socio-political order and to 
dismantle the existing barriers to further accumulation. The negotiations for 
independence began, and independence was agreed in 1961 after several 
constitutional conferences held at Lancaster House in London. KADU and 
KANU were the largest and most influential African рюliticai organizations 
and represented during these negotiations the interests of the African 
population. Despite the differences between both political parties, they shared 
the ideology of the free enterprise system and private property. Pre-
independence elections were held in 1963 and won with an overwhelming 
majority by KANU, and Kenyatta was appointed as Kenya's first African 
prime minister and later president. Kenya became an independent country on 
12th December 1963 signifying the ultimate removal of the white settlers from 
the apex of state power. 
2.5. Conclusions 
This chapter stressed that the colonial state must not be seen solely as a 
manager of capitalist development in Kenya. The state apparatus and the state 
bureaucracy used their powers to express its own interests and perceptions of 
development and agrarian change. The colonial state also appeared, however 
to be a condensation of endogenous and exogenous politico-economic 
interests. The state appeared to be a an ensemble of institutions upon which 
the various actors exercised political pressure to implement policies to further 
their own interests. Through a myriad of political organizations and 
associations, white settlers and Africans tried to influence their conditions of 
production as well as to control the direction in which the expansion of 
commodity production in agriculture could proceed. Through political 
representation, the white settlers in particular gained privileged access to state 
services and funds. The post-war reforms implemented by the colonial state 
under pressure of internal and external interest groups changed this situation 
significantly. From that time onwards, participation by Africans producers in 
agriculture and commerce, as well as and indigenous accumulation was 
strengthened. 
The chapter indicated the crucial role of the state during the period 
between World War I and II. That particular episode must be considered as a 
watershed in politico-economic developments in Kenya. During that period 
and particularly after Word War II, the state, due to an intermingling of 
several political forces, manoeuvred itself gradually into a position of strength 
vis-à-vis the white settlers who had dominated the decision making process of 
the colonial state apparatus for a long time. White settler interests were 
increasingly overruled by the colonial and the British state. From that time 
onward, various interests in the colony were set on a collision course which 
was to culminate in the Mau Mau Rebellion in the early 1950s, the 
proclamation of far-reaching agrarian and political reforms and ultimately in a 
transfer of colonial state power to an independent African government in 1963. 
In this particular respect it is crucial to understand that state formation and 
the role of the state can and must be viewed in the light of a process: an 
apparatus transformed by sodai forces in society acting upon it as well as 
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society transformed by the state apparatus. The colonial state apparatus 
pursued policies which established an administrative and modem 
technological agrarian structure upon which household and capitalist 
commodity production by smallholders and estate producers expanded 
gradually. In the course of this process, a class of indigenous capitalists 
emerged which took the lead in the struggle for independent rule to realize a 
political order which would, as we shall see in Chapter 8, accommodate their 
economic interests. More importantly, perhaps, post-war colonial rule also laid 
a politico-economic foundation for household commodity production and 
arrested the further concentration of land. 
Notes 
1 In this respect, we follow the historical research endeavours of Cowen (1981a, 1983,1986), 
Cowen h Kmyanjui (1977), Leys (1975,1978), Kitching (1977,1980) and Swainson (1977,1980). 
Their objective was precisely to establish the specificity of the transition from pre-capitalist to 
capitalist relations of production. Cowen m particular sees that transition as governed by a 
complex interaction of the forms and 'periods' of indigenous and foreign accumulation of 
capital over the past hundred years. An interaction, on which the colonial and post-colonial 
state plays a crucial role. 
2 The archaeological record of mankind m Kenya is the oldest in the world, stretching back 
some four to five million years to the earliest men and women and their immediate forebears 
living on the shores of Lake Turkana near the current border with Ethiopia. There is no need to 
review here the developments during the early period of mankind through the stone-age and 
late stone-age penod, when food produchon started, up to the iron-age. We start our review in 
the 17th century. For a detailed archaeological review see Spear (1981), chapter I 
3 Some came from other areas of the African continent, others claimed to originate from 
Kenya. See Spear (1981), chapter II and HI. 
^ This makes it hard to present a coherent picture of Kenya as a whole, but nevertheless some 
clear overall trends are traceable. 
5 See MacWilliams (1976), p. 3; Carlsen (1980), p. 17; Obudho & Waller, p. 8; Feam (1961), p. 27 
and Spear (1981), p. 114. 
6 See Feam (1961), p. 28, Spear (1981), pp. 114, 115, Hitching (1980), pp. 8-22 and Uzoigwe 
(1976). 
7 The most important source is Cowen. See also Cowen & Kmyanjui (1977), Kitchmg (1980), 
Leys (1978), Feam (1961), Cliffe (1977), Stichter (1982), Carlsen (1980), Ogot (1976), 
MacWilliams (1976), Mukara Ng-ang-a (1981), Ambler (1985) and Cohen & Odhiambo (1989). 
Leys (1978) prefers to label the pre-colomal elite as 'a class of accumulators'. Although he 
stresses that it involves 'primitive accumulation', this labelling is not accurate since 
accumulation (and hence accumulators) can only be linked with capital accumulation. What 
was occurring in pre-colomal Kenya was a concentration of control (not ownership) ova' the 
principal means of producbon in the hands of a few 
8 See for instance Feam, pp. 36-38; Stichter (1975), p. 24 and Cliffe (1977), p. 200. 
9 This statement is based on a.o. Baran (1973). He suggested the hypothesis that trade based on 
inter-society contact is beneficial for both sides only when they are both at a comparable level 
of soao-cconomic and technological development; conversely, the bigger the gap, the more 
detrimental the consequences to the weaker party (i.e Africa). See also Sheriff (1976) and Amin 
(1972.1973). Amin showed that during and since the period of mercanble-capitalism, Africa's 
development was sblted and in many cases reversed. Africa lost its autonomy. 
10 For more detailed information about the development of trade, the effect of import/export 
trade on the spatial development of the Kenyan economy and company formation see: 
Swainson (1980), Feam (1961), Memon (1973,1976) and Obudho & Waller (1976). 
11 In the beginning, the impact of trade was merely restricted to the coast. It brought new 
consumption items and wealth but also destroyed the local textile, weaving and iron 
industries which could not survive the stiff competition of imported goods from Asian 
countries and later from Europe and America. When the Arabian merchants changed from 
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Import/export trade (а о in slaves) to production of certain crops (grains, copra) for export 
under favourable economic conditions d e. by employing slaves), the demand for slaves 
increased dramatically and commercial production enterprises (plantations) were established 
m Kenya itself. See Sheriff (1976), Cooper (1980) and Spear (1981) 
12 The establishment of a British Protectorate can be viewed as a response of the Bnbsh state 
to the failure of the Imperial Bnbsh East Africa Company to establish favourable conditions 
for the exploitation of the region's natural resources Western Kenya was not part of the 
Protectorate and was administered by Britain from Uganda. In 1920 the Western region 
became part of Kenya See Van Zwanenberg (1975), Leys (1975) and Sorrenson (1968) 
13 For an in depth account of developments m Uganda, see Mamdani (1976) and Jorgensen 
(1981) 
14 The admmistrabon invited in agricultural experts whose reports invariably stressed 'the 
apparent abundance of land and annate suited to both tropical and temperate agriculture' 
(Smith, 1976, ρ 113). 
15 Huxley (1957) described (from a pro-white settler point of view) the attempts of the colonial 
administration to persuade South African (particularly Afrikaners) and Rhodesian farmers to 
settle m Kenya. TTie plan succeeded and many Afrikaners came to Kenya, renewed their 
ossentrek and wandered in the open 'veld', cleanng lands which were not occupied by white 
settlers from Britain The Afrikaners laid the foundabon for the colonization of the western 
parts of the White Highlands, particularly around Eldoret And there they encountered the 
extremely warlike Nandi (see Chapter 5) The coloniza hon of this part of the Highlands 
excluded the Nandi and Maasai from access to the productive pastures in the North to which 
they used to migrate The Nandi were locked up into a Reserve and the Maasai were driven to 
the South where they sbll remain After this penod of 'primitive' colonization by the 
Afrikaners of these parts of the Scheduled Areas, many other, mainly Bnbsh settlers, followed. 
16 See Swainson (1980) p. 6. 
17 Ibid, ρ 6 H 
18 Ibid, pp 48-51, and Londsdale & Berman (1979) Van Zwanenberg (1975, pp 31 ff) stresses 
that the state acted as an instrument on behalf of the settlers, but it was never automabcally an 
integral part of the economy For most colonial state officials it was a question of cultural and 
social identification rather than immediate structural association The settlers did not identify 
with the state to them it was an instrument to be manipulated and to be used for their own 
ends. 
19 The KFA was bom in the Nakuru area in the first decade of the 20th century through a 
group of farmers trying to organize the selling of their surplus maize Its first name was the 
Maize Growers' Association and was later changed in KFA The date of birth is less clear than 
Its objeebve. It had been in existence for several years before its records started in 1919 In 1922 
The Plateau Maize Growers' Association was founded by settlers (English and a few 
Afrikaners) who took up the farming of wheat and maize on the Uasin Gishu Plateau The 
Kenya Wheat Growers' Association was formed in 1925 by Lord Delamare, the great advocate 
of wheat growing in Kenya and the founder and major shareholder of Unga Ltd In 1927 these 
three settler organizations merged into the KFA These were hard bmes for the settlers. 
Diseases, no roads, lack of capital and marketing infrastructures and the unknown climate and 
ecology caused a lot trouble The KFA's objective was to improve marketing, to ensure good 
prices for their products and to stimulate the scientific breeding of maize in Kenya. Levies per 
purchased bag were contnbuted to implement these objectives. The KFA was also formed to 
protect the weaker séchons of the settler farmers by guaranteeing (minimum) pnces for their 
commodities. KFA, however, was dominated by large settler fanners See Huxley (1957), Van 
Zwanenberg (1975), chapter I and Leys (1975), chapter II 
20 In the beginning they were granted on a 21-year basis, but later extended to 99 years. 
21 Swainson (1980), p. 6, Leys (1975), ρ 29 and Sorrenson (1968) 'Occupied' is used to 
distinguish this land from actually-culhvatcd land Particularly in the beginning, the settlers 
had neither the knowledge and funds nor the labour force to cultivate all the land they owned. 
The total alienated land was more than 4 million hectares by 1953 
22 See Swainson (1980), p. 63 ff. 
23 See Smith (1976), ρ 115 ff. Leys (1975), pp 33-66 and Van Zwanenberg (1975), pp. 35 ff. 
Collier & Lai (1986), table 11, p. 31 mention a percentages ranging between 15 3 and 20.4 % for 
this penod. 
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2 4
 The reason for opposing commodity production by Africans was, of course, the fear that 
they could outperform white settlers quite easily (African coffee production in Uganda and 
Tanganyika demonstrated this quite clearly) and that it would led to a movement of labour 
away from European agriculture (See а о Smith (1976) 
25 See а о Kitching(1980),p 200 ff and Smith (1976), ρ 116 ff 
26 See in particular Brett (1973), pp 192 -196 and van Zwanenburg (1975) 
2 7
 See а о Huxley (1957), Van Zwanenbcrg (1975), chapter I and Leys (1975), pp 29 ff The 
weakness of the settler agriculture and their financial welfare was hidden behind the high 
commodity pnces during the 1920s Most settlers survived thanks to high mortgages on their 
land which they could repay because of the high prices The productivity of settler agriculture, 
however, could not warrant the debt burden of the individual settler During the Great 
Depression years the debt became an intolerable burden 
28 brctt (1973), ρ 176 
29 Kitching (1980) ρ 25, Heyer (1981), ρ 103 and Mosley (1983), ρ 74 ff 
30 Ib,d and also Heyer (1975) ρ 143, Carlsen (1980) ρ 21, Feam (1961) ρ 43 
31 See Swamson (1980), ρ 33, 35, Carlsen (1980), pp 21-22, Van Zwanenberg (1975), ρ 5-15 
and chapter HI, Anderson & Throup (1985), ρ 329 and Heyer (1975,1976,1981) 
32 As is documented by Kitching (1980) pp 25-57 Chapter Г of his book and chapter ΙΠ of 
Mosley (1983) give a detailed account of African agriculture during the years of the 
Depression Kitching raises an important point The redistribution of labour time, represented 
in the emergence of an African working class, consisted essentially of men The sexual division 
of labour on the farm changed accordingly 
33 Heyer (1975), ρ 148 
34 See Cowen (1983), ρ 203 
35 Access to educabon played an enormous role in the upward mobility of 'progressive' 
fanners and the nascent indigenous capitalists The role of the Local Native Councils as well as 
the missionaries is important too See Kitching (1980), pp 188-199 and pp 297 - 311 for the 
life-stones of several of the emerging 'big' men in colonial Kenya 
36 Cowen (1983), ρ 204 
37 Wahl wa mission' as opposed to the watu wa blanketi' (the men in blankets) which is the 
urunstructed and pagan element in the reserve, see Cowen (1986), ρ 361 
38 See Cowen (1983), ρ 203 and Kitching (1980), pp 159-188 for more details 
39 According to Heyer this aspect is neglected in most of the analysis of agranan change m 
Kenya by several authors Heyer (1981), ρ 98 
40 For developments in Maragoli area see Martin (1984) 
41 See а о Cowen's work on Central Province and Kitching (1980), pp 108 -159,200 - 240, and 
Heyer (1981), pp 96, 97 for developments in regions other than Central Province In chapter 4 
we shall pay more attention to regional imbalances m Kenya' agncultural economy 
42 Kitching (1980), ρ 188 
43 Ibid, ρ 189, ff 
44 See а о Cowen (1983), ρ 203, Leys (1978), ρ 248 and Mukara Ng'ang'a (1981), ρ 11 
Cowen and Mukara stress that, through litigation, quite a number of workers and squatters 
lost their land in the Reserves When they returned, their land had been taken or bought by 
others Some sold all they had so as to raise money for litigation, but lost the suits Land 
disputes took over 75 % of the Tnbunal's time and thousands of shillings were spent in 
libgabon 
45 Cowen (1986),p 364 
46 Ibid, ρ 364 
47 Kitching (1980), pp 16, 17 Kitching stresses that the opportunities for high off-farm 
incomes were generally better in Kikuyu land than in Nyanza This situation appears to be of 
strategic political importance later The Kikuyu 'straddlers' invested heavily in educabon 
which facilitated their entry into vanous strategic positions within the state apparatus from 
which they could control the state after Independence 
48 See а о Cowen (1981,1986) and Leys (1978) ρ 247, Swamson (1980) pp 173-208, Swamson 
(1977), Kitching (1980) pp 159 187, Carlsen (1980) ρ 22 The nse of the new indigenous class, 
however, was not a creation of the colonial state and can be traced back to developments In the 
1930s when commodity production started to expand m the Reserves 
49 Former Vice-President Oginga Odinga (1966) has clearly analyzed the strategy of straddling 
from this point of view in his autobiography Not Yet Uhuru 
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5 υ
 The majonty of traders in wholesale and retail belong to the Asian minonty group Their 
position in Kenya's political economy is such that their economic activities bearne restncted 
lo commerce Ownership of agricultural land was prohibited for Asians Asians were never 
able to exercise political power, under cither the colonial or independent regime, which would 
have sustained their accumulation Their relative isolation gave nse to the emergence of family 
business operations which were reluctant to bnng in outside capital and management Many 
Asians remained therefore in commerce only some of them were able to move into spheres (in 
manufactunng) other than commerce The family mode of operation In Asian enterprises 
rendered them more competitive than, for instance, settler enterprises See Swainson (1980), ρ 
54 
51 Ibid, pp 176, ff 
52 Van Zwanenberg (1975), pp 29,30 
53 It became dear to the administrahon that, although settlers dominated the marketed 
production of maize, Afncan producbon was increasing rapidly, and that its producers were 
far too many to be effectively cartellized The administration's first response was to regulate 
markets It attempted to bnng in marketing rules for maize with the intention of forcing 
Afncan producers to sell in regulated markets (rather than to a plethora of small traders) and 
to meet certain quality standards guaranteeing higher pnces On the other hand, the KFA 
never had the funds nor the ability to organize the purchase and storage of maize which 
would have been required if the base of domesbc pnces was to be lifted The maize strategy 
dunng this penod was thus a complete failure See Kitching (1980), pp 60-62 
54 Dunng the years of the Great Depression maize pnces dropped from 12/- per bag to 3/- or 
even below, a sum far below the cost of producbon (wheat pnces fell from 19/- per bag to 5/-
to 6/- a bag) A conference initiated by (he KFA, held in 1930, found that the European cost 
for maize was 6/50 per bag The administration was prepared to pay the 6/50 pnce and this 
implied an enormous subsidy Huxley (1957), ρ 107 This implied also that the more effiaent 
groducers were subsidizing their less effiaent compatnots 5 The change in state policy was not and could not be achieved in one day A new and 
positive strategy was clearly on its way but it is clear as Kitching argues the 'Afncan producers 
could not be turned overnight Into major export producers and consumers of settler products 
In fact by 1938, when the depression was over, Afncan producers still only contributed 
thirteen per cent of exports value' Such a strategy would have required allocation of 
considerable amounts of money and manpower into the Afncan areas At that time, the 
commitment to do so was not really present, either in the administration or in the settler 
community Increasing food, and particularly, maize producbon by Afncan producers for the 
internal market and offering marketing facilities were the only way out See Kitching, pp 60-
62 
56 Anderson & Throup (1985), ρ 329 
57 The rationale of banning Afncan production of coffee was also undermined by the 
successful expenences with Afncan coffee producbon in the other Bntish colonics in East 
Afnca, Uganda and Tanganyika 
58 а о Heyer (1981), pp 102 ff Kitching (1980), pp 59,60 and Brett (1973), ρ 184 
59 The outbreak of WW-II was a so-called economic boom penod for Afncan agnculture The 
presence of troops from South Afnca, India and Britain expanded the domesbc market for 
food stuffs. The colonial administration's war effort was to expand food exports, particularly 
for the provisioning of troops in the Middle East Campaign Africans as well as settlers were 
encouraged to put every available acre under food crops The Maize and Produce Board was 
established by the colonial administration to maximize maize producbon in all suitable areas 
Shortly before and dunng WW-II, maize producbon in remote areas (like Nandi and areas in 
Kencho) was hindered by the general absence of marketing opportunities while the conditions 
for maize producbon were favourable and maize producbon was only slowly expanding The 
Board was created to give these areas the full benefit of high wartime pnces The creabon of 
the Board meant that earlier arrangements made with settlers and the KFA to market maize in 
Kenya were withdrawn from them See Kitching (1980), pp 108, 109, Huxley (1957) and also 
footnote 53 of this chapter For an historical account of the ongins of marketing boards in 
colonial Kenya see Heyer (1976), Brown (1968), Leys (1975) and Bates (1980,1983) 
60 See Kitching (1980) pp 106-107, Feam (1961) pp 111-114 team relates the adopbon of 
clothing by the Africans to the teaching of the missionanes expressing Victonan ideas and 
values The improvement of farming technology and crops was not only supported by the 
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state's agricultural extension service but was indirectly also the fruit of the hard work by white 
settlers in scientific plant breeding The settlers' intention was first of all to develop an 
agricultural input industry which could support settler agriculture, in the second place, and, 
this shows how much the intention changed, to gam at least control over the input part of 
African agriculture when it became clear that African agriculture could not be halted any 
longer 
61 Quoted in Smith (1976), pp 123,124 
62 Anderson jc Throup (1985), ρ 343 have highlighted this clearly Based on several colonial 
agricultural reports and archives, they detect that the wisdom of the strategy to promote 
African agriculture was doubted The doubters within the Agricultural Department were 
convinced that their worst fears had been justified The emerging "big men' were seen as a 
threat to the sociological and ecological equilibrium of the Reserves The spread of 'selfish 
individualism' at the expense of the communal solidarities of pre-colorual Africa, it was 
suggested by these doubters, had undermined the balance between Africans and their land 
Agricultural production had reached 'a scale which is positively harmful to the best interests 
of the land and the people ' 
63 In respect it is hard to distinguish the fiscal and economic motives (high productivity and 
low costs) from the soaal mohves (more welfare for an impoverished peasantry) of the 
administration to support small scale African commodity production 
M A new and positive strategy was clearly on its way, however, without preventing some 
sectors of the colonial administration from being engaged m strategies to rescue settler 
agriculture Africans, for instance, continued to pay for the tribulations of European 
agriculture in Kenya through the tax system [see for instance Brett (1973) and van 
Zwanenburg (1974,1975)) In addition, several plans were drawn up to improve productivity 
and efficiency on European farms marking a continuing concern on the part of the 
administration for white settler agriculture New settlers were attracted to occupy land bought 
from people whose holdings were too large, credit facilities were enlarged resulbng in a more 
intensive mixed farming systems The proportion of land under crop in the large farm sector 
increased, production and wage-employment expanded marking the growth of the large farm 
sector during the mid 1940s and early 1950s All this happened in a period when pnces on the 
world market rose the benefits of the price rises accrued largely to the settler community 
Paradoxically enough, settler influence diminished in a penod of economic prosperity See 
Van Zwanenberg (1974,1975), Smith (1976) and Heyer (1981) 
65 Cowen (1981, pp 131-132) pays attenhon to an interesting case illuminating the argument 
that among the Africans, interests were not uniform In certain regions, culling, dipping and 
the exclusion of grade stock from holdings of smaller households was urged by 'progressive' 
farmers This can be seen as an attempt by neh farmers to protect their interests by preventing 
smallholder production in grade cattle through state imposed acbon The fact that it 
culminated in widespread disturbances between 1945 and 1949 illustrates that smaller 
households refused to be bullied by the state and the progressive farmers and that they also 
wanted access to improved objects and elements of labour (i e new and improved culbvars 
and instruments) 
66 Forestal reallocated its investment from South Africa to Kenya The spontaneous planting of 
wattle m Kenya since the early 1920s by indigenous capitalist farmers threatened to disturb the 
output and pnces decisions of Forestal to equilibrate the international market for tanning 
extracts Forestal responded by inveshng in Kenya and from the early 1940s, started to 
purchase wattle produced by middle peasants who became engaged in wattle production at 
the same bme For more details of wattle producbon in Central Province, the posibon of 
Forestal in relabon to the colonial administration and indigenous capitalist farm interests, see 
Cowen (1982a), ρ 159,160 and Cowen (Шіа) 
67 The traditional role of finance capital is to facilitate the transfer of money capital into 
produebve enterpnses All the foreign banks (mainly Bnbsh and Indian banks) established 
offices in Kenya to finance commodity trade and to provide credit to the farmers. 
68 See Leys (1975), pp, 48 ff. Miller (1984), pp 20, ff and also Sorrenson (1968) and Furedi 
(1973,1976) When the hostilities ended and Mau Mau was defeated, the human losses were 
great 11303 Mau Mau fighters were killed, while the British Army lost 101 Kenyan African 
and 53 European soldiers Furthermore, 32 European civilians and 1319 African loyalist were 
killed by Mau Mau During the Emergency years, nearly a million Kikuyu were forced to 
move from their homesteads to protected villages Thousands of homesteads were destroyed 
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to deny them to die Mau Mau and hundreds of villages were bulldozed In addition, nearly 
100,000 Africans were held in detention camps and 27,000 Kikuyu, Embu and Mem living m 
Nairobi were sent back to the countryside 
69 See а о Van Zwanenberg (1974), pp 165, (f 
70 Two other seminal reports signified the new policy era in Kenya The first, the East African 
Royal Commission report, was a plea for a free market in land and industrial development in 
Bnbsh East Africa, the second, the Carpenter report, argued the case for a rapid rise in cash 
wages to a minimum level See а о Swainson (1980), pp 113 ff and Leys (1978), pp 248 ff 
71 It is, therefore, no accident that finance insbtutions m parbcular, and after independence the 
World Bank, supported the objeebves of the Swynnerton plan 
72 See Swynnerton (1954) 
73 Land tenure reform has three aspects, first, the land is adjudicated to ascertain the 
ownership rights of individuals or groups, second, if necessary, separate fragments of land are 
consolidated into single units, third, these land units are registered and the land owner 
receives a title deed This programme is almost completed today land in the districts where 
agricultural development is highly commercialized are virtually all registered, in some remote 
and dry districts registra bon has started only recently For more details, see а о Okoth-
Ogendo (1976), ρ 167-170 After independence, the Bnbsh state offered aid in the form of 
loans to adjudicate and register land, simultaneously offering the state the means to pay off the 
white settlers For more details see Holtham and Hazlewood (1976) 
74 Okoth-Ogendo (1976), pp 163,164, Swynnerton (1954), Sorrenson (1968) and Heyer (1976) 
75 See а о Swainson (1980), pp 177, ff, Kitching (1980), pp 179-189 
76 Oginga Odinga's autobiography illuminates this quite clearly His book not only reflects the 
frustra bon of the African strata to be involved in accumulation of capital, but is also a clear 
example of an ideological (nationalist) attack on the colonial state 
77 See Leys (1978), ρ 248 
78 Swainson (1980), ρ 123, ff 
79 Before World War II, industrializahon in Kenya was limited due to discouragement by the 
Bnbsh state It feared compehhon with home-industry Despite this discouragement some 
industnal activibes were set up by white settlers They invested a small share of their capital in 
grain milling, coffee and milk processing on a cooperahve basis through state-sponsored 
bodies, such as the KFA (who had a majority share in Unga Ltd, a wheat and maize mill), 
Kenya Cooperative Creamenes and the Kenya Planters Union After World War II, Asian 
merchants reallocated their activibes to manufacturing, although, before the war, some had 
already moved into primary processing (oil-milling, cotton ginning, jaggery faetones) Some of 
the merchant groups emerged as large-scale industrial firms A few even became international 
firms operabng outside Kenya The settlers could not withstand the compehhon from Asian 
and foreign firms Immediately after the war, a considerable number of settler firms were 
absorbed by ather Asian or foreign based companies See Swainson (1980), pp 55, 123-135 
Huxley (1957) also gives rather detailed information of settler achvihes related to 
mdustnalizahon 
The penod after World War II gave nse to mdustnalizahon based on import subsbtubon 
African entrepreneurs and settlers were eager to invest Import subsbtubon meant that Bnbsh 
industry lost a considerable share of their markets in Kenya Swainson explains this trend by 
the fact that, dunng the war, Bnbsh industry was not eager to invest because of the war 
Immediately after the war ended, industry was involved in the reconstruction of Britain 
80 Ibid, pp 131,132 
81 See Cowen (1986) ρ 356 and parbcularly Cowen (1982), pp 142 -157 for an account of the 
Bnbsh dnve to expand colonial producbon See Swainson (1980), pp 136 f f for the role of the 
CDC in faalitabng industnalization in the colony The CDC was renamed in the 
mmonwealth Development Corporabon after independence 
Ibid, ρ 361 and also Van Zwanenberg (1974) & 
67 
CHAPTER 3. 
STATE INTERVENTION IN AGRICULTURE SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
Introduction 
Smce the policy reforms of the 1950s and, although there have been some 
modifications smce independence, state a gn cui turai and other policies show a 
remarkable, but nonetheless rather obvious, continuation The role of the state 
is crucial in this respect and became even more important after the transfer of 
state power to an independent government had taken place The state had not 
only assumed an important role in facilitating the development process in 
Kenya m the past, but also expanded its functions and powers (in this regard 
geographically as well as politically) to integrate more areas and more people 
in the development process 
This chapter deals with the following aspects of the state First of all, we 
shall delineate how the state legitimates its leadmg role and how it defmes its 
function Then we shall examine the pohcy objectives or goals of the state's 
agricultural pohcy In order to do that it is necessary to examine the pohbco-
economic and finanaal-economic determmants of state intervenbon and 
policy formulation Secondly, the stage of policy formulation and 
identification of pohcy instruments and means are specified in more detail In 
the last section of this chapter we shall examine the role of foreign aid The 
national level serves in this chapter as the level of analysis 
3.1. The leadmg role of the state 
The Deoelopment Programme of 1957/60, drawn up by the colonial 
administration, laid down the general, but essential, features of future 
developments m Kenya in non-agricultural sectors of the economy The 
programme clearly acknowledged the leadmg role of the state and the private 
sector m economic development In clear terms it is stated that the policy of the 
government is 'based on the encouragement of development mainly through 
private enterprise ' It also emphasized that, m order to develop and sustain the 
system, there has to be 'a continuing injection of imported capital and skill ' 
The role of the state is to establish a free-enterprise economy, but it was seen as 
essential that the state itself ('the public sector') facilitated and encouraged the 
growth of domestic capitalism 1 
The World Bank prepared shortly before and after independence two 
economic reports which recommended the further implementation of both the 
Swyimerton Plan of 1954 and the general development strategy outlined m the 
1957/60 development programmez The independent government endorsed 
the views of the World Bank and asserted that private investment from 
domestic and international sources had a critical role to play 3 
In 1965, two years after independence, the newly independent government 
published a Yfliite Paper, entitled African Socialism and its Application to Planning 
in Kenya The paper spells out what African socialism for Kenya should be 
Non-alignment (no satellite relationships with other nations), adaptability 
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(instead of pragmatism) and prevenbon of dass-forma bon (the paper claims 
that class problems were non-existent) were part of the developmental rhetoric 
of the paper In a separate paragraph, the papier rejects the 'Marxist-soaahsf 
route to development as well as the 'laissez-faire' capitalist way Instead, a 
threefold strategy was proposed in order to seek the fastest possible rate of 
economic growth 
The first objecbve was to reform the inherited colonial economy and to 
establish a vtable mixed economy Kenya's first president, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta 
defined a mixed economy as 'a situation in which the role of the private 
enterprise and that of a government are complementary to each other' * The 
second objecbve is to Afncamze the enbre economy This meant the 
revitalizabon of exisbng parastatali and the creation of new ones with the 
speafic purpose of assisbng Africans to parbcipate m the commodity 
economy In another section, the paper emphasized that it is the individual 
rather than the state who is the initiator of economic activities The economy 
was to be Africanized but not by state ownership of the means of producbon 
The state would support the enlargement of the assets of Africans Thirdly, the 
Paper acknowledged the presence of foreign capital In the fourth place, the 
Paper welcomed foreign assistance and aid flows to Kenya m order to 
contribute to development in Kenya 
The basic lines drawn in the White Paper of 1965 and the Swynnerton Plan 
of 1954 albeit with some minor modifications, are sbll accurate for a 
characterization of contemporary state policy thinking for the agricultural 
sector The White Paper is sbll referred to in order to legitimate the leadmg 
role of the state, ι e, the concentration of policy instruments within the state 
apparatuses which are the backbone of economic planning in Kenya 5 In 
Chapter 8 we shall deal with the political and ideological cargo of the Paper 
3.2. State intervention in agriculture: policy objectives and formulation 
The Swynnerton Plan may be considered as the foundation of contemporary 
agricultural policy formulahon and implementabon The Plan, drawn up in 
the early 1950s to trigger off reform, laid down the essenbal admimsbabve 
and technological bed-rock of Kenya's contemporary agranan structure 
The polibco-admmistrabve conditions for private land tenureship were 
created by the implementabon of the Plan Private land tenureship and 
individual btle deeds on land (i e commoditizabon of land) as well as 
consolidation and registration of holdings were identified as the way to realize 
a sound agranan structure The colonial admimstrabon, and so the post-
colonial bureaucracy, believed that private land tenure was attractive and 
advantageous, politically as well as economically Private property rights to 
land were viewed as a means to internalize the benefits of innovabve 
acbvibes Commodibzabon of land provided the economic incenbves for 
producbvity increases in agriculture 6 Commodibzabon of land was, m its 
tum viewed by the colonial admimstrabon as a means to solve the problems of 
the rather diffuse nature of customary land rights Commodibzabon of land 
would also prevent the chronic and costly libgabon which had become a 
feature of African land relabons Consohdabon of land would also solve the 
problem of excessive fragmentation 
The second perspecbve of the Swynnerton Plan which aimed at promobng 
commodity producbon m the African Reserves was the provision of 
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administrative and technological services. An agricultural extension service for 
African areas was created. Agricultural research programmes were established 
to study the problems of African agriculture and programmes already existing 
were widened. Credit schemes were extended to 'African' areas and marketing 
policies were initiated to support commercialization of African agriculture.' 
The transfer of new technologies - the introduction and adoption by African 
producers of high-value crops (coffee, tea, pyrethrum), improved food crop 
varieties (such as Kitale Synthetics and later hybrid maize varieties) as well as 
improved farm implements - was the agronomic backbone of the Swyimerton 
Plan. The technological conditions for an intended expansion of commodity 
production could now be based on capital intensive production. Private land 
ownership could serve as collateral for credit with which a capitalization of 
production could be financed. 
From the implementation of all these measures envisaged in the 
Swyimerton Plan emanated the development of new, and the revival of 
existing, state institutions and statutory boards. The District Land Boards were 
established to supervise the implementation of land tenure reform. The Maize 
and Produce Board and various other marketing boards were mandated to 
expand their activities in African areas to facilitate the commercialization of 
production. The Special Crops Development Authority (SCDA) was 
established to supervise tea production by African farmers. The Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (AFC) was launched to administer the flow of credit. 
Together with land conservation programmes and a considerable increase 
in agricultural extension work, the expansion of cultivated land and extended 
credit facilities offered by the state in the former Reserves resulted in a 
dramatic increase in agricultural marketed production. 
The Swyimerton Plan proclaimed an agrarian revolution finally destroying 
all elements of the former colonial agricultural policies. More importantly, 
perhaps, the Plan provided the state with the legal means to realize the 
development of a technological-administrative structure upon which 
commodity production could expand. The majority of institutions which 
formed the core of the structure were mainly concentrated within the state 
apparatus. This did not only result in the envisaged expansion of commodity 
production and capitalization of production by small-scale African producers 
through the extension of capital loans, services and production inputs. It is 
also very significant because of the political integration of these producers and 
an extension of state control into areas which were hardly incorporated or 
touched by commoditization processes previously." 
Before we continue to describe how the contemporary state formulates its 
policy objectives, it is crucial to anticipate the financial-economic determinants 
for state intervention and policy formulation since Uhuru. These developments 
were going to have a major impact on policy formulation and implementation. 
3.2.1. Financial-economic determinants for policy formulation 
The immediate consequence of the reforms implemented in the 1950s and a 
continuation of the implementation of colonial agricultural policies after 
independence, was that commodity production for the international market 
(e.g. coffee, tea pyrethrum, pineapples, sisal and wattle), as well as of food 
crops like maize, wheat and rice for the internal market, increased 
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enormously. The trends in the commercialization of agricultural production 
are shown in Table 3.1. 
The economy after independence experienced GDP growth rates in the 
range of 4.6 to 7.7 % per year. Between 1965 and 1980, GDP annual average 
growth rates were 6.4 %. Between 1980 and 1987, the growth rates slackened 
down to an average of 3.8 % per year.9 
Gross marketed production in agriculture and livestock increased from K£ 
7.76 million in 1958 to 9.62 in 1960; from K£ 75 million in 1969 to 320 in 1979 
and to K£ 945.74 million in 1988 (expressed at current prices). Average farm 
incomes rose steadily, being some 178 % higher in 1952 than they had been 
twenty-one years earlier. In the 1960s and early 1970s, agricultural 
development recorded annual average growth rates of 4.6 %. In the late 1970s 
growth in agricultural GDP per capita dropped to an average of 1.2 %. The 
average growth rate for agriculture during the period 1965 - 1980 was 4.9 %. 
From that time on until 1987 the agricultural sector experienced average 
growth rates of 3.4 % per year, however, with substantial annual variations,™ -
a respectable growth rate, but still about 0.5-1 % less than the population 
growth rate which is estimated at 4 % per annum. 
Table 3.1. Increase in recorded marketed agricultural production purchased by 
Marketing Boards in Kenya, 1946-1988, for selected crops ('000 tons) 
1946 
Cereals 
maize 70.5 
wheat 73.0 
Temporary indust. crops 
sugar cane pyrethrum** 6.7 
Permanent crops 
coffee 9.0 
tea 5.5 
sisal 127.0 
Livestock and products 
cattle/calves 265.9 ('000 head) 
milk+ 24.7 ('000000 Utres) 
1950 
100.5 
126.9 
-1.8 
9.8 
6.7 
39.8 
217.3 
36.3 
1960 
168.8 
126.7 
335.0 
8.5 
23.4 
13.6 
59.7 
307.0 
37.6 
1970 
205.7 
221.5 
1451.0 
50.0 
58.3 
41.1 
43.9 
368.4 
103.1 
1980 
217.9 
204.6 
3972.0 
100.0 
91.3 
89.9 
46.9 
91.9 
186.8 
1988» 
485.3 
220.2 
3800.0 
102.0 
124.6 
164.0 
36.9 
701.0 
359.0 
* provisional 
** the figures for '46, '50 and '60 stand for pyrethrum flower, for '70, '80 and '88 
for pyrethrum extract equivalent (tons) 
+ sales to Kenya Cooperative Creameries and sales licensed by Kenya Dairy 
Board; 1946-1960 mainly represent milk sales from large farms 
Source: Economic Survey, 1961-1989; Statistical Abstract, 1955-88. 
The remarkable economic success in the agricultural sector during the period 
immediately after independence was not only fuelled by policy reforms 
envisaged in the Swynnerton Plan, but was also induced by an expansion of 
the are under cultivation, the integration of numerous household producers in 
export production schemes and the market-oriented farming strategies of the 
fanning population. In addition to that, international terms of exchange were 
extremely favourable during the immediate post-independence period. The 
economic success due to a rapid expansion of commodity production in 
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agriculture during the 1960s and 1970s facilitated an enormous expansion of 
commodity relations in the country-side. It permitted the growth of an internal 
market for productive and consumption items such as production inputs, 
food, education, health and transport. This, in its turn, fired the post-
independence ambition for indigenous capitalist accumulation in transport, 
manufacturing, commerce and services. The favourable economic growth rates 
contributed simultaneously to the an increased trust by the rural population 
on the post-independent state and enhanced the legitimacy in the state vis-à-
vis the population in the rural areas. 
Current developments in industry are a continuation of trends emerging 
shortly before independence. During the early post-independence years, the 
industrial sector - and particular manufacturing - and commerce/service 
sectors realized remarkably high growth rates. Between 1965 and 1980 
industry grew at an annual average rate of 9.8 % and manufacturing at a rate 
of 10.5 %, while the commerce and service sector realized a growth rate of 6.4 
%. During the period 1980-1987, growth rates declined to 3 %, 4.3 % and 4.4.% 
respectively.il 
Several surveys of industrial production by CBS Kenya give evidence of the 
marked increase in numbers of agro-processing industries for meat and dairy 
produce, canned fruit, fish and oils, grainmill products, sugar and 
confectionery, miscellaneous foods, beverage and tobacco, pyrethrum extract 
and miscellaneous chemicals. 12 Because the surveys are based on samples of 
different sizes, it is difficult to present empirical data for a specific historical 
time period in order to analyze the above-mentioned trend. It is obvious that 
in an economy increasingly devoted to the market, and with such a large 
proportion of production being market as in Kenya, various agro-industries 
and trading enterprises will develop. Besides the increase in number of 
established industries, the Statistical Abstracts show a steady increase in 
quantities produced.13 
The international terms of trade for Kenya's principal export commodities -
conditions which are beyond local state control - deteriorated dramatically, 
however, during the late 1970s. The deteriorating terms of trade must have 
resulted in a considerable decline in average income from marketed 
production for almost all agricultural producers. With the ending of the 1977 
export bonanza, the inflation in energy costs (mainly of oil) and the steadily 
increasing prices of imported goods, GDP per capita growth rates dropped 
from 5.1 % in 1976/1977 to 1.2 % in 1978-1980. 
Apart from growth rates, the tourism sector gradually outstripped coffee 
and tea as the major foreign exchange earner due to changes in international 
economic conditions. For years, coffee and tea provided the state with approx. 
40 % of the foreign exchange with which development planning was financed. 
Total agricultural exports provided, depending on world market prices, 
roughly an average of 50-65 % of total export earnings. Although the 
agricultural sector is also a user of foreign exchange, it still finances approx. 29 
% of the imports by the rest of the economy. This leaves 71 % of the non-
agricultural import bill to be financed by foreign exchange inflows from 
tourism, foreign aid, private capital and external borrowing.!* 
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Table 3.2. Indicators of economic development, government income and 
expenditures in Kenya, various years 
Agriculture and Food 
cereal imports ('000 tons) 
food aid ('000 tons) 
fertiliser consumption 
index of food production per capita (1979/81 and 1985/87 resp.) 
Growth of trade (%) 
exports 
imports 
terms of trade (1980,1987) 
Structure of exports (%) 
fuels, minerals, metals 
other primary commodities 
machinery/ transport equipment 
other manufactures 
Structure of imports (%) 
food 
fuels 
other primary commodities 
machinery/ transport equipm. 
other manufactures 
Energy 
energy consumption 
growth rate (%) 
energy cons/capita 
energy import (% of exports) 
Consumption / investment 
annual average growth rates (%) 
general government consumption 
private consumption 
gross domestic investment 
1974/1975 
15 
2 
238 
100 
1965-1980 
0.3 
1.7 
100 
1965 
13 
81 
0 
6 
1965 
10 
11 
3 
34 
42 
1965-1980 
4.5 
110 
13 
1965-1980 
10.6 
5.7 
7.2 
1986/1987 
274 
107 
518 
93 
1980-1987 
-0.6 
-3.0 
80 
1987 
21 
62 
2 
15 
1987 
9 
21 
4 
34 
33 
1980-1987 
-0.2 
99 
39 
1980-1987 
0.8 
3.1 
-2.3 
Source: World Development Report 1989, pp. 170-174,178-179,190-196. 
Table 3.2. is a reflection of the immediate effects of the deteriorating terms of 
trade on the performance of the Kenyan economy. It shows the limitations of 
an economy depending on imports and primary commodity exports. 
A major consequence of the decline in world market prices and the rising 
import bill (particularly of oil) was that state revenue was rapidly falling. The 
state's balance-of-payments current account deficit trebled since the mid 
1970s.l5 The only exception was 1977 when the international terms of trade for 
coffee and tea were extremely favourable as a result of which the current 
account deficit was less dramatic (only K£ 15 million). Table 3.3 displays the 
developments of Kenya's current account deficits. 
73 
Table 3.3. Current external and loan accounts, 1968-1989 for selected years (in 
K£ million) 
Year 
1965 
1968 
1971 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
1988 
1989 
+ 
* 
** 
Balance of 
payments/ 
curr. ace. 
deficit 
-7 
-14 
-40 
-58 
-15 
-373 
-326 
-404 
-403 
-456 
excluding grants 
loans fromWorld Bank 
GDP at current market 
Bilateral 
loans+ 
42 
53 
59 
81 
122 
343 
656 
1173 
1568 
n.a. 
Multil. 
loans*+ 
44 
58 
73 
34 
87 
154 
512 
856 
1149 
n.a. 
, IDA, ADB, IMF, Opee ] 
prices 
Total 
loans 
86 
111 
122 
115 
209 
497 
1168 
2029 
2717 
n.a. 
Fund, EEC 
Loans as a 
proportion 
GOT (%)*» 
n.a. 
n.a. 
11.5 
11.3 
11.2 
16.4 
30.5 
36.1 
35.6 
n.a. 
Source: Cowen (1986), p. 369; Statistical Abstracts (1982,1987); Economic 
Survey (1966,1973,1982,1983,1986,1989); Finandal Times, 18-10-1989. 
State revenue from taxes - on international trade and transactions and on 
incomes and profits - and other sources of non-tax revenue declined 
dramatically since the 1970s. Expenditure on health, housing/sodal welfare 
and economic services declined at about the same rate. Falling revenue was 
only partly covered by an increase in domestic taxes on goods and services.16 
Table 3.3 indicates that the volume of external loan finance increased rapidly. 
Moreover, the reliance on IMF-loans increased at the same rate.17 Whereas 
debt servidng accounted in the early 1970s for a relatively low percentage of 3 
% of the total value of export of goods and services, the proportion reached 
12.3 % in 1982 and rose to 15.3 % and 17.1 % in 1985 and 1988 respectively.18 
Between 1971 and 1978, external financing accounted, on an annual average, 
for 12 % of GDP; after 1979 and during the early 1980 this proportion nearly 
doubled to an annual average of 21 %; in the second half of the 1980s, the 
proportion even trebled to 36 %. 
For the finandal year 1989/1990, Treasury predicts a current account defidt 
of K£ 458 million. The government is asking donors for additional support of 
K£ 197.5 million, mostly in balance-of-payments support, loans and grants, on 
top of the existing donor commitments.19 The contribution of aid to total 
government expenditure has increased substantially since the mid 1970s. 
Foreign aid contributions for the finandal year 1989/1990 are estimated at 28 
% of total government expenditure.20 
The deteriorating external economic conditions and falling state revenue 
made it extremely difficult to implement all the policy objectives and to deal 
with the high expectations which various people and interest groups 
entertained from Uhuru and the independent state. 
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3.2.2. The evolution of policy formulation 
The more recently conceived objectives and efforts of Kenya's development 
targets and policy guidelines are published in four year Development Plans and 
various Sessional Papers. Sessional Papers are official publications of the 
government that spell out major policies affecting development. Development 
Plans are drawn up by the Ministry of Finance and Planning (Treasury). The 
plans set out the general targets for economic growth for the plan period as 
well as the general guidelines for their implementation. Development Plans 
are in their turn translated in to various Provincial Development Plans and 
District Development Plans.21 
A central issue in these papers and plans is that the objectives of previous 
plans (i.e., the ones drawn since the 1950s) which have made substantial 
progress in building the technological, infrastructural and administrative base 
for the development of agriculture and industry, are re-asserted and should be 
consequently implemented. 
The general objective of development planning is to 'improve the well-
being of the people of Kenya'.22 Emphasis is placed upon continued economic 
growth, the creation of income earning opportunities, the increase in output 
and quality of services and improved income distribution. The basic 
objectives, couched in terms of freedom, opportunity, equality, social justice 
and equity, are to be pursued on the basis of four principles that are 
considered fundamental to the development process. These principles are: 
widespread participation in development; diversity of social organizational 
forms and incentives in advancing the economic and social objectives of 
development; government participation in initiating and directing 
development with the highest standards of efficiency; and mutual social 
responsibility through promotion and regulation of economic activities. 
One of the basic objectives of development planning is the alleviation of 
poverty. The Development Plan 1979-1983 conceived that poverty had several 
dimensions of which inadequate income is the most obvious one. A general 
target group is identified: the group of families engaged in smallholder 
agriculture who constitute about 80% of Kenya's total population. The first 
Integrated Rural Survey of 1977 (IRS-I) disclosed that 41 % of smallholder 
families feature incomes of less than K£ 100 per family per year including 
subsistence production. Another 14 % of those families had incomes in the 
range of K£ 100 to 150 per family. Incomes of that order are considered by the 
administration to be insufficient to provide more than the basic necessities of 
life. To this large target group belong: the pastoralists (with incomes mainly 
from livestock in a nomadic setting, numbering at that time 195,000 families); 
small farmers (those with land and whose income is mainly derived from 
agriculture, 618,500 families); and landless rural workers (those who have little 
or no land and mainly derive their income from casual farm labour and non-
agricultural work, 410,000 families). Handicapped adults (140,000 families) 
and the urban poor (with incomes derived generally from casual self- or wage-
employment, 40,500 families) were also targeted as special groups for 
government attention.^ 
Killick (1981), comparing the third and fourth development plans 
comments that the fourth plan's 'effort to identify poverty groups and to 
estimate the magnitudes is a laudable step in building a data base essential for 
effective anti-poverty policies. It is also commendably frank in drawing 
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attention to the implication of its estimates - that half of the total population 
lives below the poverty line.'24 
The fourth Development Plan 1979-1983 as well as the subsequent issued 
plans were, contrary to the earlier plans, drawn up in a period of adverse 
international conditions for agricultural growth. Import prices of oil and 
capital goods for agricultural (tractors, combine-harvester, spare parts) and 
industrial purposes rose dramatically before and during the Plan years, while 
export prices decreased even more dramatically. 
The fourth (1979-1983) and the later issued fifth Deoebpment Plan 1984-1988 
stated repeatedly that the period of easy development was over and drew 
attention to the emergence of two serious constraints: shortages of foreign 
exchange and an inability to sustain government spending at its past rate of 
expansion.^ 
In this situation it is no wonder that the state implements an import 
restriction programme as well as frequent currency devaluations, while, at the 
same time, the state's major criterion for economic growth is the maximization 
of foreign exchange earnings. In the Kenyan context, this means expanding 
agricultural export production and particularly smallholder production which 
since the 1950s has become largely directed towards export commodity 
production. The government increasingly recognizes that smallholder 
commodity production promotes foreign exchange earnings and that the 
smallholder community provides the state with revenue and access to foreign 
exchange. Simultaneously, the state under Moi puts more effort into the 
reorganization of government spending and investment than during the 
previous Kenyatta-regime.26 
The fourth Plan emphasized that agricultural expansion faces a number of 
constraints which are now more severe than in earlier years. The Plan notes 
the following constraints. 
'(1) Population growth is creating shortages of land and the emergence 
of a landless class in the rural economy. Soil erosion will increase with it 
as well as subdivision of farms into unviable small plots. (2) 
Agricultural growth will have to rely primarily on production 
development and improved market effiaency rather than higher 
producer prices. The government asserts that producerprices can not be 
manipulated in such a way to induce greater output. (3/. The technology 
constraint will be more severe. No R&D breakthroughs are currently 
available to achieve major improvements in productivity. (4) The 
implementation of programmes designed for non-progressive farmers, 
pastoralists and for medium and low potential land will be more 
difficult than was the case in earlier periods when agricultural services 
were primarily geared towards the larger, more progressive farmers, 
cultivating mainly high potential land.'2' 
The state conceded with this that previous plans and economic growth 
patterns drove a wedge between sections of the agricultural population as well 
as between agricultural production zones. That is, to use the state 
bureaucracy's vocabulary, between progressive and non- progressive farmers 
and high and medium potential areas and low potential areas. With this it was 
explicitly acknowledged by policy makers that certain regions and strata of the 
peasantry did not benefited from economic development The fourth 
Development Plan stressed, therefore, that: 
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'small farmers will be given every opportunity to increase their 
participation in the monetary economy. Among small-scale farmers, 
greater attention will be given to those who have been lagging behind 
up to now. Rural access roads will be built so that the flow of inputs to 
such farms can be expanded and produce more easily be brought to the 
market; extension services and credit will be increasingly directed to the 
small farmer: consumer goods and social services will be brought within 
reasonable distances; water and power will be increasingly extended 
into the rural areas; and the means and resources devoted to identifying 
inexpensive and easily repairable technologies which will enhance smaS 
farm productivity and ease the problems of off-road transport will be 
increased.'28 
In 1981, the state outlined and adopted a National Food Policy (Sessional Paper 
No. 4). This policy document serves together with the fourth and fifth 
development plans, the National Livestock Development Policy (1980), Guide-
lines for Development Prospects and Policies in 1982 (Sessional Paper No. 4), 
Economic Management for Renewed Growth in 1986 (Sessional Paper No. 1), and 
the continuing political debate about grain marketing, as a policy framework 
for the contemporary efforts to co-ordinate government intervention in 
agriculture. 
A particular goal of state agricultural policy is to attain self-sufficiency in 
food. Four agricultural commodities - maize, wheat, milk and meat - have 
been identified as central to reach this objective. At the same time the 
agricultural sector must continue to generate foreign exchange earnings to pay 
for oil, capital equipment and other essential imports. Coffee, tea and 
horticultural crops are crucial commodities in this respect. In addition, the 
agricultural sector must be the major source of new jobs for the rapidly 
growing labour force.29 Furthermore, the agricultural sector must continue to 
substitute for imports of industrial crops. Self-sufficiency in these crops and 
food crops would reduce the need for imports and prevent a further 
deterioration of the country's balance-of-payments. This particular objective 
can be traced back to the early 1960s. The first Development Plan 1966-1970 sets 
out a programme of import-substitution and industrialization to diversify the 
economy from its agricultural base and to promote the import-substitution of 
agricultural commodities, such as sugar, malt, cotton, tobacco, vegetable oils 
and oilseeds. Most of these commodities had to be imported at independence. 
To increase local production, since 1965 substantial private and public funds 
have been invested in raw material production and in the processing activities 
for these commodities. Within this policy framework, foreign (such as 
Unilever [oils], BAT [tobacco], CDC [tea], Booker McConnel [sugar production 
and processing]) and local companies (such as Kenya Breweries Ltd [barley] 
were attracted to participate directly, or in a joint venture with the state, in 
commodity production schemes. The majority of these production or contract 
fanning schemes came to be peopled with smallholder producers. 
The central objective of contemporary state policy is to increase food 
production and to attain of food self-sufficiency in such a way that export 
production is not endangered and forest reserves not destroyed. Given these 
constraints, there is little potential in Central and Eastern Province for an 
expansion in the area of good quality land and devoted to food production. Of 
the high and medium potential land not under forest in these provinces, all 
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but an estimated 7 and 32 %, respectively, is being cropped. The only available 
options to increase food production are to increase crop yields and to adopt 
intensive techniques of animal husbandry. The plan goes on to clarify that 
increases in yield may be achieved by increased intercropping and multi-
cropping; by increasing fertilizer application and other inputs used; by the 
progressive introduction and adoption of improved seeds and livestock; and 
by other improvements in cultural practices.30 In order to attain these 
objectives the government is taking several measures. Four major policy areas 
are briefly outlined here. 
The first major policy area for government action is pricing and marketing. 
The intention is to improve the efficiency of the food marketing boards, and of 
the National Cereal & Produce Board (NCPB) and the Kenya Meat 
Commission in particular. Existing restrictions on inter-district and inter-
regional movements of maize and other produce impede nationwide 
distribution by private traders and add to marketing costs and consumer 
prices. The long term aim is to simplify the marketing system by removing the 
artificial movement restrictions and employing the NCPB as a buyer and seller 
of last resort.Sl Private traders should be allowed to operate more widely and 
without restrictions. A major restriction for private traders in maize is that 
trade between districts is prohibited. NCPB is the only agent in maize 
marketing permitted to trade beyond district borders. 
Prices paid to the producers for harvested crops are identified as a major 
incentive for the farming population to produce food for the market. The 
government's intention is to regulate producer and consumer prices in order 
to protect both consumers and producers. Particularly farm-gate food prices 
should be related to import panty. The government recognizes the instability 
of world grain markets, so it will set domestic prices based on longer-term 
parities. 
Another central objective of the policy is to ensure that adequate inputs are 
made available at the lowest possible prices at the farm gate.32 A proper 
distribution of production inputs and the provision of credit through the 
expansion of seasonal credit schemes are perceived as vital to reach that 
objective. 
A second important policy are is agricultural R&D and extension and 
services. The attainment of the above-stated objectives requires a continued 
search for productive crop varieties. The Kenya Seed Company (KSC) fulfils, 
together with the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and the 
National Agricultural Laboratories (NAL), a central role in this objective. 
Attention must also be focused on the improvement of crop and livestock 
management. In addition, the extension services of MOALD will be 
strengthened in order to guide and improve the flow of information to the 
farmers.33 Recognizing that research and extension have mainly been oriented 
towards the needs of the high potential areas and large farmers, the 
government now intends to switch the focus onto the development of 
technologies appropriate to the arid and semi-arid lands and the development 
of labour-intensive technologies appropriate to smallholder food production. 
This will be achieved through work on the introduction of new crop varieties, 
while the main emphasis is on increasing food production on small farms.34 
A third crucial policy area emphasized in Sessional Paper No.l of 1981, is 
land and resources. Land tenure systems, as well as laws and regulations 
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governing the transfer and adjudication and registration of land, are key 
aspects according to the government Appropriate land ownership and 
transfer systems must be worked out. The District Development Committees 
will be responsible for co-ordinating and overseeing activities related to land 
issues. Land speculation must be discouraged. In addition to that, land 
management practices that maintain soil fertility, prevent soil erosion, silting 
and protect water catchment areas will be fostered.^5 
The fourth policy area is employment Unemployment is identified as a 
major problem. The basic aims of manpower development policy are to 
increase the willingness of the population to participate in agricultural 
development and to equip the agricultural work force with appropriate 
technical and managerial skills. To meet this objective, great emphasis will be 
placed on vocational training for agriculture and the expansion of existing 
training institutions. Labour intensive techniques will be a major area for 
attention. Additionally, the constraint of seasonal labour shortages in certain 
areas and labour surplus in others, has to be alleviated by increasing labour 
mobility and by increasing of labour productivity at times of labour 
shortage.36 
In order to improve efficiency and co-ordination of activities in the various 
districts, the Kenya government embraced a policy geared towards 
decentralization. The rigid and centralized control of the state apparatus was 
replaced by the 'District Focus'.37 The district level is indicated as the most 
appropriate level for planning and policy implementation. Public funds will be 
allocated to the district. According to president Moi, the district is the right 
level at which to spend money. The responsibility of the District 
Commissioner and the District Development Committees (DDCs) increased 
substantially in taking local initiatives in the field of agricultural development 
and matters of food security. Five to ten percent of district development 
budgets will be decided at the level of the DDCs. The consequence of this 
policy change was that the position of local government vis-à-vis the central 
state apparatus improved and is considerably strengthened by an expansion of 
its development bureaucracy. The co-ordination of crucial tasks in the 
implementation of agricultural policies, and particularly the food policy, 
remains, however, in the hands of MOALD. 
3.3. Policy instruments for intervention 
The previous section indicated, besides policy objectives, various policy sub-
sectors and institutions. The concrete policy objectives are passed on to various 
sub-sectors and into state institutions. Equipped with these instruments, the 
state hopes to implement its policies. Figure 3.1. summarizes the sub-sectors 
and the institutions. The figure shows clearly the supremacy of two central 
state institutions in policy development: the Office of the President (OP) and 
the Ministry of Finance and Planning (Treasury). The role of the so-called 
technical ministries - Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development 
(MOALD), Ministry of Cooperative Development (MOCD), the Ministry of 
Lands and Settlement (MLS) and Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources (MENR) - is first of all to implement policies and development 
programmes and projects. Secondly, these ministries have a strong regulatory 
function as can be seen from Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 31 Slate intervention in agnculture in Kenya 
Sub-sectors Institutions Level Mandates/activities 
Policy 
formulation 
Treasury 
OP 
N resource allocation to agricultural sector 
establishing long term sectoral goals, 
drafting and monitoring development plans 
collecting (agricultural) statistics (CBS) 
N coordination of development activities 
Und 
relations 
and 
distribution 
Agricultural 
Research and 
Development 
MLS 
DDC's 
KARI 
NAL 
KSC 
NSQCS 
ADC 
Private comp 
parasta tais 
MENU 
Ν 
D 
Ν 
R 
Ν 
Ν 
Ν 
R 
R 
Ν 
supervise land transactions, 
registration/adjudication /consolidation 
supervision land settlement schemes 
secure legal property right to land 
co-ordinate research activities 
conduct on-stabon research 
collecting genetic resources and 
maintaining genebanks 
seed production/packaging 
seed testing, quality control 
seed production/livestock breeding and 
range improvement programmes 
seed production and crop research 
crop research and seedling production 
forestry research and afforestation 
programmes, collection and monitoring of 
natural resource data 
Promotion MOALD N/D co-ordinabon/trairung staff 
of use of extension guidelines through T&V method 
modem and FTCs through extension 
inputs private comp R supervision of production in specific 
produchon schemes (tea, tobacco, sugar 
parastatals N cotton, barley, oils) 
Promotion of MOALD N promotion of mechanization 
mechanization THS D implementation and services 
Credit AFC 
CBK 
Pnv Banks 
Treasury 
N 
N/D 
N/D 
N 
provision of credit 
provision of credit to cooperatives 
provision of credit to individuals 
regulating credit flows 
Cooperative 
development 
MOCD regulation/supervision of unions and 
cooperatives, technically/financially 
Importation 
of inputs 
OP 
Treasury 
MOALD 
Pest Control 
Board 
Treasury 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
issuing import licences/fertilizer 
allocation, import restrictions, 
quantitative and qualitative 
ad vice/import regulation of agro-
chemicals 
coordination/procurement of fertilizer aid 
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Input supply KGGCU/KFA N input distribution 
private comp N licensed importers of inputs 
Cooperatives D end-users' of imported inputs in 
parastatals N production schemes by obtained import 
private comp R licence 
Price 
fixation/ 
control 
Marketing 
control 
Physical 
infra-
structure 
OP 
Treasury 
MOALD 
Export 
Boards 
Marketing 
Boards 
Cooperatives 
Farmer union 
Private 
traders 
MTC 
MWD 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
D 
D 
D 
D/N 
D/N 
Annual Price Review: price fixation on 
all levels (cons., prod., retail, input and 
processing pnces; 
fix producer prices export commodities 
determined by int. terms of exchange 
monopoly marketing position; 
boards are supervised by MOALD 
mandated to market produce and deliver 
to marketing boards or other authorized 
traders 
restricted by laws prohibiting purchase 
and movement of food (maire) beyond 
district borders 
rural access roads planning and building 
rural water supply and assistance in 
constructing water supply components 
in MOALD projects 
N= national level 
R= regional level 
D= district level 
Source: National Food Policy Paper (1981), World Bank (1984), AIR/World Bank (1985) 
The core of agricultural policy is to facilitate marketing and increase 
production through the promotion of productivity enhancing technology in 
agriculture. The latter is enabled by establishing linkages between agricultural 
research and the farming population through extension services in order to the 
secure the adoption process. The supply of credit and the legal property right 
to land are, therefore, perceived as crucial ingredients of agricultural policy. 
Figure 3.1 shows that MOALD is a central institution in the process of 
technology transfer to the agriculture sector. Within MOALD, the Tractor Hire 
Service (THS) was established in 1966 to stimulate mechanization. The 
ministry is also responsible for the implementation and co-ordination of 
agricultural extension programmes and veterinary services. MOALD designs 
the basic extension guidelines and agronomic objectives and is also involved 
in organizing training of extension field workers. From MOALD's 
headquarters in Nairobi, the ministry instructs the district level extension 
service which is present in every district in Kenya and located in the district 
administrative centres. 
The extension method used to reach the farmer comprises Training and 
Visit (T&V) programmes, trials, field days and annual agricultural shows. In 
this way new technologies, new husbandry and fanning methods and research 
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results are brought to the farmer. The T&V system was established based on 
recommendations from the World Bank. The essence of T&V consists of 
regular training sessions for field staff at which extension messages are 
discussed, in conjunction with frequent visits by field workers to 
representative farmers (the so-called contact farmers). The latter act as the 
person passing on the extension message to the larger fanning community. In 
addition to extension field work and visits to farmers. Farmers Training 
Centres (FTCs) are set up at district level to complement the extension service. 
The idea of establishing FTCs to train individual farmers originated in the 
early 1950s and was extended rapidly in the 1960s.38 
The colonial legacy of the instruments of state intervention in the economy 
is apparent in many sub-sectors. The post-colonial state did not change this 
mode of organization and confirmed the responsibility of state involvement in 
the economy in cooperation with the private and cooperative sector. These 
objectives, presented as reforms, are clearly expressed in the White Paper. 
The commitment of the post-colonial state to enhance economic growth is 
moulded in four forms: in parastatale and boards, by state participation in 
production enterprises, import regulations and price fixation. Promoting 
cooperative development is another major element in Kenya's development 
strategy in which the state plays a crucial role. 
As is the case in many other African countries, the main method for the 
colonial and post-colonial state embraced to ensure state power in the rural 
and urban economy was the establishment of numerous parastatale and 
statutory boards. After independence, various parastatale were revitalized and 
new boards were created by the state. State intervention in the economy has 
increased considerably since independence. 
These prominent state institutions in agriculture do not own agricultural 
land. The only parastatal company owning land in Kenya is the Agricultural 
Development Corporation (ADC).39 The economic functions of the state are 
thus primarily oriented towards facilitating growth and accumulation in 
agriculture by the private sector, rather than, by constituting itself as a 
producer to accumulate on its own behalf. 
3.3.1. State intervention through boards and parastatals 
A government working party, the Ndegwa Commission Report issued in 1982, 
revealed that there were 147 statutory boards established under specific Acts 
of Parliament.40 With regard to agricultural development, the statutory boards 
can be grouped into four functional categories: commercial marketing boards, 
commodity development authorities and corporations, finance boards and 
advisory/regulatory boards. The monitoring of these agricultural parastatals 
is in the hands of MOALD. Monitoring includes also fínancial management 
and control. 
The history of some of the marketing boards stretches back to the 1930s or 
even before. During the colonial period, the state established marketing boards 
for almost every crop grown in the country. These boards were granted a 
monopoly position in price arrangements as well as in the purchase of 
agricultural commodities. The majority of them were initially established by 
the colonial state to facilitate and support white settler agriculture. They were 
mandated to operate with a monopolistic pricing and marketing policy in 
favour of the white settlers. After independence, the state maintained its 
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dominant position in the circulation sphere of the economy. The boards are 
still the major institutions, although the number of authorized purchasers of 
agricultural commodities is increasing. In particular, the marketing share of 
marketing cooperatives in certain commodities is considerable (see below). 
Recently, private traders have been authorized to become more involved in the 
purchase of grains: an activity which has long been restricted geographically 
as well as monopolized by the Maize and Produce Board/NCPB. 
The Maize Control Board (renamed in the Maize and Produce Board in the 
1950s) was set up in 1942 to regulate prices and stabilize maize production. 
The Wheat Board was established in the 1930s. The Coffee Board of Kenya was 
created in the same period. The Maize and Produce Board merged in 1982 with 
the Wheat Board shortly after the Ndegwa Commission recommended the 
merger. The joint board was renamed the National Cereals and Produce Board 
(NCPB). The Kenya Meat Commission was established in the 1950s. Two other 
boards are the Pyrethrum Marketing Board and the Cotton Lint and Seed 
Marketing Board. During the third plan period, 1974-1978, the Kenya National 
Trading Corporation was assigned the task of marketing locally produced 
sugar and of organizing imports. 
To enhance smallholder production special deoelopment authorities were 
created. These authorities are particularly responsible for production, 
marketing and processing where smallholders are involved. To expand 
smallholder production in tea, the colonial state created, as envisaged in the 
Swynnerton Plan, the Spicciai Crops Development Authority (SCDA) in the 
1950s. Later, in 1977, this board was renamed the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority (KTDA). KTDA handles all smallholder tea and processes the tea in 
its tea factories. The majority of these factories are owned by the KTDA. The 
Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) was constituted in the 
1970s to coordinate and supervise horticultural production which is primarily 
directed at export markets. HCDA has limited powers in the marketing 
sphere. 
The Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) is considered by the 
state as a strategic development institution. ADC's activities are primarily 
oriented towards establishing a solid structure for farming in Kenya. ADC is 
directly involved in multiplication of maize seed, maize seed drying, seed 
potato production and storage, and is particularly devoted to improving 
livestock in the country through intensive breeding and exchange 
programmes. 
Advisory boards are institutions regulating and overseeing activities in the 
marketing of various crops. These include a.o. the Tea Board of Kenya, Sisal 
Board and the Kenya Sugar Authority. The Pest Control Board, established in 
1982, advises on, and regulates imports and distribution of, agro-chemicals. 
The Land Control Boards are an important type of advisory board. These are 
established at national, provincial and district level. To this group of state 
organizations can also be added, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI), the Coffee Research Foundation, the Tea Research Foundation and the 
National Council for Science and Technology. KARI, established in 1979 
within MOALD, is mandated to coordinate agricultural research in the 
country. 
The financial agencies through which the state intervenes in the economic 
sphere are the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), Industrial 
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Development Bank (IDB) and Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation (ICDC). These agencies supply loans to individual entrepreneurs 
and were the main instruments in the process of Kenyanization of the 
economy after independence. In addition, the IDB and ICDC are the main 
vehicles for state participation in various enterprises. 
3.3.2. State intervention through joint ventures 
The second form of state intervention is through state participation in various 
companies. The politico-economic import of state participation through joint 
ventures has already been dealt with in Chapter 8. 
According to the Ndegwa Report (1982), 47 companies were wholly-owned 
by the state; it has a controlling interest (i.e. more than 51 % of the shares) in 36 
companies and in 93 companies the state is a minority shareholder.41 The 
enterprises in which the state holds shares operate in various economic 
sectors: industry, tourism, commerce, insurance and finance. The agencies 
through which the state participates in enterprises are the above-named IDB 
and ICDC. In addition, some boards and development authorities (such as the 
NCPB, ADC, KTDA, Coffee Board) own shares in processing factories. 
The state has important joint ventures in the agricultural production sector 
with local and/or foreign agribusiness companies. These joint ventures all 
produce commodities which at the time of independence had to be imported 
in considerable quantities. These companies were invited to operate, supervise 
and manage smallholder contract farming production schemes in partnership 
with the state. In many cases the expansion of the commodity production 
schemes was funded by foreign finance institutions and/or aid agencies. These 
particular schemes entail the following crops. 
-Sugar cane production: in four out of seven sugar companies the state is a 
majority shareholder, in one company, a minority share holder. Participating 
enterprises are a.o. Tate and Lyle, Booker McConnel and Madhvani. The 
remaining two are fully owned by foreign companies. 
-Tobacco production: British American Tobacco Kenya Ltd (ВАТ-K) is a joint 
venture with BAT International in which the state owns 60 % of the shares. 
-Oilseeds and vegetable oils: East African Industries (EAI) is a joint venture of 
the state (through the parastatal company Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation) and Unilever, in which the state holds 34.15 % of 
the shares. Recently, the state launched through the newly formed Oil Crop 
Development, two projects to boost vegetable oil production. The largest 
project is a joint investment involving EAI, the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation (CDC) and the World Bank. The latter two provide loans while 
EAI is involved in the management and supervision of the scheme.42 
Through these production schemes, the state hopes to establish an 
economic structure with a double pay off. Increased production saves foreign 
exchange. In addition, these schemes provide jobs and development 
opportunities for the low potential areas and they will strengthen relations 
between agriculture and industry. For example, oilseed and vegetable oil 
schemes produce animal feed for the livestock sector. 
A particularly important joint venture in the agricultural production sector 
is the Kenya Seed Company (KSC). The KSC was originally set up in 1956 as a 
settler company. Since independence, the state has gradually acquired more 
influence on the operations of the company. The state has increased, through 
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the parastatal company ADC, its shares in KSC. Around 1970, the state had a 
10 % share-holding but is now the majority shareholder in KSC: 52 %. The 
Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union (KGGCU) owns 27 % of the total 
shares; the remaining 21 % still remain in private hands (individual farmers or 
businessmen).43 The KSC functions nowadays, together with the KGGCU, as a 
major vehicle for the state in the implementation of its national food policy. 
KSC fulfils a specific function in the promotion of improved crop varieties in 
agriculture. Improved seed production is an important ingredient of state 
policy. The objectives of KSC (and KGGCU) are outlined in the National Food 
Policy. The state uses its majority shareholder position to impose pricing 
decisions and production targets for seed production on KSC. In realising the 
objectives of KSC, the state, through the ADC, is directly involved in this 
particular case as a producer of commercial maize seed.44 
KSC is now the main source of commercial seed in Kenya. Since 1956, the 
KSC has devoted much of its time to the development and production of seeds 
of maize, wheat, barley, oats, sunflower, tricitale, forage, pasture seeds and 
grain legumes. KSC has a monopoly position in the production of hybrid 
maize seed. Together with the ADC, KSC established Seed Driers to dry the 
seeds before packaging. The takeover of Simpson and Whitelaw in 1978 was 
intended to increase the capacity of KSC in seed marketing. The acquisition of 
Hortiseed Ltd, now a full subsidiary of KSC, had the intention of 
strengthening its activities in horticultural seed production. The first task of 
the KSC is to produce seeds for the national market. The company also exports 
seeds to other countries in Eastern and Central Africa as well as Denmark and 
Britain. 
33.3. Import regulations 
Kenya has, Ûke other African countries, an agricultural economy depending on 
imports to satisfy the internal demand for agricultural production inputs. 
Fertilizers, agricultural implements (tractors, combines) and agro-chemicals 
are 100% imported agricultural production factors. Local manufacturing 
companies only produce inputs such as improved seeds (hybrid maize, seed 
wheat, hortiseeds), hand tools and ox ploughs. Ideal Casement Ltd, 
Agricultural Implement Manufacturers and Agritool Industries Ltd are the 
major local producers of farm implements for both the internal market and for 
export to other African countries. Some of the hand tools (such as panga, 
jembes, fork jembes) which appear on the local market are nevertheless British-
and Chinese-made products.45 
Controlling the import of agricultural inputs through a licensing allocation 
system was one of the recommendations of the Havelock Commission which 
issued a report in 1971, the so-called Havelock Report. This commission was 
installed in 1969 to review the situation of agricultural inputs. The Working 
Party found the costs of fertilizers, agricultural machinery and chemicals 
higher than they need be because of restrictive practices in an oligopolistic 
distribution network.4^ Since then, quantities of goods to be imported are 
determined by the state, who also issues the import licences. Since the deficits 
on the state's current account have been increasing rapidly from the mid 1970s 
onwards (see Table 3.3) the imposition of import restrictions had become even 
more urgent. 
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In 1974, the state took over all importation of fertilizers, and these were 
then distributed through a federation of cooperatives. Established firms were 
denied trade licences and did not distribute government imported fertilizers. 
In 1976/1977, the state issued licences to four new importers, but not the 
established importers. In 1977/1978, licences were extended to ten importers 
including the former importers.*? 
Since 1979/1980 two central state institutions, the OP and the Treasury 
have played an enormously important role in the allocation of import licences 
and quantities. They dedde which company or cooperative is allowed to 
import the agricultural inputs. Together with MOALD they dedde final 
fertilizer allocation.^ Treasury has, furthermore, a leading role in the co-
ordination, procurement and allocation of fertilizer received under bilateral 
balance-of-payments and import-support programmes. The shipment of 
fertilizer aid, which covers now approx. 50 % of Kenya's fertilizers need, has 
grow rapidly since the late 1970s. 
Various cooperative sales units have been established in the rural areas to 
provide the farming population with agricultural production inputs. Through 
the enactment of cooperative laws and related legislation, the government is in 
clear control of the operations of the cooperative sector (see section 3.3.5). 
Apart from cooperatives, various private firms are authorized by the state 
to import and distribute agricultural production inputs. These local private 
retail and wholesale companies are of local origin (i.e. Asian- and African-
owned companies and family businesses). There was a considerable increase 
in the rate of Asian company formation in the circulation sphere before World 
War II. All over Kenya, even in the then still remote areas, dukas (shops) were 
established by Asians. After independence and the enactment of the Trade 
Licensing Act in 1967, Africans gained access to retail and wholesale trade. 
The Kenya Farmer's Union (KFA) has long been the largest distributor of 
agricultural inputs. In the early 1980s, KFAs market share in fertilizer 
distribution was over 70 %. The largest proportion of imported fertilizer (i.e. 55 
%) is nowadays distributed by the KGGCU and by two private companies 
MEA Ltd (14 %) and Devji Meghi (9 %). The remaining fertilizers are imported 
and distributed by the so-called end-users, such as the Murang'a Cooperative 
Union (who also import agro-chemicals for coffee production) and private and 
parastatal companies (such as BAT, Kenya Breweries, Brooke Bond Kenya, 
sugar companies and KTDA). The KGGCU is, furthermore, the main 
wholesale distributor of maize seed.49 
The KGGCU is, in its tum, assisted by a myriad of local retailers and shop 
holders (over 3,000 stockists and recognized dealers) to supply agricultural 
inputs to the farmers. The role of shops in the distribution of inputs is 
crudal.50 
The majority of wholesale companies importing and distributing 
agricultural machinery (combine-harvester, tractors) are, however, owned by 
international firms or act as appointed agents of international firms. These 
firms have taken over local settler input-supplying companies or have 
established companies with or without partnership with local businessmen. 
Gailey and Roberts, established in 1905/1906 and now a full subsidiary of 
Unilever, is an important importer and distributor of agricultural tools and 
machines.51 
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Ford, Massey Ferguson, International Harvester and Same-Corsaro are the 
mam suppliers of mechanized agricultural equipment. Together they handle 
70 - 75 % of sales The KFA (now KGGCU), has for a long fame, been importing 
Claas combme-harvesters from Germany In mid-1984 within the framework 
of a national import restriction programme, the Government announced 
restrictions on the number of agricultural machinery imports as well as that 
limiting the range of imported machines Imports of tractors and related 
implements were to be limited to Ford, International Harvester, Lamboghmi, 
Massey Ferguson and Same-Corsaro, while Claas and Kubota (South Korea) 
were permitted to import combmes 52 
Agro-chemicals are imported by appointed dealers and distributors They 
formed an associa bon m 1958, the Pesticide Chemicals Association of Kenya 
(PCA) Its objective is to promote the application of chemicals in agriculture 
and to act as liaison with the government and others Another objective is the 
representation of the interests of its members m relation to the importation and 
use of pesticides At the moment, about forty firms are members of PCA A 
number of reputable mtemabonal firms such as Shell, Ciba Geigy, Union 
Carbide, Hoechst and Bayer feature on the membership hst for 1985 
33.4. Price fixation 
Apart from a monopoly marketing and import-licensing position, the state is 
heavily involved in the fixation of prices Price fixation occurs at all levels and 
involves almost all commodities Consumer prices for food, producer pnces, 
agricultural inputs as well as retail pnces and processing prices are fixed by 
the state Only prices of agro-chemicals and agricultural equipment are related 
to market factors 53 Two central state institutions, OP and Treasury undertake 
together with MOALD the Annual Price Review Certain consumer pnces are 
uniform (for milk), for others (such as grains) prices vary according to 
transport costs The marketing boards for Kenya's export commodibes (coffee, 
tea, pyrethrum) determine the producer prices The prices paid to the 
producers are, in their tum, determined by international terms of trade for the 
commodity concerned 
To stimulate the rate of increase of fertilizer application, the state deaded 
to subsidize ferbhzer purchase pnces Depending on the type of fertilizer 
used, the subsidy entailed between 4 4 and 14 % of the retail pnce 
Consumption and imports of ferbhzer increased considerably The subsidies 
on ferbhzer were cut by 50 % in 1972/1973 They were reduced even further in 
197654 and finally completely withdrawn in 1978/1979 
33.5. Cooperative movement 
The cooperabve movement is viewed as an essenbal ingredient of Kenya's 
post-independence development strategy In the White Paper of 1965, 
cooperatives were perceived as the means to 'establish a socialist basis' The 
basic principle has been that cooperatives should 'compete unhindered on an 
equal basis with other state and private business organizations' 55 They are 
crucial vehicles in the implementation of state agricultural policy They have 
all been sancboned with cnbcal funcbons m marketing, credit supply to 
members, input distribution and importation of crucial inputs The operabon 
of all kinds of cooperabves is supervised and assisted by the Ministry of 
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Table 3.4. Share of cooperatives in marketed production 1979-1988 
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* mainly local and regional farmer unions delivering smallholder milk to KCC-
factories 
Source: Economic Survey (1983,1986,1989) 
Cooperative Development. That ministry was formed in 1974 and performs its 
role laid down in the Cooperative Society Act. 
The history of cooperative development goes back to the colonial period 
when white settlers formed several country-wide marketing and input-supply 
organizations. After independence, a great number of so-called Farm PurAase 
Societies were formed. Through these societies, members could purchase 
settler-owned large-scale farms. This kind of land ownership transfer was 
promoted by the state. The state neglected, however, to assist these societies in 
the running of these newly acquired farms. The result was that most of these 
farms were subdivided illegally among the members. Today government 
policy is to intervene directly in the subdivision of these cooperative farms. 
In addition to country-wide marketing cooperatives, smallholders were 
encouraged to form marketing cooperatives. Actually, the marketing 
cooperatives were formed under pressure from the state. Membership of a 
marketing cooperative is obligatory. They are compulsory for smallholder 
farmers marketing coffee, pyrethrum and dairy produce.56 Large farmers, on 
the other hand, may operate outside these cooperatives and supply directly to 
the responsible board or intermediate agency. As a result of this, the number 
of smallholder producer and marketing cooperatives has more than doubled 
in the period from independence to 1988; membership increased substantially 
in the same period.57 
The cooperative movement ranges today from giant savings and credit 
cooperatives to small-farmer production and marketing cooperative societies 
and farmer unions. The role of both small farmer marketing cooperatives and 
local and regional farmer unions is essential to circulation. They act as licensed 
traders of the various marketing boards and other authorized traders, some 
even as processors of primary produce. In this function, the marketing 
coopératives and unions act as mediator between primarily smallholder 
producers and the state-owned marketing boards and the world market. Their 
share in the marketing of coffee, dairy produce, sugar-cane, pyrethrum and 
cotton is considerable as can bee seen in Table 3.4. Other marketing 
cooperatives do not play a significant role. 
Cooperatives and unions are organized on local and/or district bases as 
well as country-wide. The smallholder marketing cooperatives are primarily 
district level organizations. The country-wide category includes the Kenya 
Cooperative Creameries (KCC for dairy products),58 Kenya Planter 
Cooperative Union (KPCU coffee processing and marketing). Cooperative 
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Bank of Kenya (banking institution for cooperatives) and the KGGCU 
(purchaser of grains and input supply) and the Horticultural Cooperative 
Union. The KGGCU was launched by President Moi on June 4,1984, with the 
objective of establishing a state controlled, country-wide cooperative body to 
purchase grains and particularly to improve grain marketing and input supply 
conditions in the country. The role of the KGGCU in input distribution has 
been set out earlier. As President Moi ordered a merger between KFA and 
KGGCU59 in 1985, this cooperative became the largest single distributor of 
agricultural inputs. KGGCU increased its activities after the merger and 
opened up various new branches in districts not previously served by the now 
defunct KFA. KGGCU alone now runs over 50 branches throughout Kenya. 
KGGCU depots can be found in almost every district in Kenya's major 
agricultural zones and are mostly located in the larger towns or administrative 
centres. 
3.4. The role of foreign aid in the implementation of policy 
Since independence in 1963, foreign aid from both multi- and bilateral sources 
has become increasingly important in Kenya. Kenya has both been offered and 
has asked for numerous development projects, import support, capital and 
technical assistance. The bulk of foreign aid is channelled into agriculture to 
establish the conditions for commodity production in agriculture. The 
Government of Kenya receives substantial foreign assistance in irrigation, 
marketing and transport of food, building of storage facilities, livestock and 
crop development, health and education. 
The aim of this section is merely to show that foreign aid plays an 
important role in the implementation of policy. Kenya is successful in 
generating aid for its development plans. An overview of aid flows indicates 
where aid is channelled. It is neither intended nor pretended to analyze here 
the effects of aid in Kenya. 
Chapter 2 emphasized the trend in agricultural commodity production and 
the increased participation of African producers at the end of the colonial 
period. It was not unreasonable to expect that in the coming decades there 
would be a growing demand for important agricultural inputs (fertilizers, 
machines, pesticides, etc). The majority of these inputs are not produced in 
Kenya. It became clear to the newly independent government that securing the 
importation of these essential inputs as well as the financing of the completion 
and further development of the technological infrastructure for farming was 
vital for the economic development of the country. At independence, 
agronomic research on maize and seed testing and certification was still in its 
infancy. The administration became conscious of the fact that the pursuit of its 
general economic aims, carefully set out in African Socialism and its Application 
to Planning in Kenya, could not be financed by resorting to the countries own 
financial and technical resources. The newly introduced four-year economic 
planning policy and subsequent budgeting of recurrent cost method revealed 
that the Kenya government could only cover 75 to 80 % of this budget. 
The state, therefore, was increasingly looking for alternative and 
convenient sources of financial as well as technical assistance. After 
independence, the government lead by Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta -
and after his death in 1978 by his successor President Daniel агар Moi -
pursued a foreign policy to attain this objective. The new administration in 
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Nairobi was concerned with establishing its economic and political status by 
diversifying its range of external relations which had hitherto been dominated 
by well-established economic and political links with the former colonial 
master. Great Britain 
The attempts to diversify its external relations, however, did not prevent 
Great Britain remaining the leading donor country until 1972 Great Britain's 
relative importance as a donor has, quite naturally, declined since 
independence In 1964, well over 80 % of all Kenya's official aid receipts came 
from the UK, compared with under a half of aid gross, and 22 6 % of aid net of 
amortization, m 1972 60 The dominance of a single donor has declined since 
then 
Many different states and international aid institutions (such as the World 
Bank groups, IBRD and IDA, which are on top of the list) started to give aid to 
Kenya The contribution of Bnbsh aid declined to 16 % of total bilateral aid in 
1981/1982 The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States have 
remained significant donors for much of the post-independence period In the 
early seventies, the Nordic countnes (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland) 
and the Netherlands emerged as important bilateral donors In the same 
period, aid from multilateral sources increased rapidly 61 
Multilateral aid increased more than ninefold between 1974/1975 and 
1981/1982 The World Bank groups have been very important donors of 
financial aid with a tendency in recent years for credits by the IDA to decline 
in importance compared with IBRD lending, so hardening the terms of 
multilateral aid to Kenya During the 1980s, IMF loans and structural 
adjustment loans from the World Bank became indispensable phenomena in 
the state's financial management62 
Although Kenya has attempted to diversify her external sources of capital 
for development, the major sources still contìnue to be in the West Aid from 
the Eastern European countries is very small - virtually negligible 63 
The evolution of development cooperation arrangements with donor 
countnes other than Great Britain, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Netherlands, USA, Nordic countries and World Bank groups, was seen as 
part of a wider liberation and nabon-building process, a political factor greatly 
faahtatmg the mibal conduct of aid negotiations with the new Kenyan 
administration The first aid negotiations made clear to the donor countries 
that the architects of Kenya's development programmes were fully prepared to 
use foreign technology, capital and personnel, where these could be used to 
the national economic advantage and to strengthen the economic 
infrastructure of the country 64 Aid and technical assistance are welcome 
because they mean that 'development here need not be limited quite so 
severely by the shortage of domestic savings and education', but aid will not 
be welcomed 'if it is designed to promote the economic or political dominance 
of the aiding country 65 This strong commitment and the relatively strong and 
stable administration in Nairobi, was the starting point for many donor 
countnes to initiate foreign aid arrangements and programmes in Kenya From 
independence up to the mid 1970s, foreign aid was around 12-15 % of total 
government expenditure 66 The rest of the budget shortage shortfall was 
covered by commercial lending from international bank consortia After 1979, 
the dependence on foreign aid and external loan finance increased 
considerably Treasury estimates that the contribution of foreign aid for the 
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financial year 1989/1990 stands at 28 % of total government expenditure (see 
Table 3 3) 
3.4.1. The evolution of foreign aid arrangements and allocation67 
Technical and programme assistance, commodity aid and financial aid (loans 
and grants) are the dominant forms of aid from the international community 
to Kenya In the beginning, technical assistance and financial aid were the 
most important forms Capital or financial aid has become since then a more 
important form of aid than technical assistance The grant element in fmancial 
aid flows is increasing, particularly since the mid 1970s, ι e , after the sool led 
'oil-msis' with its disastrous effect on Kenya's balance-of-payments and the 
worsening m terms of Kenya's agricultural trade In the penod 1971-1974, the 
grant element averaged 83 % of total aid After 1974, the proportion increased 
to 90 % 68 At the same time, the proportion of 'soff loans (interest rates less 
than 3 %) declined from 44 2 % in 1970 to 36 % m 1979 'Hard' loans (interest 
rates more than 9 %) rose from 0 5 % to 9 5 % over the same period 69 
During the same period, (tied) commodity aid, often in the form of balance-
of-payments and import support, emerged also as an important form of 
foreign aid to Kenya The aid-to-imports ratio increased from 6 3 % m the 
1970s to 36 9 % m 1980 In 1984 the ratio dechned to 16 3 % and to 11 2 % in 
1986 The decime in the aid-to-import ratio was, however, largely induced by 
declining loans and grants as well as being due albeit to a much lesser extent 
to import restriction programmes of the state Due to increased borrowing 
from abroad the ratio increased to 34 4 % in 1988 70 
Technical assistance was found to be greatly needed m the administration 
of aid as well as education and training The bulk of technical-assistance funds 
was spent on expatriates The proportion of aid spent on technical assistance 
annually averaged 47 % between 1970 and 1980 A policy of Kenyamzabon has 
been pursued since independence and has gradually led to a diminution in the 
need for foreign expertise In 1985 there were reportedly 9,039 expatnates m 
Kenya of whom 6,967 worked in the private sector, 1,225 under Teachers' 
Service Commission, 451 m the civil service and 200 elsewhere in public 
institutions Tbs represented a decline from 18,000 m 1977 and 12,000 m 
1982 71 Reckoned m money, however, the total value increases after 1974 72 
This implies that there are more relatively low-paid expatriates and fewer 
highly paid expert advisers 
British capital aid (as loans and/or gifts) to Kenya has gone mostly into the 
Land Transfer Programme or into land adjudication and registration Since 
1964 over half of British capital aid has been for land transfer, settlement and 
adjudication British aid to Kenya immediately after independence was used 
а о to pay off the white settlers A second pole of British aid was the financing 
of smallholder commodity schemes (tea in parbcular) The Colonial 
Development Corporation, now the Commonwealth Development 
Corpora bon (CDC) appears as a leadmg financier of tea production schemes in 
Kenya since the early 1950s Furthermore, as a response to the Governments 
shopping list of aid requirements, mainly for capital equipment, British aid 
went into road building, the sugar industry, afforestation and livestock 
marketing schemes, grain storage and education Over the early post-
independence penod (up to the mid seventies) the sectorial breakdown by 
value of Bnbsh general development aid disbursements was agriculture 17 
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%; processing agricultural products 23 %; physical infrastructure, 32 %; sodal 
services 25 %; other 3%. If the Land Transfer Programme and land 
adjudication programmes are counted as assistance for agriculture, however, 
total aid tot that sector is 59 % of gross capital aid73 
The US is an important donor for Kenya. US aid began in 1951 when the 
United States and Britain signed a general agreement for technical cooperation 
in colonial Kenya. From 1953 to 1984, the total aid flow (including loans and 
grants) was US$ 1,619.7 million including military assistance of US$ 245.2 
million.74 The bulk of US economic aid to Kenya, particularly between 1962 
and 1972, was either technical assistance, small commodity grants supporting 
technical assistance or food aid.75 Aid went overwhelming to the agricultural 
sector. After 1972, the US became a more active donor. Technical assistance has 
continued at roughly the same levels with back-up in the form of vehicles and 
other equipment. Teams of advisers were operating in such areas as livestock 
and range development, agricultural credit administration, rural development 
and family planning. 
Recentìy, the USAID shifted from the public sector to place more emphasis 
on the development of the private sector.'é Military aid continued at the same 
pace as during the first 30 years of US development assistance to Kenya. 
Kenya is among the largest African recipient of aid from the US. The build-up 
of food imports (maize primarily) and balance-of-payments support from the 
US in the form of aid and the build-up of military aid, raises the question of 
Kenya as a client state of the US. Kenya represents for the US a suitable 
country in US' geo-political objectives. Kenya offers military facilities for US 
Rapid Deployment Forces. 
West Germany also supports Kenya's development endeavours by offering 
capital aid and technical assistance. All German capital aid is loan aid while 
technical assistance is grant aid. The sectorial distribution of West German 
capital aid to Kenya is as follows: the sugar industry: 20 % (completely spent 
on the construction of the Chemilil sugar factory); the tourist industry: 20 % 
(mainly 'tourisf roads); industrial and commercial development 13 % 
(financing industrial estates in Nairobi, Nakuru and Mombasa). In the 
agricultural field, nearly 8 % of total capital aid commitments have been in 
rice cultivation projects, and further sums have been committed for a pilot 
irrigation scheme and for a scheme to provide credit to small farmers. In 
earlier years. West Germany provided money for the promotion of tea-
growing. Water supply and sewerage are also fields to which West Germany 
appeared attracted. The sectorial breakdown of technical assistance shows that 
much the higher proportion has gone into agriculture. 
Swedish aid to Kenya shows the following sectorial distribution for the 
1964-1975 period: public administration and other services: 35.3 %; agriculture: 
25 %; education: 18 %; water and power supply: 10.7 %. The 1974 
disbursement pattern was: agriculture 22 %; education 19 %; health, including 
family planning, 15 %; rural water 13 %; import financing 10 %. Most Swedish 
aid comprised loans on very soft terms; recently, grants are increasing and 
loans are extended interest free. Capital aid as well as technical assistance is 
untied. Like the US, the Netherlands and Great Britain, Sweden frequently 
provides balance-of-payments loans to counteract the deterioration in the 
world economic situation. Sweden became the largest single donor to Kenya in 
1980/1981, providing 21 % of total bilateral aid. 
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The World Bank group has long been one of the largest donors to Kenya. 
Between independence and 1975, it had committed US$ 144.8 million in IBRD 
loans, US$ 122.8 million in IDA credits and US$ 25.9 in IFC investments. Much 
of this investment has been in large capital-intensive projects and continues to 
be so, although the Bank now lays emphasis on rural development. Less than a 
fifth of commitments were to agriculture. The patterns changed after 1974 
marking the World Bank's change in attitude and policy orientation. Since 
then, aid flows increasingly went to rurally-based enterprises and agricultural 
research projects and programmes. In addition, financing the expansion of 
smallholder tea production schemes became an important ingredient of World 
bank policy in Kenya. During the period 1970-1978, the World Bank became 
Kenya's leading donor, providing some 25 % of the total aid flows. Since 1980, 
the Bank has provided 35.8 % of all donor assistance to Kenya.?? 
The Netherlands has committed itself as a foreign aid donor since 
independence. A review of more than 25 years of Dutch aid to Kenya shows 
that the largest share of aid went into agriculture. The bulk of aid in 
agriculture was in its tum, mainly directed to the further development of the 
technological and physical infrastructure for agricultural production in 
Kenya78 Much attention is being paid to increasing the efficiency of input 
production as well as the supply of inputs. 
The first major achievement of Dutch aid was assistance towards the 
establishment of the National Seed Quality Control Service (NSQCS) in 1965 
and the accompanying cooperation with the enactment of a new Seed Law. 
The NSQCS project (known as 'Seed Certification Unif or 'Seed UnitO 
terminated in 1987. Contributions to the NSQCS from 1987-1984 represented 
approx. 3 % of total Dutch aid to Kenya. Since then, Dutch aid for research and 
development has been channelled through KARI. The improvement and 
expansion of agricultural education facilities, agricultural research and the 
provision of credit to the agricultural population have always been sectors to 
which the Netherlands allocated aid. Dutch aid assisted a.o., within this policy 
framework, the Soil Survey Unit, the Faculty of Agriculture of the University 
of Nairobi, Coffee Selection and Breeding programme and the Grain Legume 
and Dry Beans project. 
Dutch assistance to Kenya's National Dairy Development Programme 
(DDP) must also be interpreted within this framework. Since DDP started in 
1980, the Dutch Government has contributed 21 million Dfl. Half of this 
amount is earmarked for personnel costs; 12.8 % is set aside for fellowships 
and education courses/1' A similar project is the National Poultry 
Development Programme. 
Another major receiver of Dutch commodity aid was the government-run 
Tractor Hire Service (9 million DF1 during 1975-1980). Irrigation received 
about 6.5 % of total Dutch aid during 1977-1980. The Dutch Government is, 
together with the United States, Japan, Norway and Denmark, an important 
fertilizer donor for Kenya. The terms for fertilizer import support are rather 
different, however.80 The bulk of Dutch balance of payment support was used 
to finance the import of fertilizer. Fertilizer import support started in the mid-
1970s and totalled 138 million Dfl (i.e. approx. 35 % of total Dutch aid to Kenya 
during 1975-1985). Another major aim of Dutch aid is to provide funds to 
upgrade the physical infrastructure, i.e., support for rural access roads, water 
supply, extension services and communications. 
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An overall view of aid to Kenya shows two important trends. Capital aid 
disbursements, commodity aid and technical assistance are rather unequally 
spread over the sectors of the economy. It is not surprising that agriculture 
received about a quarter of total aid. Transport and communications and the 
development of water resources received 18 % and 11 % respectively. Energy 
development, balance-of-payments support and education and training took 
up about 7 % of the total aid allocation. The remainder is scattered among 
eight other sectors.81 
Foreign aid to agriculture was generally spent on the further development 
of the administrative, technological and physical structure supporting 
agricultural production and productivity in particular. Apart from agricultural 
R&D programmes and road construction, the financing of smallholder 
commodity production schemes is of particular relevance of foreign aid to 
Kenya. The loan proportion in the expansion of tea and vegetable oil 
production schemes is large. In tea production, it is on average approx. 50 % 
and in some years even higher. In 1974/1975 the loan proportion was 81 %; 
and 77 % and 86 % in 1979/1980 and 1980/1981 respectively, when new 
expansion plans were implemented.82 
A second apparent fact about foreign aid to Kenya is the discrepancy 
between committed aid and the actual disbursements by donors. Since the mid 
1970s, the disbursement ratio has been declining. The average ratio is just over 
50 %.83 That the ratio is declining may be explained by a combination of 
several factors. There is an increasing pressure on the state by donors to 
contribute to local project costs (transport, fuel, local expertise). Donor-
imposed conditionalMes to finance recurrent costs contribute to the delay of 
some projects. Given the financial position of the state, recurrent costs 
financing is restraining implementation. Frequent under-estimation of project 
costs also increases the difficulties of implementation.94 in addition, aid-tying 
may force the country to select import-intensive projects absorbing a large 
proportion of recurrent costs after the project is terminated. The negative 
effects of aid-tying are real, since almost all donors specify that at least 25 % of 
aid is tied. Furthermore, not more than 30 % of donor aid is available for local-
cost fmancing.85 
3.5. Conclusions 
This chapter delineated the main policy objectives of state intervention in 
agriculture as being to modernize the agricultural economy in such a way that 
self-sufficiency in food and industrial crops is attained; that the agricultural 
sector continues to generate foreign exchange earnings; and that the 
agricultural sector continues to be the major source of new jobs for the rapidly 
growing labour force. 
The role of the state is to define and formulate policies and to create an 
administrative, physical and technological structure favourable for their 
implementation. The technological core of agricultural policy is the raising of 
productivity of land and farm labour. Agricultural R&D and the promotion 
and use of modem inputs by various state institutions is essential. The crux of 
Kenya's agricultural policy hinges, thus, around qualitative and quantitative 
changes in agriculture with a view to promoting agricultural growth and 
development. Credit supply, extension service and private land ownership are 
viewed as the means to facilitate capitalization of production which would 
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trigger off agricultural growth. Private land tenure in particular is perceived as 
the way to internalize the benefits of growth. In addition, commercialization of 
production and the expansion of commodity relations rather than subsistence 
production is envisaged as crucial. For these reasons, the state is highly 
committed to the operation of various commodity - import and export, input 
and output - markets. The state is in other words omnipotent. 
The realization of these objectives requires the commitment and active 
participation of the state, the private and cooperative sectors - as 
manufacturers, land-owners, traders and distributors, processors and 
consumers - and foreign aid agencies. 
In its endeavours to implement policy, the state strongly regulates and 
supervises the private and cooperative sector. The nature of state involvement 
in Kenya as can be seen in Figure 3.1, varies by sub-sector as well as by 
production inputs and agricultural commodities. There is a high degree of 
intervention in pricing of fertilizers and livestock products, while only import 
regulations are imposed on pesticides, machinery and equipment with no 
interference in price setting. Licences for companies to import fertilizers, 
pesticides and machinery are issued by the state. Production and pricing of 
maize seeds are heavily and directly controlled by the state. In addition, the 
state fixes consumer prices, producer prices and retail prices as well as the 
profit margins of industrial processing and local production of agricultural 
implements. The Office of the President and Treasury come forth in many 
respects as the two most central state institutions in Kenya. 
Commoditization and institutionalization through state intervention may 
thus be considered as the basic processes structuring agricultural production 
as well as the driving force behind the formation of an agrarian structure in 
Kenya. The colonial roots of the policy objectives and the motor force of 
devdopment are obvious. The administrative and technological foundation 
upon which commodity production for the national and international market 
could expand was already laid down from the time the colonial state 
implemented far reaching reforms in the 1950s. The post-colonial state 
continued to implement this policy. 
The overview of policy objectives also highlighted three other important 
facts. In the first pbce, the euphoria after Uhuru and the high run expectations 
the various classes and groups had of the new state, were supported by 
extremely favourable economic conditions. The conditions deteriorated 
dramatically, however, in the late 1970s as the international terms of exchange 
shifted decidedly against the country. The financial conditions for policy 
implementation deteriorated with it. The limitations placed upon an 
export/import oriented development strategy became increasingly overt. 
In the second place, in relation to the first aspect, macro-economic objectives 
such as debt management and dealing with the steadily increasing deficits on 
the state balance-of-payments current account, also became an overriding 
criterion for policy development. Furthermore, improving the efficiency of 
state intervention in agriculture may also be put forward as an essential 
objective. These objectives are closely tied to the objectives of increasing export 
commodity production and attaining self-sufficiency in food and industrial 
crops. 
In the third place, the overview pointed to various serious shortcomings in 
the agrarian structure which need special attention of the state. The National 
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Food Pohcy paper indicated а о that current land tenure systems proved to be 
inappropriate, that marketing, and particularly food marketing, is ineffective 
The Development Plan 1979-1983 is quite frank about the wide spread 
incidences of poverty m the rural areas In addition, the agricultural research 
and dissemination system has to face senous challenges in order to force a 
breakthrough m σορ and husbandry improvement 
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE RHYTHMS OF AGRARIAN CHANGE SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the policy objectives and the instruments and 
policy terrains of agricultural policy in Kenya since the post-war reforms were 
implemented. In this chapter, we shall examine the general effect of these 
instruments on agricultural developments, i.e., what kind of developments 
were set in train by the implementation of state policy. 
The immediate consequence of the post-war reforms was a phenomenal 
expansion of commodity production for international and national markets. 
Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 displays this dearly. Production of nearly all marketed 
agricultural commodities doubled, trebled or increased on an even greater 
scale between 1950 and 1988. Agricultural production growth rates were 
extraordinary. The economy as a whole expanded as a result. 
This chapter elaborates the directions, specific forms and rhythms of 
agrarian change generated in Kenya since the reforms were implemented in 
the 1950s and particularly since independence. The remarkable economic 
success in the period immediately after independence was fuelled by the 
agrarian revolution proclaimed by the colonial state and further implemented 
by the independent state. Various aspects of the agrarian revolution contribute 
to the expansion of commodity production. The registration and consolidation 
of holdings and private land tenureship and the implementation of land 
transfer programmes are generally portrayed as important elements 
stimulating agricultural development. A general expansion of cultivated area 
and the related lifting of crop restrictions on high value commodities, the 
integration of numerous small-scale household producers in export 
production schemes and their market oriented farming strategies may also be 
conceived as an important driving force. A third component explaining the 
high growth rates is the process of technology transfer to the agricultural 
sector. Various state institutions facilitated the commercialization of 
production as well as the transfer of new productivity-enhancing technologies 
in agriculture and secured their adoption by the farming population. An 
administrative and technological infrastructure was created by the state 
providing the conditions which triggered off agricultural growth. In the course 
of the process of commoditization, however, glaring differentials in the rate of 
development between regions as well as between people began to emerge. 
This chapter is composed as follows. It will examine in brief the effect of the 
process of land transfer after independence. Land reform unleashed a 
considerable expansion of commodity production. The reform process must 
also be considered as one of the mechanisms reproducing the bimodal, 
colonial agrarian structure in the country. After that we shall examine the 
directions of smallholder and large farm production. Technology transfer to 
the agricultural sector in general will be highlighted in section 4. The last 
section is a detailed examination of the processes underlying regional and 
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sodo-economie differentiation. This section on socio-economic differentiation 
reviews the available data on distribution of land and income in the country 
and delineates, at the same time, the structure of smallholder agriculture. This 
review raises doubts about the distinction between a large and small farm 
sector which is frequently applied in state documents as well as in this chapter. 
4.1. The land question and land reform 
The land reforms envisaged in the Swynnerton Plan of 1954, and implemented 
further after the transfer of state power in 1963, is an important ingredient of 
post-colonial developments. The land reforms laid down the essential feature 
of Kenya's contemporary agrarian structure: private property rights to land on 
the one hand and the maintenance of the so-called large farm and small farm 
sector on the other. In this respect it is not surprising that the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) still keeps separate statistical records.1 
The effect of the land reform was twofold. It unleashed a considerable 
expansion of production. It is safe to assume that the land tenure reform has 
been one of the factors contributing to increased smallholder productivity and 
income. The automatically asserted positive association between the 
implementation of the land tenure reform and the dramatic expansion of 
commodity production after the 1950s is severely questioned, however. Heyer 
(1976), for instance, is quite definite about this: '(···) there is little to show that 
the production increases of the 1950s and the 1960s were attributable in any 
way to the land reform programme. They were much more clearly the result of 
the relaxation of restrictions on cash crops and the keeping of dairy cattle.'2 
The prime target of the immediate post-independence land transfer policies 
was the maintenance of the estate or large farm sector and the settlement of 
smallholders and the landless. The politico-economic determinants of the land 
reform will be stipulated in Chapter 8. 
After independence, land transfer of the settler farms in the Scheduled 
Areas in the White Highlands occurred mainly between white settlers and 
wealthy Africans, simultaneously enlarging the economic base of an 
indigenous capitalist class in agriculture. Likewise, foreign investment in 
estate agriculture was closed off by the state. It is estimated by several 
researchers that at least two-thirds to three-quarter of the fertile White 
Highlands remained intact as estates and large mixed farms. By 1973, the 3 
million ha. of the Scheduled Area was divided as follows: 0.9 million ha. of 
'mixed' farms or estates (i.e. maize/wheat fanning and dairy/meat 
production) - roughly 1,800 in all - were sold privately and intact to AÍricans; 
1.5 million ha. remained as plantations or estates (coffee, tea, sisal) -
numbering 400-500 - and large ranches (extensive dairy farming and stock 
raising). The remaining 0.6 million ha. of former 'mixed' farms, were turned 
into relatively small plots under the post-independence land resettlement 
programmes. By 1977 it is estimated that only 5 % of the mixed farms in the 
former White Highlands remained in expatriate hands.3 
Ownership of the estates lies in the hands of the so-called 'telephone-
farmers' (high ranking civil servants, business men and politicians straddling 
agriculture and other economic sectors) and a class of wealthy capitalist 
farmers. Ownership of plantations is confined to a limited number of foreign 
estate companies and local African capitalists. The latter have started to invest 
in land and export commodity production, outside the smallholder production 
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schemes, since independence and some started even before. A number of well 
known international firms (a.o. Unilever, Sodnaf, James Finlay) are still 
directly involved in the ownership of coffee, tea and sisal estates and 
processing facilities.4 
Table 4.1. Number of holdings in the large farm sector, 1954-1987 
Holding size group (ha.) 1954 1963 1971 1981 1987» 
0-49 
50-399 
400 and over 
total 3164 3368 3176 3771 4358 
* provisional figure 
Source: Statistical Abstract (1955,1970,1980,1988) 
This table displays the trend towards division of the large farm sector into 
smaller land holdings. 
The form of property acquisition in agriculture was, according to Leys 
(1978) one of concentration. From 1959 to 1970 between K£ 7 and 10 million of 
private capital, mostly from the Central Province, was invested in large farm 
purchase in the White Highlands.S The same applies to foreign owned coffee-
farms. By the end of 1977 57.3 % of the total hectarage of foreign owned coffee 
had been bought by Africans.6 This implies, at the same time.was, that a 
considerable amount of capital must have been accumulated by Africans 
during the colonial period or that investment of this kind was financed with 
loans from the Land Bank and later by the AFC. It seems, however, also to 
have been facilitated by the concentration of commodity production in a few 
hands. In Murang'a district, for example, 14% of the farmers supplied 64 % of 
the coffee in 1970. In 1970/1971 in two tea-growing locations in Nyeri district, 
20 % of the growers supplied 55 % of the crop (in 1965, 20 % of the growers 
supplied 64 % of total output)7 
The rest of settler-owned 'mixed' farm land was turned into relatively small 
plots in the form of settlement schemes, such as the 'Million Acre Scheme' 
initiated in 1961, soon followed by the 'Haraka', 'Shirika', 'Harambee' and 
'Stateland' schemes. The schemes were implemented with loans provided by 
Britain, the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the World Bank. 
The first and main beneficiary of land transfers for smallholder settlement was 
Central Province.8 
The settlement schemes were set up as a step to relieve the pressure off 
demand for land from the landless, to pay off the outgoing settlers and to 
satisfy the demands for land by the so-called 'yeoman' or 'progressive' 
farmers. Ethnic sentiments were also part of the settlement process. Kikuyu-
settlers were frequently favoured by the settlement schemes at the expense of 
non-Kikuyu settlers.' 
The settlement schemes were above all presented as a way to relieve the 
situation of the landless and poor peasants.10 The schemes were not planned, 
however, as a strategy to resolve the rural poverty problem, although poverty 
undoubtedly has been reduced by settlement policies, since land was provided 
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for the landless and near landless. Due to subdivision of land in the Scheduled 
Areas and implementation of various Settlement Schemes in several phases 
between 1960 and 1982, the amount of resettled land totalled nearly 0.8 million 
ha. Eighty thousand households gained access to land during that period.! 1 
The settlement programmes affected only about a quarter of the country's 
best land, only 3 % of total agricultural land in Kenya and only about a 
twentieth of the country's total population. 
In the former Non-Scheduled Areas or Reserves which total 7 million ha. of 
arable land, there were no land settlement policies planned. Smallholders in 
the former Reserves were given individual freehold titles to the land. The land 
tenure reform stimulated the creation of a free land market in the former 
Reserves. This certainly increased the potential of the rich peasant classes to 
buy more land and gain easier access to labour. The land reform programmes 
have significantly altered the pattern of land distribution at the expense of the 
bottom quartile of the rural population. The situation of land-poor households 
in the former Reserve areas remained the same as before independence. The 
situation of tenants has been worsened since the implementation of private 
land tenure.!2 
The benefits of the land tenure reforms in the non-settlement areas accrued 
thus only to a small proportion of Kenya's regions and to a minority group of 
rural producers. To make matters worse, the settlement schemes were 
favoured in extension and agricultural credit programmes at the expense of 
the former Reserves. In addition, in some of these schemes farmers were 
resettled who already owned land in the non-settlement areas. The settlement 
schemes were used by many farmers to obtain more land.13 
An important issue relating to the land settlement programme was the 
nature of the target groups. A famous settlement scheme was the 'Million Acre 
Scheme' which started in 1961 and was completed in 1971. The initial plans 
involved the settlement of 1,800 'yeoman' farmer families with targeted 
incomes of Ksh 5,000/- and 6,000 'peasant7 families (or the so-called non-
progressive farmers) with a targeted income of Ksh 2,000/-. The scheme 
contained therefore a high-density and a low-density scheme. In the end, 
approx. 30,000 peasant households were settled in the high-density scheme 
and 5,000 yeoman farmers in the low-density scheme. The size of the holdings 
in the high-density scheme averaged 4 ha. while the low-density scheme 
holding size averaged 16.2 ha. In practice, the high-density schemes came to be 
peopled with landless households, many of whose heads had been active in 
the Mau Mau Rebellion, while the low-density schemes were mainly occupied 
by households whose heads had considerable off-farm incomes, and who often 
already had land elsewhere. 
From the start, the low-density scheme farmers received preferential 
treatment in terms of choice and price and quality of land and the 
establishment of extension services.l4 Despite the bias in government attitude 
towards the schemes - it was probably assumed that the high-density schemes 
would fail - economic evaluation by the Statistics Division of the Ministry of 
Finance and Planning conducted between 1964 and 1968, indicated that the 
theory proved to be seriously misconceived: the low-density schemes did not 
outperform the high-density schemes. Output per unit of land in the high-
density schemes exceeded that in the low-density schemes. The rate of return 
on capital invested followed a similar pattern. Although the evaluation report 
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mentioned that output per unit of land grew more quickly in the high-density 
scheme, the level of output was substantially greater in the low-density 
scheme.15 The high-density schemes with intensive farming styles appeared to 
be very productive in terms of output per unit of land and the number of 
people supported by that land. 
Probably drawing on these experiences, state planners stipulated, in the 
third Oeoelopment Plan 1974-1978, the need to redefine the size and criteria for 
land ownership in settlement schemes and for cooperatives in order to leave 
room for more small farms. The state, however, did not commit itself to the 
purchase of large farms for further settlement of smallholders. Neither did it 
conceive of the idea of a land tax or a legal ceiling on the size of holdings. The 
subdivision of the large farm sector to the small farm sector came virtually to a 
standstill in the early 1970s16 and proceeded after that at a slow pace. 
The situation evolved in this way despite that various state sponsored 
socio-economic studies conducted during 1971-1972, indicating that 'non­
progressive' smallholder agriculture could be highly productive, even under 
unfavourable conditions. These fanners were more productive than the 
large(r) farmers. The research results invariably showed that the smaller the 
size of the farm, the higher the output per unit of land, the higher the level of 
wage employment in relation to the area cultivated and the smaller the costs of 
inputs used per hectare.17 
This particular aspect of smallholder agriculture strengthened the belief of 
large numbers of state planners and policymakers in that sector. Policy 
documents such as the Sessional Paper on Employment of 1973 and the 
Development Plan 1974-1978 reflected their views on the positive contribution 
of smallholder agriculture to the national economy as a provider of 
employment opportunities and foreign exchange.18 
4.2. Shifting land-use patterns 
The fast growth rates of agricultural commodity production are primarily 
realized in the production of 'nev/ cash crops such as coffee, tea, pyrethmm, 
sugar, cotton and food crops such as (hybrid) maize and wheat. Data on land 
use indicates this dearly. Heyer (1975) compared land-use data for 1930 with 
the data for 1969-70. Her analysis highlights the fact that in all provinces the 
cultivated area of millet and sorghum has declining since the thirties, with a 
parallel increase in the area under coffee, tea and pyrethmm. Sorghum and 
millet are increasingly being replaced by hybrid maize, especially in Nyanza 
and Western Provinces.1' The recorded decline in the cultivated area of pulses, 
root crops and bananas is, however, less dramatic. When the restrictions on 
the production of high-value crops and the ownership of graded cattle were 
lifted by the state, the smallholder population responded immediately by 
growing and selling these crops. 
More recent data on land use from the Integrated Rural Surveys (Ι,Π, ΙΠ, 
and IV) held between 1974 and 1979 and the Agricultural Production Survey 
1986/8720 for the smallholder sector support the conclusion that smallholder 
land use shifted increasingly from production of use-value to exchange-value. 
The degree of commercialization in smallholder agriculture is fairly high. 
Aggregate data from the 1RS surveys reveal that roughly 45 % of total output 
is marketed, although this differs significantly by region as well as by income 
and holding size group (see also Table 4.6).21 
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One immediate effect of the strategy of large numbers of smallholders was 
that commodity production increasingly became specialized production, 
notably of commodities destined for the international market (primarily coffee, 
tea, horticultural produce and pyrethrum). This trend can be noted from the 
1930s onwards when agricultural production became increasingly 
commercialised. The lifting of the radal barriers on the production of high-
value crops accelerated the shift of smallholder production to export crops. 
This trend is particularly observable in the major export commodity producing 
agricultural zones in Kenya: Murang'a, Nyeri and Kirinyanga districts in 
Central Province; Machakos, Embu and Meni districts in Eastern Province and 
Kisii district in Nyanza Province. In these three provinces, the percentage of 
smallholders producing export crops (coffee, tea and pyrethrum) was in 
1974/1975 70.6 %, 67.9 % and 46.2 % respectively.22 The consequence of this 
pattern is that the extent to which these households depend on income from 
export production is high. In Central Province alone in the year 1982, 33.2. % 
of the average smallholder household income from commercialized production came 
from raising cash crops.23 
Due to different sample sizes and locations of the sample areas, the IRS-1 
data are not comparable with the later IRS-surveys. A comparison of IRS-II 
and IRS-IV data indicated that the number of coffee-growing holdings 
dropped by 7 % while the coffee area remained steady. The number of tea 
growers and tea quantity of cultivated increased considerably, however, by 22 
% and 32 % respectively (see also Figures 4.1 and 4.2). The Pyrethrum area and 
the number of growers reported a 45 % drop, and production declined by 50 
%.24 To make long term interpretations of the shifts in land use even more 
difficult, the Agricultural Production Survey 1986/87 is again based on a 
different sample size and location of sample area. 
In contrast to smallholder land use, large farm sector data are published 
annually, probably because these are easier to record. Land use in the large 
farm sector is shown below. 
Table 4.2. Area planted by crop in selected years on large farms ('000 ha.) 
Cereals 
Maize 
Wheat 
Temporary indust 
Sugar cane 
Pyrethrum 
Permanent crops 
Coffee 
Tea 
sisal 
1960 
57.0 
99.2 
. crops 
16.9 
15.9 
28.4 
14.8 
97.9 
1970 
59.3 
121.1 
26.4 
3.3 
29.7 
23.8 
85.1 
1975 
68.1 
89.8 
31.5 
4.1 
28.3 
26.0 
73.8 
1980 
70.7 
79.4 
37.4 
3.6 
29.4 
27.3 
82.5 
1985 
69.0 
66.2 
27.3 
4.7 
40.0 
27.4 
54.0 
1987» 
68.8 
94.6 
18.3 
4.2 
43.7 
18.3 
54.1 
* provisional figure 
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1965-1988 
The large farm sector land use is subdivided by CBS in: 
- Mixed-farms or estates. These farms generally combine cattle/maize, 
cattle/wheat or cattle/wheat/maize. The core areas of estate production are 
Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and Nakuru districts, which are the estate areas of 
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the former White Highlands. Together the estates make up 40 - 45 % of total 
large farm area. The estates produce primarily food for the national market.25 
- Ranches with extensive livestock rearing, mostly located in the semi-arid 
zones and producing mainly for the national market. 
- Plantations growing coffee, tea, sisal and sugar. These enterprises occupy 
about 10 % of the large farm area. 
4.3. Smallholder and large farm production 
Table 4.3 provides a clue as to what kinds of producers realized the 
phenomenal expansion of commodity production after the 1950s. Total 
agricultural output in smallholder agriculture doubled between 1964 and 
1983.26 Smallholders' share in marketed production increased gradually but 
constantly from 13.5 % in 1955 to 55.6 % in 1975. After 1985, the contribution 
from small farms fell below 50 % for the first time in years. A major 
contributory factor to this scenario was the large increase in the sale of coffee 
from large farms and a relatively small increase in production of coffee by 
smallholders and an absolute decline in rice paddy by small farmers.27 
Table 4.3. The share of large and small farms in recorded marketed production 
to Marketing Boards, 1955-1988 (measured in terms of output value) 
Year 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988» 
Large farms 
annual % 
change 
+11.2 
-7.0 
+ 8.7 
-2.2 
+13.9 
-10.3 
+48.7 
-16.2 
+15.8 
Small farms 
annual % 
change 
_ 
+13.1 
-3.3 
+21.4 
+20.1 
+11.7 
+1.7 
+3.3 
-8.8 
+15.8 
Total 
annual % 
change 
_ 
+11.6 
-5.2 
+13.8 
+9.2 
+12.7 
-4.2 
+24.1 
-12.9 
+15.5 
% share 
small 
farms 
13.5 
20.1 
47.5 
52.5 
55.6 
52.2 
54.2 
45.1 
47.2 
47.1 
* provisional 
Source: Economic Survey, 1970 - 1989 
Figure 4.1 shows the effect of this process of 'smallholderizatìon' in detail for 
two crucial commodities, coffee and tea. It displays the growth trends in coffee 
and tea production on estates and by smallholder producers. The absolute 
increase in production may be explained by a combination of changes in 
productivity of land and labour and by a steady increase in smallholder 
cultivated area. The variation in production may be explained by variable 
weather conditions, the changing terms of exchange for coffee and tea and the 
variation in coffee- and tea cultivated area by estate producers. 
The phenomenal expansion in tea and coffee production by smallholders is, 
apart from smallholder farming strategies, also founded upon the desire of the 
post-war colonial state, and thereafter post-colonial state, to incorporate small-
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Figure 4.1. Export commodity production on estates and by smallholders, 1959 
-1988 
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Source: Economic Survey (1960-1989), Statistical Abstract (1956-1988) 
scale producers in the process of development. Several producer and 
marketing cooperatives in coffee and the parastatal company Kenya Tea 
Development Authority (KTDA) have put considerable efforts in marketing 
smallholder output, conducting crop research, rendering extension services, 
supplying inputs and supervising smallholders' labour processes. Figure 4.2, 
showing the increase in smallholder tea area and the number of smallholder 
tea producers, indicates that the average area cultivated by smallholders is 
gradually decreasing in the period 1964 - 1971. The early entrants into tea 
production schemes cultivated larger average tea plots than those who entered 
later. After 1971, the trend remains stable. In 1988, producers in state-managed 
tea production schemes cultivated an average of 0.38 ha. of tea. Figure 4.2 
demonstrates clearly the successful implementation of the objective of state 
policy to integrate more and more smallholders into export commodity 
production schemes. It also shows that increasingly even the smallest among 
them were integrated into these schemes. 
The consequence of the smallholder land-use allocation system, as noted by 
Cowen (1983), is that the proportion of direct home consumption out of total 
food consumption of the export-commodity producing households started to 
fall rapidly. These households maintained their food consumption level by 
purchasing food on the market. In addition, many holdings in the small farm 
sector appeared to small to protect the household means of subsistence (see 
section 4.5.2.2). An internal market for food and other basic consumption items 
(maize, meat, milk, bread, clothes, kerosene, etc.) has developed in the course 
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Figure 4.2. Tea cultivated area by type of producer and number of smallholder 
producers 
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of the smallholderization and the export-commodity promotion strategy of the 
state. The demand for food is thus not only based on the purchasing power of 
the proletarianized masses gathered in Kenya's larger cities (Nairobi, 
Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru) but increasingly also on the consumption needs 
of the smallholder households in the rural areas. Rural households are both 
consumers and producers of maize. The production retained for home 
consumption covers only 60-65 % of total family consumption. Schmidt (1979) 
estimates that rural market demand accounted in the 1970s for 80 % of total 
demand, i.e., approx. 3.5 times the demand in urban areas.^ 
In this context it is crucial point out that the largest proportion of 
production of food for the internal market originates from estates in the former 
white Highlands. Ownership of these estates lies with members of Kenya's 
ruling classes and politicians. Estate production accounts for the largest 
proportion of maize sales and virtually all production of wheat. For the year 
1978/1979 and for 1983 it was estimated that their share of marketed maize 
production was about 70 %. In 1976, 90 % of maize produced on estates 
originated from three large-farm districts. Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and 
Nakuru.» The smallholders' share of marketed maize output in 1978/11979 
and 1983 was 30 % (even though the smallholder production accounted for 80 
to 90 % of total maize output).30 
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Table 4.3 already demonstrated the growing importance of smallholder 
production, i.e., the produce of more than 80 % of Kenya's rural population. 
More importantly, perhaps, the smallholding community became a major 
foreign exchange earner and thus a major source of state revenue in the form 
of taxes. The favourable international terms of trade during the 1960s and up 
to the mid 1970s nourished both the expansion of export commodity 
production and the confidence of the producers in the post-independence state 
and state policy. 
As a result of post-independence agricultural policy, the plantation and 
estate sector maintained its economic position. These sectors accounted 
throughout the 1980s for all sisal and virtually all pineapple production; a little 
less than 40 % of the coffee, slightly more than 50 % of the tea and about 40 % 
of the sugar cane; 30 % of the pyrethrum; 20 % of the marketed milk and 70 % 
of the marketed maize. 
Household commodity production on numerous smallholdings accounted 
for 60-65 % of the total coffee production; 70 % of all pyrethrum; all cotton; 
about 60 % of sugar cane; approx. 40 % of tea; all the tobacco; 80 % of the 
marketed milk and 30 % of the marketed maize. Because of the emphasis of the 
state on the promotion of household commodity production (to paraphrase the 
slogan 'expanding the smallholder sector') in dairy farming, horticultural 
crops and tea in particular, considerable changes will result in the proportion 
of household producers in marketed production of such produce.3l 
Due to state policy, the estate producers have been able up to now to 
continue accumulation in large-scale agriculture largely based on capitalizing 
on smallholders' consumption of purchased food.32 It is dear in this context 
that indigenous accumulation in estate agriculture and household export-
commodity production converge closely in two circuits of exchange: an 
international and a national circuit. 
The level of food consumption of the households engaged in specialized 
commodity production - and thus the willingness of these households to 
produce for the market - depends to a large extent on the prices paid to 
producers by the principal marketing boards for their commodities. Producer 
prices are either fixed by the state or determined by price fluctuations on the 
international market. This implies, as Cowen (1986) notes, that household 
commodity production could be increased 'provided that the (international 
and national, p.h.) terms of exchange permitted smallholders to maintain food 
consumption and satisfy their rising demand for other basic goods and 
services which are provided through the market.'33 
A direct implication is that the international terms of exchange for Kenya's 
principal export commodities influence directly the level of accumulation on 
the estates unless the state carries the load of accumulation through a 
privileged system of marketing and price regulations. Moreover, if the 
conditions for estate food production should deteriorate, for any reason, 
marketed output from the estate areas would be reduced. This, in its turn, 
would force smallholders to grow their own food and reduce their proportion 
of marketed output. Small fanners also cut back on export commodity 
production or cease to produce these commodities if the international terms of 
exchange, which are beyond control of the state, are unfavourable, small 
fanners would then start to grow food for subsistence.3^ 
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This feature of Kenya's agranan structure, particularly the intersection of 
two circuits of exchange and the effectiveness of the exercise of state power 
within the realm of the national circuit of exchange, will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 7, section 2 
State agricultural policy also generated another specific pattern of 
agricultural production contract farming production schemes In addition to 
the existing production schemes established during the colonial penod by 
foreign agribusiness firms, the post-colonial state developed plans to expand 
these schemes, in particular for local production of crops which at the time of 
independence were imported in considerable quantities (sugar, barley, 
tobacco, cotton, oilseeds, vegetable oils, see Chapter 3, section 3 2) This form 
of production, in which producers are closely tied to supervision of 
production and the terms of exchange regulated by the contracting enterprises 
and parastatali, emerged rapidly in Kenya Contract farming arrangements 
between international agribusiness firms and/or parastatal companies and 
boards with household producers account now for 40 % of tea (m KTDA-
managed production schemes), about 50 % of sugar cane, all barley produced 
(in Kenya Brewenes managed schemes) and 80 % of tobacco production (BAT-
K)3 5 Oilseeds and vegetable oils are produced by smallholders in production 
schemes managed by East African Industries (EAI) and by the newly formed 
Oil Crop Development Authority 36 
The state as well as the household commodity producers found contract 
farming beneficial and accepted this mode of organization in agriculture 
Socio-economic research indicated that the peasant households engaged in 
contract-farming commodity production schemes in tea, and to a certain extent 
also m sugar and tobacco, obtained positive income benefits from these 
arrangements 37 These findings correspond with Cowen's in Central Province 
Cowen (1974, 1981) has shown that the intervention of agro-industnal 
enterprises, facilitated by the state, resulted m a more equal distribution of 
agnculturai incomes 38 
As a result of these import-substituting crop developments, the country 
became self-sufficient in sugar and barley (since 1979) and tobacco (smce 
1982) Oilseed and vegetable oil schemes are still not successful and imports 
continue, although m decreasing quantities It is particularly relevant for the 
state that these commodity production schemes reduced the need for imports 
and save foreign exchange Whether these schemes produce the intended 
employment-enhancing effect or stimulate linkages between agriculture and 
industry is ambiguous 39 
4.4. Agricultural inputs and labour use in agriculture 
A key feature of Kenyan agricultural policy, which had contnbuted to the fast 
growth rates in the agricultural sector, is the growth in use of modem 
agncul turai inputs, such as fertilizers, agro-chemicals, purchased unproved 
seeds, ploughs, tractors and improved hoes The core of the proclaimed 
agranan revolution programme was the transformation of the labour process 
m agriculture in order to raise productivity on the farm and to increase 
marketable production It was especially directed towards improving the 
objects and instruments of labour Production became not only increasingly 
commercialized, but also increasingly capitalized The Kenyan peasantry is 
frequently glonfied for its fast adoption of innovations by several 
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development agencies such as the World Bank, as well as responsible state 
institutions (extension service, agricultural research institutions) which 
facilitated the adoption process.*} 
In Chapters 6 and 7 we will go into more details of a particular case of 
technology transfer to the agricultural sector: the introduction of hybrid maize 
and associated commodity packages of land- and labour-saving technologies. 
Figure 4.3 shows the trends in use of key agricultural inputs from 1972 to 
1988 (1976=100). The period under review shows remarkable declines and 
increases. Contributory to these fluctuations are the influences of 'good' and 
'bad' years and the fact that the terms of exchange are fluctuating as well. The 
use of purchased seeds (i.e. mainly hybrid maize, wheat, sunflower, barley, 
seed potatoes) lags behind the application of fertilizers almost every year. The 
marked difference can be explained by the fact that the biggest proportion of 
total fertilizers applied is for crops such as coffee, tea (export) and sugar 
(internal market). For 1982/83 it was estimated that 60 % of total fertilizers was 
used for these three crops, while for maize and wheattwo major 
commodiüzed food crops in Kenya, only about 26 % of total fertilizer was 
used.4l The two crops which receive the bulk of fertilizer do not feature in 
Figure 4.3 under the category purchased seeds. This may explain the marked 
difference. 
The data on the employment of wage-labour in agriculture and modem, 
mostly imported, fanning implements (such as tractors, planting machines, 
harvesters) also not incorporated in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3. Agricultural input indices, 1972-1988 
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The employment of modem farm implements (tractors, harvesters, planting 
machines) in Kenya is high compared with other African countries.4? The data 
produced by the Integrated Rural Surveys on this item for smallholder farms, 
the intermediate 'gap' farms and large farms are hard to interpret because they 
only show the distribution between the provinces and not the distribution 
between the three categories. It is, however, accurate to state that the use of 
harvesters and planting machines is fairly restricted to the large farm areas 
(notably Rift Valley Province), while mechanization of land preparation is a 
common phenomenon in smallholder agriculture. It is assumed by a World 
Bank study that more than half of the tractor-hours spent in agriculture is 
employed on medium and small scale farms.43 The demand for tractor hire 
services is high.** A small share of the tractors is owned individually by 
medium- and large-scale farmers; the largest share of tractor-hours is provided 
by the government (Tractor Hire Services, operating 1,000 tractors) and private 
agricultural contractors (the actual number is unknown). 
An ILO-mission report of 1972 confirmed the high rates of employment of 
casual or seasonal and regular agricultural wage labour. The report stressed 
that rich and middle peasant households were hirers of wage-labour: the rich 
tends to hire permanently and seasonally while the middle peasant household 
tend to hire casual and seasonal wage labour.45 Agricultural wage labour has a 
very long history in Kenya and appears not to be merely restricted to the large 
farm sector.** The IRS-I survey*? and various research projects at district level 
show unquestionably that, within the smallholder sector, the rate of wage 
labour employed on smallholdings is large and probably increasing. About 
10% of labour used on holdings is hired. Collier and Lai (1986) estimate that 
approx. 60 % (within a range of 50 to 75 %) of hired labourers appears to be 
landless.4*) The IRS-I survey indicated that the hiring of wage labour differs 
considerably by holding size as well as by region. Significantly, perhaps, there 
is a clear inverse relationship between farm size and labour hiring per hectare. 
From Kitching's (1977) interpretation of the data produced by Population 
Census of 1969, it may be concluded that approx. 60% of the agricultural wage 
labour force is employed on smallholder farms. The fourth Development Plan 
1979-1983 estimated that 76% of total agricultural wage labour time is spent 
within the smallholder sector. The rest is employed on large scale mixed 
farms, ranches, irrigation schemes and plantations.4' Collier (1983) found that 
in the most commercialized area in Kenya, Central Province, 11.3 % of the 
days worked on smallholdings (and 10 % of the hours) was accounted for by 
hired labour.50 Cowen (1986) stressed that the success of smallholder 
production has created a shortage of wage labour across a range of large and 
intermediate-scale farms.Sl 
4.5. Differentiation in Kenya 
So far we have only marginally considered the inter-regional and intra-
regional differences. The conditions for individual peasant households and 
regions to participate in commodity production differed, however, and from 
the start of commercialization of production in the 1930s glaring differentials 
between regions and people began to emerge. Cowen, Heyer and Kitching 
reiterate, that from the start of commercial production in the early days of 
colonialism to the onset of the 'agrarian revolution' in the fifties, farming 
strategies of individual peasant households were increasingly oriented 
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towards earning money. Modem money was made king, at least as a means of 
exchange of commodities. The fanning strategies relied not only on earning 
money through agricultural production but, from the early thirties onwards, 
increasingly also on income from wage labour migration and other sources of 
off-farm income. Both, Cowen and Kitching have emphasized the importance 
of marked inequalities in land holding and the differences in access to means 
of production (land) and to sources of off-farm income (i.e., 'straddling'). 
Kitching (1980) depicts the following picture based on the observed 
correlation between holding size, farm income and off-farm income of the 
individual household:^ 
'The migration of male households heads to unskilled wage labour was 
the response of those households who had least land and who thus felt 
the constraints of low yields most acutely. The return even to low-paid 
wage labour time was superior to cultivating labour time for such 
households because these constraints were so severe. Moreover, and just 
as importantly, once this decision had been made, reliance on wage 
labour income by the household became more and more complete, 
because labour input into already small land holdings itself declined 
and with it the farm income. (...) At the other end of ine spectrum, the 
migration of a male household head from a larger landholding to a 
much more highly-paid skilled or white collar post provided the means 
to purchase both more land and the labour power with which to work 
it.'53 
For the poorest households as a general rule, the diversion of labour away 
from the farm could make a greater contribution towards subsistence. For the 
richest households, comparatively large farm incomes were supplemented 
with even larger off-farm incomes. In between these extremes we find: 
'many middle-level households where the male remained on the plot 
and increased his labour input, as did his wife, but even among labour 
migrants wage incomes were enormously varied both at one time and 
through time, since the African labour force in colonial Kenya was 
stratified by a myriad of finely-graded wage scales.'S* 
After reviewing several household surveys carried out by the government as 
well as by independent researchers (Cowen, Hunt, Heyer), Kitching identifies 
three broad groups of households and agricultural zones left out in the cold by 
the 'agrarian revolution'. It is not surprising that his categorization is based on 
holding size and off-farm income (often wage labour migration). The influence 
of the ecological variation in altitude, rainfall and quality of the land makes it 
extremely difficult to specify the holding size threshold below which the 
enterprise became unviable. 
'(...) those left out were those with the ecological opportunity (of 
growing the new crops coffee, tea and pyrethrum, p.h.) but without the 
lana, capital or labour power to take advantage of that opportunity 
(Central Province, Kisii, Machakos highland and parts of Central 
Nyanza), those without the ecological opportunities and without 
enough land to make up for yield deficiencies by the size of the 
cultivated area (lowland Machakos, Kitui, other parts of the Coast, 
Nyanza lowlands), and those with the land and the opportunity, but 
essentially without the capital (Nandi, Kericho, West- Pokot). Common 
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to all of them was the marked narrowing of alternatives due to lack of 
access to sufficiently large sources of off-farm incomes. With such 
sources land could be bought, labour hired and capital invested in the 
'home' area, or if the latter was poor or semi arid, better land could be 
bought elsewhere.'SS 
His conclusion is that the 'agrarian revolution' 'had by 1970 touched only a 
minority of the smallholding households of Kenya in any way*, and that it 'did 
little or nothing to alter the patterns of differentiation which had been 
operating among Africans in Kenya before its onsef. On top of the existing 
pattern of differentiation, 
'after 1952 there was a speeding-up of the process of differentiation (socially as well as regionally, p.hj, particularly after Independence, 
when some African households gained access to the resources of the 
state. With this speeding-up, there was also a widening of the relative 
gap between the richest and poorest African households (and between 
regions, p.h.), as some gained access to the very highest incomes and to 
forms of wealth which had previously been monopolized by Europeans 
and Asians. Despite this speeding-up and intensification or the process 
of differentiation, the mechanisms of income and wealth accumulation 
remained largely unchanged, and in particular the essential mechanism 
of using access to off-farm business remained the touchstone of 
accumulation and differentiation.'56 
Later on, after the following section, we shall see that Kitching's conclusion 
requires important adjustments. 
4.5.1. Regional differences in commoditization 
An analysis of regional differentiation is closely connected with the spatial 
developments laid down as a consequence of colonial state policy. From the 
early period of colonialism to the present period, spatial development in 
Kenya has been unequal. Infrastructural development during the colonial 
period took place primarily in favour of the White Highlands, the core of 
settler and estate agriculture containing most of Kenya's fertile agricultural 
land. The construction of the Uganda Railway, from Mombasa to Kisumu, and 
the later extension of the railway to Kitale in the 1920s, favoured agricultural 
development in the regions adjacent to the railway line. Additionally, 
infrastructural development planning, such as road construction, agricultural 
research and the provisioning of agricultural credit and services, was 
increasingly geared towards the White Highlands. 
The Non-Scheduled Areas lagged seriously behind in infrastructural 
development, particularly during the pre-war period. When commodity 
production started to expand in the Reserves, the colonial administration 
started to pay more attention to the infrastructural development of these areas. 
Plans were drawn up and implemented to upgrade the existing infrastructure 
to support agricultural development. The colonial administration clearly 
favoured Central Province and some districts in Rift Valley Province (i.e. 
Kikuyu land and the former White Highlands) at the expense of others (i.e. the 
Reserves excluding certain parts of Central Province). In other areas such as 
Western Kenya, agricultural development remained at a much lower level; the 
predominant economic activity was labour migration to the White Highlands 
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and/or subsistence agriculture. The traditional white settler areas, mainly in 
Rift Valley Province, remained throughout the colonial period a net receiver of 
public investment funds for infrastructural development. The political 
dominance of the white settler over the state ensured the continuing assistance 
of the administration for the development of a viable settler economy. 
The weakening of the political and economic position of the settler 
economy after World War Π coincided with a simultaneous build-up of 
economic and political power in the Reserves, notably in Central Province. 
This situation forced the colonial administration to reverse its policies. During 
the 1950s, the new policy of the colonial administration was focused primarily 
on Central Province. Programmes aiming at land consolidation and title-deed 
registration were first implemented in Central Province. The same can be said 
about the stationing of agricultural extension officers. This focus on Central 
Province was influenced by the existing natural and infrastructural advantages 
of the province. But it was not only an easy option for the state to explore its 
economic potential as political considerations too underlie the emphasis of 
policy implementation on Central Province. Central Province was, on the one 
hand, the region where indigenous accumulation of capital in agriculture was 
already well advanced (see Chapter 2, section 4.). On the other hand. Central 
Province had been the particular focal point of the Mau Mau rebellion and the 
struggle for independence from colonial rule since the early fifties.57 It 
received therefore, particularly during the Emergency years, substantial 
development and infrastructural resources with a view to restoring order and 
peace and preventing revolutionary changes in the country. And thus the 
region was advantaged and has maintained since that time its position of 
economic dominance. 
The economic position of Central Province has not always been the 
strongest compared with other regions. Until 1957, for instance, Nyanza and 
Central Province produced roughly the same quantity of marketed output. 
Kitching stresses the structural differences between districts in Central 
Province (Kiambu, Fort Hall and Nyeri) and those in Nyanza Province (North 
Kavirondo, Kericho). In the former, the effect of market forces was strong 
enough to produce rapid expansion of output and sales. Being within striking 
distance of Nairobi, these districts were the first to experience the increased 
demand for all types of foodstuffs. Their response to the offered opportunities 
was immediate. In the Nyanza districts, the problem was slightly different. 
These districts depended almost entirely on the export of maize cultivated by 
hoe or ox-plough. As a low-value and high-weight crop, maize suffered from 
high transport costs, increased by the bad state of many roads. The transport 
factor impeded the spread of production in areas remote from infrastructure 
and markets.58 
To Kitching's explanation of Central Province's fast growth rates can be 
added that offered by Heyer. Development in Central Province was long 
frustrated by the colonial authorities. After the lifting of the restrictions, the 
potential was rapidly explored by numerous households. This argument can 
easily be extended to Rift Valley Province growth rates. Nyanza (except Kisii 
district) and Western Province (except Bungoma district) did not have such 
large areas that were well suited to the expansion of cash aops hitherto 
prohibited. The limited resources were already in use. Nyanza's growth did 
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not stagnate, but its marketed output grew less dramatically at the moment 
that Central Province experienced fast and sustainable growth rates.59 
Figure 4.4. Smallholder marketed production by Province, 1945 -1962 
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Agricultural development in Western Province and Nyanza was primarily 
dominated by maize. After 1957, growth in Central Province became 
progressively based on arabica coffee and to a lesser extent on maize, hides 
and skins, pulses and fruit and vegetables. Tea, dairy products and pyrethrum 
only became important in the sixties. After 1957, Nyanza's production became 
more diversified. Cotton, hides and skins, groundnuts for a while and coffee 
became important crops in Nyanza. Coffee, however, never became as 
important in Nyanza as in Central Province. The fluctuations in output after 
1957 can no longer be attributed to maize only. 
The effect of the introduction of high-value crops on the one hand and the 
concentrated efforts of state policy towards Central Province on the other 
hand, has been shown by Heyer (1974,1975). By using the value of marketed 
production by smallholders as an mdex for development in smallholder 
agriculture (see Figure 4.4), Heyer demonstrated that from 1957 Central 
Province rapidly drew ahead of other provinces.*1 One remark is necessary. 
Before 1953, Central and Southern Province was counted as one 
administrative entity. In 1953 they were split into Central Province and 
Southern Province. The comparison of Nyanza and Central Province is 
influenced to the extent that after the split Nyanza had considerably more 
population. This makes the comparison even more disturbing. 
115 
Data compiled by Bigsten for the year 1971 on gross marketed production 
by province in cereals, industrial crops, permanent crops and livestock and 
related products show a slightly different picture The difference from Meyer's 
data is that Bigsten's data comprise marketed output from small as well as 
large farms About 41 % of gross marketed output came from Rift Valley 
Province Central Province produced around 27 % of total gross marketed 
output, while Nyanza, Western and Eastern produced approx 9 %, 3,5 % and 
10 % respectively 61 The trend towards unequal regional distnbubon of 
marketed agricultural production is dear Two provinces. Rift Valley 
(excluding districts like Kapado, West-Pokot, Samburu and Turkana) and 
Central Province produce the bulk of Kenya's agricultural output 
Rift Valley Province's leading position and fast growth rates can be 
explamed by the fact that it is dominated by large scale farms (mainly in maize 
and wheat) which were left intact after independence and some successful 
state-managed agricultural commodity production schemes for smallholders 
which have been introduced in the region 
Detailed regional comparative studies by Tait Davis (1977) and Dietz & 
Komnx (1984) revealed that during the period 1960/1961 and 1976 - 1979 
agricultural growth in the smallholder districts did not accelerated at the same 
pace 62 More importantly, the exhibited growth proved to be quite unstable 
The instability of growth is reflected in an increase or decrease in the degree of 
commeraalizabon of commodity production and in wage labour migration 63 
Growth in Nandi district, for example, exhibited an upward trend m 
commercialization of agricultural (maize, tea) and livestock (meat, milk) 
production and a related downward trend in wage-labour outward migration 
A similar trend is manifest in Kisu district, although growth is mainly based 
on tea and coffee production for export purposes Kihfi and Kisumu districts, 
on the other hand, exhibited a clear decrease m the extent of 
commercialization in agriculture and an increase in wage-labour outward 
migration A second unambiguous trend is that the differences between 
regions levelled out somewhat after the 1970s as more regions and producers 
were incorporated in state and/or agribusiness managed production schemes 
Dietz & Komnx (1984) speak in this respect of regional polarization and of 
regional equalization 64 Polarization in the sense means that agricultural 
developments in the and and semi-arid areas stagnated relatively compared 
with sustainable and high growth rates m Central Province and the 
agricultural core districts in Rift Valley Provmce (Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, 
Nandi, Nakuru) Since the 1970s, the commercialization of livestock m the and 
areas increased considerably in the northern regions This contributed to 
equalization. 
Regional polarization is taking place if we consider the agricultural output 
growth rates of Kenya's major and traditional agricultural zones Kisu district, 
Central Province, Embu/Meru and Machakos districts (in Eastern Province) 
and Rift Valley Province displayed higher and more sustainable growth rates 
in comparison with the exhibited lower - even negative - and relatively 
unstable growth rates m Western (except Bungoma district), Nyanza (except 
Kisu district) and Coast Provinces Dietz & Komnx estimated that Nyanza, 
Western and Coast Provinces experienced negative growth rates between 1971 
and 1977 of -16 %, -4 % and -2 % respectively These figures include the 
positive growth rates of Kisu (in Nyanza Provmce) and Bungoma districts (m 
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Western Province). In the first named regions, i.e. Central, Eastern and Rift 
Valley Provinces, agricultural growth rates were estimated at +7 %, +9 % and 
+6 %, respectively.» Among these three provinces and Kisii district we can 
speak of prolonged regional equalization. 
The research of Bevan et al. (1989) confirms the process of regional 
polarization. In 1982 they conducted a household survey in Central and 
Nyanza Province. A comparison with data from IRS-I of 1974/1975, despite 
that it is fraught with difficulties, shows that agricultural incomes in Central 
Province declined by 5.7 %. In Nyanza Province, farm income declined in the 
same period with 21.9 %. Note that in this period the producer prices for 
export commodities declined significantly with the general effect of lower 
agricultural incomes.66 
There has been no recent research on regional inequality on the national 
level. Nevertheless, the lack of recent data does not preclude an assessment 
that the pattern of regional disparities based on agricultural commodity 
production has not changed fundamentally. The trend towards the expansion 
of agricultural commodity production for the international and national 
market in certain areas, and towards regionally confined enrichment and 
accumulation, perseveres. The perseverance of the trend towards, on the one 
hand, enrichment and, on the other hand, impoverishment is confirmed by 
several regional level studies.67 Commodity production continues to expand 
and/or maintain high output levels notably in districts were household 
commodity production for the international and national market is the 
predominant form of production and the basis for accumulation of wealth and 
capital - i.e., in Central Province (Nyandarua, Nyeri, Muranga in particular) 
and some districts in Eastern Province (Machakos, Embu, Mem), in Rift Valley 
Province (Kericho, Nakuru, Nandi), in Western Province (Bungoma), in 
Nyanza (Kisii). Western Province (except Bungoma district), Nyanza Province 
and the whole northern territory, comprising virtually all the semi-arid and 
arid lands of Kenya, exhibit clear trends towards marginalization and 
impoverishment. Socio-economic development in these regions is increasingly 
based on wage-labour migration and less and less founded upon 
developments in the agricultural sector itself. 
Bigsten (1980, 1981,1984) documents regional differentiation as coinciding 
with a spatially unequal distribution of institutionalization and physical 
infrastructure. The distribution and quality of health and education facilities, 
the spatial distribution of the industrial sector and the spread of infrastructure 
and employment is rather uneven. Generally, health service are mainly 
oriented towards the urban areas. Although there has been considerable 
equalization among regions in primary education since 1974, it is still the 
wealthiest regions which are best provided with education facilities. There are 
still large differences in access to secondary education, and there are also 
considerable differences in the quality of the teaching staff. Bigsten found for 
the 1970s that, in terms of government expenditure on infrastructure per 
capita. Central Province received the most and Nyanza Province the least. 
Concerning infrastructural development, the tentative conclusion must be 
that the government puts high priority on the expansion of roads within areas 
where there is considerable economic activity.68 In an effort to combat the 
processes of regional polarization, there has been a considerable expansion of 
the input distribution network and the number of marketing boards' depots 
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outside the traditional agricultural core areas in the new areas, although the 
infrastructure supporting commoditization of agriculture outside the 
traditional core areas is still limited. The rural shops, which play a important 
role in the input distribution network, are still only located in the high 
potential agricultural production zones in the country. Coverage in medium 
and low potential areas is thin. Shop holders have been reluctant to move into 
these areas because of limited scope for cash sales and the difficulty of 
covering costs on fixed retail margins.69 The recent decentralization drive may 
alter this unequal allocation of state funds between districts. 
4.5.2. Socio-economic differentiation 
The farming population in Kenya is not, and cannot be treated as, a 
homogeneous social category. The usual categorization of Kenya's agricultural 
population is smallholders and large fanners. An ILO mission invited by the 
Kenya government in 1971 to review the state of the economy, used the 
following classification system to denote the differentiation of the smallholder 
community: 
Table 4.4. Classification of Kenya's smallholder community by ILO mission, 
1972 
Peasant households 
Rich 
Middle 
Poor 
Pastoral 
Landless 
Total 
» 6 persons per household 
Source: ILCr(1972), pp. 35-38 
Number* 
225,000 
250,000 
620,000 
220,000 
300,000 
1,615,000 
The report emphasized that the rich and middle peasant households were 
among those who benefitted from post-war policy reform and post-
independence policies and economic developments. Both groups benefitted 
from land settlement programmes, land registration and from services 
rendered by state and marketing cooperatives. The latter three groups of 
households were designated by the ILO mission as being largely untouched by 
the agrarian revolution at time of investigation. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the smallholder community is highly 
differentiated in terms of distribution of land and income. 
4.5.2.1. Income distribution and poverty in smallholder agriculture 
The IRS-I survey, conducted in 1974/1975, gives detailed information on the 
sodal and economic developments in smallholder agriculture.Table 4.5 shows 
the unequal distribution of income and the nature of household income in the 
smallholder sector. The following observations can be made. The table 
displays clearly two crucial aspect of the nature of the rural economy. 
In the first place, it highlights the importance of straddling agricultural 
production and off-farm work. Data gathered by Kitching (1980) and research 
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Table i5 Average value of income, expenditures and savings by household income group 
Farm operating 
surplus 
Non-farm opera hng 
surplus 
Regular employmenl 
Casual employment 
Remittances from 
relatives 
Other gifts 
Total household 
income 
Total outlays 
Current savings 
Number of 
holdings 
Less 
thanO 
Ksh 
2,624-
832-
: 183 
155 
241 
38 
2,840 
3,691 
6,530 
98,982 
0-
999 
Ksh 
128 
87 
46 
116 
159 
14 
551 
1,611 
1,060-
175,057 
% 
232 
15.8 
8 4 
211 
28 9 
25 
100 
1,000 
1,999 
Ksh 
649 
170 
142 
217 
261 
46 
1,485 
2,165 
681-
332,813 
% 
43 7 
115 
9 6 
14 6 
176 
3 1 
100 
1,000-
2,999 
Ksh 
1,327 
250 
128 
350 
389 
61 
2,505 
2,721 
216-
204,972 
% 
53 0 
9 9 
51 
14 0 
155 
25 
100 
3,000-
3,999 
Ksh 
1,933 
409 
457 
222 
390 
45 
3,456 
3,364 
93 
201,972 
% 
55 9 
118 
13 2 
6 4 
113 
1 3 
100 
4,000-
5,999 
Ksh 
2,944 
572 
449 
266 
443 
141 
4,815 
3,893 
923 
200301 
% 
611 
11.8 
93 
55 
9 2 
2 9 
100 
6,000-
7,999 
Ksh 
4,239 
421 
1,290 
439 
404 
160 
6,953 
5,618 
1,335 
117,919 
% 
608 
6 1 
18 6 
6 3 
5 8 
1 3 
100 
ВДЮ-
more 
Ksh 
7,865 
1,390 
2,331 
281 
322 
128 
12,317 
6,505 
5312 
179,176 
% 
639 
113 
189 
23 
2 6 
11 
100 
Total 
Ksh 
2,081 
354 
566 
252 
324 
75 
3,652 
3,450 
202 
1,483,422 
% 
570 
9 7 
15 5 
6 9 
8 9 
2 1 
100 
Source IRS-1, table 85 
conducted by Cowen in the Central Province, the most commercialized 
agricultural area, invariably indicated that peasant labour time is increasingly 
spent as wage labour time outside the farm.'O 
Research outside Central Province reveals that the trend is emerging 
elsewhere in Kenya as well.7l Research of Martin (1984) in Maragoli district in 
Western Kenya disclosed that, as a consequence of the deteriorating terms of 
exchange for export commodities, producers ceased to produce for the 
international market. In particular the poor peasant households in Maragoli, 
producing coffee on holdings smaller than 1.2 ha., moved out of commodity 
production and went into semi- and unskilled migratory wage labour 
employment in Kenya's larger dties.72 Consequently the proportion of off-
farm income in the total income of a household is increasing. Martin noted 
between 1969 and 1979 an increase from 77.5 % to 84.5 %. Bevan et al. (1989) 
noted an increase of 7 % for Central Province and of 11.7 % for Nyanza 
Province between 1974/75 and 198273 
The bottom 40 - 50% of the smallholder population survives by straddling 
smallholding production, casual wage labour and petty trade and remittance 
from relatives. Bevan et al. (1989) indicated that the off-farm income was the 
most dynamic component of household income. The decline in income from 
agriculture, caused by a general worsening of terms of exchange for 
agricultural commodities, has been met by a re-allocation of labour time off the 
farm.74 Collier & Lai (1986) estimated that 18 % (within a probable range of 
11.5 % and 23.5 %) of smallholder peasant labour time is spent off the farm.75 
Straddling in this particular perspective is thus not the means towards 
capitalist accumulation but the way to protect the means of subsistence. Greer 
& Thorbecke's (1986) research revealed that the success of poor peasant 
households in protecting their means of subsistence varies considerably. They 
showed that nutritional levels are extremely inadequate in the lower income 
groups because of low food consumption levels. Total purchased food items 
appear to be high in the income groups below 3,000 Ksh in relation to the low 
income76 On the basis of IRS-I data Vandemoortele (1982) found that 33 % of 
all the rural households are affected by poverty; their average incomes equals 
only 55 % of the poverty line.77 
In the second place, the data in Table 4.5 on farm operating surplus and current 
savings suggest a strong income differentiation among the smallholder 
community in Kenya. Poor households, with average incomes lower than Ksh 
3,000, e.g. 55% of the all rural households, find it increasingly difficult to make 
ends meet. Their current savings appear negative which means that their 
survival depends largely on borrowing money78 The income group above Ksh 
8,000, e.g. 179,176 households (12 % of the total) save 47 % of the total average 
income, i.e. Ksh 12,317. Total savings of this income group are about Ksh 1,080 
million which represents 27 % of total capital formation in 1974. Furthermore, 
higher income groups tend to have more and better access to off-farm income 
compared with poorer households. Carlsen (1980) suggests the rich peasants' 
and even middle peasants' savings go into banks and out of agricultural sector 
which on its tum is via the banks channelled towards investment in urban 
areas.79 
Crawford and Thorbecke (1978) estimated the distribution of income in 
rural Kenya for 1976. They, as many others, relied mainly on IRS-I data. Of the 
1.42 million smallholder peasant households, 44 % earn average incomes of 
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less than K£ 100, and 51 % an average of K£ 250 per annum The former group 
are very likely to be living in poverty Even the significant number of 
smallholders averaging K£ 250 per annum can hardly be described as neh, 
since their average incomes he below the average for Kenya as a whole, ι e K£ 
291 Only 5 % of smallholder households receive an average income of K£ 600 
The richest group in the agricultural sector are the 3,400 large scale farmers, 
whose farms exceed 20 ha and whose incomes average K£ 2,500 per year 80 
Vandemoortele estimated on the basis of national level data that the lowest 
40% of the population received only 9% of the national income in 1976, whereas 
60% of the income accrues to the top 20% of the population He found a Giru-
coefficient of 0 59 81 Within the rural areas it appears, however that the 
mequahty among smallholders is significantly lower than among the other 
rural households, including large farmers, 'gap' farmers, landless people and 
pastorahsts For the last group the intra-group Gini-coefficient was 0 67 m 
1976 The inequality within the urban areas is larger than m smallholder 
agriculture (a Gmi-ratio of 0 51 and 0 38 respectively) 82 
The following table shows the distribution of sales and the degree of 
commercialization for smallholder agriculture m 1974/1975 The table 
indicates the concentra bon of sales 17 5 % of the holdings, ι e holdings larger 
than 4 ha, realized 60 % of total marketed output Table 4 6 is however 
aggregated on a high level and is a static picture 
Table 4 6 Share of average value of marketed output (Ksh) by holding size 
group (ha), 1974/1975 
Sales 
Producbon 
consumed 
on farm* 
Degree of 
commercia­
lization (%) 
Share of 
sales (%) 
No of holding! 
(Ό00) 
Distr of 
holdings 
Under 
05 
546 
835 
384 
46 
s 
206 3 
13 9 
«7 
05 
-09 
798 
1011 
42 9 
68 
265 8 
179 
10 
-19 
699 
1270 
339 
59 
4003 
26 9 
20 
-2 9 
1349 
1735 
43 7 
115 
224 0 
151 
Γ 
30 
-3 9 
1454 
1744 
45 5 
12 8 
1319 
89 
У 
40 
-49 
2305 
2009 
53 4 
19 6 
1070 
72 
о 
50 
-7 9 
2575 
1996 
56 3 
219 
96 3 
65 
80 
over 
2030 
1903 
516 
178 
514 
38 
* as household consumption, given to labour and stock or seed retained for 
production 
Source IRS-I, table 8 26, ρ 68 
Cowen's (1974) research in two sub-locations in Central Province revealed that 
between 1964 and 1971 there was a fall, a decrease m the measured inequality 
of tea and milk production The explanation for this fall is to be sought in the 
resilience of the middle peasantry, that large group of households with 
holdings withm the middle range of the size distribution by assets In Central 
Province, holdings of the middle peasantry lie withm the 1 2 to 2 8 ha group 
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by size distribution of holdings. A group of farmers entered into tea and milk 
production for sale in 1964 and, in 1971, accounted for a relatively larger 
proportion of output than they did in 1964. Cowen found a substantial 
improvement of the agricultural income of middle peasants.83 This 
corresponds with Bagei^s (1980) findings in Kisii district in Nyanza Province 
and of Martin's (1984) in Maragoli district in Western Province.*· Cowen as 
well as Martin, however, raise the point that it may also be that the variation in 
the proportionate growth accounts for the relatively worsening position of the 
smaller 20 to 30% of all producers. 
The latter coincides with Collier & Lai's (1984) findings. They compared the 
distribution of farm income within smallholder agriculture in Central Province 
between 1963 and 1974 (based on a comparison of data from an Economic 
Survey of Central Province 1963/4 with IRS-I data). The comparison indicates 
that the poorest 40 % lost a substantial share of income to the middle and rich 
peasant households. They contend, however, that the bottom 40 % were not 
made poorer as their real capita income increased by 9 %, while the middle 
and rich increased their income 60 %. More importantly, the poorest 40 % 
maintained their level of consumption while the richest producers lost part of 
their share to the middle peasants.85 
Collier and Lai (1984) suggest, however, that only the rich peasantry is 
adopting high risk development strategies such as investments in tree crops 
and graded dairy cattle. The result is hard to assess, but through capitalization 
they may regain their former share of income. This is also brought forward by 
Leys (1978) and Peterson (1986). 
It is quite obvious that the regional concentration of agricultural 
commodity production coincides with regional inequalities in wealth. In 
Chapter 2 it was argued that during the pre-independence period 
accumulation of capital in Central Province by capitalist and rich African 
farmers was already well advanced. That capital was mainly accumulated by 
commercialising production as well as by straddling. When the option for 
further accumulation in agriculture was offered, the process went rapidly 
ahead. Some of these past developments are reflected in the contemporary 
regional distribution of household assets among smallholder families, which 
are accumulations out of past levels of income. According to data collected by 
IRS-I, Central Province invariably has a greater than average mean holding of 
assets, while households in Eastern (except Meru and Embu districts, p.h.), 
Nyanza and Western Provinces are often below average in their possessions.86 
These arguments can easily be extended to some districts in Rift Valley 
Province (such as Nandi, Kericho, Nakuru). 
On the basis of IRS-I data. Smith and Dorling calculated the distribution of 
smallholder income by agro-ecological zone. In general, the distribution of 
income among smallholder supports the view that the unequal spatial 
distribution of agricultural commodity production in suitable ecological zones 
coincides with unequal distribution of income between the zones. The coffee 
and tea zones west of the Rift (Nyanza and Western Province) and the cotton 
zone east of the Rift (mainly Eastern Province) exhibit below-average incomes. 
Large proportions of the population in these zones have incomes of less than 
Ksh. 500/- per adult equivalent per annum. The western tea zone of the Rift 
(mainly Rift Valley Province) and the tea and coffee zones to the east of the 
Rift (mainly Central Province and parts of Eastern Province) show high 
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incomes. A small proportion of the population in these areas has below-
average incomes, while a large proportion earns above-average incomes, 
although, in an above-average income zone, such as the tea zone east of the 
Rift, 30 % of the people still have annual incomes lower than Ksh. 500/-.87 The 
spread of poverty is almost inversely related to the spread of accumulation of 
wealth and capital. Poverty and enrichment/welfare are extremely 
regionalized in appearance. At provincial level, the incidence of poverty is 
above average in Coast, Nyanza and Western Provinces. Nyanza alone has 
37.5 % of all those with inadequate household consumption and accounts, 
together with Western Province, for 60 % of the total poor. Similar conclusions 
can be drawn by agro-ecological zones. The zones west of the Rift account for 
65 % of the poor.» Among the rural poor, three specific disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups were identified: women (particularly women of those 
households of which the husband is working in rural and urban centres), the 
landless and the pastoralists. 
4.5.Z2. Distribution of land 
The ILO-mission report revealed that land-ownership was becoming more and 
more concentrated during the late 1960s/early 1970s. The report noted that the 
largest 4 % of farms occupied 47 % of all farm land, whilst the smallest 70 % of 
farms occupied only 13.3 % of the total.89 
The available data on land distribution in the small farm sector invariably 
show a skewed distribution. 
Kitching (1980) presents data on holding sizes which were collected during 
a census held in 1960/61 for 509,800 holdings in Central and Nyanza 
Provinces and in Nandi district. These data show the marked inequality in 
holding size. In the area as a whole, 25 % of all holdings (those of 4 ha. and 
over) covered 65 % of the land in use, whilst 50.7 % of the holdings (all those 
under 2 ha.) covered just 15.6 % of the land in use.90 The ILO mission recorded 
that in 1969 7 % of the holdings which were over 10 ha. in the then registered 
small farm area took up 34.9 of the land, while 52 % % of holdings under 2 ha. 
owned 30 % of the land.'l Similar evidence is found in data provided by the 
IRS-I survey. 
An analysis of these data provided by Dorling shows that, if we exclude the 
relatively larger holdings of 8 ha. and over, the smallest-scale farmers, 
accounting for three-fifths of the smallholder population, occupy only 28% of 
the land. The largest scale farmers, making up 14% of this class, occupy 37% of 
the total area. The measured degree of skewness would be vastly greater if the 
data allowed us to include the larger holdings.92 Vandemoortele (1982) found 
on the basis of IRS-I data, that the Gini-ratio for land distribution was 0.45.93 
By including land distribution data from IRS-II, and CBS figures on the so-
called 'gap' farms, he calculated a Gini-ratio of 0.80. The unequal distribution 
of land is even more paramount then. Ten percent of the farmers occupy 73 % 
of the total land; while the bottom 50% occupy about 5% of the land.?4 
Martin (1984) registered an increase in formal inequality in land 
distribution in Maragoli district. The Gini-ratio for land distribution shows a 
fall from 0.44 to 0.52 between 1969 and 1977. He stated, however, that there is 
little doubt that the increasing inequality is a result not of action by the large 
farmers, but of intensive land subdivision by the smallest holciings.95 This is 
more or less confirmed by Table 4.7. 
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The IRS-I, Π, ΠΙ and IV surveys are still the best statistical proof of the 
statement that land distribution in the smallholding sector is unequal. IRS-I, II 
and IV, for instance, revealed the following distribution. 
Table 4.7. Distribution of holdings by holding size, 1974/75-1978/1979 (%) 
Size (ha.) 
0· 
0-2 
2-4 
4-8+ 
Total 
Total number of 
holdings ('000)1483.4 
1974/75 
58.8 
24.0 
17.2 
100.0 
1978.9 
1976/77 
13.7 
64.7 
12.3 
9.3 
100.0 
2693.6 
1978/79 
21.6 
61.6 
10.5 
6.8 
100.5 
* 'Zero hectares' group 'refers to a holding that is not operating any piece of 
land, although it may own or graze livestock' or rent land. IRS-I did not define 
this size group 
Source: IRS-I, table 7.1. p. 44 and IRS-II, IV, table 8.3., p. 89. 
It is striking that the proportion of households within all holding size groups is 
diminishing except the zero hectares group. Subdivision of landholdings is 
probably the driving force behind this. We must be careful, however, with 
these data. There are severe problems attached to the interpretation of these 
relative figures. The sample sizes as well as the locations of the sample areas 
are quite different. IRS-IV for Eastern, Central and Rift Valley Province was, 
for instance, larger than the IRS-Π sample. 
Besides the numbers of farmers whose holdings are too small to yield more 
than low incomes from agricultural production, there is also a substantial 
incidence of landlessness. Table 4.7 indicated that the number of households 
within the 'zero hectare' group increased considerably in Central and Rift 
Valley Provinces. The percentage of households in the 'zero hectare' group for 
Kenya as a whole increased dramatically, from 13.7% in 1976 to 21.6% in 1979. 
The official estimate is that there are 410,000 landless families and squatters · 
people who mostly live and work illegally on land they do not own - in Kenya. 
The nutritional status of the landless is considered as precarious. It was 
suggested by Mbithi & Bames (1975) that landlessness was growing during the 
1970s at a rate of about 5 % annuaUy.96 
One of the few options of landless people, other than wage labour outward 
migration to dues, is agricultural work. Leitner (1976) described agricultural 
workers as the most numerous and most degraded workers. She found wages 
ranging from Ksh 86-117 monthly for men, even lower for women, i.e., Ksh 52 
- 100 monthly, and even lower wages for non-contract work. As the modem 
urban sector's absorbing capacity is low, the rural and urban 'informal sector" 
provides the other option. House for instance, found that 43% of the heads of 
informal sector businesses in Nairobi were landless peasants. Many of them 
live below the poverty line.'? 
These aggregate figures become particularly relevant when they are 
disaggregated to mirror district level. The distribution of land ownership in 
Africanized large farm areas is, as shown by Collier (1978), still highly 
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concentrated: co-operative settlement did not contribute to the goal of 
equalization. In Nakuru district for example, 16,500 farmers held plots of 
slightly more than 1 ha. on average, while just 38 farmers held farms in excess 
of 4000 ha. In Central Province between 1963 and 1974, the share of the two-
fifths of the fanners with the smallest plots went down from 26 % to 18 % of 
the total land area, with a corresponding gain by those with the largest plots.98 
Njonjo (1981) carried out a survey in 1974 which covered 230 farms 
occupying 88,696 ha. or about 67 % of the total African-owned mixed-farm 
land. He arrived at the following distribution of land by forms of ownership 
and number of individuals as shown in Table 4.8 below: 
Table 4.8. Ownership of surveyed mixed farm land in Nakuru, 1974 
Form of ownership 
Proprietors 
Partnerships 
Private Companies 
Public Companies/ 
Cooperatives 
Total 
No. of 
farms 
130 
47 
36 
17 
230 
No. of 
individuals 
128 
208 
347 
17,413 
18,096 
Hectarage 
23,910.8 
10,781.6 
30,714.4 
23,290.4 
88,697.2 
Source: Njonjo (1981), p. 38. 
Njonjo furthermore calculated the hectare/persons ratio. In proportions it 
means that 91 % of the owners held only 21 % of the land and each had less 
than 1.2 ha.; whereas 5 % of the owners controlled 79 % of the land and owned 
more than 8 ha. of land. Noticeably, 2 % of the owners, with holdings over 40 
ha., owned 69 % of the land. Similar trends of concentration of land-ownership 
for other areas in the coffee, tea and ranching areas of Kiambu and Nakuru 
districts were found: 388 farmers owned 47 % of the total Africanized land in 
1974. And this, according to Njonjo, 'is only the result of 14 years of 
Africanization.'99 
My own research in Nandi district during 1987 supports the view that the 
contemporary pattern of land distribution is unequal (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
The data on income and land distribution among the smallholder 
population indicate that farm income and land became concentrated in the 
hands of a peasant stratum. This stratum may be labelled as relatively rich 
peasants who frequently employ wage labour. That particular fact does not 
necessarily imply that the rich peasant households are either 'kulaks' or 
capitalists. 
On the other hand, we may identify a rather large peasant stratum engaged 
in commodity production based on the employment of family labour and 
casual wage labour. This stratum may be entitled as middle peasant 
households. Equally, a group of marginalized peasant households emerged 
who protect their means of subsistence by straddling agricultural production 
by selling their labour power. One must be cognisant of the fact that, for all 
three peasant strata, straddling of agricultural production, rural wage labour, 
petty trade, and/or government jobs is an essential ingredient of their farming 
strategy. 
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It seems that as a result of commoditization in Kenya, a sizeable proportion 
of the smallholder community and the landless does not participate 
advantageously. Peterson (1986) estimates that approx. 60 % of the 
smallholder population has benefitted significantly from economic growth 
patterns since independence. However, according to Peterson, 
'the success of this upper 60 percent (...) leads to an increased 
concentration of land and income mat may be deleterious to the (state's. 
p.h.) objective of maximizing total agricultural output and 
етрІоутепІ.ЧОО 
4.6. Conclusions 
The colonial period after the implementation of the agrarian reforms and the 
post-colonial period can be characterized by two major rhythms of agrarian 
change which appeared to be highly interrelated. The state is not only an 
important intermediary between the two. Largely due to planned state 
intervention in the past and present, the concrete conditions for estate, 
capitalist and household commodity production were established almost 
simultaneously. The first rhythm, particularly after independence is founded 
upon a continuation of indigenous accumulation through agriculture. The 
second rhythm represents a continuation of colonial policies after 
independence in promoting and facilitating the production of agricultural 
commodities by smallholders who became mainly oriented to the international 
market. 
This chapter has indicated various components of agricultural growth 
patterns in Kenya. The Swynnerton Plan and the subsequent agricultural 
policies after the transfer of state power destroyed the elements in the earlier 
colonial policy which had long impeded the development of the productive 
forces (physically as well as socially) in the rural areas of Kenya. As a result, 
Kenya experienced fast growth rates in agriculture as well as in the industrial 
and services sectors. 
The implementation of the 'agrarian revolution' since the 1950s, i.e. a 
combination of measures involving land tenure reforms, relaxation of 
restrictions on cash crops and the keeping of dairy cattle, land settlement, 
creating marketing facilities for the commercialization of agriculture and 
technology transfer to agriculture, as well as the market oriented farming 
strategies of the smallholder population contributed to a phenomenal 
expansion of commodity production. This, as argued in the introduction to 
this chapter, would suggest that a technological and administrative structure 
was created due to the implementation of state policy, which triggered off 
agricultural growth. Behind these facts several tendencies of agrarian change 
emerged in Kenya, questioning its real nature. 
The implementation of state agricultural policy during the period 
immediately after independence and the early 1970s illustrated three critical 
features of agricultural growth in post-independent Kenya. 
The early policies were more aimed at issues of resource distribution, 
governed by a strict legal regime of private property, than at the productive 
use of resources. The expansion of commodity production during the 1960s 
and early 1970s was merely a reflection of increased area under cultivation, of 
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the (limited) transfer of 'large farm' to 'small farm' use and of a shift from low 
value to high value crops rather than of increased yields per unit of land. After 
that period, increases in yields for crops such as coffee, maize, tea and wheat 
were realized due to the introduction of improved seed, fertilizer application 
and improved crop husbandry. 
It may also be argued that due to the intensive farming styles of small-scale 
fanners, output increased twofold. This is supported by substantial evidence 
from independent as well as state sponsored research. And this has noting to 
do with state policy as some researchers indicated. The bias in favour of the 
low-density settlement schemes and the more land-extensive farming style of 
its inhabitants, suggests this, although, this did not prevent those left out in the 
cold by the state from coming forth as highly productive producers obtaining 
high yields from small units of land. 
This brings us to the way in which the state solved the land question after 
independence. Three elements were highlighted. Firstly, there was a planned 
intervention in land distribution by the state with the objective of reproducing 
the bimodal, colonial agrarian structure. State power was used to expand the 
basis of indigenous accumulation from its traditional focal area in Central 
Province to the former White Highlands. Secondly, it may be argued that the 
state preferred the establishment of a peasant stramm with holdings larger 
than average sizes in smallholder agriculture. Thirdly, there was a complete 
lack of intervention in the distribution of land in the former Non-Scheduled 
Areas which were non-settlement areas. The state thereby allowed the 
continuation of existing unequal land-distribution patterns which emerged 
before and during the colonial period. This unequal distribution of land was 
subsequently built into the process of post-independence processes of 
commodi tiza tion. 
It is not surprising that the land tenure reform and associated measures 
have been valued negatively by many observers rather than just glorified.lOl 
Thus, behind the economic growth rates, several other patterns of agrarian 
change emerged. Commodi tiza tion in Kenya is illustrative of the assumption 
that it has a regionally and socially differentiated impact Sodo-economic 
differentiation of the smallholder sector is one essential rhythm of agrarian 
change in Kenya. Besides that, empirical evidence points out clearly that 
peasant households may not be considered merely as agricultural producers. 
The 'agrarian revolution' generated a growth process of differentiation 
through which labour time is increasingly directed off the farm. 
Regionally differentiated growth patterns are a second pattern which 
became visible. The difference in regional ecological conditions for commodity 
production is one reasonable component of the explanation. There exists, 
however, a clear institutional bias in state policy towards areas. The 'agrarian 
revolution' had most to offer for the high potential areas, i.e. the Highlands, 
mainly the tea and coffee zones to the east and west of the Rift. These policies 
offered the best opportunities for those areas with a well developed physical 
and administrative infrastructure, fertile soils and reliable rainfall patterns. 
The Lowlands, with less reliable rainfall and a less developed infrastructure, 
and particularly the arid and semi-arid regions stagnated considerably. 
Third, the data presented indicate that within the small farm sector a wide 
range of farms (with related farming styles) emerged, ranging from relatively 
large farms to intermediate-sized farm and small household units. Although 
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there is no necessary direct linear relationship between holding size and 
production output, there is evidence that output became highly unequally 
distributed as concentration of output in the hands of the neh and middle 
peasantry took place m smallholder agriculture This occurred at the expense 
of the poor peasant households and the landless That wage labour is an 
important element m smallholder agriculture suggests that the degree of 
inequality in size of distribution of sales may reflect the establishment m the 
small farm areas of rationale and relatively efficient capitalist farms The wage 
labour force is formed by the poor and landless households 
This quesbons the prevailing distinction made by planners between a large 
farm and small farm sector A more constructive distinction for policy 
development may be based on different development perspectives on the one 
hand, on an agricultural sector in which commodity production is governed 
by maximization of output and profit based on the employment of wage 
labour, and on the other hand, on a sector governed by household commodity 
production m which straddling agricultural production with off-farm work is 
an essential element in farming strategy m order to protect means of 
subsistence and to optimize household labour power 
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CHAPTER 5. 
THE HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF COMMODITIZATION IN NANDI 
DISTRICT : FROM RESISTANCE TOWARDS CO-OPTATION 
Introduction 
In this chapter we shall analyze the trends in commodity production in the 
regional context, i.e., Nandi district. At district level we can depict more 
accurately the specific and localized trends in socio-economic development as 
a result of the expansion of commodity production. 
The chapter is designed as follows. In the first section, we shall present 
some general information about the district: location, administrative set up, 
climatological and ecological conditions, population growth patterns, the 
major crops cultivated in Nandi district, land use and non-agricultural wage 
employment. In the second part, we shall examine the historical trends of 
socio-economic development in the district and the gradual incorporation into 
the market economy. 
5.1. Nandi district general information 
Nandi district is one of the smallest districts in the Rift Valley Province. To the 
north and east, the district is bordered by Uasin Gishu district, by Kisumu and 
Kakamega districts to the south and west, and by Kericho district to the south-
east (see map 2. The district occupies 2,745 square kilometres of land. 
The district is divided into three administrative units (divisions), which are 
subdivided into 17 locations and 82 sub-locations (Table 5.1. and map 2). The 
district headquarters is at Kabsabet. The Nandi County Council covers the 
entire district, except for Kabsabet town and immediately surrounding area 
which is administered by the Urban Council. In the near future an Urban 
Council will be set up for Nandi Hills. Furthermore, the creation of another 
division (Kabiyet division) is foreseen in the future. The three divisions also 
serve as electoral constituencies for the district. The constituencies are led by 
three Members of Parliament. 
Table 5.1. Administrative set-up Nandi district 
Division Headquart. Number of Number of 
locations sub-locations 
Aidai Kobujoi 7 34 
Mosop Kabiyet 5 22 
Tinderet Nandi Hills 5 26 
Total 17 82 
Source: District Development Plan, 1984-1988, p. 2. 
The majority of the population are Nandi and belong to the Kalenjin-speaking 
people (approx. 70% of total population in 1979). The Population Census for 
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1979 estimates that about 15% of the population are Bantus (mostly Luhya); 6% 
are considered as Nilotics; and approx. 9% of the people belonged to other 
ethnic groups. The vast majority of the population live and work in the rural 
area. The population of the two urban areas, Kabsabet and Nandi Hills totalled 
8,700 (i.e., almost 3% of the total population) in 1979. Population density is low 
when compared with the other districts in Kenya: an average of 1.09 persons 
per ha. for 1979 and 0.75 for the year 1969. Population density varies, however, 
per location and sub-location as well as per ethnic group. The locations and 
sub-locations of Aidai division, where the majority is Luhya, show above-
average population density figures for 1979 (Kapkangani and Kemeloi location 
2.74 and 1.65 persons per ha. respectively) while the locations in Mosop 
division, inhabited mainly by Nandi, show below-average figures (Kabiyet, 
Sangalo and Kosirai, 0.96,1.06 and 0.92, respectively).1 
Table 5.2. Population growth in Nandi district, 1931-1988 
Census year Census name Population 
1931 Administrative 50,400 
Census (37,000 in Reserve) (13,400 squatters) 
1945 Veterinary 50,000 
department (38,430 in Reserve) (12,000 squatters) 
1948 East African 116,681 
Census (78,693 in Reserve (32,287 squatters) 
1969 Population Census 209,068 
1979 Population Census 299,319 
1988 CBS Projections 448,686 
Source: Huntingford (1953), pp. 2,3; Disfrict Development Plan, 1983-1988, p. 9 
Table 5.2 shows the available population figures for Nandi district since a fírst 
administrative census was held in 1931 by the colonial administration. The 
annual population growth rate from 1969 to 1979 is approximated at 3.65 %. 
CBS estimates growth rates between 1980 and 1999 at 4.19 %. At this growth 
rate, the total population in the district at the end of the 1983-1988 plan period 
is estimated to be 448,686.2 One factor which has contributed to population 
growth during the 1970s has been immigration from nearby districts. This 
immigration has been stimulated by acquisition of land in Aidai division 
(particularly in Kapkangkani sub-location) and by employment opportunities 
in the big tea estates and in forest areas. 
The dimatological conditions in Nandi district are considered to be 
favourable for agriculture. Agriculture is rain fed and irrigation is not used in 
the district. Mean annual rainfall in the northern half of the district ranges 
from 1,300 mm to 1,600 mm. The long rains are from March to September, with 
a maximum of rainfall in May and August. The southern half experiences 
annual mean rainfall ranging from 1,100 mm in the west to 2,000 mm to the 
east. Generally, rainfall is well distributed throughout the year with maxima 
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Table 5.3 Agro-eco log ica l z o n e s (AEZ) in N a n d i district, in '00 ha. 
AEZ area 
Upper Highland Zone 
UHI 37 
Lower Highland Zone 
LH1 288 
LH2 229 
LH3 477 
Upper Midland Zones 
UM1 314 
UM2 57 
UM2-3 93 
UM4 267 
Lower Midlands Zones 
LM1 12 
LM2 152 
Total 1926 
remarks/extension recommendations 
Sheep and Dairy Zone, very steep, therefore forest reserve zone 
Good yield potential for maize and very suitable for graded dairy 
farming. 
Tea-Dairy Zone with permanent cropping possibilities dmdable in two 
variable cropping seasons. Very good yield potential for tea, good 
yield potential for maize and vegetables, very suitable for graded dairy 
farming 
Wheat/Maize-Pyrethrum Zone with a very long to long cropping 
season, dmdable in two variable cropping seasons Very suitable for 
graded dairy farming, wheat, oil seed, vegetables. 
Wheat/Maize-Barley zone with long to very long cropping seasons, 
dmdable in two variable cropping seasons Good yield potenbal for 
maize, wheat, oil seeds, wattle and vegetables, suitable for graded dairy 
farming 
Tea-Coffee Zone with permanent cropping possibilities, dividable in 
two to three cropping seasons Very good yield potential for tea, beans 
bananas, fairly good yield potential for coffee (Arabica) 
Zero-grazing dairy farming recommended. 
Coffee Zone with a very long cropping seasons and intermediate rams, 
dmdable in two variable cropping seasons and rain periods Very good 
yield potential for maize, fairly good yield potenbal for vegetables, 
fruits and coffee (Arabica) Zero- grazing dairy farming recommended. 
Marginal Coffee Zone with a very long to long cropping season and 
intermediate rams, dividable in two variable cropping seasons and 
rain periods No good yield potential, fair chance for medium maturing 
maize varieties 
Sunflower-Maize Zone with a long to very long cropping season, 
dividable in two variable cropping seasons Good yield potential for 
maize (late maturing), beans, sweet potatoes Fairly good 
yield potential for vegetables and fruits. Suitable for graded cattle and 
daily cows 
Sugar Cane Zone Very small potenbal 
Marginal Sugar Cane Zone with a long to medium cropping season 
followed by a (weak) medium to short one Very good yield potential 
for beans, sunflower, sorghum, good yield potential for maize 
(medium maturing), tomatoes, eggplants, fairly good potenbal for 
tobacco, cotton, sweet potatoes, sugar cane, sisal, pineapples 
Zero-grazing in dairy farming recommended 
Source Farm Management Handbooks (1982), pp. 28-34 
in Apri l a n d M a y . D u e to its ecology, the district is wel l watered . Natura l 
water s u p p l y consists of several rivers and springs . 
The temperature reg ime in Nand i is classified as cool to cold d u r i n g the 
rainy seasons . D u r m g the months of October to February, w h e n rainfall m a y 
be little, the d i m a t e varies from cool to w a r m in m a n y parts of the district. The 
m e a n m a x i m u m temperature varies b e t w e e n 22 and 26 degrees Cels ius except 
b e l o w the e scarpment to the south and w e s t w h e r e it m a y rise to 30 d e g r e e s 
Cels ius . 
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Ecologically most of the agricultural land (233,900 ha) in the district is 
classified as high potential for both agriculture and dairy farming as well as 
forestry. See table 5.3. Vegetation in the district is green throughout the year. 
There are three types of soil components in Nandi: 
- well drained, dark brown, sandy loam soils in the North and some parts of 
the southern area; 
- well drained, dark red friable soils, partly covered with dry loam top soil in 
the north; and 
- black cotton soil, common in the southern half of the district.3 
Table 5.3 shows the classification of Nandi district in agro-ecological zones 
(Aezs). The classification of Aezs is based on altitude, rainfall and to a lesser 
extent on type of soils.4 
The total rural area in Nandi district is 233,900 ha of which 192,600 ha is 
used for cultivation and dairy fanning. The rest of the land is either unsuitable 
(steep slopes), forest reserve, swamps and lakes, or occupied by roads, 
homesteads and rivers). Maize production and dairy farming are the mainstay 
of the agricultural economy in Nandi. Besides maize and milk, other major 
commodities produced in Nandi district are meat, hides and skins and tea. 
Other agricultural products, but less important in terms of quantity and 
number of producers, are sugar cane, coffee, wattle and pyrethrum. See also 
section 5.2.4. Furthermore, a wide range of food crops (beans, millet), 
vegetables (sukumawiki [spinach], cabbages, onions, tomatoes) and fruits 
(bananas, pineapples) are grown; the greatest share of these products is 
consumed by the household itself, although some of the households have 
commercialized these commodities. 
The district authorities estimate that roughly 40% of the agricultural land is 
cultivated and 60% is used for grazing. Land-use patterns vary, however, per 
sub-location located within a certain agro-ecological zone. The survey held in 
1987 took six sub-locations and their respective location within the AEZ-
classificadon scheme as a starting point (see map 2 and also Appendix I). The 
six sub-locations chosen for the survey were Kapkangani (situated in the UMl 
zone), Kibwareng (UMl), Kipsigak (LH2), Mosombor (UM1/UM2), Ndalat 
(UM4) and Ndulele (LH3/UM4). Table 5.4 shows the land use in the sample 
sub-locations. In section 5.2. we shall deal with the historical land-use pattern 
in Nandi district. The table shows clearly that population pressure on the land 
in the southern region is significantly higher than in the northern region. 
Furthermore, Kapkangani is the only sub-location where land for cultivation 
of crops and livestock is equally divided. All the other five sub-locations show 
percentages between 16 % and 26 % for land under cultivation. The smaller 
average land base per household (see Chapter 6) and higher population 
density in Kapkangani sub-location and possibly the cultural background of 
the majority of its inhabitants, mostly Luhya agriculturalists, contribute to the 
exhibited land use pattern. Table 5.5. shows the land-use in the sample by land 
holding size. The difference is then even more significant. 
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Table 5.4. Land use and land available for people and livestock in the sample 
area by sub-location** 
Sub-
location (ha.) 
Kapkangani 
Kibwareng 
Kipsigak 
Mosombor 
Ndalat 
Ndulele 
%cult. 
area for 
maize 
(mixed/pure) 
49 
23 
26 
24 
20 
18 
% grazing 
land (pasture)* 
(ha.) 
51 
77 
74 
76 
80 
82 
Total 
agricult. 
land 
capita 
91.6 
43.4 
86.0 
47.0 
166.0 
249.9 
Cult. 
area 
per 
cow 
0.13 
0.11 
0.14 
0.11 
0.35 
0.29 
Grazing 
land 
per 
0.41 
0.50 
0.49 
0.85 
0.99 
0.79 
* including small patches of land for vegetable garden, bananas and export 
crops as well as land used for homesteads and granaries. These were not 
measured in the survey. 
** included plots rented but excluded plots owned/rented outside sub-
location and district. 
Source: own survey. 
Table 5.5. Land use and land available for people and livestock in the sample 
area by holding size** 
holding 
size 
0-1 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
4-5 
5-
%cult. 
area for 
maize 
(mixed/pure) 
62.5 
60.0 
46.8 
31.1 
24.5 
20.9 
% grazing 
land (pasture)* 
37.5 
40.0 
53.2 
68.9 
75.5 
79.1 
total 
agricult. 
land 
(ha.) 
3.68 
21.95 
24.56 
38.89 
31.00 
563.78 
cult. 
area 
per 
capita 
0.02 
0.08 
0.11 
0.08 
0.16 
0.30 
grazing 
land 
per 
cow 
0.23 
0.20 
0.23 
0.46 
0.45 
1.08 
* including small patches of land for vegetable garden, bananas and export 
crops as well as land used for homesteads and granaries. These were not 
measured in the survey. 
** included plots rented but excluded plots owned/rented outside sub-
location and district. 
Source: own survey. 
Land use on holdings larger than 3 ha. is more diverted towards livestock (70 
% - 80 % of total area). The number of cows per hectare (as well as per 
household) is much higher (and consequently milk sales are higher) and there 
is still enough land left for maize production for commercial and subsistence 
purposes. 
The following table shows the effect of the enormous variation in 
productivity of land (reflected in yields) in the sub-locations (or AEZs) as well 
as per holding size. This situation indicates the appropriateness of the two 
selection criteria employed. In chapter 6 we will return to this issue in more 
detail. 
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Table 5.6. Average yields per ha. (90 kg bags) and standard deviation by 
holding size апсГЪу sub-location in the sample* (N=response; between 
brackets non-response) 
Holding Mean Std N Sub- Mean Std N 
size yield location yield 
0-1 15.5 6.6 6(0) Kapkangani 22.2 10.2 21(8) 
1-2 28.8 11.4 11(4) Kibwareng 28.9 11.3 9(0) 
2-3 22.8 13.5 7(4) Kipsigak 48.6 9.5 3(3) 
3-4 41.4 20.1 7(4) Mosombor 38.3 20.8 7(4) 
4-5 59.7 30.9 6(1) Ndalat 45.4 11.0 10(0) 
5- 48.4 20.7 7(3) Ndulele 66.5 24.0 14(1) 
*: including plots rented but excluded plots owned/rented outside sub-
location ana district. 
Source: own survey 
The majority of the people in NaNandi district make their living from farming, 
although, a combination of fanning and income from a secondary occupation 
is of crucial importance for the smallest farmers in the district. Furthermore, 
local government and civil service (teachers, town clerks), transport industry, 
commerce and the tea estates provide wage employment in the district. The 
total estimated work force was estimated in 1979 at 66,000 (population 25-50 
years). If this age group is widened to 60, the available work force in 1979 was 
79,904. The work force regularly employed is estimated at 32,000 people (i.e. 
40% of the working age population), mainly in tea estates. The rest are mostly 
employed on small-scale family farms and large-scale agricultural enterprises. 
A few are engaged in various forms of trade and handicraft industry. More 
details on farming strategies, distribution of income and land, and reliance on 
off-farm work will be presented in the following chapter. 
The physical infrastructural development such as roads and 
communication networks is of a high level. A major bitumen road runs 
through the district, connecting Nandi district with Uasin Gishu and 
Kakamega/Kisumu district. A dense network of rural access roads serves the 
rural areas. Along these roads, a dense network of trading centres and market 
places has been established in the past, supporting the commercial and 
agricultural development in the district and satisfying the people's need for 
consumption goods. 
5.2. History of commoditization in Nandi district 
The history of Nandi district can be divided in four periods. As in Chapter 2, 
we distinguish the pre-colonial period (- 1895); the period after colonial rule 
was established (1895-1930), which was a period of non-co-optation and 
resistance; the 1930-1950 period, during which development within the 
confines of commodity production commenced and 'new7 forms of 
administration were imposed; and finally the period after 1950 upto the 
present day, when commodity production rose dramatically and the state 
intervened in the mode of agricultural production. 
139 
5.2.1. The pre-colonial period 
The Nandi have traditionally been portrayed as an essentially pastoral people 
whose subsistence was primarily based upon cattle. Migration to new pastures 
and, finally, settlement in the region which is now Nandi district is an intrinsic 
part of their history. Oral history research by others revealed that the Nandi 
originated from the Mount Elgon region, north of the Nzoia river.5 The 
emergence, growth and expansion of the Nandi during the pre-colonial period 
can according to Walter (1981), be divided into three sub-periods. The first of 
these periods (the formation period) is the arrival and formation of the people, 
beginning about 1500 and lasting into the last half of the 16th century. The 
second period (the consolidation period) is the one of slow initial growth and 
limited expansion, extending to 1850. The final period (the expansion period) is 
the one of internal change and rapid, although small, expansion beginning in 
1850 and ending in 1905, when the Nandi were finally subdued by British 
colonial forces.6 
During the formation period the Nandi met no resistance to settlement 
because apparently the land was empty. The area where the Nandi settled was 
initially small. It was located in the extreme southwest of the present district at 
the escarpment. The location seems to have been chosen primarily for reasons 
of defence. 
The consolidation period was the period during which the Nandi society 
began to develop. The main social organization form was the clan, i.e., based 
on kinship relations within a restricted territory. Contacts with the 
neighbouring Wanderobo exposed them to rudimentary agricultural 
knowledge. Economically, cattle rearing became an important activity. Walter 
(1981) indicates the importance of cattle for the social organization of the 
Nandi. The importance of cattle to the Nandi lies in the implications it was to 
have for the divisions of society - the non-kinship divisions that were 
developing, along with the clan structure, as the society grew in size. The focus 
of Nandi life was the homestead. Larger groupings soon developed, however. 
One of the earliest was that of immediate neighbours. These groups (a kokwet) 
assisted and helped each other with tasks having large labour requirements. 
All the people of Nandi, particularly the adult males (boys, warriors {murenik), 
old men), were put into this division, belonging to one group only. Nandi 
society did not know chiefs and was markedly egalitarian. Very quickly, 
another division appeared. Probably conflicts between influential men in the 
community gave rise to the institutionalization of new groups (a pororiet). 
These groups, headed by an influential man, would break away and settle in a 
separate area from the kokwet, but still nearby. A significant change in the 
social division of the Nandi society was that the pororiet took over the duty of 
procurement, protection and care of cattle. But more importantly, the pororiet 
became the territorial and political unit in which the murenik were organized. 
As these new groups grew in number, new land was incorporated, particularly 
to the north and east of the original settlement area. Each of the pororiet 
operated independently of the others. 
Until 1850, the Nandi lived and expanded in relative peace. They raided 
cattle from the Luo and Bantu peoples to the south and west, but these had 
been isolated, uncoordinated thrusts by the Nandi. The Maasai raids on Nandi 
territory did not limit their expansion. The consolidation period can be 
characterized by a condition of equilibrium existing between the Maasai and 
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the Nandi, m terms of area controlled But by 1850, the Nandi had reached the 
edges of the protective terram and vegetation Further expansion could only 
occur m a different physical environment Walter (1981) assumes that thus 
would have required cooperation between the porortet on a level then non-
existent 
The expansion penod was simply an extension of earher movements 
Nonetheless, while the amount of land occupied was not large, the temtonal 
expansion of this period is crucial for two reasons First, the expansion was the 
outward manifestation of an internal political innovation the adoption of a 
spiritual and religious leadership, the orkmyot (literally, a prophet) The 
adoption of this political institution was to have the effect of catalysing the 
latent military powers of the Nandi This system originated from the Maasai 
Second, the temtonal, geographical expansion after 1850 covered a different 
physical environment, one traditionally avoided by the Nandi Walter (1981) 
relates this geographical expansion to the adoption of the wfcmyof-system It 
must have strengthened their belief in themselves 7 
Walter (1981), Ellis (1976) and Huntingford (1953) explain the introduction 
of the orkoiyot m Nandi soaety as follows Firstly, the Maasai, the then 
dominant military force m the region who developed a political spintual 
leadership system (known as the laibon), were respected by the Nandi Maasai 
laibons had great power in Maasai soaety They were believed to have 
supernatural powers This power includes precognition, clairvoyance, 
telekinesis and ability to control the weather and health and fertility of animals 
and people These powers were inherited patnlmeally by men only Secondly, 
as a result of inter-Maasai conflicts, some Maasai sub-groups took refugee in 
Nandi soaety Dunng the middle of the 19th century, the Maasai became 
involved in a long senes of avil wars A sub-group of the Maasai, the 
Losegallai, were almost completely destroyed The few who survived the 
dashes came to the Nandi and were absorbed into Nandi soaety Similarly, 
the Uflsm Gishu Maasai, Nandi neighbours to the immediate northeast, were 
destroyed some 25 years later, those who survived were absorbed into Nandi 
soaety It is assumed that these sub-groups of the Maasai, and particularly a 
family of Maasai laibons among them, institutionalized this kind of Maasai 
spintual leadership for the Nandi The assimilation of the Maasai laibons was 
explained as follows 
'It was not unusual for a tribe to employ foreigners as sorcerers and, m 
this case, the Nandi presumably hoped that the laibons would help 
them against the Uasin Gishu and would have information about the 
areas raided by their fellow tnbesmen Immigrant Uasin Gishu settlers 
f)ossibly persuaded the Nandi that Maasai power was dependent on the aibon system, and that it would be advantageous for the Nandi, who 
had imitated their nvals in other fields, to follow their example in this 
particular '8 
The end result of the Maasai civil wars was the removal, in some cases 
complete and in others partial, of several Maasai sub-groups This created a 
vacuum of which the Nandi took advantage As the orkoiyot became accepted 
by the Nandi and built up their power, aggressive raiding and warfare became 
more and more important for the Nandi As the Maasai on the Uasin Gishu 
Plateau had been virtually removed dunng the inter-Maasai wars, the Nandi 
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took control over this area. The Nandi became the dominant power in Western 
Kenya during the latter part of the 19th century.' Their military power was 
renowned even among the Arab slave traders. The presence of Swahili traders 
was therefore minimal. Several traders were killed by Nandi warriors. The 
Swahili traders did not start operating until the 1850s. Outsiders, including 
Europeans, generally regarded Nandi territory as impenetrable. No European 
traders were active there during the period of Imperial British East Africa 
Company rule over Kenya until 1895. This was not only because of Nandi 
hostility, however, but also because the Nandi showed little interest in 
European goods. 
The orkoiyot-leadership system transformed a relatively unorganized and 
decentralized society into a centralized political military system under the 
leadership of a chief orkoiyot. According to Huntingford (1953): 
'The chief orkoiyot, orkoiyot ne oo, is not an executive authority. He is not 
the 'chief of the tribe, he is not a judge, and he is in no way a supreme 
or central authority to whom appeals may be made (...) his real 
functions are confined to that expertness which is founded on magic 
and religion.'lO 
The people believed that the ritual leader's powers of prophecy, witch finding 
and witchcraft exerted great influence on people's well-being. His powers 
extended to rainmaking, fertility of women and cattle. The orkoiyot sanctioned 
war, circumcision and planting. When he considered the time and weather 
conditions suitable for planting, the orkoiyot sanctioned the beginning of 
planting by saying Okol ('planf). When a raid was planned, representatives of 
the pororiet in question approached the orkoiyot asking whether it could 
succeed and he gave them his blessing. The orkoiyot afterwards received 
tribute in cattle if the raid was successful." The orkoiyot gradually came to fill 
a position of influence and to exercise a coordinating role over the pororiet 
groups. Not directly, but indirectly. Through a system of representatives in the 
pororiet groups, he had information on what was happening politically. When 
colonial rule was imposed, the person of the chief orkoiyot became a rallying 
point for Nandi resistance to British rule. 
It is not surprising that the clan to whom the orkoiyot belonged grew very 
rich. The Talai clan, in particular, where supernatural powers were believed to 
be found in a greater degree than among other clans, became a powerful and 
rich dan. The Talai clan rapidly grew in size and influence and spread to all 
parts of Nandi territory. This practice on the part of the Talai was greatly 
resented, but little could be done against the Talai because people were afraid 
of their powers. This did not mean, however, that there were no conflicts 
between the Talai and the rest of Nandi clans. 12 
The economic basis of Nandi society was cattle. Wealth and social status 
were primarily reckoned in terms of cattle. The pororiet members herded stock 
which was often not owned by them. Cattle was frequently lent out to friends 
and relatives who enjoyed the usufruct of milk and blood. The stock was 
enlarged both by breeding and cattle raiding. In the first case, it was family 
property; in the latter case, the men disposed of the cattle as they liked. Cattle 
rearing was controlled primarily by men, but they had no exclusive property 
rights. Women, too, had some right to the cattle acquired by breeding and 
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could dispose of its produce. Land, for agricultural and grazing purposes, was 
not owned and was free for use by anyone in the community. Land was not 
viewed as a property. It was so plentiful that control over it was not a real 
issue in pre-colonial times. 
Cultivation, however, has always played a major role in their economy. 
Eleusine, or fìnger millet, was the traditional staple crop. Other crops were 
sorghum, beans, tobacco, pumpkins and several indigenous green leafy 
vegetables. These crops were often grown in mixed gardens. Milk, meat and 
blood were other elements of their diet. Ideally, agricultural production, and 
eleusine in particular, was the joint product of husband and wifes. The harvest 
was divided into two parts which were stored separately. The wife's share was 
used to feed the family and she traded the surplus if any. The husband's share 
was brewed into beer, which was important in discharging sodal obligations 
and in recruiting communal labour when necessary.lS 
Relations of trade traditionally existed between the Nandi and their 
neighbours to the south and the west, the Luo, Luhya and Terik. Trade which 
involved foodstuffs was largely in the hands of women. Certain points along 
the boundaries of their territory were recognized as trading centres. In times of 
food shortages, women would travel into the territory of neighbouring ethnic 
groups to exchange small stock (goats, sheep) for surplus grain. In the case of a 
Nandi surplus of grain and shortages in other areas, the process worked the 
other way. The Nandi maintained trade relations with their neighbours in the 
north, the Pokot, Tugen and Keiyo, from whom they obtained metal 
implements, hoes, axes and weapons. 
The Nandi also started to grow wheat at the beginning of the 20th century 
and traded it on many occasions with the first European settlers. 
5.2.2. The imposition of colonial rule and the Nandi Uprising 
The colonial administration tried from the beginning to stop the raiding and 
looting practices of the Nandi. Their location near areas which were gazetted 
to become white settlement areas and their military power posed a severe 
threat to colonization of the northern parts of the White Highlands. Because of 
their location, the Nandi could not be isolated. The colonial policy towards 
them was twofold. On the one hand, the policy was shaped by the need to 
contain their military capability, mirrored in their removal to a Reserve. These 
controls had subsequently to be relaxed because Nandi labour power was 
needed on European farms. On the other hand, in the early period of 
colonialism, the administration did not attempt to create relevant development 
opportunities for the Nandi within the Reserve. The colonial administration 
did not do much beyond keeping military control and collecting taxes. 
The Nandi resisted the imposition of British rule for a very long time and 
tried to keep the impact of colonialism in the Nandi area to a minimum. The 
killing of two white traders was followed by more raids on caravans on the 
Uganda road, constructed by the British, which crossed Nandi territory. These 
attacks led to a British government punitive expedition in 1895 which was, 
however, unsuccessful. The construction of a new road which passed through 
central Nandi and a government-built fort to guard the road gave the British 
the idea that Nandi was under their control. Continual attacks by Nandi 
warriors on caravans passing along the two major roads and on railway gangs 
and railway property, resulted in several punitive expeditions, in 1897,1899, 
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1900 and in 1905 and 1906. The orkoiyot coordinated the Nandi war effort 
against the British. The last two military campaigns were truly massive 
expeditions as a result of which the Nandi were finally effectively subdued, 
though resistance was not totally aushed. After the defeat of the Nandi in 
December 1905 when a peace settlement was arranged, Nandi territory became 
clearly defined as a Reserve of about 700 square miles, and 1,250 sq miles was 
alienated for white settlement.14 Nandi territory became the first Reserve in 
colonial Kenya. 
The impact of the last punitive actions was devastating on Nandi society 
and economy. Not only were 1,117 Nandi killed (estimated at over 2 % of the 
total population of about 45,000) but additionally 16,213 cattle (50 % of the 
estimated cattle population) and 36,205 sheep and goats were captured by the 
British and 4,956 huts and granaries were bumed.15 The imposition of British 
rule which followed the military expeditions resulted in considerable loss of 
land. The Nandi pororiet in the north lost their lands on the Uasin Gishu 
Plateau as this fertile area was opened up for white settlement. These land 
alienations deprived the Nandi to the south of important grazing areas and 
salt licks for their cattle. Those Nandi resettled in the north found themselves 
in a marginal climatic area with less rainfall than in their previous location and 
unsuitable to crops normally grown. This resulted in periodic food shortages 
which in years of very low rainfall resulted in famine. Population pressure on 
the remaining land became a real issue in the early days of colonialism, as the 
Nandi strived to restore the numbers of cattle to a level sufficient to sustain 
semi-pastoral subsistence. These issues were important causes for resistance to 
colonization and, at the same time, for the later movement of Nandi as 
squatters onto European farms, many of which were located on former Nandi 
land.« 
The first settlers who occupied the Uasin Gishu Plateau were Afrikaners 
from South Africa. Huxley (1957) has described the history of these first 
settlers. They arrived around 1907 and 1909 with their ox-wagons. The Uasin 
Gishu Plateau was ideal for the Afrikaner immigrants: far from the centre of 
government, perfect for wheat farming, and close to an abundant supply of 
squatter labour. 
'They immediately started to break patches of'veld' and sow their seed. 
But all the plants died. (...) They came in contact with the nearest tribe. 
the Nandi. It was remarkable that the relations with this proud and 
warlike tribe were always friendly. The Nandi kept the hills, the 
Afrikaner the plains, and neither attempted to interfere with the other. 
When the first crop failed, several of the new settlers bought some 
wheat at Kabiyet from the Nandi, and from it they got Eneir first 
harvest.'17 
The wheat had been distributed among the Nandi two or three years before by 
the Agricultural Department. The Nandi appeared to be good farmers as 
'in 1909 the Nandi exhibited an excellent sample at the Nakuru (Agricultural, ph.) Show. Apart from a small crop harvested during the 
year of the trek by Johan van de Waal (approx. 1907, p.h.), this was the 
first wheat to be grown on the Plateau.'iS 
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The Afrikaner settlers also traded with the Nandi for cattle The Afrikaners 
brought quite a number of stock with them But soon almost all the imported 
cattle died and only a very small herd of Afnkaander cattle stayed alive As 
stock disease was rampant, the Afrikaner increasingly rebed on wheat 
production 19 
Land alienation apart, the Nandi found the economic burdens of colonial 
rule in the decade before World War I easy to meet The demand for taxes after 
the imposition of hut and poll tax law was mainly met by the Nandi by selling 
off sheep and goats and agricultural products The Nandi were not forced 
during this period to meet settler demand for labour the same extent as other 
ethnic groups in Kenya The Nandi showed little interest in farm labour, or 
public works labour such as road building Enlistment m the army and police 
or taking part in the lion hunts organized by the Uasm Gishu settlers, 
represented, however a very attractive alternative for the defeated warriors 
Quite large numbers of Nandi took part in World War I as soldiers of the 
Kenya African Rifles where they formed a separate Nandi Company 20 The 
enlistment of Nandi m the army and police force brought cash money mto the 
Reserve by which taxes could be payed 
Squatting by Nandi became important after 1913 Nandi began moving to 
settler farms as squatters and the number increased steadily Nandi never saw a 
pattern of male labour migration to cities or (tea) estates, leaving women to 
manage the subsistence economy The Nandi entered the labour market 
primarily as squatters, and whole families and stock moved together In fact, 
many of the squatters did not work at all, but paid for the right to squat on the 
settler farms with milk or other produce The economic and poh beai weakness 
of the settlers in the area allowed the Nandi to move freely Squatting met the 
needs both of the settlers and the Nandi For the settlers, it provided a much 
needed labour force and the Nandi were the only neighbouring people from 
whom cattle could be procured,2l while for the Nandi, squatbng meant access 
to grazing land Initially, squatting alleviated some of the disadvantages of the 
land alienation pracbee The Nandi felt that they returned to their former 
lands with little change in their traditional way of life Squatbng allowed 
traditional relations of production to be maintained intact, unbl a later point in 
tame The fact that they had no legal btle to the land was m those days viewed 
as immaterial and irrelevant The Nandi had no experience with property 
rights to the land, as land was plentiful, control over land was never a real 
issue among the Nandi 22 Squatbng also had another advantage Once outside 
of the Reserves, squatters were not subject to the pass regulations and they had 
much greater mobility than those who stayed behind in the Reserves The 
squatters avoided paying taxes regularly A major advantage of squatting was 
that they could escape the imposition of collecbve punishment for cattle 
thefts 23 Equally important was the fact that squatbng established strong links 
between the squatters and the people in the Reserve Most of the squatters' 
cattle on the settler farms belonged to people in the Reserve 24 Although the 
squatters did not own the cattle, they could use the milk and the blood Cattle 
m Nandi were traditionally lent out to fnends and relatives who became cattle 
caretakers They were organized in the so-called pororiet (see secbon 5 21 ) 
This economic independence of the Nandi in the early period of colonial 
rule resulted in a large degree of political independence The creation of local 
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successful until after 1923. The problem was that the potential headmen had 
little government backing, while they often had to face the opposition of their 
people to unpopular demands, such as forcing out labour for public works and 
the reporting of cattle thefts. Furthermore, the squatting system undermined 
the attempt to create such local authorities. It entailed a loss of control over the 
Nandi and thus became an important supplementary reason for squattmg.25 
The relative peace in Nandi district characteristic for the period before the 
First World War was, however, disturbed by the colonial authorities. In Kenya 
as a whole, pressure on Africans, exercised by the government and the settlers, 
increased substantially. State policy was designed to increase white settlement 
in Kenya. Settlement schemes were set up to achieve this goal and led to 
further alienation of land in Kenya as a whole. These schemes brought a large 
influx of white settlers. The Soldier Settlement Scheme, for example, pushed 
former British WWI-soldiers to settle in Kenya as farmers. In addition to that, 
new legislation restricted the mobility of African labour and resulted in 
reduced wages. Taxes and the more active intervention of local administrative 
efforts forced many more Africans onto the labour market. All these 
developments had important repercussions on the Nandi. The early twenties 
(1920-1923) became a period of unrest in Nandi, an organized campaign of 
non-cooperation. Tax paying and labour controls were massively evaded by 
the Nandi. Several factors contributed to the 'Nandi Uprising'.26 
The Nandi protested strongly against the alienation of further lands from 
the Reserve, as this was not part of the peace settlement negotiated in 
December 1905. In 1920,130 sq miles, i.e., about one-fifth of the Reserve, were 
incorporated into the Soldier Settlement Scheme.27 The land alienated, the 
Kipkaren valley, was among the most fertile parts of north Nandi and an 
important grazing area containing several salt licks. This alienation of land 
meant the removal of 1,500 to 2,500 residents. New land grants to white 
settlers were also made at this time in the Kaimosi area on the southwestern 
side of Nandi Reserve. 
The impact of these land alienations was not only that access to salt licks 
was denied, but also that more Nandi were forced to become squatters on 
settler farms. These disruptive colonial actions disturbed the relations between 
the Nandi and the colonial administration and settlers. The Nandi were 
angered by these land alienations, but the government did nothing to correct 
the situation. 
In addition to that, taxation tripled between 1909 and 1920. The impact of 
the increase was aggravated by a shortage of cash. Due to fear of rinderpest 
following an epidemic, a stock quarantine was imposed on the Reserve from 
1921 to 1923. As there were few opportunities for wage-labour and as the 
Nandi were unable to sell cattle outside the Reserve, the quarantine cut off the 
Nandi supply of cash. As a consequence, payment of taxes was refused on a 
massive scale. The quarantine also hindered the flow of squatters and their 
cattle to and from the settler farms. The purchase of grain in years of shortages 
was cut off too by the quarantine. The quarantine, continuing through 1922 
and 1923, brought hardship in the Reserve. 
In the meantime, pressure on the Nandi to supply labour for public works 
increased. The Nandi generally showed little interest in working on road and 
railroad construction. The administration made plans to force the Nandi to 
work. Labour registration began in 1920. Deserters were brought to court. This 
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work Labour registration began in 1920 Deserters were brought to court This 
labour conscription also contributed to the build up of unrest and antagonism 
towards the colonial administration The Nandi, and particularly the murena 
among them, preferred to look for work as herdsmen on settler farms despite 
the wages in railroad construction being twice that for squatters Farm labour 
was generally refused when the compensating advantages of grazing cattle 
and cultivation rights were denied by the settlers during the quarantme The 
Nandi became squatters to avoid wage labour conscription and for the sake of 
the grazing and cultivation rights This implied that settlers could cut squatter 
wages, which they did in 1922, without fear of losing their labour supply 
While the Nandi increasingly moved as squatters to the settler farms, the 
colonial administra bon was losing control over them The settlers fostered this 
loosening of control by encouraging squatters onto their farms without their 
being registered, by allowing them to reside on unoccupied farms without 
supervision, and by giving them passes to move from farm to farm For half 
the year the squatters had no labour obligations and had relabve freedom The 
white farmers were afraid of losing their labour if they stuck to the letter of the 
Resident Native Labour Ordinance 28 This ordinance obliged squatters to 
work for 180 days a year in settler employment, it was not, however, 
incumbent on the adult male to perform these duties, since members of the 
family split their labour obligations In such a loose situation, the system of 
local councils of elders and appointed headman was not as easily transferred 
as was done in other areas m Kenya The leadership vacuum was only partly 
filled by the captains of the muremk (the kiptaiena) As a result of the loss of 
control over the Nandi, cattle raiding occurred more frequently 
Along with this loss of control, the influence of the orkoiyot revived The 
administration attempted to control the situation by makmg the orkoiyot an 
instrument of local administration by appointing them as chiefs These 
attempts failed, however, since the colonial administration misjudged the 
nature of the orkoiyol's position Their position is built on spiritual powers and 
not based on initiating, but coordinating, raids Their powers could not be 
inherited or chosen by the administration The attempts to transmit labour 
demands and prohibition against raiding to the murena through the officially 
appointed orkoiyot met little success Moreover, the orkoiyot influence lay 
outside the control exerased through the headmen Instead of their influence 
diminishing, the orkoiyot could build up more power over the muremk in the 
situation where cattle raiding increased This power was based on the 
organizational network of orkoiyot control over the muremk and was focused 
on the revival of traditional ceremonies assoaated with preparations for war 
and was directed against the local representatives of the colonial 
administration and the settlers One of the orkoiyot, Barsenon, became by 1923 
the most powerful orkoiyot m Nandi whose influence rivalled that of the 
colonial administration itself 
Ellis (1976) and Агар Magut (1969) explain Barsenon's leadership m the 
colonial context and not in the socio-anthropological context A combination of 
political and economic factors are relevant for the understanding of the 
orkoiyot revival Politically, the African squatter had no legally recognized 
channel for the articulation of his interests 29 In addition, the Nandi had no 
literate spokesman, such as Harry Thuku and Jonathan Okwim who were 
organizing the political protest among the Kikuyu and Luo against the colonial 
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administration at the same time, instead the Nandi turned, as was their 
custom, to their orkoiyot 30 While the orkoiyot were building up their influence, 
the government appomted headmen had no influence, indeed, the contrary 
was the case This was even recognized by the administration itself The 
headmen were depnved of their payment for the last quarter of 1922 by the 
Governor for not exerting more pressure on the young men to go out and 
work. Barsenon, himself a squatter on Uasin Gishu farms, filled this vacuum 
accurately by guiding the energies of the murentk His leadership was a 
product of his role m countering the colonial situation, particularly 
government restrictions on cattle raiding and mcreased labour demands on 
squatters At the same time, through the effective influence of the orkotyot, but 
more importantly, through the common gnevances which the protest 
expressed, it came to include both the traditional authorities and the few 
educated Nandi, the more conservative elders and the young murenik, and 
Nandi resident both in and outside the Reserve The role of the elders and the 
educated in this protest is illustrative of both the generalized character of the 
protest and the general lack of relevant development opportunities offered by 
the colonial administration m the Reserve 
The protest, until now a passive resistance of not paying taxes and avoiding 
labour conscnpbons, opposing cattle inoculations and obstruction of 
government attempts to control cattle raiding, and - on the settler farms - the 
opposition of squatters to settler labour demands, became increasingly violent 
The orkotyot channelled the protest and mcreased their activities Barsenon 
called for a general sagetab etto, a traditional ceremony which had not taken 
place since 1892 The elders supported the injunction that all Nandi, in and 
outside the Reserve, had to be the Reserve for the ceremony This ceremony 
entailed the complete withdrawal of all Nandi labour from the settler farms 
They left with or without their employers' permission The colonial 
administration envisaged the potential danger of the gathenng Cattle raiding 
would be increased, and the attempts of the administration to assimilate the 
Nandi into modem conditions and closer administra bon control would be 
endangered Barsenon and four elders were arrested before the ceremony was 
to take place His arrest and removal to Meru put an end to the organized 
campaign of non-cooperation 
The funcbon as well as the influence of the orkoiyot eroded gradually The 
gradual coming of socio-economic changes and increased opportunities for 
socio-economic development, as we shall see in the next secbon, coincided 
with a gradual erosion of the traditional structure of Nandi soaety a soaety in 
which the position of a spiritual leader became a lost cause Barsenon role's in 
particular was, however, was not totally finished, as he, was again placed in a 
posibon to channel Nandi protest when m the 1950s the land issue became a 
real issue 
The Nandi Uprising differs from other protests m the colony because of its 
traditional form and tactics and because it was local in its focus No 
nationalism underlay their protests, to mobilize their own people was the aim 
The protest partly reflected the failure of the colonial administration to create 
agents within Nandi whose positions, like those of the Kikuyu chiefs or 
Kamba headmen, were dependent on government patronage and brought 
increasing exploitation of their subjects Unlike the Kikuyu who found 
through education a means of escaping the rule of colonial chiefs and 
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establishing economic independence in urban employment, the Nandi found 
éducation economically irrelevant and culturally alienating There were very 
few 'watu wa mission' among the Nandi and these had no social basis for their 
appeal outside the tradì bonal leadership of elders and headman Ultimately, 
the traditional form of the protest mirrored the relative lack of soao-cultural 
change and the prolonging of the traditional way of life m Nandi, compared 
with the Kikuyu in this period Squatting was an important ingredient 
economically, because it relieved the impact of the alienation of land, 
politically it allowed the Nandi, and particular the murernk, to escape from 
colonial controls over Nandi movements and labour conscription 
5.2.3. The 1930s and the gradual expansion of commodity production 
The Nandi Uprising, accompanied by other unrest in the colony at about the 
same time, prompted the government to implement policy changes almost 
immediately In line with this new attitude, the administration was willing to 
undertake action to correct some Nandi gnevances The immediate changes m 
state policy toward the Nandi included the removal of the quarantine, the 
return of ahenated land not yet occupied (although very little alienated land 
was actually returned in the end), reduction of hut tax pending the removal of 
the quarantine and immediate access to salt licks Cattle still held by the 
administration were returned and the kiptaienúc were appointed as paid 
government headmen All these policy changes were implemented within the 
year, alongside increased police powers over the Nandi The government also 
made plans to open a school in Nandi, one of the first m the country, which 
opened m 1925 One of the functions of this school was to counter the 
influence of the orkoiyot These policy changes greatly circumscribed the basis 
of the orkoiyot's appeal, while the chiefs and educated elite, who were offered 
new and much better opportunities than before, increasingly found the 
agitation assoaated with the orkoiyot a threat to their new positions within the 
colonial structure Economic development and integration into the commodity 
economy were on their way , and this reduced the ground for protest along 
traditional Imes Instead, political and economic life became greatly influenced 
by initiatives from the Local Native Council 
The Nandi squatters returned to the settler farms and paid their taxes for 
the first time in years Squatting remamed a major economic source for the 
Nandi and continued to be so for quite some time, despite low wages the 
general brutalities of the settlers against squatters In 1931, the District Officer 
noted that 90 % of all adult males were at work outside the Reserve m 
November of that year and that the average for the whole year had been 69 
percent In 1935 the average figure had mcreased to 73 % with 40 % of all adult 
Nandi males being squatters on the farms of Uasin Gishu Although these 
percentages were exaggerated due to a persistent underestimabon of 
population and even assummg an exaggeration of 20 % it is clear that a very 
considerable proportion of all adult labour power was absent from the Nandi 
Reserve for long penods of the agricultural season 31 The cattle belonging to 
Nandi squatting on Uasin Gishu settler farms accounted in 1947 for 150,000 
head, a figure representing about 40 % of all cattle m that area 32 
The 1930s saw the beginning of a gradual integration of Africans in the cash 
economy all over Kenya Nandi Reserve was one of these areas It was during 
the 1930s that consumer demand for items such as cloths, blankets, tea and 
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sugar began to be significant. A major development plan was drawn up for 
Nandi Reserve in 1934. The plan called for a further development of maize 
cultivation and also for the encouragement of potatoes, beans, linseed, peas 
and the planting of wattle and eucalyptus. This was thus the period during 
which commercial production by the Nandi economy became firmly 
implanted. Access to cash fuelled the demand for consumer goods, which in 
turn promoted dependence upon sources of cash. Commodity production was 
primarily based on livestock and maize. Commercialization of agricultural 
production spurred, at the same time, the development of commodity 
relations in the district. The number of trading centres increased over time. 
Commercial activities and the location of trading centres were, however, 
strictly controlled and planned by the district authorities. The establishment of 
trading centres in the district was restricted by an ordinance issued in 1932 in 
order to prevent uncontrolled commercial development. The effect of this 
control was such that ribbon development along roads was hindered and the 
proliferation of commercial centres was stimulated. This pattern is still in 
operation today; within each sub-location a politico-administrative centre 
serves as a commercial unit as well.33 
There was another reason why 1934 can be marked as the year an 
intensification of development in Nandi Reserve. The Local Native Council 
received 5,000 Pounds as a compensation for the land alienated from the 
Reserve. A major share was used to build a hospital at Kapsabet. The 
remainder of the funds were used to construct roads and several new schools. 
A portion of it was directed to the budget of the Veterinary Programme at 
Baraton.34 
The colonial administration's change in attitude (see Chapter 2) brought 
about a period of support for African cultivation of maize as a cash crop. 
Those who remained inside the Reserve were forced to decrease the size of the 
herds. By 1920, many of these families turned from pastoralism to small-scale 
agricultural production. Maize had been introduced and adopted both for 
home consumption and for sale. These efforts coincided with the stock 
quarantine and the heavier tax demands. At the same time, a market for food 
emerged in the district in the form of the development of European-owned tea 
plantations near Nandi Reserve. Maize was needed to provide food for the 
African workers. This provided an impetus to planting maize which was not 
negatived when the quarantine was lifted. It was in the early twenties that the 
planting of maize as a cash crop began, expanding in the mid 1920s. Over time, 
maize became the staple crop and gradually became a subsistence crop as well. 
Millet was slowly replaced by maize. The move towards maize was probably 
encouraged by a failure of the millet crop in 1939, while maize prospered at 
that time. Table 5.7 shows the increase in maize exports from Nandi district 
during the thirties. 
Generally, maize production was encouraged by the favourable climatic 
and soil conditions in the district. The drop in the price of maize in the mid 
1930s was compensated for by a large volume, the great advantage of 
extensive maize growing and the increasing employment of ploughs instead of 
hoes. The adoption of maize cultivation in the Reserve increased the 
competition for land with cattle considerably. Throughout the 1930s and early 
1940s, the Nandi squatter stock increased at a greater rate that the stock in the 
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Table 5.7. Maize exports from Nandi district, 1930-1939 
year output 
1930 n.a. 
1931 n.a. 
1932 15 bags 
1933 38 tons 
1934 181 tons 
1935 202 tons 
1936 21 tons 
1937 75 bags 
1938 n.a. 
1939 n.a. 
Source: Kitching (1980), pp. 98,99. 
Reserve. This resulted in the situation that the connection between the Reserve 
and squatters outside the Reserve began to break down, because over-grazing 
in the Reserve was severely limiting the option of returning stock. The forcible 
removal of squatter stock to the Reserves was often used by settlers as a means 
to control squatter cattle. The forced removals increased the pressure on the 
Reserve economy considerably, while the squatters became more dependent 
on settler land. Their position was becoming increasingly vulnerable. Youé 
(1987) considers this as 'the transformation of labour tenancy to rural 
proIetarianization.'35 Attempts to enforce more control over squatter labour, 
and to eliminate squatter stock, led to a mass exodus to the Reserves. 
Overstocking in the Reserves was reaching crisis point by the late 1940s. This 
closed off the option for squatters return. The return of squatter stock became 
a real issue in this period. When in 1956 the Nandi District Council accepted 
legislation on land enclosures (see below), destocking and branding, the 
border with Uasin Gishu district was closed and this cut off the squatters from 
the Reserve almost completely.36 Attempts to organize the Nandi and Elgeyo 
squatters in a Resident Labourers' Association failed in 1948. Discontent was 
more usually expressed through tribal societies or religious revival 
movements.3/ Orkoiyot Barserion, as we shall see later, again played a role in 
the squatter protests during the late forties and early fifties. 
While cash crop cultivation rapidly gained ground during the 1930s, the 
administration believed that the future of the Nandi economy lay in cattle. 
Agriculture was seen as a way of bringing the people to rely more on grain 
than on milk for subsistence, thus releasing animal products (especially dairy) 
for export. In order for this plan to work, one of two things had to happen: a) 
milk production had to be greatly increased; or b) home consumption of milk 
had to be reduced. The administration initiated a veterinary programme and a 
demonstration herd and dairy at the Veterinary Station at Baratón. 
'Upgrading' of stock, artificial insemination, combating diseases by building 
dips, and controlling over-grazing through placing limits upon herd size were 
the measures employed by the colonial administration. Field dairies were set 
up to buy local surpluses of milk and by 1939 there were six dairies operating 
throughout the district. Upgrading of stock encountered opposition. 
Ownership of exotic high-producing dairy cattle was forbidden for Africans; it 
was only a white settler privilege. The stock chosen for upgrading was 
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Sahiwal, a type of cattle that, though superior as a meat source and for draught 
purposes, does not give substantially more milk than indigenous cattle The 
Nandi showed little interest in this programme It did not bring more milk, ι e, 
what they wanted Since they had no access to high milk produang cattle, the 
only option for the production of more milk was to sustain large numbers of 
low yielding cows 30 
The increased cultivation of land for food crops left less land for grazing 
and, although over-grazing never became too critical in Nandi region, the 
Nandi were pressed to reduce the number of cattle Since the cash-generating 
potential of cattle was limited - the Nandi had no access to graded cattle, and 
meat pnces were ngidly controlled and regulated - the Nandi turned 
increasingly towards the cultivation of maize for both cash and subsistence 
purposes With the partitioning of land, the social issue shifted to a large 
extent from a community to an individual concern The Nandi were forced to 
decrease the size of herds and to change from lineage-based to family-based 
pastoralism on a smaller scale than the traditional herds 39 
The adophon of maize in the Reserve as a staple crop was soon followed by 
the introduction of ploughs The Local Nah ve Council developed a scheme to 
provide the Nandi with ploughs and water mills This gave the Nandi access 
to means to increase the acreage under maize The scheme was not successful 
initially The number of ploughs employed on Nandi farms and issued by the 
Local Native Council was 4 in 1927 The number of ploughs increased during 
the following years from 51 in 1935 to 250 m 1939 Regrettably, the number of 
Nandi participating in maize growing is unknown The District Offtcer (DO) 
reported in 1931 that 'our native partner near Kabiyet put a considerable area 
under cultivation ( ) Arap Boit a sub-headman of Location 7 and Sam of 
Location 8 are two others who are annually extending their acreages under the 
plough ' In 1934, the ЕЮ was able to enthuse that 'for the first time known the 
Nandi had a real surplus of maize and sold in an appreciable quantity ' 
Agriculture was 'slowly but steadily extending ' In 1935, he reported only 'that 
there are some Nandi who grow maize on a fairly extensive scale, their farms 
runrung up to forty acres or so' *0 After 1936 maize, production dropped 
significantly The sharp drop in prices and the fact that Nandi maize faced stiff 
competition from maize grown by Kikuyu squatters on nearby settler farms 
must have contributed to the decline in maize production In addition, the 
price of cattle increased sharply and heavy rains mined a large part of the 
maize crop For the years 1937 to 1939, the available figures are unreliable The 
drop in production cannot be explained by soil conditions - which were 
favourable - or by the level of prices - they were the same as m other areas 
where maize production prospered 
The declining curve of Nandi maize production over the latter part of the 
decade (Table 5 7) must have been due to other factors Kitching (1980) 
suggests three possibilities 4 1 In the first place, production appeared to expand 
most rapidly in the early thirties when grain prices were lower but grain/stock 
barter terms were very favourable It certainly seems significant that after 
stock pnces rose in 1936 and production fell due to climabc factors production 
then did not recover even in subsequent seasons Secondly, m comparison 
with other areas where maize production increased steadily, such as Kipsigis 
and Kikuyu land, Nandi producers lacked a buoyant and expanding market 
for local maize and maize flour, on the lines of the huge Kencho estates and 
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the Nairobi market. Both the local Nandi farms and the farms of Uasin Gishu 
and Eldoret seem to have become increasingly self-sufficient in maize and 
maize flour for non-resident workers, largely through the efforts of Kikuyu 
squatters. Nandi's other market. North Kavirondo (in 1933, 30 % of Nandi 
maize was purchased by dukas on the North Kavirondo border) was also 
increasing its own production over this decade and may thus have been a 
declining outlet. Thirdly, the already mentioned high proportion of absent 
adult male labour power in the district in that decade placed an extra burden 
on the female labour force and must have had a considerable negative impact 
on the extension of cultivated area and production. It certainly seems 
significant that Nandi maize production again resumed its exponential growth 
in a period - 1941-1945 - when a great deal of Nandi squatter labour was being 
compulsorily returned to the Reserve from the Uasin Gishu farms. 
The combination of high wartime prices of the Maize and Produce Board, a 
markedly increased administrative effort plus the new availability of Nandi 
male labour power together produced the explosive expansion of die cropped 
area and of marketed production in Nandi in the forties. The common pattern 
was expansion of maize monocropping with the plough. Table 5.8 shows the 
quantities of maize formally marketed from the district over these years. 
Table 5.8. Marketed output of maize, Nandi district 1940-1952 
Year Output (tons) 
1940 94.6 
1941 277.6 
1942 316.9 
1943 probably small or nill - drought 
1944 Ì7S5.T 
1945 2678.5 
1946 357.0 
1947 806.1 
1948 ?-drought 
1949 
1950 3928.5 
1951 1785.7 
1952 ?-drought 
Source: Kitching (1980), p. 147 
As the increase in maize output was no smooth and linear process, there being 
frequent downturns due to droughts in certain years (1943, 1948, 1949, 1952), 
the Reserve became a net importer needing to purchase food to feed both 
people and livestock. It is clear from observations in the district reports and 
from the occasional mention of increases in the number of ploughs in the 
Reserve that the area under maize increased markedly over these twelve 
years. 
By 1946, as Nandi squatters and their livestock returned from the settler 
farms of Uasin Gishu and other areas, the District Officer was so concerned at 
the reductions in the area of 'communal' grazing caused by the large 
extensions of ploughed land that he had the Local Native Council pass a 
motion restricting the issue of ploughs to two for each kokwet, in the district. 
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In response to this situation, in addition to ploughing, 'the more advanced 
natives' (words of the District Officer in 1949) were beginning to fence their 
land. The Local Native Council decided to endeavour to control, but not to 
prevent, this inevitable trend toward fencing. By 1952, these attempts at 
control of individual holdings had taken the form of Local Native Council 
mies laying down maximum acreage and attempting to prevent uneconomic 
subdivision of holdings by inheritance. There were also attempts to control 
rights of land disposal or sale. According to Oboler (1982), the start of land 
enclosure by individuals had already commenced in the early 1940s. My own 
research in Nandi during 1987 supports Oboler's views. The process 
intensified in the late 1940s, abetted by policies of the colonial administration. 
The 1940s thus saw the gradual beginning of land enclosure and the 
commoditization of land. 
The basis of commodity production was in this period maize and cattle. 
Oboler (1982) stresses that the advantages of commodity production were 
confined primarily to men. It brought cash into the hands of Nandi men 
almost to the exclusion of women. Incorporation into the cash economy did 
not change the pre-colonial forms of distribution between men and women. 
Cattle remained men's business and maize production came to be under male 
control. 
Several economic activities gave women access to a little cash. The 
production of vegetables remained an exclusively women's concern. The 
surplus was traded on the expanding markets in the district. Tea estates, 
mission compounds and a growing number of boarding schools provided 
these markets. Poultry rearing and the sale of eggs were another source of cash 
for women. There was a poultry scheme initiated by the Local Native Council 
in the early forties but abandoned in 1945. It is probably due to the limited 
markets for eggs that the scheme, aiming to 'upgrade' chickens, was aborted. 
But, according to Oboler, it has much to do with the complete lack of regard 
for the issue of developing other cash sources other than maize and milk that 
would benefit women and men. 
Throughout this period, women continued to plant independently patches 
of millet, adjacent to or as part of a vegetable garden (kapungut). After millet 
was replaced as food crop by maize, millet was used primarily in brewing 
beer. Millet production and beer brewing had traditionally been women's 
work. The beer industry came to be one of the profitable cash ventures that 
was primarily controlled by women. Another major avenue open to women to 
generate cash during this period was prostitution. Prostitution occurred 
traditionally in Nandi, as women who went into the lowlands to trade for 
grain were known to trade sexual favours for cattle.45 
5.2.4. The 1950s and the 'agrarian revolution' 
The decade of the 1950s, however, was the period in which Nandi was 
suddenly and radically transformed The Swynnerton Plan of 1954 brought, 
instead of the gradual changes during the preceding period, rapid and radical 
changes. The new nationwide agricultural policy provided for the allotment 
and tilling of individual plots in areas of high agricultural potential, such as 
Nandi district. The land tenure system changed profoundly. The pasture land, 
which had been held communally, was now divided and allocated to 
individuals. Land registration and demarcation of individual plot boundaries 
155 
took place in Nandi during 1954 and 1955 Another part of the programme 
was that alienated land in Kaimosi and Kipkaren valley was returned to the 
Reserves This new land could be claimed by people from more crowded 
locations Squatters on Uasm Gishu farms were also allowed to return to 
Nandi to make land claims The return of stock was restricted, however, and 
related to the 'carrying capacit/ of the land claimed 
Chiefs, headmen and Protestant church leaders, were those who benefitted 
most because they had already been involved since about 1947 in land 
enclosure 46 Parcels of land allocated were of not less than 4 ha and m many 
areas averaged 8 ha Persons who had already been permitted to enclose large 
tracts of land before the Swynnerton Plan became official policy were allowed 
to register these same tracts, which in many cases were larger than average 
holdings And they were precisely those persons trying out innovations on a 
limited scale before this period Land enclosure became so popular that 
measures to control it were deemed necessary 
Once plots were allocated, title holders were required to cull their herds in 
accordance with government determinations on the 'carrying capaaty' of 
individual plots This policy was accompanied by another unfolding policy 
which encouraged upgrading of indigenous cattle through artificial 
insemination with semen from Guersney bulls Ownership of pure-bred 
European dairy stock was sbll denied, however, to Africans unhl after 1960 
This new attitude of the colonial administration towards cattle was well 
received by the Nandi 
In addition, in the late 1950s following the demarcation of individual plots, 
Africans were for the first bme allowed to plant profitable cash crops Tea, and 
coffee to a lesser extent, became a cash crop of tremendous importance for the 
Nandi Today tea, is grown by almost every household in areas where its 
cultivation is authorized by the Kenya Tea Development Authonty In 1958 
the number of Nandi growing tea was shll less than 50 Tea production rapidly 
gained ground in the 1960s Today, more than 5,000 small-scale producers 
grow tea *7 
All these changes had, however, far reaching implications land issues 
began to assume greater importance in district affairs and this in tum gave rise 
to a revival of the orkoiyot's position4 8 The new land tenure system was 
inconsistent with the social fabric and cohesion of the Nandi and it limited the 
abihty of the Nandi to rotate crop and cattle over a wide area All this gave rise 
to discontent and to severe economic inequalities The number of discontented 
people was mcreased by the fact that the Nandi squatters, who had been 
dismissed from their jobs on European farms, returned to the district The land 
shortage as a result of the privatization of pastures previously held 
communally, and the fragmentation of land, forced many to seek alternative 
means of livelihood, e g , labour migration to а о Tanzania and Uganda *9 
Those who remained deaded to consult orkoiyot Barsenon, whose position was 
sbll influential, about what to do in the new situation Barsenon told them of a 
large tract of empty and fertile land on the Laikipia Plateau and advised to 
them leave Nandi district to settle there A large group left m 1951 with 
livestock and other possessions, accompanied by Barsenon The group was 
intercepted before they reached Laikipia Arrests were made and the livestock 
confiscated Barsenon managed to escape Soon after that, Barsenon called for 
a general rebellion which would dnve out the settlers and the government He 
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estimated that the British, occupied as they were with the Mau Mau rebellion 
and the Suez-crisis, would be ill-prepared to deal with an uprising in Laikipia. 
Before this could happen, he was arrested by the army and exiled to an island 
in Lake Victoria. As was the case in the Nandi Uprising in 1923, the basis 
resistance collapsed completely and almost immediately, without the 
leadership of the orfco/yof .50 
According to Oboler (1982), the change in the system of land tenure could 
only result in the widening of the economic gap between individuals with 
different access to resources. Though difference in wealth had already been 
emerging in the Reserve, private land tenureship was the turning point in the 
movement towards stratification. Inequality in the distribution of land gave 
rise to ever growing inequalities in the distribution of other resources, through 
credit. Preference was given to persons with more collateral. The larger the 
landholding, the larger the loan extended to a fanner and the more money was 
available to develop land and to increase the resources he controlled. 
Systematic advantages for large land owners, which after independence were 
also extended to medium sized fanners, widened the gap between large land 
owners and small land owners, between men and women and also between 
sparsely and densely populated ethnic groups and regions.51 
In addition, the resources increasingly came to include non-agricultural 
property (lorries, trade enterprises, tractors, etc.). As these resources were 
almost completely controlled by the large farmers in the district, this in 
particular must have widened the gap between large and small land owners 
even more. 
Land distribution figures for the year 1960 in Nandi district reveal that, 
when commodity production started to expand, land was quite unevenly 
distributed, as is the case in other districts in Kenya. The average holdingsize 
in Nandi, however, is large compared with other non-large-scale farming 
regions in Kenya. An agricultural census displayed the following fígures on 
land distribution in Nandi: 
Table 5.9. Land distribution in Nandi district (1960 survey) 
0-1 ha. 1-2 ha. 2-3 ha. 3-4 ha. 4-6 ha. 6 and over 
%of %of %of %of %of %of %of %of %of %of %of %of 
all all all all all all all all all all all all 
land hold land hold land hold land hold land hold land hold. 
1.0 0.1 6.7 1.7 10.9 4.2 11.7 6.2 23.2 16.8 46.5 71.0 
Source: Kitching (1980), op. cit., p. 332-
The expansion of commodity production, which Kenya as a whole experienced 
from the 1950s onwards, also took place in Nandi district. The ecological 
advantages of Nandi district for commodity production of maize, milk and 
tea, contributed to enrichment and affluence among the Nandi. In this process, 
however, because of traditionally low population density, the Nandi occupied 
a favourable position and this contributed to general Nandi affluence 
compared with other ethnic groups who settled in the southwestern part of the 
district (Luhya especially). Tensions inherent in the new economic situation 
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were beginning to make themselves felt. These tensions reflected the interests 
of smallholders versus larger scale landholders whose holdings continued to 
grow; of agricultural labourers versus large landholders who are employers of 
labour; Nandi landlords versus. Luhya workers/tenants.52 
Oboler (1982) stresses rightly that not only did the inequality between the 
large and middle size landowners and the smaller land holders increased 
significantly, as the large were favoured above the smaller. The inequalities 
based on gender, between men and women, increased considerably also. Land 
titles were given to men ignoring the traditional rights of women to land. 
Consequently, women's access to credit was cut off. Oboler argues that: 
'if the Nandi as a group have been co-opted to the interests of Kenya's 
landed elite, Nandi women as an interest group have also been co-opted 
by the general affluence. Though Nandi^ women's relative economic 
Eosition vis-a-vis that of men has declined, in the midst of affluence it is ardly noticed.'53 
5.2.5. Expansion of commodity production since the 1960s 
Unfortunately, detailed information to examine the socio-economic 
development patterns underlying commodity production in Nandi since the 
1950s is not widely available. There is in particular, a lack of information for 
the period 1950 - 1971. There are only two economic case studies covering a 
limited number of farms in Nandi district available for the early 1960s.54 The 
picture extracted from these case studies is that commercialization of maize 
and livestock production was taking on rapidly. Grading of cattle by artificial 
insemination and by buying in animals as well as disease control (dipping) 
were also increasingly taking place. 
Maize production is still based on local varieties, although use of fertilizer 
and use of improved maize seed varieties (such as Kitale Synthetic II) is 
reported. Five out of the 14 farms covered by the farm enterprise survey held 
in 1963/64 planted improved seeds in combination with fertilizers. Eight of 
them still used local varieties; four of the eight applied fertilizers. 
Incorporation in the market for casual wage-labour and tractor hire service is 
already considerable. The tractor was used on nine farms to plough the land. 
Casual wage labour is primarily hired for weeding and harvesting. Two of the 
farms hired a permanent wage-labourer. 
Roughly 51 % of total maize produced was marketed.55 Only six of these 
farms commercialized maize production at that time. The yield of maize per 
ha. ranged from 6.4. bags to 24.4 bags. Commercialization of maize and milk 
was, however, mainly realized by the 'larger7 farmer. The share of the four 
largest farms (i.e., larger than the average holding size in the 1963-64 survey) 
of gross revenue from sales of milk is 68.1 % and of maize 50.3 %. The share of 
the largest farm in the survey (42 ha.) was 39.8 % of total gross revenue from 
milk sales and 30.0 % of maize sales.56 
These surveys as well as other research, notably that of MacArthur (1964), 
hinted at another crucial aspect of the agricultural economy in Nandi district: 
the emergence of straddling. A number of the more 'successful' farmers in the 
survey, without exception those with above average holding sizes, invested 
spare capital in means of transport (lorries), farm implements (tractor) and 
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trade enterprises. According to MacArthur, 'all the "progressive farmers" 
enumerated had outside sources of income that doubled the family income.'^7 
After 1969, information about economic development has been gathered 
systematically on an annual basis by the District Agricultural Officer. This 
information is published in the Annual Reports for Nandi district. On the basis 
of this information, we can produce a general overview of developments in 
agriculture from 1971 to 1987.58 Furthermore, District Development Plans give 
some, but very little, information. Another source of information is the survey 
held during 1987. From the survey, crucial knowledge can be derived about 
the conditions of production prevailing that year (technologically and socially) 
for the Nandi agricultural population. We simply assume here that since the 
1930s, and particular from the proclamation of the 'agrarian revolution' upto 
the early 1970s, economic development in Nandi district is continuously based 
on commoditizadon of agricultural production. 
Based on the Annual Reports of the DAO, we shall examine the 
development of the agricultural economy of Nandi district. We shall do this by 
reviewing the increase in the commonly-grown agricultural commodities -
maize, milk and tea - and by stating the role of state policy. 
5.2.5.1 Maize production 
Hybrid maize was introduced into Nandi district soon after the first varieties 
were released in the mid 1960s by the Kenya Seed Company (KSC). Evidence 
from our own survey suggests that the phase of adoption is over, which 
implies that the adoption rate is 100% in Nandi (see also Chapter 6, section 
6.3.). From the survey we may also conclude that the process of adoption has a 
regionally differentiated picture. In some areas - the northern part of Nandi 
(Ndulele and Ndalat) and the middle part (Kipsigak) - it started in the mid 
1960s; in others - the southern (Kapkangani) and more remote areas 
(Mosombor and Kibwareng) in the early 1970s. A major implication of 
hybridization of maize is that the traditional seed production and distribution 
systems were gradually, but in the end completely, dismantled. Soil fertility 
sustaining practices rely today almost completely on imported technology and 
inputs (fertilizers, top dressing). Production of maize is thus completely 
commoditized and determined by market forces. This implies that even 
production for the purpose of attaining self-sufficiency at the household level 
is founded upon the maintenance of commodity relations. 
A crucial and definite step towards commodidzaüon of maize was the 
establishment of the Maize Board in 1966 in the district and the establishment 
of agricultural extension services and formal credit systems encouraging the 
adoption of hybrid maize seeds and fertilizers. 
The agricultural extension service is set up as the vehicle through which 
new technologies and new farm practices are introduced on the farm. Its goal 
is to advise all farmers how to grow hybrid maize. The extension service can, 
therefore, be considered as a crucial institution in the commoditization of 
maize production. Since 1982, extension is organized on the basis of the so-
called Training and Visit system (T&V). The T&V system, or rather method, 
implies that a target farmer will be visited once every month by an extension 
officer. The average visit per officer is set at 8 per day. From this target farmer, 
a trickle-down effect is expected to spread the information to (30-50) 
neighbouring farmers. The target farmer is selected on the following criteria: 
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he or she must be a full-time farmer, must be respected, must be willing to 
innovate, must own an average-sized holding and must have a certain degree 
of literacy. It is expected that the agricultural extension service should finally 
reach all the farmers in the district through T&V method irrespective of 
holding size and racial background.59 
The DAO is very enthusiastic about the adoption of the Training & Visit 
extension system in 1982. The number of participating 'contact farmers' and 
the number of estimated 'follower farmers' is incremental. The reports 
mention 2,900 'contact fanners' (mainly maize fanners) for 1982 and 1,692 
'followers' and for 1986, 4,123 'contact fanners and 25,707 'followers'. In 
addition, the extension service frequently organizes field days and hybrid 
maize trials in the district. 
The provision of agricultural credit to the farming population is regarded 
by the state as an important ingredient of its policy to increase commodity 
production. The logic behind credit is that it can direct capital, which is not 
formed in smallholder agriculture, into the agricultural sector in such a way 
that productivity on the farm will be raised; the ultimate result will be an 
increase of production for the market. 
The state clearly opted for a mixed structure for the credit system (see 
Chapter 3). It consists, therefore, of several private commercial banks (such as 
Standard, Kenya Commercial Bank) and a parastatal organization (AFC) 
which channels credit obtained through foreign aid into the agricultural sector. 
These institutions, the latter strongly controlled by the state by means of 
schemes (Seasonal Credit Schemes, Guaranteed Minimum Return (GMR)), and 
the former urged by the Central Bank of Kenya to direct at least 17% of their 
capital into agriculture, are the main suppliers of credit to farmers in Nandi 
district. 
State-controlled agricultural credit schemes (the Guaranteed Minimum 
Return scheme, commercial IDA (=World Bank) loans. Fertilizer Import 
Support Schemes (FISS), Seasonal · Credit Scheme (SCS), USAID-credit 
schemes) made capital available for Nandi farmers to raise yields and to 
expand maize production in the district. The DAO complained however in the 
1977 report that 'small farmers were not benefitting from the AFC loans, but 
they will when IADP comes into being'.«' The AFC administered the GMR 
loans. Farmers could obtain such a loan for extending or improving maize 
farming only when they owned a holding of at least six ha. Because of its bad 
repayment record the GMR scheme is generally regarded as a generous 
subsidy for the larger farmer in Kenya (see also Chapter 7). For that reason, 
GMR was abolished in 1979 and replaced by credit schemes more oriented 
towards smaller farmers. The commercial IDA (World Bank) loans were issued 
particularly to offer opportunities to finance tractor purchases. Between 1971 
and 1976, forty-three farmers obtained a loan to purchase tractors. 
Mechanization of certain tasks on the farm is well developed in the district (see 
also Chapter 6). However, access to all these loans must have been limited to 
rich farmers only, since a 6 ha. holding was required (in case of the GMR 
loans) and 40 % of the tractor price had to be deposited in cash. 
Since the 1960s the number of buying centres of the Maize Board 
(nowadays the NCPB) have increased substantially. In 1987, there were 106 
buying centres in operation, while, in 1980, 34 centres were in operation; in 
1981, 54 centres; and in 1987, 67. In addition to that, the supply of production 
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inputs improved considerably in 1972 when the KFA (now KGGCU, see 
Chapter 3) deaded to erect a depot in Kapsabet Before that hme, farmers 
either had to go to Eldoret or get their inputs through middlemen and traders 
Transport costs were considered as a hindrance for the expansion of hybrid 
maize production Most of the time, the inputs are widely available, though 
not always (such as during 1983) 
Table 5 10 displays information derived from District Annual Agricultural 
Reports about the increase in area under hybrid maize The table mirrors 
dearly the commoditizabon trend in maize and the efforts of the national and 
district authorities to support the trend It is also clear that the total yield is 
increasing as the area under hybrid maize is increasing as well as the use of 
new technologies (certified hybrid seed, fertilizers, ploughs, tractors) 
Table 5 10 Area under hybrid and local maize (ha ) in Nandi district 1971-
1987, estimated total maize yield purchases by NCPB (kg) and reported 
fertilizer use 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976» 
1977 
1978» 
1979 
1980» 
198 
1982» 
1983» 
1984» 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Hybrid 
maize 
area 
22,179 
23,372 
23,75 
25,900 
41,095 
43,012 
49,475 
51,974 
n a 
59,239 
162,977 
60,578 
59,496 
62,000 
62,744 
77,409 
78,000 
Local 
maize 
area 
10,298 
4,673 
93,632 
3,500 
na 
n a 
na 
n a 
na 
n a 
na 
n a 
n a 
n a 
na 
n a 
na 
Total 
yield 
n a 
n a 
n a 
983,500 
1,638,960 
1,402,160 
1,870,506 
1,838,466 
n a 
2,100,000 
2,204,195 
2,120,230 
2,082,577 
1,984,000 
2,197,090 
2,709,31 
n a 
NCPB 
purch­
ases 
n a 
336,967 
293,750 
296,581 
na 
442,255 
n a 
η a 
n a 
224,000 
426,033 
551,775 
524,004 
388,235 
369,770 
1632,348 
674,464 
Use 
ferti­
lizer 
n a 
364,577 
η a 
239,592 
n a 
964,650 
654,650 
753,800 
n a 
n a 
n a 
n a 
n a 
n a 
n a 
n a 
n a 
* these years were marked as bad years for maize cultivation Drought (1976, 
1980), too much ram (1982) or came too early (1978), 1976 and 1983 were 
marked as bad years because of input price rises (1976) and marketing and 
mput supply was badly orgamzea 
Source Ministry of Agncuiture, Nandi District, Annual Reports, 1972-1986, the 
data for NCPB maize purchases for the years 1980/81 -1986/87 are from NCPB 
Kapsabet 
5.2.5.2. Livestock and milk 
The commeraahzahon of milk was until the mid 1980s, primarily spurred by 
the Kenya Cooperative Creameries plant m Eldoret Commeraahzahon of 
milk was, therefore, basically confined to the northern region of Nandi 
Marketing problems, bad conditions of roads and high transport costs to 
Eldoret hampered dairy development in the southern regions of Nandi 
district The building of two KCC plants, in Kapsabet and Lessos m 1985, 
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changed that situation dramatically.61 Lower transport costs and better 
marketing opportunities contributed to a considerable increase in milk 
production. Smallholder milk is marketed by 18 cooperative societies (in 1987), 
while the large farmers (numbering 3,200 in 1987) are able to deliver milk 
directly to milk the factory. From DAO-reports - confirmed by data from KCC-
Kapsabet - it is clear that the intake of milk by the KCC plants in Eldoret, 
Kapsabet and Lessos is steadily increasing (see Table 5.11). At the same time, 
dairy development schemes, which from the mid 1930s always have been a 
major part of district development plans, provided supportive measures upon 
which milk production could expand. 
Table 5.11. The expansion of marketed milk in Nandi district, 1972-1987) 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Marketed milk (kg) 
1,892,638 
7,904,201 
7,110,338 
4,035,951 
3,452,852 
7,140,947 
3,767,301 
n.a. 
n.a. 
6,458,068 
5,898,516 
6,442,822 
4,379,005 
5,302,409 
6,400,000 
? 
(bad year) 
(bad year) 
4,277,612 Kabsabet plant only 
(July-December 1985) 
9,893,022 Kapsabet plant only 
9,598,508 Kapsabet plant only 
(January-September 1987) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Nandi District, Annual Reports, 1972-1986; the 
data for Kapsabet plant 1985-1987 are from KCC-Kapsabet. The intake of the 
Lessos plant is unknown. 
The table reflects only a part of the commercialization of milk in Nandi district. 
There is probably more milk marketed as well as produced that of which the 
DAO is aware of. The intake of milk by the Kabsabet plant is considerably 
higher than the DAO stated in his annual reports. The 1987 survey indicated 
that the smallholder 'morning milk' is marketed through the cooperative 
societies; a small proportion is marketed locally; the 'evening milk' is generally 
consumed by the household itself. 
The livestock extension and veterinary services to the farmer have 
continually intensified since livestock development was launched in the mid 
1930s. The objective of the livestock development programme is to reduce the 
zebu cattle to a very minimum. Zero-grazingb2 is today widely recommended 
by the department, in particular for the small-scale farmer. Many farmers have 
already entered, or are gradually moving towards, zero grazing. Grading of 
cattle is increasing due to purchase of graded dairy cows and by artificial 
insemination and the use of graded bulls. Commercial IDA loans were issued, 
particularly in the early 1970s, to provide the capital to purchase graded dairy 
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cattle, pasture development, napier grass planting, fencing and dairy 
equipment A title deed to the land served as collateral for that loan. Fencing 
of pastures is increasing at high speed. Table 5.12 shows the development of 
the cattle population in the district. 
Table 5.12. Development of livestock in Nandi district 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Graded 
dairy 
cows 
44,195 
n.a. 
29,050 
n.a. 
50,306 
49,615 
47,650 
n.a. 
n.a. 
48.810 
65,490 
70,064 
68,505 
69,175 
152,665 
Zebu 
161,418 
n.a. 
290,315 
n.a. 
206,639 
280,734 
291,735 
n.a. 
n.a. 
88,400 
78,700 
70,522 
73,439 
74,438 
30,140 
Crosses 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
173,931 
175,340 
179,743 
180,370 
185,781 
126,888 
Sheep 
53,797 
n.a. 
54,600 
n.a. 
46,342 
46,000 
45,000 
n.a. 
n.a. 
22,460 
23,383 
46,963 
30,045 
30,295 
n.a. 
Goats 
45,776 
n.a. 
46,900 
n.a. 
46,550 
46,200 
45,800 
n.a. 
n.a. 
14,600 
14,971 
24,404 
26,540 
27,250 
n.a. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Nandi District, Annual Reports, 1972-1986. 
At the same time, the number of private and government-built (mostly in 
cooperation with foreign aid agencies) cattle dips is increasing. In 1972, there 
were 93 dips in the district, slowly increasing to 117 operational dips in 1977. 
In 1986, 306 cattle dips were operational in the district. Furthermore, the 
annual DAO reports reveal clearly the selling of Nandi zebu cattle and sheep 
and goats to the Kenya Meat Commission for slaughter. The same hold true 
for the commercialization of hides and skins. 
5.2.5.3. Tea cultivation 
Table 5.13 shows the expansion of tea production for Nandi district Tea 
appears to be a suitable crop for Nandi's agro-ecological zones. The number of 
tea growers has increased since the 1960s. Today, approximately 9,400 ha. is 
under tea. 1,869.8 ha. was cultivated by approx. 5,000 small- scale farmers in 
1986. It is estimated that they obtain an average yield 1300 kg of green leaf tea 
per ha./p.a. A few foreign-owned large tea estates (in total 7,500 ha.) still 
operate in Nandi district. The yields on these plantations is approximated at 
roughly 8,000 kg of green leaves per ha. per annum.63 Marketing of tea is 
handled by KTDA which is also responsible for supervising smallholder tea 
production in the district. A tea factory (named Chebut), established in 1972 in 
Kapsabet, processes (by drying) the green leaf tea from the district and from 
the neighbouring district Kakamega. Previously, green tea leaves were sold to 
private tea factories at Nandi Hills and Kaimosi tea plantations. Recently, the 
government of Kenya started to expand tea production in Nandi within the 
framework of the 'Nyayo Tea Zones'. The acreage of 'Nyayo tea' will increase 
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in the coming years. It will occur, however, at the expense of the Nandi Forest, 
one of the few remaining natural forests in Kenya. The 'Nyayo tea' belt 
totalled 97.6 ha. in 1986. 
Table 5.13. Green tea leaf production in Nandi district, 1975-1987 (kg), 
smallholder tea area and number of smallholders 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Production 
1,118,500,0 
1,652,250.0 
1,335,397.5 
1Д99,008.0 
1.149.980,0 
1.075.041,5 
1.716.021,0 
2.223.050,5 
2.352.103,5 
1.937.004,5 
1.933.238,0 
1.969.013,5 
2.408.492,0 
2.443.339,0 
3.265.642,0 
3.068.049,0 
Tea 
hectarage 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1,364.7 
1,365.5 
1,414.6 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1,567.8 
1,655.7 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1,815.6 
1,869.8 
Number of 
producers 
n.a. 
n.a. 
3,889 
n.a. 
n.a. 
4,102 
4,227 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
4,760 
4364 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
approx.5,000 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Nandi District, Annual Reports, 1972-1986 
and KTDA, Nandi district. 
5.2.5.4. Other crops 
Other cash crops in the district are coffee, pyrethrum, sugar cane, wattle, 
bananas and vegetables. The expansion of coffee and pyrethrum production is 
not impressive. Both crops were introduced in the 1950s. Coffee and 
pyrethrum production is hampered by marketing and storage problems as 
well as the fact that the capital needed for expansion is lacking. Several coffee-
and pyrethrum farms are not well kept by the owners. The area under 
pyrethrum (mainly in the eastern region) is constantly declining; the crop is 
increasingly replaced by food crops. The area under coffee (mainly restricted 
to Aidai division and Songhor) has slowly expanded from 69.1 ha. in 1972 to 
441 ha. in 1986. Coffee, produced by smallholders in Aidai division and by 
large scale farmers in Songhor, suffers, according the DAO, from 2 major 
problems. On the one hand, fertilizer application and pest and disease control 
are poor due to financial constraints. On the other hand, the coffee marketing 
agency appears to have a bad record for delayed payments to farmers. The 
three coffee factories in the district are underutilized as a result of the slow 
development of coffee production. More coffee needs to be planted in the 
district in order to overcome this situation. A specific coffee credit schemes has 
been set up in order to encourage more farmers to plant coffee. The Farmers' 
Trading Centre in Kaimosi established a coffee seedling nursery in the early 
1980s. Since that time, coffee production is recovering; at least the area under 
coffee is expanding again. The area under coffee again reached its 1974 level in 
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1985. The large-scale coffee farms are in bad condition. The owners lack the 
essential capital to upgrade the former European-owned coffee farms. 
The development record of sugar cane and wattle is likewise not 
outstanding. The expansion of sugar cane is hampered by the marketing 
inefficiency of the Chemilil Sugar Company, the bad condition of roads and 
the lack of transport for smallholders. The area devoted to wattle is unknown 
but output has been declining since 1971. The DAO noted that farmers showed 
no interest in this commodity. After 1978, there is no information available for 
wattle. Sunflower is another crop recommended for Nandi district The 
information on sunflower is rather scattered in the reports. 
Table 5.14. Development of beans production in Nandi district 
Year 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Area 
ha. 
620 
778 
850 
1,956 
3,405 
2,633 
2,870 
4,700 
5,245 
Estimated 
production 
tbgs) 
4,000 
6,227 
4,754 
10,000 
n.a. 
2,370 
2,58 
5,076 
5,664 
Purchase by 
NCPB (bgs) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
108 
2,734 
1,577 
110 
317» 
452 
3,697 
* the NCPB stopped purchasing beans during that year. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Nandi District, Annual Reports, 1972-1986. 
Next to the staple food crop maize, production of beans is expanding 
significantly (see Table 5.14). Beans are primarily produced for home 
consumption, although the quantities marketed by the NCPB are increasing. A 
considerable proportion is marketed locally through informal marketing 
channels. It is estimated that approx. 20 % of total bean production is sold. The 
hectarage under beans is expanding, and it has become a widely grown crop in 
the southern region (in Kapkangani and Kibwareng sub-locations). Beans are 
not widely grown in the northern region; beans were considered a 'poor men's 
crop' there. Beans are a long neglected crop. The agricultural department 
views beans as an important protein rich, nutritious and. above all, cheap food 
crop. The bean seeds are, in many cases, not bought at the market but retained 
from a previous harvest. In addition, beans do not require fertilizer and when 
intercropped with maize, the yield of maize will be higher. For these reasons, 
bean production is receiving increasing attention from the district authorities. 
5.3. Conclusion 
The review of trends in commodity production in Nandi indicates clearly the 
crucial role played by the state in fostering commoditization of the agricultural 
economy. Before the proclamation of the 'agrarian revolution' in the early 
1950s, the Nandi dearly adopted a market oriented fanning strategy. When 
the 'agrarian revolution' was effectuated and the state intervened in the 
conditions of agricultural production, commodity production in Nandi district 
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became progressively founded upon a trend towards capitalization and 
commercialization of production State intervention involved state/public 
investment in the establishment of a technological and administrative 
framework m the country as a whole and in Nandi district As a consequence 
of state investment, new opportunities for the Nandi peasantry became 
available improved (synthebc and later on hybrid) seeds, fertilizers, machines, 
agricultural credit, extension- and tractor hire services and marketing facilities 
The subsequent integration of these options into their farming strategies meant 
that new forms of commodity production emerged m Nandi district Land was 
privatized and the distribution of land was subsequently regulated by market 
forces Commenang in the late 1950s and early 1960s, commodity production 
became based on improved maize seed vanebes which where available at that 
tune, improved husbandry practices and m vestment in graded cattle At the 
same bme we see a gradual adoption of new and higher value crops (tea and 
coHee, pyrethrum, sugar cane), although these crops do not rival with maize 
and dairy products 
The review also indicated that there were Nandi farmers, portrayed by 
Kitching, as having the potential (good agricultural land) but lacking the 
essential means (capital) (see Chapter 4, section 4 5), gradually gamed access to 
the means of capitalizing production This resulted in a dramatic increase in 
production for the market The means of capitalizing production came from 
three sources The most important source was capital obtained by 
incorporation into the agricultural credit market and invested m agriculture, 
graded livestock, fencing and implements It may be assumed that money (or 
capital) earned from sales of agricultural products and money (or capital) 
obtained from off-farm economic activities (wage labour, hinng out 
implements and trading) were the two other sources A large part of that 
money must have been re-invested in agricultural production by a large 
number of fanners since the number of farmers who actually gained access to 
credit was rather small Moreover, results from the limited survey held during 
1963/64 suggest that the agricultural and non-agricultural resources were 
largely controlled by the larger fanner commodity production (of maize and 
milk) was primarily earned on by the large farm enterprises, and the more 
profitable mvolvement in off-farm ventures fell largely into the hands of the 
large farmer in the district If this continues to be so, it would imply that 
commodity production could lead to enrichment of the wealthy and middle 
peasant strata and to impoverishment of those with fewer resources 
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CHAPTER 6. 
COMMODITIZATION AND HETEROGENEITY IN NANDI DISTRICT: 
RESULTS OF A FARM SURVEY 
Introduction 
In this chapter we shall examine the contemporary socio-economic trends 
underlying the continuing process of commoditizatìon in Nandi district. 
Particular attention will be paid to who, or what kind of peasant household, is 
participating in commodity production and under what kind of conditions, 
technological as well as social, under which commodity production is being 
carried out. The data for the analysis emanate from a survey undertaken in the 
second part of 1987. A methodological explanation of the survey and details of 
the actual survey will be given in Appendix I. 
The survey was undertaken at the farm level during August, September 
and October of 1987. Two sample criteria were employed enabling us to draw 
a stratified sample according to holding sizes and their location in Nandi's 
agro-ecological zones. Employing both criteria, a representative stratified 
sample was obtained comprising 90 farm enterprises and households. We 
defined a household as the persons who were working and living, and eating 
together everyday. Family members working in other parts of Kenya and 
living away were not included as members of the household and their income 
was only included in as far as they sent money to contribute to the welfare of 
the household.1 The first sample criterion, holding size, was based on data 
gathered from the land registration files of the Ministry of Lands and 
Settlement in Kapsabet. This department registers plot sizes and numbers, plot 
holders and time of purchase, selling and/or subdivision. The second criterion 
for the sample rests upon the existing ecological variation in the district. This 
criterion was employed in order to highlight the natural, climatological 
conditions for agricultural production. For this purpose, six sub-locations were 
selected according to their location in Nandi's agro-ecological zones (see also 
Chapter 5 section 5.1 and map 2). The Department of Agriculture, Kapsabet, 
assisted in this selection procedure. 
The questionnaire was built up to gather empirical data to assess the socio-
economic nature of development in the district and to assess the degree of 
commodi tiza tion in the district. These issue were covered by questions about 
the productive and consumptive reproduction patterns of the farming 
community and their farm enterprises. A second major objective of the 
questionnaire was to gain information on aspects of state intervention and 
distribution of state services in the district. 
A review of the data discloses two important characteristics of the agrarian 
structure in Nandi district. In the first place, the data support the trend towards 
commodi tiza tion of agricultural production examined in Chapter 5. The 
development of commodity production and commodity relations is 
widespread and deeply rooted. The market is an important conditioning factor 
for farming in the districL Not only production inputs but also labour 
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increasingly appear in the production process as commodities, and the 
consumption of individual households is partly satisfied through the 
maintenance of commodity relations. 
In the second place, the data demonstrate that the farming strategies of the 
agricultural population vary greatly. This is apparent on two levels. The 
farming population exhibits, on the one hand, differential degrees of 
commoditization. One household tries carefully to balance its farming strategy 
of maintaining non-commodity relations to regulate production and 
reproduction while keeping the mobilization of resources via commodity 
relations at a minimum. Another household acquires virtually all resources 
(labour, physical inputs, implements) through commodity relations. Between 
these two extremes we can distinguish many different strategies. The same 
holds true for reproduction of the households. There exist varying degrees of 
incorporation into the market to satisfy consumption needs. On the other 
hand, reproduction of the household and the farm enterprise is not merely 
based on agricultural production. The population clearly diversified their 
economic strategies: straddling agricultural production and off-farm work. 
The reasons for straddling vary widely, however. The agricultural economy of 
Nandi district is thus founded neither upon a fully-fledged circulation of 
commodities, nor on agricultural production only. 
Although I am fully aware of the dialectic relationship between the 
reproduction of relations of production and farming strategies, I limit myself 
here to one side of the equation: the determination of social relations of 
production on farming strategies. 
The variation in farming strategies can be ascribed to an extremely large 
differentiation of the sodo-economic preconditions for commodity production. 
Resources such as land and implements are unevenly distributed. In addition, 
the state institutions maintain differing linkages with the farming population 
in the district. The degree of incorporation into the market for capital and 
services differs considerably, thereby reinforcing the unequal transmission of 
the benefits of commoditization. The almost logical outcome is that the level of 
reproduction of farm and household differs widely. The farming population in 
Nandi district cannot therefore be regarded as a homogeneous group of 
producers, neither can their farming strategies be regarded as homogeneous. 
The different farming strategies correlate closely in their turn with various 
styles of farming. Maize farming in particular is organized in different ways 
with different techniques. Particularly in agriculture, we can seldom 
distinguish one single labour process. Several combinations of implements of 
labour can be distinguished in the fields. The technological level of the farm 
enterprises in the sample varies widely, therefore. This technological 
difference, in its tum, is mirrored in the extremely large variation in the 
intensity of farming. Productivity of land and labour also exhibits an 
enormous variation (see Table 5.6 of Chapter 5 on the variation in maize 
yields). Apart from the obvious explanation of the ecological diversity in the 
district, the variation in yields can also be attributed to technological and 
organizational factors. 
There is only one crucial factor which is common to the fanning population 
as a whole in Nandi district: the operation of the market. The farming 
population is on the one hand firmly integrated into the market for physical 
production inputs, particularly for maize production. On the other hand, the 
170 
market for inputs and output operates in the same way for each household or 
peasant stratum prices are the same and each household, whether large or 
small, poor or rich is faced with the same peculiarities of the market For all 
the households, and on all farm, the labour process for maize farming is 
governed by the same prescription or technology code of hybrid maize 
production (as emphasized earlier m Chapter 1) This does not mean, however, 
that all households cope with the logic and peculiarities of the market m the 
same level and on the same way As we shall see later on, the prescriptions for 
hybrid maize farming are resolved in the fields m different ways 
In the following we shall first elaborate on the soao-econoimc 
characteristics of the agricultural economy and examine the different 
preconditions of each household for farming (land, labour and implements) 
and the extent of market incorporation For these reasons, the survey was built 
up around issues such as 'who are these farmers, how do they farm, and what do 
their holdings look like, what kind of relations do they have with the market and the 
institutional framework m the district, what do they earn from farming and do they 
have other sources of income"' By answering these questions we may assess the 
effect of the operahon of market forces for agricultural production on socio-
economic development in the district, and how these effect constrains or open 
up choices of fanners 
This exammabon leads us automatically to the issue raised in previous 
chapters the question of social differentiation of the farming population in 
rural Kenya This question is two-sided In the first place, is the family farm or 
household commodity production the predominant form of production, is 
differentiation taking place within the household commodity produang strata 
(enrichment and/or impoverishment) and is capitalist producbon emergmg m 
Nandi district 7 It may be argued that social differentiation is partly 
reproduced by differential commodibzabon and partly through different 
strata being linked to each other in the process of commoditization Or to 
phrase the question differently, what is the socio-economic dynamic of 
commodity production in Nandi district 7 In the second place, is there a close 
relationship between farming strategies, social differentiation and the 
application of agricultural technology m maize production 7 The data gathered 
permitted a quantitative analysis enabling us to 'measure' the relevance and 
impact on yields of the 'place' people occupy in the set of social relations of 
producbon in the countryside 
Both aspects of the question of rural differentiation are outlined in this 
chapter In order to get a good picture of social and economic developments 
we chose to present the relevant data at holdmg size level When necessary, 
we shall point out the differences between the sub-locations d e , here treated 
as AEZ) in the district 
6.1. Ownership and distribution of means of production: land 
Land is a crucial precondition for agricultural producbon The survey gave a 
good impression of the distribution of land ownership m Nandi district and m 
the sub-locations The selection method employed implies, however, that one 
category of households is not present m the survey landless people or 
households According to several studies, the phenomenon of landlessness is 
increasing m Kenya (see Chapter 4) The evidence of landlessness from Nandi 
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Table 6.1. Size distribution of land in the sub-locations in the sample 
Holding 
size 
(ha.) 
0-1 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
4-5 
5-
total 
Kapkangani 
no of 
h.h.% 
5 
6 
9 
3 
2 
4 
29 
Source: Own 
are excluded) 
17.2 
20.7 
31.0 
103 
6.9 
13.8 
99.9 
Kibwareng Kipsigak 
no of no of 
h.h. % h.h. % 
0 0.0 
2 22.2 
1 11.1 
1 11.1 
1 11.1 
4 44.4 
9 99.9 
1 
2 
2 
0 
1 
10 
16 
62 
125 
12.5 
0.0 
6.2 
625 
99.9 
Mosombor Ndalat 
no of no of 
h.h. % h.h. % 
0 
4 
1 
3 
0 
3 
11 
0.0 
36.4 
9.1 
27J 
0.0 
273 
100.1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
8 
10 
survey (plots owned and cultivated outside 
0.0 
10.0 
0.0 
10.0 
0.0 
80.0 
100.0 
sampli 
Ndulele 
no of 
h.h.% 
0 
0 
0 
1 
3 
11 
15 
0.0 
0Ό 
0.0 
6.6 
20.0 
733 
99.9 
total 
no of 
h.h.% 
6 6.7 
15 16.7 
13 14.4 
9 10.0 
7 7.8 
40 44.4 
90 100.0 
e sub-locations 
district is not well documented. The District Development Pkn 1979-1983 only 
mentions of 400 persons as being landless at the beginning of the plan period. 
The policy document did not point out how, and in which economic sector, 
they were earning a living. It is dear, however, that as they own no land, the 
only reproduction opportunity the landless households have is to sell their 
labour power on a regular bases. 
Private ownership is the only type of ownership in the district and is the 
result of colonial and post-colonial policies towards land (see Chapters 3,4 and 
5). The current trend in distribution of ownership of land is partly a reflection 
of the accumulation of land by ancestors - 42 % of the households in the 
sample obtained access to land through inheritance - and partly the result of 
the operation of the land market - 58% of the sample households gained access 
to land through purchase. The survey established that this is especially the 
case in Kapkangani sub-location where in the last two decades (roughly since 
the late 1960s) at least 90% of the land has been transferred from Nandi to 
Luhya ownership. In Ndulele and Ndalat sub-locations significantly fewer 
land transfers took place, though this does not mean that a land market is 
absent or that distribution of land is solely the result of past accumulation 
patterns. 
The incidence of land rental is almost absent in the district, contrary to 
other districts and provinces such as Nyanza and Western Province.2 Only 
two households in the sample rented land for cultivating maize in addition to 
their own holdings. Furthermore, only one household in the sample reported 
hiring out of land, and in this case, half of the holding. The absence of land 
rental implies that owner-tenant relations do not feature in the process of 
social differentiation in Nandi district 
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of land in the sample. Figure 6.1 displays 
the Lorentz curve for the distribution of land in the sample sub-locations. The 
Table discloses a rather unequal distribution of land in Kapkangani, Ndalat 
and Ndulele (i.e., a high Gini-ratio) compared with the other sub-locations. 
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Ownership of land, as one of the most important preconditions for commodity 
production, varies widely among the fanning population in the district 
Land use in the sample area has already been discussed at the beginning of 
the previous chapter (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5, Chapter 5). 
Figure 6.1. The Lorentz curve for distribution of land in Nandi district 
0 20 40 60 M 100 0 20 4 0 6 0 8 0 100 
Gim [»no overill 0 66 G.m ratio Kipngik 0 35 Ndulelo 0 49 
6.2. Mobilization of labour for maize farming 
Two major forms of labour can be distinguished in the area: on the one hand, 
non-commoditized labour from the household itself and exchange labour 
mobilized through different relations, and, on the other hand, commoditized 
labour, i.e. wage labour. The survey covered mainly the mobilization of 
labour for maize production, while the labour input in dairy farming was not 
recorded. It is accurate, however, to assume that for dairy farming Sie wage-
labour market plays a less important role than in maize fanning. Labour in 
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dairy farming on the smallholder farm is mainly undertaken by non-paid 
household labour for milking, grazing and dipping. The size of the herd can be 
used as a yardstick: the larger the herd, the larger the share of wage-labour. 
Labour mobilized for production of other crops (beans, vegetables, fruits) is, as 
the survey revealed, primarily household labour. The fact that some of this 
produce is marketed has no relevance. The households producing tea and 
coffee hire wage labour, but mainly for harvesting. With respect to maize 
farming only, the following observations can be made. 
In the case of family labours, the cultivator/owner and members of his/her 
household work on family land. Non-paid family labour, widely available on 
the farm, is an important non-commodidzed element in the production and 
reproduction of farm and family. Family labour is of particular relevance for 
the small or poor peasant household. Exchange labour too is non-paid labour. 
Family labour is reciprocally exchanged between different households or units 
of production. It is the labour type of the least importance in the district. Since 
it is rather rare - 8.2 % of total labour input on the farm is exchange labour -
and since it is basically family labour which is exchanged, it has been treated 
as equivalent to such labour. Generally, household and exchange labour is 
more widely employed on small and middle sized holding, than on the larger 
holdings (see Table 6.2). Furthermore, household and exchange labour is 
basically manual labour. Table 6.2 shows the extent of use of hired labour on 
the farm by holding size for the identified farming activities. The wage-labour 
ratio, calculated by dividing wage-labour input by total labour input, 
represents the degree of commoditizatìon of labour. 
Table 6.2. Mean wage-labour ratio and percentage of households not hiring 
wage-labour, by holding size (N=90) 
Holding 
size 
0-1 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
4-5 
5-5 
Overall 
Wage-labour 
ratio (%) 
0.7 
23.4 
24.6 
13.8 
26.5 
4.4 
35.3 
Households not 
hiring wage-labour (%) 
83.3 
42.8 
23.0 
35.6 
28.6 
5.0 
27.8 
Source: own survey 
Wage labour is not merely hired for one farm task only. It is employed 
differentially on the farm: for land preparation (i.e. hiring a tractor with a 
wage-labourer in case of mechanized ploughing or people for digging), 
sowing/fertilizing purposes (manual or mechanical), weeding and harvesting. 
The households employing an oxen plough rely on the application of family 
labour only. In case of manual wage-labour, a six hour labour day is rewarded 
by Ksh 10 per day and a nine hour working day by Ksh 15. In some cases of 
manual labour the price is calculated on the basis a price per acre (i.e. piece 
work). Tractor hire prices are mostly on the basis of the acreage of land to be 
ploughed (the average price is Ksh 200 per acre). The same applies to the 
174 
hiring of planters. Furthermore, wage labour is primarily on the basis of casual 
or seasonal employment. Some large fanners (9 % in the sample) employed 
wage labour on a permanent basis. 
Table 6.2. shows that the larger farms are the dominant users of agricultural 
wage-labour and that the smallholdings primarily rely on household labour. 
Incorporation into the agricultural wage-labour market is fairly high in Nandi 
district, although family and exchange labour remain important non-
commodidzed elements in the reproduction of the farm enterprise and 
household. Wage labour measured in terms of number of labourers employed 
represents 35 % of total labour input This situation means, that in Nandi 
district as a whole, wage labour (but not necessarily free labour) is available 
for either permanent or casual/seasonal employment. Seventy-two percent of 
the households are hirers of wage labour for one or more farm tasks. This 
leaves only 28 % of the households solely depending on family and exchange 
labour. Wage labour in the form of tractor hire is the most common form of 
wage labour. Sixty-two percent of the households in the sample hire a tractor 
plus worker/driver in order the prepare the land for sowing (see Tables 6.3 
and 6.4). 
6 J . Ownership and distribution of means of production: implements for 
maize fanning 
The ownership of jembes (for land preparation, sowing and weeding) is well 
distributed among the agricultural population. A minority (i.e., 16 % of the 
households) own an ox plough. The majority of the households do not own, 
but hire, a tractor or planter. Only 9 % of the households own a tractor, and 8 
% own a planter. Tractors and planters are also used for hiring-out purposes 
and earn a considerable amount of cash for the owner. The survey indicates 
that the smaller farms mainly rely on manual (mainly household) labour*, 
while on the larger holdings the use of tractors and planting machines is high, 
and much more labour is hired to perform the time-consuming farming 
activities (ploughing, sowing/fertilizing, harvesting and weeding in 
particular). Jembes cannot be considered as implements which can be 
monopolized by a certain peasant stratum, while tractors and planters are 
subject to monopolization.5 
6.4. Labour processes and farming styles in the sample area: cultivation 
techniques and fanning intensity 
An agricultural labour process embodies the following elements: the 
instruments of labour (tools or implements: jembe, tractor, ox plough, planting 
machine, etc.): the objects of bbour (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides) and the labour 
force (household- and exchange labour, wage labour and mechanized labour). 
It is typical for agricultural production that one single labour process can 
seldom be distinguished. Several combinations of the elements of the labour 
process are possible, in theory as well as in the fields. In the sample area we 
found twenty-three different labour processes in maize cultivation. They were 
rank ordered in Table 6.3 according to the level of 'sophistication' or 
'modernization' in order to show the structural trend in maize farming in 
Nandi district, the more sophisticated the labour process, the more 
implements and labour are mobilized through market relations. Implements 
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(hoes, tractors, planters), tractor hire service and labour appear increasingly as 
commodities in the production process of maize. 
Of these labour processes nine types are, in accordance with their 
frequency of appearance in the sample area, of relevance for further 
explanation . These types are 4, 5,8,11,12,13,15,17 and 20. These are marked 
with + and discussed in more detail below. The remaining types are 
comparable with at least one of the relevant types. The Table would be more 
complex if we included the different forms of labour employed in maize 
production. 
Table 6.3 Variation in the labour process of maize growing in the sample area. 
(N=89,1 non response) 
Type 
1 
2 
3 
4+ 
5+ 
6 
7 
8+ 
9 
10 
11 + 
12+ 
13+ 
14 
15+ 
16 
17+ 
18 
19 
20+ 
21 
22 
23 
Mean 
maize 
plot PI 
fha) 
1.0 · 
1.0 · 
1.4 · 
0.6 » 
1.0 
0.9 
0.4 
1.0 
1.6 
1.5 
1.0 
1.6 
2.3 
1.8 
1.5 
6.0 
1.6 
1.2 
0.8 
4.6 
6.0 
4.8 
12.0 
P2 P3 SI S2 D Wl W2 W3 
crop 
index 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
Nu 
h.h 
2 
3 
2 
12 
4 
3 
1 
4 
2 
2 
9 
5 
14 
2 
8 
% 
2.2 
3.3 
2.2 
13.3 
4.4 
3.3 
1.1 
4.4 
2.2 
2.2 
10.0 
5.6 
15.6 
2.2 
8.9 
1.1 
6.7 
1.1 
1.1 
4.4 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
Legend: 
P: land preparation: 1 manual, i.e. digging 
2 mechanized, plough, ox drawn 
3 mechanized, plough, tractor drawn 
S: sowing/fertilizing: 1 manual 
2 mechanized, planting machine 
D: dusting against diseases 
W: weeding: 1 manual, once 
2 manual, twice 
3 mechanized, i.e. spraying. 
a: weeds by combining manual labour with a ¿actor 
Crop index: 1 maize pure 
2 maize intercropped with beans 
Source: own survey 
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Table 6.4 displays the average labour input per hectare for the various farm 
tasks. Fanning intensity was measured in terms of man-days per ha. It is 
obvious that the choice of how and with what kind of instrument the tasks are 
to be performed on the farm is mirrored in several levels of farming intensities. 
The accompanying Figures 6.2. and 6.3 show the farming intensity of the 
representative farming styles. Table 6.3 and 6.4 both indicate that problems of 
labour peaks occurring for crucial tasks, such as preparation and 
sowing/fertilizing, are resolved differently. The dominant trend for the 
problem of labour peaks to be resolved by mechanization of land preparation 
(type 10-23 in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3)) and to a lesser extent by planting 
machines (type 16-23). The ox plough represents a good and cheap alternative 
to even out the labour peak, but it is not widely applied in the district.6 The 
only option available for the households who cannot afford mechanization is 
to employ the jembe (hoe) and to rely on manual labour input (type 1-4). 
Table 6.4. Average labour input per farming task in the sample (N=89,1 non 
response) 
Farming tasks 
Land preparation 
manual (PI) 
ox ploughing (P2) 
tractor (P3) 
SMST* 
mechanized (S2) 
Weeding 
manual (once) (Wl) 
manual (twice)(W2) 
spraying (W3) 
Dusting 
manual (D) 
Harvesting 
manual (beans) 
manual (maize) 
Man days 
hectare 
112.8 
15.0 
1.8 
21.6 
1.3 
28.3 
57.7 
2.9 
4.0 
15.8 
34.3 
Per percentage 
households 
22.2 
14.4 
62.2 
81.1 
17.7 
34.4 
56.6 
5.5 
12.2 
38.8 
98.9 
N.B.:The percentages do not total 100% due to rounding and the fact that one 
interview was rejected for calculation of this data. 
Source: own survey 
The manual farming style (type 4 from Table 6.3 and Figure 6.2) is 
characterized as follows. Labour input is high in all farm tasks. This fanning 
style can, therefore, be labelled as a labour-intensive farming style (the so-
called I-calculus) relying primarily on manual labour input. АЛ these 
households were intercropping maize and beans and weeded twice. 
The households without any form of mechanization almost all cultivate 
holdings smaller than three hectares (i.e. 85 %). Most of these smaller holdings 
in the sample area are located in Kapkangani sub-location. It is not surprising 
that the majority of the households here farm by means of hands and hoes 
only. This holds true for 64 % of all the households visited in Kapkangani sub-
location, being 86 % of all the manual farming households in the sample. Next 
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to the size of the farms and the cash income from farming and other sources, 
the ecological setting is another explanatory factor for the low degree of 
mechanization. Much of Kapkangani sub-location, for instance, is not really 
suited to mechanized ploughing, partly due to the steep valleys and the many 
small rural access roads. 
Figure 6.2. Farming intensity per type of labour process 
type 4 type 5 type 8 
The labour input of the types preparing the land by employing an oxen plough 
(type 5 and 8) are shown in Figure 6.2. The difference between type 5 and 8 is 
that weeding is carried twice in the latter. Ox ploughing is mainly undertaken 
by households with farms larger than three hectares (i.e. 86 % of the ox-
ploughing households). It is, perhaps, striking that of all the ox-ploughing 
households 36 % are located in Mosombor sub-location, representing almost 
half of all the households interviewed in this sub-location. 
The total labour inputs of the main types in the mechanized, low labour 
input farming style category (type 11, 12,13, 15,17, 20) are shown in Figure 
6.3. This mechanized farming style can be labelled as a labour extensive-style 
of farming (the so-called Ε-calculus). The differences between these types is 
attributed to the sowing and weeding methods applied. Maize was mostly 
planted in pure stand. As already emphasized earlier, the degree of 
mechanization follows the increase in holding size: more than 60 % of the 
households using a tractor for ploughing own holdings larger than five 
hectares. For those who, in addition to a tractor, use a planting machine, the 
proportion is 88 %. and 100 % of those who also spray instead of manual 
weeding have holdings of more than five hectares. The highest degree of 
mechanization is found in Ndulele and Ndalat sub-locations. All the 
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Figure 6.3. Farming intensity per type of labour process 
households interviewed in Ndalat and almost all (93 %) of those in Ndulele 
have mechanized land preparation. Together these households form 42 % of 
this category. Explanations are, as in the case of Kapkangani sub-location, on 
the basis of farm size, i.e. advantage of scale, and the open and rather flat 
environment. 
Dusting is done by hand and mainly on farm larger than five hectares (i.e., 
88 % of the dusting-households). Dusting does not consume too much labour 
time (i.e., an average of 4.0 man days per hectare) and is normally done in a 
period of low labour requirements (between sowing and weeding). Due to the 
relatively high costs involved, this farming activity is mainly restricted to the 
larger holdings. 
6.5. Production and reproduction of the farm enterprise and the 
household: incorporation into the market 
The market plays a crucial role in the agricultural economy of the district. 
Inputs for agricultural production increasingly appear as commodities in the 
production process, and produce is largely disposed of on the market. In 
addition, consumption needs of households are increasingly satisfied through 
maintaming commodity relations. Access to money (or capital), obtained by 
selling produce or off-farm work, is thus an essential ingredient of the 
economic strategy of the households in order to sustain production and 
reproduction. 
The importance of the market varies widely, however, by crop as well as by 
farm enterprise and household. Production of maize, coffee and tea is 
completely commoditized. The physical inputs for these crops are purchased 
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goods, and output is fully commercialized. Dairy farming is only partly 
commoditized and contrary to maize, coffee and tea, the commoditization of 
beans, vegetables and fruits hardly took place. Generally, all the inputs are 
reproduced on the farm. 
Crop» are also disposed of differently. The degree of commercialization of 
agricultural production is fairly high: for example, 61 % of total maize output 
is marketed. While all households in the sample produced maize, 71 % of them 
market maize on the formal or informal market as is shown by Tables 6.5 and 
6.7. While nearly all households (98 %) owned one or more cows, 61 % sell 
milk on the market and 40 % of total milk output is marketed. Furthermore, 18 
% of the households in the sample produced and marketed one of the two 
export commodities grown in the district, i.e., tea and to a lesser extent coffee. 
Food crops (such as beans, sukumawiki [spinach], potatoes) and fruits 
(bananas) are primarily produced for home consumption, although some 
households, approx. 25 % of the sample and mainly located in Kapkangani, 
have commercialized these crops. 
Table 6.5 points at regionally differentiated commercialization strategies in 
the district. Ecological conditions for tea and coffee production may contribute 
to this. The table displays unquestionably that production for home 
consumption is the dominant pattern in Kapkangani compared with the other 
sub-locations. It also shows that the fanning strategies of the people in 
Kapkangani are more diversified and entail also the commercialization of 
minor food crops such as beans. The much smaller average size of land 
holdings in Kapkangani is an explanatory factor. 
Table 6.5. The degree of participation of households in production and sale of 
agricultural produce (in % of households) by sub-location (N=90) 
Maize 
Sub-location prod 
Kapkangani 
Kibwareng 
Kipsigak 
Mosombor 
Ndalat 
Ndulele 
Overall 
Source: own 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
sell 
41.3 
55.5 
87.5 
81.8 
100 
93.3 
71.1 
survey 
Milk 
prod 
93.1 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
97.7 
sell 
24.1 
77.8 
68.7 
50.0 
80.0 
86.6 
61.1 
Beans 
prod 
72.4 
44.4 
75.5 
9.1 
0.0 
60.0 
51.1 
sell 
48.3 
22.2 
6.2 
9.1 
20.0 
6.6 
23.3 
Potatoes 
prod 
31.2 
22.2 
20.0 
9.1 
20.0 
33.3 
11.1 
sell 
6.9 
22.2 
6.6 
9.1 
10.0 
20.0 
18.9 
Coffee 
/tea 
prod 
3.4 
55.5 
31.2 
27.3 
0.0 
13.3 
17.7 
6.5.1. Commoditization of maize and milk 
The importance of the market for maize production was the subject of the 
survey. As pointed out earlier, market relations in respect of dairy farming 
inputs were not part of the research. Only the degree of commercialization of 
milk was emphasized. 
The introduction of hybrid maize varieties (HYVs such as H614, H613, 
H612, H625) at the beginning of the sixties, increased the level of 
commoditization substantially by breaking down non-commodity forms of 
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reproduction. Seeds and the now necessary fertilizers became commodities for 
households. Reproduction of the farm, very obvious in the case of maize, is 
dearly commoditized. Table 5.6 shows that the use of hybrid maize is 100 % 
(i.e. a commodi tiza tion degree of 100 %), while fertilizers are applied by 93 % 
of the sample households. The high adoption rate of fertilizers indicates the 
acceptance of HYV-seeds with a package of associated biochemical inputs, in 
this case mainly fertilizer and, to a much lesser extent, pesticides. 
Table 6.6. Adoption of HYV-seeds and associated package of biochemical 
inputs CN=90) 
Package % of h.h 
HYV-seed+fertilizer+pestiddes 6.6 
HYV-seed+fertilizer 86.6 
HYV-seed only 6.6 
Total 99.8 
Source: own survey 
The level as well as the speed of the adoption rate of the commodity package 
for hybrid maize can be explained in the context of the transformation of a self-
suffident production process into a market oriented production process. A 
quantitative analysis to prove the correlation between 'the degree of adoption 
of commodity package' and 'the degree of commoditization' appeared, 
however, problematic. The correlation coefficient of +0.40 between 'degree of 
commerdalization' of maize and 'adoption of the commodity package' points 
at a strong relationship between the two variables. One would have expected, 
however, a higher correlation coeffident. That it is not so may be attributed to 
the undifferentiated nature of the variable 'package' since a large majority of 
the farming population adopted hybrid seeds and fertilizers (Table 6.6). 
This suggests that other factors or a combination of factors, such as the 
rational economic behaviour of the farming population, the favourable 
ecological conditions in the district, the availability of the inputs, labour and 
services, or pressure from above or from external agendes explain more. The 
question 'why was HYV-maize seed adopted' was generally answered with 
'the expectation of getting higher yields from if. The fact that the commodity 
inputs were indeed widely available in the appropriate quantities in the 
district must have contributed to the fast adoption of the HYV-package. But 
we must not underestimate the influence of local and central state institutions: 
the extension service and the Kenya Seed Company in particular launched an 
aggressive campaign to increase the adoption rate of hybrid maize seed in 
Kenya (see Chapter 7). Public statements by local and national political leaders 
that hybrid maize production is good for the nation is another - but hard to 
measure - contributory factor. 
The adoption of HYV-seeds in combination with fertilizer application in 
relation contributed to a considerable capitalization of production in 
comparison with maize based on local varieties, but it did not prevent the 
adoption of the package. This happened despite that with the increase of 
capitalization of maize production, the costs, which involve a.o. purchase of 
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inputs and transport, increased considerably The average cost for fertilizers 
represents 30 % of the total production costs (wage labour, tractor hire and 
physical inputs for maize farming), while the average costs for HYV-seed is 12 
%.' The much publicized aversion-of-risks strategies of peasants and the fear 
of incorporation into the market did not seem to have played a crucial role in 
the adoption of the package.8 
Non-commoditized forms of maize production are, because of the adoption 
process, sporadic in the district. Some very few households in our sample still 
planted some local maize but on a very small scale (i.e. less than 0.1 hectares) 
and solely for home consumption. Neither is cow dung not much applied as 
manure in Nandi district. Chüy a few fanners reported practices of shifting 
their maize plots to the cows' grazing areas once in a while. Surprisingly, all 
the cases of non-commoditized maize farming we found were in Kapkangani 
sub-location. 
Milk production seems to be hardly commoditized. On the one hand, 
labour mobilized for grazing and milking is mainly household labour. The 
inputs for livestock production are mainly non-commoditized. Pasture 
maintenance, watering and grazing are primarily activities taking place 
without dependence on the market. The livestock management system is 
mostly based on grazing in fenced pastures and/or on the maize plots after the 
maize is harvested. Only for the larger farms employing a permanent labour 
force can it be argued that livestock production is integrated or depending on 
the wage-labour market. A few farms in the sample area as well as some 
outside the sample had changed from this management system to an intensive 
dairy system of paddocking, supplementary feeding and mechanization of 
milking. Hiring wage labour is also an essential element of this system.' 
Zero-grazing, i.e., a livestock management system centred on grazing in 
fenced pastures and supplementary feeding which is obtained on the market 
or on the farm itself (by planting napier grass), occurs but not widely yet 
Zero-grazing in fenced pastures in combination with napier grass production 
on the farm itself is particularly recommended by the extension department 
for the small-scale farmer in the district. Zero-grazing is part of the national 
Dairy Development Programme (DDP) to increase marketed milk production 
in the country through the development of a technological package specially 
designed for, and with, small-scale dairy farmers. Recently, in 1988, the DDP 
was extended to Nandi district. 
The envisaged expansion of zero-grazing in smallholder livestock 
production in the DDP requires, however, the fulfilment of three crucial 
preconditions by the smallholder in question. In the first place, napier grass 
planting requires adequate application of fertilizers. In the second place, a 
sufficient quantity of land must be devoted to planting napier. The major 
slogan of the programme is, therefore, zero-grazing in combination with 
destocking and upgrading of the stock left. The question which remains is 
whether the acreage for sufficient napier grass production is available on the 
smallholder farm.") In the third place, napier planting is labour intensive. 
Again here we can raise the question as to whether that labour is available, 
especially when it interferes with commercial and subsistence maize farming. 
The rational choice of the smallholder to concentrate on commercial dairy 
farming will depend on estimates of the finandal returns. DDP-programme 
officials emphasize that the finandal returns on milk are high. The quality of 
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the stock is crucial too in this respect.11 In addition to all this, veterinary 
services must be available to maintain animal health care. 
The assessment of commoditization of milk was not an intrinsic part of the 
survey. The above estimates are merely based on observations and not on 
quantitative data. Reports from DDP project areas point at the above 
assessment and indicate clearly that the degree of commoditization of dairy 
farming and the underlying fanning strategies vary considerably. 
Production of maize and milk is for both subsistence and commercial 
purposes. Sixty-one percent of the total maize output in the sample is disposed 
of on the market, while almost 65 % of the total milk output is sold to the 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) or the local market. The National Cereal 
and Produce Board (NCPB) is the largest buyer of maize in the district; the 
local maize market is very small. Nearly 90 % of the total marketed output is 
sold to the NCPB. Seventy-one percent of households sell maize, while 61 % 
have commercialized milk production. Smallholders, more or less as a general 
rule, sell the 'morning' milk and retain the 'evening' milk for home 
consumption. 
The following table indicates that households developed different 
strategies. The magnitude of this can be shown by the degree of 
commoditization/commercialization and of households' participation in the 
selling of maize and milk. The degree of commoditization is calculated by 
dividing the share of production marketed by total production on the farm. 
The degree of participation is the proportion of households involved in 
production for the market. The orientation of production towards the market 
differs significantly by holding size. The low degree of commoditization and 
participation in maize and milk for the smaller holdings indicates that the 
protection of subsistence reproduction is the main rationale of their farming 
strategy, although, money obtained either by selling maize and other 
commodities or involvement in off-farm work is crucial in order to secure the 
purchase of production inputs for the following maize production cycle. 
Table 6.7. Mean degrees of commoditization and participation in maize and 
milk sales in Nandi by holding size (in %, N=90) 
Holding 
size (ha.) 
0-1 
1-2 
2-3 
3-1 
4-5 
5-
Overall 
Degree of 
commodi t. 
maize 
8.3 
32.5 
22.6 
44.6 
21.3 
56.6 
40.9 
Degree of 
particip. 
maize 
16.6 
66.7 
38.5 
88.9 
42.9 
92.5 
71.1 
Degree of 
commodit. 
milk 
10.0 
17.1 
29.6 
30.7 
35.7 
60.1 
40.4 
Degree of 
parbcip. 
milk 
16.6 
26.7 
30.8 
55.6 
42.8 
85.0 
61.1 
Source: own survey 
Apart from selling and consuming maize at home, two other ways of 
disposing of maize can be found in the district: maize may be given as gift to 
other households and/or relatives or as fed to stock. These ways of disposing 
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maize were not, however, covered by the survey, because, on the one hand, 
gifts are hard to quantify in terms of weight: 'We occasionally do this but I do 
not know how much', and, on the other hand, maize as fed to stock was in 
many cases precisely that maize which could not be consumed or sold: the 
rotten maize was given to the cows. Both these forms of maize disposal were 
treated as unmarketed production. 
6.52. Consumption needs and the market 
It is clear that reproduction of the household is only partly commoditized. For 
instance, only 4.6 % of the totally home-consumed maize is purchased, while 
consumption of sukumawiki, beans, and fruits is mostly covered by own 
production. All the households which purchased maize for home consumption 
where those with holdings smaller than 2 ha. On the other hand, consumption 
of other basic consumption goods (kerosene, sugar, tea, bread, meat etc.) is 
fairly high. 
When a comparison is made between the sub-locations, it is striking that 
the average food expenditures for items such as maize, milk and vegetables 
are much higher in Kapkangani and Mosombor sub-locations than in Ndulele 
and Ndalat sub-locations. The average size of holding in the first two sub-
locations is apparently too small for simple subsistence production. This forces 
these households to sell maize and thus, when their grainaries are empty, to 
purchase food at times when the price of food, particularly maize, is high - i.e., 
the period before the next harvest The sale of maize and/or milk, or 
involvement in off-farm work is necessary to obtain cash with which they can 
purchase the necessary inputs for the following production cycle, purchase 
other basic food items and pay school fees for their children. 
6.5.3. The importance of straddling 
The data indicate that a considerable proportion of the households in the 
sample (i.e. 55 %) are 'straddling7 agricultural production and off-farm 
economic activities. The 1962/63 survey as well as MacArthur's research (see 
Chapter 5) already pointed at the importance of 'outside sources of income'. In 
some cases, as can be seen from Table 6.8, reproduction of farm and household 
is only guaranteed by combining farming and off-farm activities. A large 
proportion of households diversified their economic activities. Only 45 % of 
households reproduce farm and household solely by selling agricultural 
commodities. 
The nature of the off-farm activities or secondary occupations varies widely 
(see Table 6.8). The largest share of the households is engaged in self-
employed non-farm activities: running a duka (small shop) and other forms of 
petty trade. Fourteen households reported having extra cash income by 
receiving remittances from relatives not residing at the farm and/or from 
household members living on the farm but not working on the farm. Two 
households reported receiving money in the form of a small pension from 
former employers. For eight of them who had no secondary occupation, 
remittances from household members appears to be the only means of 
replenishing negative farm income. 
The table discloses a clear correlation between, on the one hand, the nature 
of the secondary occupation and the amount of income derived from it: the 
larger the investment needed to undertake such an off-farm activity, the more 
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money it brings. On the other hand, off-farm income and farm income also 
correspond closely with holding size. Without exception, the wage labourers 
cultivated the smallest holdings and obtained negative average farm incomes. 
Conversely, those engaged in tractor hire and transport enterprises invariable 
cultivated the largest holdings in the sample and earned above-average 
agricultural incomes. 
Table 6.8. Secondary occupation of head of household in the sample (N=90) 
and mean income from agriculture and off-farm work or enterprise (Ksh) 
Nature 
of.secondary 
occupation 
None 
Wage labour 
Selbemployed 
Tractor nire/ 
transport business 
Salaried jobs 
Total 100.0 17,594 20,149 
* cash revenue in the form of remittance from relatives and family members 
Source: own survey 
Two patterns of 'straddling' are distinct in the sample. We can distinguish 
between flows of money and flows of capital. In the first case, off-farm revenue 
from casual agricultural wage-labour work, migratory male wage labour and 
petty trade, is either a necessity for sustaining agricultural and particularly 
food production and livelihood at a certain level, or a means to maintain an 
above-average level of consumption. Money earned off the farm is a.o. used to 
purchase production inputs (seeds, fertilizer and/or labour) and to pay school 
fees. This kind of income is especially relevant for those households 
cultivating small holdings and for those with a negative farm income. Whether 
off-farm revenue is a necessity or otherwise, it is money being transferred from 
non-agricultural sectors to the agricultural sector, as a way to protect the 
means of subsistence. It is usually revenue from economic activities requiring 
low levels of investment and low labour skills. The remunerative effect is 
mostly limited as these activities involve low-paid jobs. 
In the second case, when we deal with capital transferred from the 
agricultural to the non-agricultural sector and vice versa, off-farm income 
come primarily from regular sources. Here too we can distinguish two 
patterns. Off-farm income can be the result of investment of capital which is 
generated in agriculture and accumulated on a 'higher' level. This pattern is 
significant for the majority of farmers who operate tractor hire and transport 
enterprises.12 Revenue is invested in non-farm activities, i.e transport- and 
tractor hire enterprises, grain mills, large-scale trade, hotels, etc. Money 
becomes capital. A second significant pattern is that off-farm income can be 
used to buy agricultural means of production (mainly land). This appeared to 
be quite significant for those occupying a salaried position (teachers, town 
clerks) who have invested in (more) land. In both cases, more property 
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(agricultural, urban and non-agricultural based) is acquired. Straddling 
agricultural production and off-farm work is part of the strategy to create or to 
expand the basis of accumulation of capital in agriculture and/or in other 
sectors of the economy. 
The importance of secondary occupations leads to the important question 
as to who can be labelled as a real peasant who lives basically from the fruits 
of family labour and family land. These characteristics would fit to the middle 
peasant strata closely. In other words, the difference in participation in the 
agricultural production process is of strategic importance for agricultural 
development. 
The following figure (6.4.) sheds at least some light on this crucial question. 
Figure 6.4. Mean farming intensity by secondary occupation in maize farming 
(N=90) 
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This figure indicates a significant relationship between fanning style and the 
nature of the secondary occupation. The intensity of farming varies 
considerably for the identified secondary occupation groups: all 
groups designed different farming styles, ranging from labour intensive and 
manual labour strategies to labour extensive and mechanized farming. In 
addition, as is shown in the following table, labour input is mobilized 
differently and through different social relations. 
The agricultural wage labourers and the non-secondary occupation groups 
mobilize less wage labour and rely largely on non-commoditized, non-paid 
family labour, while those engaged in white collar jobs and tractor hire and 
transport enterprises rely primarily on wage labour. Apparently the higher 
remunerating effect of investment in non-agricultural sectors of the economy 
is a crucial criterion in the development of a labour extensive farming style. 
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The other extreme, the labour intensive farming style, is developed by those 
Table 6.9. Share of wage labour of total labour input by secondary occupation 
(in%,N=90) 
Secondary occupation Wage labour 
None 20.5 
Wage-labourers 23.6 
SelPemployed 46.6 
Salaried jobs 84.6 
Transport/tractor hire 85.6 
Source: own survey 
households who face a regular deficit and earn a little income off the farm. It is 
obvious that they cannot afford to hire labour and mechanize farming. Two 
other groups, i.e., those who rely mainly on agriculture and those who are 
involved in petty trade and other self-employed operations, also designed a 
rather intensive farming style, although in the latter case, the combination of 
trade and agriculture points at a certain wealth, albeit far less than those 
engaged in large-scale enterprises. Income is invested in mechanization of 
land preparation (i.e. tractor hire) - as well as in consumption - the rest of the 
farm tasks remain non-mechanized and are performed by a mix of household 
and casual wage labourers. 
6.5.4. Distribution of income 
The following tables show, when we consider the two sources of income, that 
the level of reproduction of household and farm differs significantly for the 
households in the sample. Data on income distribution (Table 6.10) indicate 
that income - and opportunities to earn income outside the farm - is unequally 
distributed among the farming population.13 Figure 6.5. shows the Lorentz 
curve for the distribution of total income in the sample area. 
Table 6.10. Mean income by income group in the sample, in Ksh (1987, N=90) 
Farm 
operating 
surplus 
Offfarm 
income 
Total 
income 
Savings 
Number 
households 
Nega-
tive 
-2,417 
0 
-2,417 
'much' 
1» 
0-
2000 
-7RS 
1,235 
950 
0 
13 
2000-
4000 
629 
2,164 
2,793 
0 
13 
4000-
6000 
882 
3,987 
4,869 
0 
8 
6000-
8000 
4,411 
2,800 
6,9148 
500 
6 
8000-
10000 
7,804 
937 
8,741 
0 
4 
10000-
more 
31,764 
24,066 
55,830 
16,137 
45 
* a rentier, surviving on savings only; the amount of savings was not reported 
Source: own survey 
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The Gini-ratio expressing the degree of inequality of total income indicates 
that income inequality is severe but varies by sub-locations. When we compare 
the Lorentz curves and corresponding Gini-ratio of distribution of land and 
income (see Figures 6.1 and 6.5), then the importance of off-farm income is 
paramount. Assuming that distribution of land patterns would give rise to the 
same distribution of agricultural income patterns, the inclusion of off-farm 
income in total household income, however, makes the picture of income 
inequalities even more extreme. The comparison shows that both the 
opportunities for off-farm income and the remunerating effects, are unequally 
spread. 
Figure 6.5. Lorentz curve for the distribution of income 
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6.6. The institutional environment for fanning in Nandi 
So far, we have described fanning in Nandi district 'behind' the farm gate and 
in relation to the market. In the following we shall briefly examine fanning in 
Nandi in relation to the institutions providing the agricultural population with 
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services and capital, and which are responsible for the operation of the market. 
The state has played a crucial role in the establishment of these institutions 
(see Chapter 3). The historical trends in the building of the institutional 
'environmenf in Nandi and its impact on commodity production have been 
dealt with earlier. In this section we shall concentrate on the contemporary 
features of the agricultural credit system, extension service, input supply and 
marketing and shall emphasize the linkages between the institutions and the 
farming population. 
6.6.1. Agricultural credit 
The importance of agricultural credit has been emphasized earlier. In the past, 
access to credit widened in the past the gap between large and medium-scaled 
land owners and between sparsely and densely populated regions (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.). Information from the Annual Reports revealed that 
credit was primarily used to improve and expand of maize and graded dairy 
fanning. There was no accurate information available, however, to assess who 
is receiving credit. The survey indicates, in the first place, that incorporation 
into the agricultural credit capital market is low. Seventy-one percent of the 
households have never tried to get - or where denied - access to the credit 
system. This indicates that investment in agriculture is financed mainly by 
commercializing production and/or by off-farm cash income. Only 29 % 
successfully gained access to the credit system. These loans were used for 
several purposes, ranging from expansion of cash crop (i.e. tea) production, to 
purchases graded dairy cows and financing of fencing and implements 
(tractors, planting- and milking machines).!4 in the second place, those who 
obtained a loan through the formal credit system owned, without exception, 
farms larger than 5 ha. In other words, the institutions charged with the 
provision of credit to the farming population are biased in the sense that the 
farming population is not treated equally. 
Several reasons can be put forward to explain the low incorporation into 
the capital market. In the first place, there exists the articulated fear of not 
being able to repay a loan. The interest rates on loans are rather high (12 % to 
14 %). Risk aversion contributes to the fact that loans are not often applied for 
in the district 
In the second place, discriminatory regulations of private commercial 
banks prevent the access of households with a small resource base to 
agricultural capital.1^ This implies that only households with a certain security 
(i.e., enough land and/or considerable farm and non-farm income) are eligible 
for loans. 
In the third place, in theory, every farmer should have access to state 
controlled credit The practice of credit schemes administered by the state 
through the AFC, however, shows that access does not appear to be easy for 
resource-poor households. Both the AFC and commercial banks are starting 
from a risk aversion strategy: who is able to repay the loan ? This implies 
working with dear definitions of the 'economic viability' of a project for which 
a farmer requests a loan. This results in the situation where large farmers, who 
have viable projects in the view of credit institutions, have access to credit. 
Large farmers, at the same time, appear to be able to command access to credit 
A local AFC-credit official verbalized it as follows: 'They are able to bulldoze 
through the organization and get their loans easily approved'.1^ 
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6.6.2. Extension service 
The survey revealed that the extension service is rather selective. Fifty-five 
percent of the interviewed households did not have any direct or indirect 
contact at all with extension officers. The majority of these are small and 
resource poor farmers. Neighbours, friends and relatives appear to be the 
major source of information and the reason for adopting a certain technology 
package and husbandry method. Those who receive regular attention from the 
service appear to be the large scale farmers in the sample: more than half of 
those visited by extension officers have holdings larger than 4 ha. 
Furthermore, it is striking that the extension officers visiting small farmers 
tend 'to sit down and talk', while those visiting large farmers are actively 
helping to plant maize and/or to adjust the planting machine. Is this situation 
a coincidence or is it structural ? Striking too, perhaps, is the situation that the 
largest and most innovative farmer in the sample, who happens to be the 
largest 'mechanizer', receives visits from students of the nearby situated 
agricultural school (the so-called Baratón University) at least three times a 
year. 
The actual practice of the extension service shows too that it is rather 
biased.17 One of the factors contributing to that situation is the method of 
selecting a target farmer (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.). These criteria, as well as 
the extension message, are set in accordance with the perception of the 
extension service proper and they are not set in accordance with the existing 
social differences and the technological heterogeneity so characteristic for the 
fanning population in the district (see Table 6.3). On the one hand, a farmer 
becomes a target, or rather model, farmer when he shows himself to be 
innovative minded (i.e 'progressive'). On the other hand, the service advises 
uniformly as if the peasantry is a uniform social category. New practices and 
technological packages are introduced as if they are scale neutral, i.e., 
applicable to all farmers irrespective of holding size and scale of operation. 
One exception to this rule is, however, the dairy development under the 
umbrella of DDP which aims directly at the smallholder. 
If we view the success of extension from the perspective of extension 
department, two facts suggest that extension is a successful operation: on the 
one hand, the high rate of adoption of the hybrid maize package (see Table 
6.5); on the other hand, the uniform application of maize seed and fertilizers. 
The advice of the extension service to plant 10kg of maize and apply 25kg of 
fertilizer (DAP) per acre (=0.4 ha.) is to a large extent implemented by the 
farming population.18 
6.6.3. Input supply and marketing 
The smooth functioning of a hybrid maize production cycle stands or falls on 
the availability and timing of the necessary farm inputs. The organization of 
input supply is often criticized for its inefficiency. The inputs are either not 
appropriate or not in time. In the past some, distortions did occur in Nandi 
district The situation in 1987 was that input supply was rather well organized 
and that the appropriate inputs were widely available at the right time. The 
chief supplier and distributor of hybrid seeds, fertilizer and pesticides in 
Nandi is the KGGCU. The KGGCU distribution channel is characterized by a 
dense network of private distributors supplied by the KGGCU which operates 
from its Kapsabet depot. In close cooperation with numerous licensed stockists 
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situated in the numerous market and trading centres, an efficient and 
smoothly operating distribution network provides the farming population 
with production inputs. The survey indicates no occurrences of not-availability 
or inappropriateness of the seeds and fertilizers. Seen the purchases of 2 kg 
and 10 kg bags of maize seed, it was a wise decision of the KSC to pack such 
quantities (see Chapter 7, section 7.1). 
The major institution responsible for the marketing of maize in Nandi 
district is the NCPB. The NCPB operates from a monopoly positionl', i.e., it is 
the sole buyer, thus determining at the same time the price paid to the farmer 
who delivers maize to its depots. Marketing boards in Kenya are frequently 
criticized for their inefficiency (see Chapter 7, section 7.2.). The problem most 
commonly cited with marketing board is the dubious practice of late payments 
to the producers. In Nandi district, farmers were confronted with the same 
practice. A large majority of the interviewed households selling maize to the 
NCPB reported severe negligence concerning the time of payment. Late 
payment is severely felt by resource poor households, i.e., those who suffer 
from a budget squeeze and whose only cash income comes from selling maize. 
This is not the case for the richer households which tend to have other sources 
of agricultural income as well as larger off-farm incomes. The consequence of 
this practice is observable in the district poor households have to plant late 
and consequently will be faced with much lower yields. 
6.7. Rural differentiation in Nandi district. 
Now that we have presented the main results of the survey, we can examine 
the question of social differentiation and the effect of the operation of the 
market. 
Starting from the analytical framework presented in Chapter 1, section 
1.3.3, we can divide the Nandi peasantry into groups whose conditions of life 
are different, according to a) the levels of production and reproduction of farm 
enterprise and household and b) the social relations of production. The data 
presented above show dearly that incorporation into markets is considerably 
high in Nandi district but highly differentiated when households are 
considered separately. There exists a dear demand for agricultural wage 
labour, and the level of mechanization of certain farm tasks which involve 
wage labour is high. The tables on distribution of the principal means of 
production (land) show clearly that the conditions for agricultural commodity 
production are not equal for all households. Furthermore, as income 
distribution figures show, this is mirrored in different levels of reproduction of 
farm and household. The data on income also reveal that straddling 
agriculture and secondary occupations is an important ingredient of fanner 
strategies. Straddling, and more particularly the nature of the secondary 
occupation and accumulation patterns derived from it, must therefore be part 
of the analysis of rural differentiation in Nandi district. 
The following classification method was employed in order to 
acknowledge the difference in quality of life among the agricultural 
population in Nandi district It must be stressed, however, that it is a static 
picture as it is the result of just one momentum of production and 
reproduction. No other empirical data were available to compare with the 1987 
survey results. This means that we cannot talk about rural differentiation as a 
process. Furthermore, as has been argued earlier, the picture is incomplete, 
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since one important stratum of the rural population was not covered by the 
survey: the landless. 
With the concrete situation in Nandi district in mind, we commenced with 
the reasoning of two sets of criteria, on primary and secondary level. The 
primary set of measures is based on the proposition that differentiation may 
develop around the preconditions to be founded in agricultural commodity 
production. The twin axis of ownership of the principal means of production 
in combination with the form of labour mobilized for agricultural production 
and the nature of straddling is considered as a crucial element of the process of 
social differentiation in Nandi district. First, land (maize hectarage) and the 
number of cows were identified as the principal means of production in Nandi 
district. From that base a regular deficit or a regular surplus of production can 
be obtained. This is mirrored, in its turn in a negative or a positive farm 
operating surplus. This criterion reflects, at the same time, the potential of the 
farm and whether it is fully utilized or not, for whatever reason. Lack of 
capital might be one reason; lack of interest in farming may be another. An 
additional reason may be that there are 'good' and 'bad' fanners. Under this 
criterion, households with equal land holdings may belong to different strata. 
Based on this resource criterion, a distinction between (resource) poor 
households, middle level and rich households was possible. 
Second, the criterion 'number of permanently employed agricultural wage 
labourers' was used in order to assess the nature of socio-economic 
development and the linkages between several strata. This criterion facilitated 
a differentiation between wage-labour hiring households and non wage-
labour hiring households and particularly between rich and capitalist farmers. 
The (casual) hired wage-labour ratio was not used since it is not powerful 
enough to differentiate between rich and capitalist farmers. 
Thirdly, straddling agricultural production and off-farm activities appears 
as an important ingredient of the farming strategy of the Nandi fanning 
population. The peculiarities and patterns of straddling have been examined 
before. The nature and underlying objective for obtaining revenue from 
secondary occupation was used as a discriminating element. By this criterion 
we are able to differentiate between poor, middle and rich/capitalist 
households. The latter group is at best portrayed as entrepreneurs. The 
households experiencing a negative farm operating surplus are compelled to 
enter the wage labour market or to be engaged in self-employed or petty trade 
operations, were labelled as poor peasant households. The non-straddling 
households were labelled as middle peasant households. Those who used off-
farm revenue as a means of augmenting consumption were labelled as rich 
peasant households. Finally, the households transforming money from 
agriculture and off-farm activities into capital were earmarked as capitalist 
farmers. 
The secondary set of classification criteria was used as complementary to 
the first set: in the first place, ownership of tractors and planters; secondly, 
access to agricultural credit, a measure of the 'progressiveness' of the fanner in 
question. Access to agricultural credit, issued by the government or private 
banks, especially serves as a perfect means of acquiring more land and of 
investing in implements (milking machines, tractors for hiring-out purposes) 
and/or improvement of the quality of land and cattle. In the 1970s in 
particular, quite a large number of loans were made available to fund those 
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households who lacked the essential capital but who had the potential and the 
necessary collateral (i.e. in most cases private land title deeds) and/or money 
deposits. It was part of the state policy to increase maize and milk production 
in the district. It was been highlighted earlier that the unequal distribution of 
credit was a reflection of growing inequalities in Nandi district (see also 
Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.). As a third and fourth complementary criterion was 
used the amount of savings and income derived from non-agricultural 
property (house rent for instance). These four additional criteria were 
interpreted as qualitative results of past levels of accumulation in agricultural 
production and off-farm activities. It is quite obvious that these criteria are 
mainly valid for a rich peasant stratum and the capitalist farmer class. 
In line with the method explained in Chapter 1, section 1.3.3. and starting 
from the primary and secondary sets of criteria, we commenced with the 
middle peasant household. The middle peasant household was defined here as a 
household solely depending on the farm for sustaining livelihood (i.e non-
straddlers). These households achieve a regular surplus out of the production 
of agricultural commodities for the internal and international market. 
Production is primarily based on the application of household labour. Wage 
labour demand is not zero but mainly limited to mechanized labour demand. 
However, some households with off-farm income were designated as middle 
peasant households. The reasoning behind this is that, on the one hand, the 
level of off-farm revenue is low. On the other hand, the surplus obtained from 
agricultural production is enough to sustain above average levels of 
consumption. Straddling was not considered as compulsory in these cases. The 
sources of off-farm revenue vary from remittances from relatives to petty trade 
operations or migrant labour.20 
Those households which are not in a position to maintain production and 
reproduction of farm and household on the basis of agriculture were 
categorized as poor peasant households. These households face a regular deficit, 
and in order to sustain even a meagre subsistence level they are compelled to 
combine subsistence production with off-farm wage labour, or to rely on 
remittances from relatives living and working off the farm. The poor peasant 
households' land base is generally too small and the number of cows too 
limited to allow reproduction of farm and household on the basis of 
agricultural production only. The households face a constant crisis of 
reproduction. Off-farm income is mainly from wages for agricultural work or 
from migrant labour in towns and other districts, or from small incomes from 
petty trade. The peasant households with no off-farm revenue but with a 
negative farm operating surplus, were also characterized as poor peasant 
households. Some of the households designated as 'poor', however, show 
signs of much greater potential. They own, for example, enough land to be a 
middle peasants, but for some reason the potential of the farm is not fully 
exploited. 
The households which marshal a regular surplus from agricultural 
commodity production were characterized as rich peasant households. Some of 
them are at the same time engaged in renting out implements of labour 
(tractors) and/or in self-employed business operations. Reproduction of farm 
and household is thus based on the combination of agriculture and off-farm 
economic ventures. Agricultural production is, however, the mainstay of their 
entrepreneurial strategy, a strategy which is largely, but not totally, dependent 
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on the employment of wage labour. This form of production is becoming 
increasingly capitalist. Some of them could be labelled as capitalist farmers in 
spe. When this stratum is able to acquire more agricultural means of 
production by investment either from revenue obtained in agriculture or in 
off-farm ventures or from agricultural credit sources, they could join the ranks 
of capitalist farmers in the district. 
The households for which agricultural production is solely based on the 
employment of wage labour and, in addition, whose off-farm economic 
ventures (if any) are primarily result of someone else's labour, were labelled as 
capitalist farmers. They maintain a considerable level of capital accumulation 
in agriculture as well as in other spheres of the economy. 
Finally, a group of households can be identified that are extremely difficult 
to characterize as 'peasant households' or farmers. This group, mainly 
consisting of teachers and other government officials, was earmarked as 'part-
time farmers'. They farm, but reproduction of farm and household is basically 
sustained by work outside agriculture as the head of the household occupying 
a salaried position within the local state apparatus. Some of them are also 
engaged in petty trade and have invested in urban property. Farming was 
designated as a secondary occupation for this group. This does not mean, 
however, that they are not investing in agriculture: at least one of these part-
time farmers invested considerable sums of money in land, even in areas 
outside the district. 
The categories of rural strata in Nandi district as defined above, were 
distributed as follows (Table 6.11). 
Table 6.11. Classes and strata in Nandi District (%) (N=90) 
Peasant stratum % 
Poor peasant households 31.1 
Middle peasant households 44.4 
Rich peasant households 8.9 
Capitalist farmers 5.6 
'Part-time' farmers 10.0 
Total 100.0 
Source: own survey 
6.7.1. Differentiation and commodity production in Nandi district wealth 
and crisis 
Given the patterns of stratification/differentiation, elaborated above, some 
crucial data are re-represented to show the significance of differentiation in 
relation to participation in a commodity economy and continuing processes of 
commoditization in Nandi district. One clear trend is emerging. On the one 
hand, we find enrichment and prosperity of a few privileged households; on 
the other hand, impoverishment and adversity of a relatively large group of 
households. In between these two extremes we discern quite a large group of 
households which are relatively prosperous. 
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Table 6.12 discloses the distribution of revenue from sales, assets and 
property among the identified strata in the district. The capitalist farmer class 
accounts for a considerable share of marketed agricultural production in the 
district. More than 40 % of gross revenue from sales is realized by 5.6 % of the 
households. Their large share is a reflection of the means of production owned 
(land and cows) as is shown in Table 6.13. The share of the middle peasantry 
(i.e. 45 % of the households) in Nandi district of gross revenue from sales is 
slightly less then 30 %. 
Table 6.12. Share of peasant strata of sales of maize and milk and gross 
revenue (%, N=90) 
Peasant stratum Maize Milk Gross 
sale sale revenue 
value value sales 
Poor peasant households 2.0 0.2* 1.3 
Middle peasant households 28.1 **27.5 28.5 
Rich peasant households 30.6 17.6 22.2 
Capitalist farmers 30.2 51.4 42.6 
'Part-time'farmers 9.1 ***3.3 5.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.1 
* only one of these households sold milk 
** 17.5 % of these households do not sell milk 
*** 50.0 % of these households do not sell milk 
Source: own survey 
The share of the several strata in revenue from commodity production is 
obviously reflected in their possessions. Table 6.13 reveals the inequality 
dearly. The degree of inequality would be even larger if the data allowed us to 
include whether the stock consists of graded cows, crosses or zebu cattle. 
Table 6.13. Average possessions of land and implements by peasant strata in the 
sample (N=90) 
Peasant strahun 
Poor peasant households 
Middle peasant households 
Rich peasant households 
Capitalist farmers 
'Part-time' farmers 
Maize 
hectar. 
0.8 
1.5 
2.4 
7.6 
2.4 
Number 
cows 
3.5 
6.8 
11.8 
53.2 
5.5 
Number 
jembe 
2.8 
3.9 
1.8 
0.4 
3.0 
Ox Tractor 
plough 
0.1 0.0 
0.3 0.0 
0.4 0.4 
0.0 1.0 
0.2 0.0 
Source: own survey 
Table 6.14 shows that different farming strategies underlie each stratum's 
share of maize revenue and sales The poor peasant households and also, but to 
a much lesser degree, the middle peasantry have designed a maize farming 
strategy essentially to attain subsistence needs. Their incorporation into the 
market for maize is considerably less than the other groupings. On the other 
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hand. Table 6.14, as well as other tables, points out that the poor peasant 
household in particularly faces a reproduction crises. Eight-five percent of 
them regularly purchase maize on the market for home consumption. Their 
resource base is too small to sustain subsistence production, while the 
commoditization of inputs for maize requires incorporation into the market. 
The market dearly restricts their choices to arrange a farming strategy of their 
own choosing. 
Table 6.14. Degree of commoditization of maize production and of maize 
consumption; degree of participation in sale ana purchase of maize (N=90) 
Peasant stratum 
Poor peasant households 
Middle peasant households 
Rich peasant households 
Capitalist farmers 
'Part-time' farmers 
Degree of 
production 
(sale/total 
output) 
18.7 
47.9 
84.7 
73.9 
57.8 
No 
of 
h.h 
39.2 
85.0 
100.0 
100.0 
62.5 
Degree of 
consumption 
(purchase/ 
total home 
consumption)* 
18.4 
2.5 
1.3 
0.0 
No 
of 
h.h 
2.5 
85.7 
22.5 
12.5 
0.0 
20.0 
Total 61.2 71.1 4.6 40.0 
*: includes abo the maize fed to livestock 
Source: own survey 
Table 6.15 also indicates other aspects of the reproduction crisis of the poor 
peasant stratum. Obtaining negative net agricultural income implies 
generating revenue from casual or permanent wage-labour employment 
and/or low paid self-employed activities. The self-employed economic 
activities they are engaged in are typically those activities requiring low 
investment (market trade) and where they face considerable compétition from 
other people. 
Table 6.15. Average income per peasant stratum and share in total income 
(N=90) Ъ * 
Peasant stratum 
Poor peasant households 
Middle peasant households 
Rich peasant households 
Capitalist farmers 
'Part-time' farmers 
Net 
agricult. 
income 
(Ksh) 
-254 
10,775 
46,368 
137,907 
1,099 
Off-farm 
income 
(Ksh) 
2,760 
1,59 
12,400 
136,148 
28,746 
Total Share 
income of tot 
income 
(Ksh) (%) 
2,50 
112,366 
58,768 
274,055 
29346 
60.7 
3.3 
15.6 
72.6 
7.9 
Source: own survey 
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Table 6.15 also supports the view that capitalist farmers obtain the largest 
share of total income in the sample, although it must be stressed that among 
these two members obtain more than half of the income earned by this class. 
Nevertheless, the capitalist fanners realize the lion's share of wealth produced 
in the district. 
Table 6.16. Frequency of jembe replacement (N=90) 
Peasant stratum Average time Used for land 
(years) 
Poor peasant households 2.7 
Middle peasant households 5.4 
Rich peasant households 11.2 
Capitalist farmers 
'Part-time' fanners 4.8 11.1 
Source: own survey 
Figure 6.6. Farming intensity by peasant stratum in maize (measured in total 
labour days/ha.) 
300 
200 
100 
0 
m-267 
m-151 
m-116 
m-105 
m-94 
m = 28 
std - 199 
std - 152 
std - 98 
std - 81 
std = 85 
std-16 
Table 6.16 hints at another crucial dimension to the reproduction crisis which 
faces the poor peasant stratum in the district. The jembe, the widely applied 
instrument of labour in maize farming, is primarily employed by poor 
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peasants. It is used for several purposes in the maize production process. Since 
the majority are not in the position to mechanize land preparation or to 
employ an ox plough, they rely heavily on the jembe as the instrument for 
land preparation and weeding. The immediate result is that the jembe does not 
last long and needs to be replaced almost every three years. This, too, is part of 
the reproduction crisis almost exclusively felt by the poor stratum. 
Figure 6.6 shows plainly that every social stratum outlined different styles 
of farming. 
6.8. Farming styles and rural differentiation: explaining heterogeneity 
In order to get a clear picture of the overall trend for maize farming in Nandi, 
a multiple regression analysis was undertaken. Multiple regression facilitated 
the examination of the relevant variables discussed above in their mutual 
relationships. The results of the quantitative analysis are represented in a path-
diagram. 
This quantitative analysis appeared to be a comprehensive way of 
untangling the complexity of farming. More importantly, perhaps, it enabled 
us to assess the nature of the agricultural production patterns and to evaluate 
the contribution of Green Revolution-inspired technologies. It particularly 
facilitated an explanation as to why an enormous variation in maize yields 
were obtained within the sample area from hybrid maize technology. Both the 
state and the farmers' reason for the introduction and adoption of the hybrid 
maize package is to increase maize yields. Yield was therefore treated as the 
dependent variable in the equations. 
The regression equations for the construction of a path-diagram were built 
up with the following independent variables which were put into several 
regression equations:21 
(1) ecological setting, i.e., natural and physical conditions for agricultural 
production of the region (Table 5.3, Chapter 5). The ecological setting is similar 
to the location of the farm enterprise in an agro-ecological zone (i.e., here a 
sub-location) and rank-ordered according to maize yields; 
(2) rural strata to emphasize social heterogeneity and the varying socio-
economic preconditions for agricultural production (see section 6.7); 
(3) the actual cultivation techniques applied in production (mode of 
preparation of land, seeding/fertilizing and weeding; Table 6.3). This variable 
expresses the increasing level of sophistication of the labour process for maize 
farming; 
(4) the physical inputs to show the impact of the application of agricultural 
technology of maize production; i.e. the hybrid maize commodity package 
(hybrid seeds, fertilizers and pesticides measured in quantities per ha.. Table 
6.6); 
(5) farming intensity measured in labour-days per ha. was put forward as an 
indicator of the fanning styles of the agricultural population. Data from Table 
6.4 were split into manual and mechanized labour days since they are 
incomparable. Both indicators of fanning intensity were used in the equation; 
(6) the formulation of the variable 'interaction' (i.e. farming intensity*physical 
inputs per ha.) is a statistical technique applied in order to gain insight into 
what occurs when both variables change at the same time. Theoretically, the 
interaction variable expresses the organization of the labour process on the 
farm structured by incorporation into the market.22 
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Table 6.17 displays the correlation coefficients between these variables. The 
results of the various regression equations are presented in a path-diagram 
(Figure 6.7). 
Table 6.17. Correlation coefficients for the variables in the regression equations (N=71) 
Variable 
1. Fanning intensity 
2. Ecological setting 
3. Cultivation techn. 
4. Stratum 
5. Yield 
6. Physical inputs 
7. Interaction (1*6) 
Variable 
(2) (3) 
-.46 -.61 
+.49 
(4) 
-.47 
+.51 
+.57 
(5) 
-.41 
+.70 
+.38 
+.53 
(6) 
-.10 
+.12 
+.24 
+.23 
+.21 
(7) 
+.85 
-.37 
-.47 
-.30 
-.34 
+.35 
1.0 
The path-diagram contains only the statistically significant relations (i.e., sig. 
T. between 0.00 and 0.06, ranging from very significant to almost significant). 
From the path-diagram we can draw the following conclusions. 
1) The direct effect of the natural conditions (ecology setting) on farming is 
beyond any doubt (+.54). The existing variety in ecological conditions explains 
to a great extent the exhibited variance in yields per hectare. In the ecologically 
suitable areas hybrid maize performs much better. This is the so-called 
ecological bias detected in many critical appraisals of Green-Revolution 
inspired agricultural modernization programmes in Third World countries. 
2) The effect of rural 'stratum' on yields is +.22. As farmers occupy better 
socio-economic positions, they succeed in realizing higher yields. This points 
at the socio-economic bias in the new maize technology. Strictly speaking 
hybrid maize technology is designed as 'scale neutral': a large/rich farmer 
purchases (for instance) ten 25kg-bags maize seeds and 25 25kg-bags of 
fertilizer while the poor/small farmer buys (for instance) one 10kg-bag of seed 
and one 25kg-bag of fertilizer. In the fields, however, we witness a clear bias in 
favour of rich farmers (who happen to operate holdings in the better areas as 
indicated by the +.51 score between 'stratum' and 'ecological setting'). Rich 
farmers have access to capital and are able to purchase the necessary inputs at 
the right time and more, importantly, because they are in a position to 
mechanise maize farming, they are able to employ the inputs at the correct 
time. Poor farmers, on the other hand, have fewer monetary resources and 
depend mainly on household labour to resolve problems of labour peaks. The 
efficient use of hybrid maize technology, in terms of reaching the technological 
optimum, is reserved for and attained by the richer farmers (as indicated by 
the +.43 score between 'stratum' and 'cultivation techniques'). The factor 
technology serves in this respect as an element widening the gap between rich 
and poor. 
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Figure 6.7. Path-diagram for maize production in Nandi district (N=71) 
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3)The direct and strong relationship/correlation in the path-diagram 
between 'ecological setting' and 'rural stratum' suggests that the new maize 
technology did not forced a break-through in the immediate dependency of 
farming on climate, soils and socio-economic differences. Both variables 
remain predominant explanatory factors in the variance of yields. Within this 
general pattern we see however a specific influence on yield of two other 
variables. 'Farming intensit/ and the quantity of 'physical inputs' applied per 
ha. of maize have a direct, positive effect on yield (+.50 and +.35 respectively). 
This implies, that as labour input per ha. increases, yield will increase too. The 
same applies to the application of the commodity package. Both statistical 
relations reflect two prevailing farming strategies in Nandi district. Some 
farmers try to increase yields by increased manual labour input (more time for 
land preparation, better and more intensive weeding), while others rely on the 
offered technology (more seeds, fertilizer and herbicides per ha.) and means to 
mechanize fanning. These are divergent strategies which ultimately result in 
divergent patterns of agricultural development 
A crucial (theoretical and practical) question is, of course, whether both 
strategies reinforce or exclude each other in practice. The aim of state 
agricultural policy is to foster an agricultural development pattern which is 
based on improving the quantity and quality of farm labour (see Chapter 3). 
Technology development and innovation are founded upon the desire to offer 
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implements (tractors, planters) and objects of labour (improved seeds, 
fertilizer, etc.) which will fit in with the farming practice of the agricultural 
population whose fanning strategy, in its tum, is based on intensification and 
supported by the quantity and quality of their labour. The outcome (in theory) 
will be an attractive agricultural development pattern: higher yields and more 
productive employment in the agricultural sector. But how did this theory 
work out in the fields ? The path-diagram gives the following answers. 
It can be concluded from the fact that the 'interaction' between farming 
intensity and physical inputs has a strong negative correlation with yield (-.62) 
that strategies founded upon high inputs of both labour and physical input 
and those based on low labour input in combination with low physical inputs 
effect yields negatively. In other words, both variables appear to be mutually 
exclusm. An interpretation of this negative correlation points at two opposite 
farming strategies of the farmers in the sample: 
- one of low labour input in combination with high physical inputs positively 
affecting yield, in other words, a trend towards mechanization (labour saving 
agricultural technologies) and extensive agricultural practices (see the -.51 
score between 'techniques' and 'ΐηΐεηβίΐ/). This indicates, as already 
mentioned, the drive towards mechanization and economizing on labour. This 
strategy is predominant in the better ecological areas and on holdings owned 
by the richer farmers. This is indicated by the positive correlation coefficients 
between 'ecological setting' and 'stratum' with 'techniques' (+.27 and +.43 
respectively); 
- another of high labour input (household, wage labour as well as exchange 
labour) in combination with low inputs positively affecting yield, i.e., a trend 
towards intensification of labour in farming practices. This strategy will be 
found in the small, and probably also the middle, holding size categories 
where family labour is the predominant form of labour. 
The explanation of both farming strategies is rooted in the socio-economic 
position of the individual farmer. What is designed in theory does not result in 
the fields: farmers do not operate according to the assumptions of policy 
makers and scientists. In this specific case of maize production, and probably 
also in other crops and countries, rich farmers apply the offered technological 
package to realize higher yields with low labour inputs. Not only will their 
f>rofits be higher, but they will also have fewer difficulties in mobilizing abour. Poor farmers, on the contrary, designed another strategy: an increase 
of family labour in order to increase yields.^ In other words, the increase of 
labour input in combination with new technological opportunities (the 
quantity and quality aspects of agricultural policy in Kenya) appear 
incompatible with each other in practice, in the fields. 
One clear aspect of this is 'cultivation techniques' in general and 
particularly the role of the tractor. One of the independent variables in the 
equation was originally 'machinable labour days per ha.'. The variable did not 
score a clear significant relation with yield or any other variable in the 
regression equation. The following conclusion seems therefore appropriate: 
mechanization of farm tasks (ploughing, sowing, spraying) is not applied for 
reasons of good ploughing or sowing/fertilizing in order to produce high 
yields. The real intention appears to be to reach the technological optimum of 
agricultural technologies (e.g., the optimum time for planting) with the effect 
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of substituting labour. An entrepreneur will qualify this as efficient use of 
scarce resources. 
The positive relation between 'techniques' and 'physical inputs' (+.24) 
suggests that as more farm tasks are mechanized, the more physical inputs are 
applied. The result is a coherent pattern: a combination of mechanical and bio­
chemical technologies which have labour- and land saving effects, leaving the 
opportunities for substantial increases in yields and productive employment 
largely under-utilized. Another indicator of the under-utilization of farm 
labour is that, increasingly, a poor farmer's labour is productively employed 
outside his/her farm, in urban and/or rural wage-employment and in self-
employed business ventures. This trend for farmers' labour to be employed 
away from the farm is observable all over Kenya (Chapter 4) and is 
compulsory because straddling agricultural production and off-farm work is 
necessary for many poor households to protect the means of reproduction of 
farm and household. 
A critical question now is what the precise impact of the adoption of the 
Green Revolution commodity package on maize yields is. The technical inter­
relations shown in the path-diagram reveal that the direct effect of 'physical 
inputs' on yield is +.35. The indirect effect (via the interaction variable) is 
negative: (-.62 χ +.43 =) -.26. The total effect of the new technology for maize 
farming is thus: +.35 -.26 = +.9. This is a very modest effect given the amounts 
of capital and manpower invested in the hybridization of maize (see Chapter 
7). The potential effects on yields per ha. (and with that an increase in national 
maize production) are nullified by the simultaneous reduction in labour input. 
In this way, the new technology has all together a very modest effect on 
agrarian growth (in the physical sense) and a negative impact on agrarian 
development: the rich and capitalist farmers realize substantial profits from 
maize farming by reducing labour input. 
6. 9. Conclusions 
The analysis indicates two important trends in development in Nandi district. 
The 'agrarian revolution' has encompassed virtually all the agricultural 
population in the district. This is particularly evident when we compare the 
1987 survey with the 1963/64 survey (Chapter 5). Although the latter covered 
fewer farms and households than the former, the conclusion is accurate. The 
Nandi-survey data highlighted in detail that the historical process of 
commoditization coincides with the concentration in a few hands of wealth 
generated from agricultural production and from other sectors of the 
economy. This conclusion was already drawn in the previous chapter but 
based on less systematic data. The Nandi-survey allows the following 
conclusions. 
In the first place, the finding support the notion, presented in Chapter 4 
which addressed the rhythms of agrarian change in Kenya, that rural 
development can be characterized by a process of (increasing) rural socio­
economic inequalities. A capitalist land market and individual land tenure has 
developed in the district which was accompanied by a deeply rooted and 
widespread process of commoditization. Production and reproduction of farm 
and household is conditioned for a large sector of the population by the 
working of market forces. As is shown in this chapter, the emphasis of state 
agricultural policy on hybridization of maize and the adoption of an 
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associated package of bio-chemical inputs directed more and more households 
into commodity production. 
In the second place, the survey verified the fact that the Nandi peasantry is 
divided into groups and strata whose life is defined by different social 
relations and material conditions. The question as to whether the dynamics of 
the expansion of commodity production in Nandi district did lead towards the 
preponderance of the middle peasantry as is the case in Central Province 
(Cowen 1974, 1981) cannot be answered entirely. Surveys conducted earlier 
were too limited in sample size and could not serve as a basis for comparison. 
What the survey tends to confirm is that the Nandi peasantry is not split into 
classes as suggested by Leninist frameworks. The middle peasantry in Nandi 
survived as a unit of production in commodity circuits. On either side of the 
middle peasantry, the survey indicated the existence of a rich peasant stratum 
and capitalist farmers on the one hand, and a poor farmer stratum on the 
other. 
The survey also confirmed that the rich peasant stratum and capitalist 
farmers receive the bulk of income from agricultural production, from non-
agricultural business and from civil service jobs. Some of them are able to buy 
large tracts of prime agricultural land in neighbouring districts (Trans Nzoia, 
Uasin Gishu) where they plant profitable crops like wheat and maize on a 
large scale. The survey also delineated a poor peasant stratum which cannot 
afford to supplement family labour with hired labour to avoid the bottle-necks 
of agricultural labour peaks seasons in digging, planting, weeding and 
harvesting. On the contrary, they have to earn an additional cash income in 
order to buy food and inputs, simply because their resource base is too small. 
The only option they have is to borrow money and/or to rely on remittances 
from family members and/or to seek employment. For some of them, the only 
way to earn cash is to enter unequal relationships with the richer strata of the 
peasantry; i.e., during periods when their presence on their own farm is 
urgently required. Therefore, their agricultural performance will be poor, and 
the yield will be insufficient to provide food for the household, except for a 
few months. They have a tough job in Nandi district where casual and 
seasonal agricultural work is rewarded with Ksh 5-10 for a 6-8 hours work 
day. Even employment on a large farm results in a payment of Ksh 20 per day 
on a no work no pay basis and Ksh 400 per month for a permanently 
employed worker. In addition, the poorer families in particular suffer from the 
price squeeze of increasing input costs for seed and fertilizers and the more or 
less steady prices for farm output. 
In the third place, the survey established the specific nature of 
institutionalization and state intervention in Nandi district. The promotion of 
expansion of commodity production expansion may be perceived as the 
rationale behind state intervention in the agricultural economy of Nandi 
district. State investment in hybrid maize farming, graded dairy farming and 
napier grass improvement schemes are the imperative ingredients of state 
policy to reach that aim. Both the Annual Reports of the DAO (Chapter 5, 
section 5.2.5) and the 1987 survey indicated that the opportunities to expand as 
well as to capitalize commodity production were actively incorporated into the 
fanning strategies of the Nandi agricultural population, but state endeavours 
to support and expand commodity production appear to be biased in favour of 
the rich peasantry and capitalist farmers. Policy bias, as reflected in the 
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differentiated linkages between the state and the farming population, must be 
seen in two broad perspectives. State practice in credit and extension services 
is based on privileged access by a minority of the farming population. The 
distribution of state services, and thus the benefits of commoditization among 
the agricultural population in Nandi district, does not differ from the national 
perspective which will be examined in the following chapter. 
Policy bias can also be elucidated by the specific choice of hybrid maize 
technology to increase maize production in the country. The overall effect of 
hybridization of maize production on yields in Nandi district, i.e., the 
technological core of state food policy, was shown to be rather modest. The 
two variables with the largest impact on yield ( i.e., with the largest 
explanatory power for the variation in maize yields) are 'ecology' and socio-
economic position. State intervention in agriculture based on policies centred 
around new technologies in concrete settings like Nandi district manifested 
three significant trends. 
First of all, it resulted in a trend toward enrichment for capitalist and rich 
farmers, relative wealth for the middle peasant stratum and impoverishment 
for the poorer sectors of the peasantry. Hybrid maize production appeared to 
be highly profitable and very well suited to the richer sections of the farming 
population. They were able to design a farming strategy based on 
capitalization of production: the employment of wage labour and the 
application of modern technology with a labour-substituting effect. This 
technology-centred strategy appeared to be productive and profitable and 
created conditions for capitalist production: the production for surplus value 
in agriculture. Hybrid maize also created, however, a foundation for a manual-
labour centred farming strategy, a strategy based on an increase of family and 
manual labour input in order to produce high yields. This strategy, like the 
technology-centred fanning strategy, is a function of the quality and quantity 
of farm labour. 
Secondly, hybrid maize production increased the pressing need to 
'straddle'. The need to straddle agricultural production and off-farm work is 
particularly felt by the poor peasant stratum. Their land base is too small. 
Specifically we find that 1.5 ha. is the critical limit for a land base to sustain 
subsistence production in Nandi district. Households with holding sizes below 
this limit can only survive by straddling. What was invented with a notion of 
scale neutrality appears in the fields and on the farms as discriminatory and an 
element in the process which widens the gap between poor and rich. Seen in 
this perspective, we can also question or at least have serious doubts, about the 
impact of the smallholder dairy development programme in the long run. 
Thirdly, the ecological bias in hybrid maize technology dearly supports the 
argument put forward in Chapter 4 that agrarian policies in Kenya are based 
on, and directed towards, medium and high potential fanning areas. 
Agricultural policy-formulating institutions in Kenya take natural and 
ecological conditions, and thus the differences between regions, as given in 
policy making and implementation. 
The Nandi survey supports the assumption worked out in Chapter 1, 
section 1.3.4. that commoditization and institutionalization, governed by the 
state, acquired a selective character and thereby reproduce heterogeneity in 
the district. 
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If we return to the policy making- and agricultural research design Table, 
the ultimate effect of the new technology is considerably different from what 
was probably envisaged, unless that effect was deliberately envisaged (see also 
Chapter 7). The task of technological innovation, if it was genuindy intended 
to help the poorest in rural society, was to get that labour power back on the 
farm. It did not succeed in this objective because the prerequisite of social 
security and a major rise in household income is land which the poor do not 
have. Moreover, the 'agrarian revolution' increasingly directs poor farmers' 
labour away from the farm. Even if, during the policy-making and 
implementation process, policy makers and agronomists abstract from the 
sodo-economic and ecological structure, they inevitably appear to be 
influenced by that structure and by sodo-economic interests who play a 
crudal role in that structure. Moreover, the fields differ considerably from the 
drawing table, and the farming population appears to be more than only 
passive receivers of new technologies. 
The future is hard to assess. Differentiation of the agricultural population 
will continue. Access to land, labour, implements and off-farm income will 
remain determining factors in that process. Land in Nandi district is hardly 
available any longer at reasonable pnces and, therefore is not affordable by the 
poorer households. Population growth and the culture of sons inheriting 
fathers' land will step up fragmentation of land holdings and population 
pressure on land. As a result, more cheap, but not necessarily free labour, will 
be available for the rich peasant stratum and capitalist farmers to employ on 
their farms. The opportunities for the poorer households to seek alternative 
sources of income off the farm are slim since there are no real alternatives in 
either inside or outside the district, in sectors of the economy other than 
agriculture. The future is also bleak in this respect and will depend largely on 
the effect of future state intervention in agriculture which aims to improve the 
living conditions of certain identified 'target groups'. 
Notes 
1 For a detailed discussion on the difficulties of defining households in the African context, see 
Guyer (1981). 
2 See, for instance, Carlsen (1980) and Lavnjsen (1984) See also IRS-I, Π, m and IV. 
3 Family labour is treated here an equivalent of household labour 
4 Exceptions to this rule can be found in households straddling agricultural production and 
non-agncul turai work. In most cases this means that the tasks of the off-farm income earner (in 
many cases the man) are performed by hired labour 
5 Ownership of such machines is thus a clear indicator of class status. 
6 A factor which may explain that ox ploughs, although relatively cheap, are not widely used 
is that after a long and dry season the oxen are generally to weak too do heavy work on the 
land. 
7 The following table incorporates data on the extent of commoditization of maize farming in 
the sample area* Sture of HYV-package and labour costo oí (оЫ production costs for maize fanning in the sample 
Physical Inputs % of total % of total 
input cost prod costs 
(a! <a+b) 
Seeds 267 120 
FeitUizen 678 303 
DDT аз 01 
Potiddes 52 23 
Sub-total 100.0 44.8 
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Labour costo 
Land preparabon 
manual 
ox ploughing 
tractor hire 
Sowing/ferblizing 
manual 
planta 
Dusting 
Weeding-
manual 
spraying 
Harvesting 
Subtotal 
Overall total 
«o f total 
labour costs 
(b) 
24 
01 
40.5 
174 
39 
αϊ 
193 
08 
256 
100.1 
13 
00 
223 
4 0 
21 
01 
106 
0 4 
14 0 
5S2 
1000 
Capitalization, ι e, incorporation into the market for seeds and fertilizers, necessarily entails 
increases in costs connected with the purchase of these inputs Apart from the production cost 
of inputs attached to hybrid maize production, transport costs appear as an extra expenditure 
which arc felt more by small fanners than by large farmers. On the one hand, the small fanner 
is confronted with an increase in his/her production costs in the form of an extra and 
relatively large amount of transport costs, ι e, when inputs purchased through middle men, 
the stockists in the market place pass on their transport costs to the buyer On the other hand, 
transport costs represent only a small proportion of total production costs, in particular for 
those owning means of transport 
8 Some resource-poor farmers were asked why they adopted hybrid maize production when it 
increased production costs considerably and implied a more market-onented farming strategy 
A simple companson between growing local maize varieties (involving less or almost ml costs 
in cash terms) and hybnd maize made them nervous and no answer was given Probably they 
did not expect such a question from an mzungu (foreigner) who in their eyes brought that 
particular technology A question from such a person, asking why they had not continued to 
grow local vanehes instead of adopbng 'his' modem technology, could not be reasoned out by 
them 
9 These dairy farms are quite similar to the famous Dutch vanguard dairy farms They differ in 
that wage labour is a central element in their mode of operation, while the Dutch dairy farm is 
merely based on family labour 
10 The recommendation in the DDP to extend napier grass is based on an average Project farm 
size of 2 8 ha Farm sizes m the project vary, however, from 2 ha (in Kiambu, Meru) and 2 8 
ha (in Kencho) to 5 2 ha (in South Nyanza and Kilifi) Napier acreage ranges in turn from 0.5 
ha (Kiambu) to 0.8 ha (Kencho, KiliH) These qualifications do not correspond to the farm 
sizes of many smallholders in the sample See Dairy Development Programme/3rd Joint 
Kenya/Netherlands Evaluation Mission, May 1986, ρ 33 
Π Ibid,ρ 11 
12 Access to agncultural credit and credit-worthiness appears to be a crucial way of 
purchasing means of production which, in tum, serve as the basis for an off-farm venture The 
tractor is an attractive investment in this respect This pattern appears particularly relevant for 
some of the large landowners in the sample 
13 It is obvious that this picture of unequal distribution of agncultural income emerges also at 
the sub-locabon level, in the sense that Kapkangani and Mosombor are the poorer sub-
locabons (i e with a small land base), while Ndulele and Ndalat can be labelled as neh sub-
locabons 
14 Pnvileged access to credit for middle peasants is one way to become a neh peasant Credit 
opens up the possibility of purchasing a tractor which they а о use for hiring out purposes 
and thus is a means to augment their income and/or to accumulate capital from this source 
Access ID credit must therefore be part of our analysis of the differentiation of the peasantry 
15 The following selection entena are employed by the Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Ltd, 
Kapsabet branch 1) the farmer must already be a client (i.e, have a bank account), 2) must 
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have a dean record, 3) must have the ability to repay (depending on the farm operations, the 
Intended projects and the size of the holding), 4) the bank demands secunty in the form of 
land btle deeds Interview with general manager, 15th October, 1987 
16 The AFC-Kapsabet office in Nandi works with an assigned budget The bulldozing practice 
could imply that only a small portion of this budget is available for small farmers (AFC-
Kapsabet interview) 
17 In an interview with the service in Kapsabet, the seventy of this bias was discerned Л е are 
working on if 
18 Measunng die relation between holding size and the quantity of inputs applied did not 
reveal a significant relation 
19 At the time of the survey, the NCPB sbD operated within a monopoly atuabon In 1989, 
however, the state abohshed the NCPB monopoly position and made more room for pnvate 
traders. 
20 The lucky or coincidental situation occurred that one of the migrant labourer fanners who 
was part of our survey worked in a hotel in Narok where I stayed Discussions with him 
convinced me that, at least in his case, he preferred to work for some years somewhere else In 
order to save money to be invested later in agriculture 
21 In the regression equation yield = ffecological setting, rural stratum, cultivation techniques, 
farming intensity, physical inputs, interaction Maiming intensity * physical inputs]) The 
independent variables for the explanation of the vanahon in yields, as well as the quantity, 
ecological setting, cultivation techniques and physical inputs are а о derived from Gerhart 
(1976) and Allan (1970), the variable rural stratum was denved from the critical Green 
Revolution literature (see ал Gnffin (1979), Fearse (1978,1980), Galli (1981), Lawrence (1988) 
and Glaeser (1987), the variable farming intensity and the interaction torn [farmmg 
intensity*physical Inputs] is denved from Bolhuis te van der Ploeg (1985) 
22 See Bolhuls & van der Ploeg (1985) and van der Ploeg (1987) 
23 This in its tum raises the crucial quesbon of gender relations In agricultural production 
Although the survey was primarily meant to examine patterns of agricultural development at 
farm enterprise level, the gathered data (not processed in this book) on sexual division of 
labour in production suggests the hypothesis that poor households survive by increasing the 
input of family labour and parbcularly of female and child labour 
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CHAPTER? 
THE NATURE OF STATE INTERVENTION IN AGRICULTURE: THE 
CASE OF THE NATIONAL FOOD POLICY 
Introduction 
The previous chapters outlined the general objectives of state intervention. 
Various instruments and institutions were created in the past and/or only 
recently to reach these objectives. Chapter 3 also indicated some of the 
problems of implementation. The Development Plans and the National Food 
Policy Paper in particular underlined some of the problems of marketing 
inefficiency in maize and the bleak prospects for a breakthrough in 
agricultural R&D and dissemination of research results. 
Chapter 4 brought forward the characteristics of Kenya's agrarian 
structure. On the one hand, estate, capitalist production and a resilient 
peasantry both play an enormously important role in accumulation. On the 
other hand, we find regional and socio-economic differentiation as a result of 
the specific impact of commoditization. Chapters 5 and 6 showed how these 
features were formed in the regional context. These chapters also 
demonstrated that the combination of commoditization and 
institutionalization, which almost logically accompany each other, is one of the 
mechanisms which strengthened social heterogeneity in the agricultural sector. 
The present chapter is designed to examine the institutional aspects of state 
intervention on the national level. This brings us automatically to the issue of 
the effectiveness of state interventions. To what extent are the instruments for 
intervention attuned to the reality of farming and the needs of the fanning 
population ? The examination will concentrate on an evaluation of Kenya's 
National Food Policy (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2. for an overview of the 
policy outlines). This chapter deals, therefore, first of all with the technological 
components of the National Food Policy and the claimed achievements of the 
effect of technology transfer to the agriculture sector. A particularly illustrative 
case of the transfer of technology to agriculture is provided by the introduction 
of hybrid maize. Simultaneously, we shall how the state established the 
technological and administrative backbone of an hybrid-maize-oriented 
structure. The diffusion of hybrid maize in Kenya is considered as a unique 
success story in Africa. 
Secondly, we shall examine the politico-administrative components of the 
National Food Policy in the broader context: marketing arrangements, the 
pricing of production and consumption goods and the role played by the agro-
institutions (research, extension and credit) in the implementation of 
agricultural policies. 
An additional but equally important aspect of state intervention is related 
to its macro-economic objectives: managing the huge deficits on the state's 
balance of payments account. To what extent is the pursuit of this objective 
detrimental to the related objective of maximising commodity production for 
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the international and national markets ?. Are the instruments for attaining this 
objective the proper instruments or only inefficient instruments ? 
7.1. Hybridization of maize 
Around 1963, Kenya's estate producers yielded an excess over domestic 
demand of maize. World market prices were, however, low at that time and 
considerable losses were faced. The area under maize cultivation in the large 
farm sector dropped by 50 %. Smallholder deliveries to the Maize and Produce 
Board dropped by 60 %. A government commission advised the production of 
maize solely for the home market until a widespread use of improved seeds 
and better husbandry practices could bring down costs and close the gap 
between producer and international prices. The following year, the 
introduction of a new, improved and higher yielding seed variety would begin 
to bring these recommendations about.l 
The role of the Kenya Seed Company (KSC) and the agricultural research 
system, notably the Maize Research Institute in Kitale and Katumani Maize 
Research Institute, has been aired frequently.2 The first hybrid seeds were 
produced and sold in the early 1960s.3 The initial objective was to concentrate 
on large-scale farmers under the apriori theorization that the small farmers 
could not cope with the agronomic requirements of hybrid maize seed. The 
KSC however, together with the state, mounted an aggressive campaign to 
involve small-scale farmers. Together with MOALD, the extension service, 
distributors of seeds and fertilizers (KFA [later KGGCU] and local traders), 
KSC accomplished the fast adoption of hybrid maize by smallholders and 
estate producers.4 
By 1966, over half of the large-scale fanners in Kenya used hybrids, but by 
1967 more than half of the hybrid maize seeds were sold to small farmers. 
Since 1968, the area planted with hybrid maize in smallholder agriculture has 
exceeded the hybrid-maize cultivated area in the large farm sector. It is 
estimated that, for the year 1974, half of all maize fanners in the high potential 
areas used hybrids. The KSC estimates that about half of Kenya's 1.2 million 
ha. maize acreage is planted with hybrid or improved maize seeds. Gerharf s 
(1976) research revealed that by 1975 virtually all farmers in favourable 
climatic zones planted hybrid maize seeds. There is not a great divergence due 
to farm size in these zones.5 The KSC reckoned that since 1967 nearly every 
large farmer has used hybrids, and that in certain traditional large-farm areas, 
such as Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu districts, the use of hybrids approaches 
99%. 
Analysis, such as Gerharf s and Chapter 6, has shown that holding size 
played no significant role in adoption of hybrid maize technology. Other 
factors, such as credit, access to cash money and education or extension 
service, also played a minor role in the adoption process. Gerhart did not 
exclude, however, that on the one hand access by a farmer to off-farm income 
increased the possibility of adoption or, on the other hand, that the nature of 
off-farm employment influenced the adoption process. What seemed to be 
important were, according to Gerhart and confirmed by the Nandi survey, the 
dear economic returns obtained from using hybrid seeds. 
The availability of seeds through a dense network of suppliers and traders 
abo contributed much to the fast adoption of hybrids. The KSC itself put much 
effort into their introduction. KSC changed considerably its packaging policy 
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for seeds. In the beginning, KSC only sold seed in 25 kg bags. It was proved 
that smallholders in particular found this too large and thus too expensive. 
The use of hybrids increased considerably when KSC issued 10 kg and 2 kg 
bags of seed maize. The 10 kg bag, which is sufficient for one acre of maize 
according to the KSC and the extension service, nowadays represents the lion's 
share of maize sales: i.e. 70 %. while 10 % for 25 kg bags and 20 % for 2 kg 
bags.6 
The success of state policy geared towards hybridization of maize can 
(albeit only partly) be shown by the estimated increase in hybrid maize 
cultivated area and by hybrid maize sales from KSC (Figure 7.1. and Tables 
7.1. and 7.2) and by the sales of maize to marketing board and imports (Figure 
7.1). The trend represented in Figure 7.1 shows clearly that both the total 
improved maize area (hybrids and the open pollinated 'Katumani' varieties) 
and maize seed sales by KSC are increasing almost every year. The following 
tables show however a regional variation in uptake of hybrid maize. 
Figure 7.1. Hybrid maize area and sales by KSC 
1600 Hybrid 
seed sales 
KSC 
Hybrid 
maize area 
700 
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 
year 
The availability of certain types of hybrids - KSC produces at the moment 9 
different type of hybrids and two open pollinated varieties) - for certain zones 
influence the geographical pattern of uptake. Data from MOALD show that 
the use of hybrids among smallholders varies widely by regions.7 Tables 7.1 
and 7.2. indicate both the regional different pattern of hybrid maize adoption 
and the degree to which hybrid maize replaced the local production and 
distribution systems of local maize varieties in Kenya. Chapter 6 showed that 
this replacement process was complete in Nandi district. 
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Table 7.1. Percentage smallholders growing local and hybrid maize varieties, 
1974/75 
Province 
Nyanza 
Western 
ИЛ Valley 
Central 
Eastern 
Coast 
Kenya 
Local maize 
80 
74 
59 
95 
99 
94 
86 
Hybrid maize 
36 
73 
92 
67 
30 
19 
50 
Note: the totals exceed 100 % because most farmers grow both local and 
hybrid maize varieties 
Source: IRS-I, chapter 9, various tables. 
Table 7.2. Maize planted with hybrid seed as a proportion of total maize area, 
by province, 1981/82 
Province Area hybrid Share of 
maize total maize 
seed sales 
Nyanza 55 18 
Western 37 13 
Rift Valley 88 53 
Central 70 13 
Eastern 5 3 
Coast 7 1 
Source: AIR/World Bank (1985), Vol. 1. Main Report, chapter Ш, p. 3. 
The adoption of hybrid maize might be somewhat greater than Table 7.2 and 
figure 7.1 show. The acreage is expected to be greater since many farmers use 
less than the recommended level of seed per ha. The estimates are based on the 
sales of hybrid seeds by branches of KFA/KGGCU. For the calculation of 
hybrid-maize cultivated area it is assumed that every 10 kg is sufficient for 0.4 
hectare, and the 25 kg bags, for 1 hectare. The hybrid maize land-use data 
should therefore be treated with some caution.8 
Figure 7.1 does not display data on fertilizer uptake in maize production. 
Overall fertilizer application increased considerably since independence as is 
show in Figure 4.3 of Chapter 4. The reason for the omission of fertilizer 
application in Figure 7.1 is that dear data revealing the rate of fertilizer 
application for maize are not widely available. The data that are available are 
only based on estimates. These are, in their turn, more or less based on the 
recommendation of research stations and of the extension service (i.e. 25 
kg/ha). 
The 1RS surveys (I, II, ΙΠ and IV) indicate low and varying levels of 
fertilizer application in most districts (lower than recommended)-9 Between 
districts there is an even greater variation in fertilizer use on maize. Levels in 
Trans Nzoia (a prominent maize-estate district) are over 40 times the levels of 
use in Kisii and the rest of Nyanza Province (mainly small-scale fanning area). 
Levels of use in Nandi and Kericho are less than a quarter of levels in Trans 
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Nzoia and Uasin Gishu district. Rift Valley Province as a whole, with 50 % of 
the country's total maize area, consumes 70 % of all fertilizers applied to 
maize. Nyanza Province with 16 % of the total maize area, consumes only 3 % 
of fertilizers used on maize. W 
The regional variation in uptake may be related to the different resources 
for maize farming between large and small-scale fanners. The long history of 
large-scale farming in Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu and possibly also the 
extension impact of KSC (located in Kitale, in Trans Nzoia district) a crucial 
factor in these areas is.H The greater number of suppliers and stockists in the 
large-scale farm areas, the lack of available supplies to smallholders in smaller 
packages and the absence of extension services to small-scale farmers, may 
also contribute to higher levels of use in large farm areas. 
The state decided to stimulate fertilizer uptake by subsidizing purchase 
prices. The subsidies comprised, depending on the type of fertilizer used, a 
generous subvention ranging between 4.4 and 14 % of the retail price. The 
Havelock Committee Report of 1971 revealed, however, that 80 % of the value 
of these subsidies went to estates and large farms. The subsidies on fertilizer 
purchase prices were subsequently gradually cut and completely withdrawn 
in the late 1970s.12 Apart from subsidies, various smallholder credit schemes, 
such as the Fertilizer Import Supply Scheme (FISS), were created to boost 
fertilizer application among small-scale farmers. These programmes were not 
successful, however, and levels of repayment were extremely low.13 
7.1.1. Claims of success of hybridization 
The claims for the achievements of the technology transfer programme are 
made on various grounds. The claims range from an increased marketed 
output to productivity increases and increased economic benefits for the 
farmers. 
Figure 7.2 displays the marketed proportion of maize as increasing 
substantially since the 1960s. Commercial imports were necessary, however, in 
some years. In addition, maize imports obtained through emergency food aid 
or loans and grants (such as the US maize disposal programme known as the 
PL480 programme) were vital to supply the nation with food.14 The data on 
food aid are not mcluded in Figure 7.2. Periods of severe drought which the 
country experienced in a.o. 1965,1976,1979 and 1984 are, however, only one 
factor causing the variation in marketed output. The politico-economic facts 
underlying maize marketing and pricing, which are part of the explanation, 
will be discussed further on in this chapter. 
Data on productivity and yields in hybrid maize production are available 
but of little use for comparison and analysis. First of all, yields vary per hybrid 
maize variety planted. The expected yields for H613, for instance, is calculated 
at 5,400 kg/ha; for H625 at 7,200 kg/ha and for H512 at 5,400 kg/ha.« Besides 
that, the available productivity and yield figures are mostly obtained from 
trials in certain areas and in the main not based on conditions of production 
which can be found on small farms. The MOALD figures for productivity and 
yields are therefore misleading and furthermore based on limited surveys 
only.tá 
The available data on average maize yields for the period 1975-1979 show a 
substantial variation between agricultural zones and districts. The data are 
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Figure 7.2. Marketed maize and maize imports, 1962 -1988 
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presented, as usual, differentiating between small farms and large farms. In 
small farm districts, the average yields range from the lowest recorded yield of 
1,036 kg/ha. in Kitui district to the highest recorded yield of 4,967 kg/ha in 
Kericho district. In the large farm sector, yields ranged from 2,223 kg/ha. in 
Laikipia district to 3,970 kg/ha. in Trans Nzoia district.17 
In Chapter 6, we went beyond this resource distinction and related the 
enormous variation in maize yields observed in Nandi district to varying 
ecological and socio-economic conditions as well the varying farming intensity 
and the organization of the labour process in maize farming. 
With financial and technical assistance from the Netherlands government, 
the National Seed Quality Control Service (NSQCS) was estabUshed. The main 
task of the NSQCS was to ensure that only high quality seed of adapted 
varieties would reach the farmers. The NSQCS became responsible for 
controlling maize seed production, seed testing and quality control.18 The 
NSQCS claims, that due to its activities in maize seed control and certification, 
production increased substantially. It is argued that as a result of better (i.e. 
certified) hybrid seed, maize production increased by 57 kg/ha. The estimated 
increase in the net income of the target-group (primarily small-scale farmers)l9 
is about Ksh 88/- per acre of maize. They assume that the small-scale farmer 
cultivates maize on an average plot of 0.25 ha. The direct net income benefits 
for the smallholder is calculated at Ksh 22/-. Furthermore, it is assumed in the 
roject evaluation report that 2 million farmers belonging to the target-group 
ave been reached directly, while approx. 10 million farmers have been 
reached indirectly.20 
f: 
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Generally, the impact of hybridization of maize is appraised as positive. 
Gerhart (1976) concludes that 
'(.··) although it is the combined package of practices (i.e., time of 
planting, good husbandry methods, p.R.) that produces the most 
dramatic results, the use of hybrid seeds alone will raise yields 
substantially, probably as much as 50 % under good conditions.'2! 
Trials indicated that hybrids planted under 'traditional' husbandry conditions 
increased production by 35 %, while hybrids plus improved husbandry and 
fertilizer application raised returns by 300 % or even more.22 
The famous 'Dr. Allan trials' carried out in Kitale in the mid-1960s 
quantified the impact of unproved cultivation techniques on yields as 
follows:^ 
Poor Husbandry: local maize no fertilizer = yield 2,000 kg/ha. 
Poor Husbandry: hybrid maize with fertilizer = vield 3,318 kg/ha. 
Good Husbandry: local maize no fertilizer = yield 4,954 kg/ha. 
Good Husbandry: hybrid maize with fertilizer = yield 8,136 kg/ha. 
The trials also showed that apart from fertilizer application, the time of 
planting is crucial for obtaining the higher yields. The Kitale Research Station 
estimated that for Western Kenya only 50 % of the yield is obtained if sowing 
is delayed 2 weeks. 70-80 kg grain/ha. are lost for each day's delay after the 
first week of the rains. The time of planting crucial for reaching the inherent 
technological optimum of hybrid maize is greatly influenced by the 
availability of labour. In Chapter 6 we have argued that this may act as a 
constraint. These constraints were dealt with in different ways: intensification 
of manual household labour and/or an increased level of mechanization on 
the farm. The socio-economic position of the farmer was put forward as 
conditioning the way in which these constraints were circumvented. 
It is not unreasonable, however, to believe that yields of maize have 
increased substantially. It is widely accepted in agronomic circles that yields 
from hybrid maize are approx. 30 % higher than from local maize varieties. 
This contributed undoubtedly to an increase in maize production and has 
resulted in Kenya becoming largely self-sufficient in maize. In some years it 
has been able to export maize to neighbouring countries. Only in years of 
severe droughts has maize to be imported (see Figure 7.2). 
Gerhart (1976) summarizes the indirect effects of hybridization of maize on 
economic development in Kenya.2* A greater availability of maize achieved 
through higher yielding varieties can also bring about increased regional 
specialization in crop production, with the highest potential areas switching 
increasingly from higher value crops such as tea, coffee and pyrethrum which 
can only be produced in limited ecological areas. Pastoralists and farmers in 
chronic food deficit areas benefitted indirectly through improved availability 
of maize, although black market operations, due to present day restrictions on 
private maize trade, increased prices and thus reduced the benefits. Gerhart 
furthermore mentions the positive employment effects in the commerce sector 
(distribution of production inputs) and in the input manufacturing industries 
(seed companies, local manufacturers of tools). In addition, hybrid maize is a 
more labour-intensive crop than traditional maize. The use of hybrid maize 
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thus increased the demand for wage labour in the rural areas. His overall 
conclusion is that 'a more beneficial case of investment in the production and 
distribution of new agricultural technology would be difficult to find.'2^ 
7.2. Institutional factors affecting the implementation of the National 
Food Policy 
The following policy areas are considered as crucial: marketing efficiency and 
pricing policy as well as the nature of agricultural research and development, 
extension services and credit supply. All these issues are relevant aspects of 
Kenya's Nation Food Policy. The Nandi survey as well as surveys in other 
districts brought these issues of institutionalization and state intervention to 
the fore front. They will be examined here largely in the national context. 
7X1. Marketing and maize marketing in particular 
The extent of state intervention in marketing varies by commodity. The 
domestic marketing boards purchase a small proportion of the food crops. The 
export marketing boards purchase almost all export crops. Most of the boards 
have operated under monopoly pricing and marketing arrangements 
throughout their history. Nevertheless, the boards vary considerably in their 
degree of efficiency, management and financial status. The position of the 
marketing boards (and with them the marketing cooperatives which are 
licensed traders of these boards) is much debated, in parliament, around the 
countryside, in government and in donor circles.26 
The World Bank and the Ndegwa Commission reviewed the efficiency of 
the marketing boards in Kenya. Prices paid to producers, the speed of 
payments to producers, costs of operation and marketing efficiency in general 
were taken as a reflection of the functioning of the boards. The 
recommendations of the Ndegwa Commission are to reduce government 
investments in parastatals in general, to impose more financial control and 
closer supervision on parastatals by the central state apparatus and to improve 
the management of the parastatals involved in marketing agricultural 
produce. The obvious background to these recommendations is most certainly 
the attempts of the Moi government to increase the efficiency of state 
intervention and to control its expenditures. In the light of the recurrent 
deficits on its balance of payments accounts, this is not surprising. 
Two facts brought forward by the World Bank review and the Ndegwa 
report are illustrative of marketing in Kenya. One is that the marketing boards 
of commodities for the internal market (i.e. maize, wheat, beans, sugar, rice, 
cotton, milk and meat) were identified as highly inefficient marketing 
institutions. Low producer prices, late payments and high costs of operations 
were responsible for this World Bank judgement.27 Aside from the Maize and 
Produce Board, the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC), Wheat Board, the 
Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board (CLSMB) and Kenya Meat Commission 
(KMC) were particularly singled out by the Ndegwa Commission as poor 
performers and misusers of public funds. 
The practise of delayed payments in particular was singled out as serious 
evidence of malfunctioning. As a result of late payments farmers found 
themselves unable to repay debts to credit institutions. The political leadership 
of the country. President Moi and other national and district political leaders, 
therefore frequently command the various marketing bodies to pay farmers 
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the millions of shillings owing to them. Much of the reduction in marketed 
production of maize, cotton and sugar can be attributed to this practice. In 
1986, the drop in sugar cane production was so severe that 40,000 tons had to 
be imported. The same occurred with cotton production in 1983. Delayed 
payments by the responsible marketing board was one of the major factors 
behind the drop in the marketed volume. 
A second observation is that the state institutions involved in marketing 
export crops (i.e. notably the Coffee Board and Kenya Tea Development 
Authority who control smallholder marketed coffee and tea) were identified as 
efficient and profitable marketing boards. Export crops in general have thus 
been more thoroughly controlled. These crops escaped from the distortions 
created by the ineffective market intervention that is practised for marketed 
food crops and maize in particular. 
The recommended merger of the Wheat and Maize and Produce Board into 
the NCPB was not an effective reorganization according to the World Bank. 
Many of the problems of the pre-merger period remained.28 
We shall review the maize marketing structure in Kenya below. The maize 
marketing arrangements (and price fixation) and the effectiveness of the 
controls have two components: the marketing monopoly position of the NCPB 
and farm-gate price fixation. 
The responsible maize marketing board, NCPB, is severely criticized for its 
financial mismanagement and is considered as highly ineffective in its 
operations. This accusation is nothing new in Kenya's maize marketing and 
pricing history. Several government-installed commissions of enquiry for 
maize marketing in the past (in 1942, 1946,1952, 1955, 1958, 1963, 1966, 1972 
and 1983) recommended without exception - against all odds - some 
diminution of state involvement in the interests of Towering the price to the 
consumer, encouraging specialization of maize growing in the best areas and 
making the large black market redundant.M 
The maize marketing structure in Kenya is characterized by duality and 
this constitutes the nub of the problem. The state-controled marketing board, 
NCPB, purchases not only a small proportion of total maize production in the 
country, but also a limited share of marketed maize volume. For the year 1988 
it is estimated that the share of NCPB was 30 % of total maize production; 10 % 
is purchased by private traders and 60% is retained by the producers for home 
consumption.30 NCPB's proportion of total marketed maize volume has been 
estimated to be 40-50 %.31 The state is not able to control the marketed volume 
as in the case of export commodities. The formal marketing system thus leaves 
a considerable part of the maize market to the operation of rural black 
markets. 
Since the predecessor of the NCPB, the Maize Control, was established in 
19432, maize marketing has tended to create seasonal and regional variations 
in the marketed volume of maize as well as in rural consumer prices. These 
variations were aggravated by the state policy of stringent food movement 
regulations and the state's inability to control food prices in rural (black) 
markets.32 Despite laws prohibiting the purchase and movement of food crops 
by unauthorized traders and in spite of the trading of food (maize, beans) in 
larger quantities than 2 bags of 90 kg being forbidden, illegal intra- and inter 
district marketing channels have always prospered.^ 
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The maize marketing system has a tendency to inhibit regional 
specialization of maize production The marketing and pnang system has 
impeded production based on (natural) comparative advantage In surplus 
areas, production is governed by the low NCPB pnce, while in deficit areas, 
production is influenced by the high NCPB pnce This kind of control 
encourages production m high-cost marginal areas while discouraging 
production m low-cost productive areas Add to this, the NCPB's practice of 
late payments to producers Late planting of maize and possibly lower yields 
are often the negative results of NCPB's practice of late payment to producers 
Thus due to the marketing inefficiency of the NCPB there has been, in 
many occasions, a reduced supply of maize Delay m exporting surpluses from 
the bumper harvest in 1978 has meant the NCPB could not purchase all the 
maize produced and the pnvate market was unable to absorb the surpluses 
due to restrictions on the movement on maize Farmers, large- and small-scale, 
responded immediately by reduang the area of maize planted for the market 
the following season Figure 72 displays the resulting reduced offer to the 
NCPB dearly Figure 73 showing the area under maize cultivation m the 
estate sector, confirms the declining trend m maize area during that particular 
penod Data on smallholder maize cultivated-area are not widely available 
and are therefore not included 
In addition, to make matters worse, the NCPB lowered producer prices m 
1979 by nearly 12 % The abolition of the existing GMR-credit scheme, which 
guaranteed loan finance to enterprises at the time of planting, and the fact that 
fertilizers not being widely available that year, contributed too to an 
exceptionally low maize harvest and low marketed volume 34 Consequently, 
maize unports increased substanbally the following year, as is shown in Figure 
72 
The recurring regional and local shortages of maize, even when national 
surpluses of maize exist, are reflections on the ineffectiveness of NCPB's 
control 35 Not only is operational efficiency considered as very low, but the 
costs of transport and storage of maize and operating costs are increased 
unnecessanly as a result of controls that inhibit inexpensive collection 36 
Most costly, perhaps, for the small-scale commercial maize farmer are the 
restrictions on movements that force small-scale farmers to use less economical 
modes of transport and/or illegal channels Furthermore, smallholders find it 
difficult to market maize through the NCPB as payments are commonly 
delayed Nandi farmers stated that clearly Small farmers, although not the 
Nandi farmers, prefer instead to sell maize to local private traders m spite of 
their prices being lower than the NCPB pnces Moreover, the officially 
gazetted price is available only at NCPB depots Large-scale fanners, in 
contrast to smallholders, can ship in bulk and usually have direct access to 
NCPB depots 37 
The groups harmed by the maize market control system have been small-
scale producers and consumers (who are often the same group) and, to a lesser 
extent, the urban poor According to Peterson (1986), the maize market is a 
perfect example of the state's bias in favour of large farmers There is no doubt 
that marketing policy regulations m general in Kenya discriminate against 
small-scale producers Not only do smallholders receive a smaller return for 
their crops than large farmers, but they also pay a disproportionate amount of 
the administrative, storage, processing and transport costs 38 
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For years the state maintained the same maize marketing system as 
originally initiated in 1942. This happened despite World Bank 
recommendations and despite various government working parties and 
inquires on maize marketing to reorganize the system. The state's attitude 
Figure 7.3. Area under maize in the large farm sector, 1959 - 1987 
Source: Statistical Abstract 1965 - 1988 
towards maize marketing has changed however. Kenya's leading donors, the 
World Bank and USAID, have exerted great pressure on the state to privatize 
food and other traded and to eliminate the monopoly position of the NCPB in 
food marketing in particular. The World Bank, as Mosley puts it, 'attempted 
from outside the country, a feat of political muscle which had defeated all 
liberalizing elements from inside for over forty years.'^ 
The World Bank found itself in a strong position to exert pressure on the 
state. The Bank directly coupled the advancement of a structural adjustment 
loan in 1982 to the restructuring of the maize marketing system. The Bank also 
managed to obtain support from various bilateral donors to take the same 
stance (such as the US and Britain); other donors, such as Sweden and the 
Netherlands, deplored this procedure and were not willing to cooperate in this 
operation. The Kenya government surrendered to the World Bank demands in 
1983. The financial crisis of the state meant that it needed future loans from the 
World Bank and IMF, loan advances which were coupled to a restructuring of 
the maize market. In addition, all other bilateral donors now agreed to link aid 
expenditures to that objective.« The government had to surrender and 
promised in 1983 to reorganize the maize market. 
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A foreign consultant, Bookers, undertook a review and recommended to 
the government in 1983 that a large part of the maize market should be taken 
out of the hands of the NCPB; the role of the NCPB would in the end be 
reduced to the role of buyer and seller of last resort from its strategic reserve of 
900,000 tons.42 Only in 1986 did the government commence to reform the 
NCPB and eliminated its monopoly position in marketing. As a result, sales to 
the NCPB declined considerably and private traders increased their share in 
maize marketing. Deliveries to NCPB in 1988 are estimated at 485,300 tons; i.e. 
a drop of about 25 % from the previous year's figure of 651,900 tons.43 See also 
Figure 7.2. The state, however, still retains control over the maize market by 
various institutions (OP and Treasury) through pricing. 
7.2.2. Pricing policies 
Fixation of consumer, producer, retail and processing prices is a second 
important element of state marketing policy. Pricing in the Kenyan context 
involves two main aspects. First of all, there is the fixation of prices of food 
(including maize) and other consumer goods versus producer prices of other 
agricultural commodities (milk and export crops). The second component is 
producer prices in relation to purchased inputs, which are largely imported, 
and the costs of living. This involves the so-called terms of exchange for 
agriculture vis-à-vis other economic sectors. 
It is understandable that in an agricultural economy such as Kenya's, which 
is characterized by a well developed exchange regime, the effectiveness of 
price fixation is crucial for the level of marketed output and income of the 
farming population. It is also clear that two circuits of exchange, a national and 
an international, intersect closely. The first is fully controlled by the state, the 
second completely beyond its power. Let us see how they meet in practice and 
how state power is exercised to deal with this obviously neat problem. 
7.2.2.1. Food consumer prices 
Consumer price developments show that urban consumers have been 
protected by the state's price fixations. Meilink (1987) collected information on 
food prices for the period 1975-1984 on crucial food crops. In the case of almost 
all food items - i.e., maize ( as posho), milk, rice, beef, wheat - under price 
control, consumers have indeed been protected from inflationary 
developments. Price increases have always been below the inflation rate. For 
maize (consumed as grain) however, the opposite is the case: maize (grain) 
consumer prices have far exceeded the rate of inflation in the 1975-1985 period. 
Increases in producer prices have not been passed on to consumers to the full 
extent. Part of the shortfall was charged to the respective marketing boards 
which in tum had to rely on government budget support for the operational 
losses. In this respect it is dear that the state implements a precarious cheap 
food policy financed through the government's budget.** 
A great majority of rural households appear as net-maize purchasers on the 
market Home production covers only about 60-65 % of family maize 
consumption in smallholder agriculture (see Chapter 4, section 4.3). 
Consequently, a large part of Kenya's rural population depends on unofficial 
market prices which are subject to supply conditions of maize on these 
markets. These households were thus not protected by the state's pricing 
policy and it seems accurate to conclude that urban households benefitted the 
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most The objective of state food marketing policy to protect the rural 
population against price variations and to guarantee a stable supply of maize 
has thus not been implemented successfully. 
ІЛЛЛ. Deteriorating international terms of exchange and its impact on 
production 
In the period immediately after independence, prices on the world market for 
Kenya's principal export commodities (coffee, tea, pyrethrum) increased 
gradually until 1977. After that prices except for pyrethrum decreased 
Figure 7.4. Deflated export producer prices, 1964 - 1987 
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Source: Statistical Abstract 1965-1988 
steadily, as is shown in Figure 7.4. Tea prices rose again in 1984 but declined 
the following years to a price level lower than prevailing in the year of the 
export boom, 1977. These international market price developments had severe 
repercussions for Kenya's political economy. The deteriorating terms of 
exchange for almost all producers must have resulted in a considerable decline 
in average income from marketed production (see Chapter 4). 
When prices for Kenya's export crops fell, prices for maize increased in 
1980. Maize producer prices were approx. 8 % higher in 1982/83 than 10 years 
before. The producer price of wheat increased during the same period by 16 
%.45 Recently, in 1988, the government raised maize (and wheat) producer 
prices again by 7 %M> Mosley (1986b) underlines the fact that since the 1930s, 
maize producer prices have been frequently held well above the export price 
of maize and that this pattern of subsidy to the commercial maize farmers has 
persisted through much of the twenty years since independence.*? 
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By deflating the producer prices for export crops by the lower consumer price 
index (1971=100), we see as is shown in Figure 7.4, that real producer export 
prices declined considerably. Except some years before 1977, only in 1977,1978 
and 1984 did the index for tea exceeded parity; for coffee for almost all years 
except 1981 and 1987. 
During the export bonanza period, the windfall gains of high export prices 
were largely passed on the producers. Davis (1983) estimates that 98 % in 
1977, and 92 % in 1978 of price increases officially went to producers.48 Leys 
(1978) iterates that the state's direct share of the export bonanza was far lower 
than in other African countries and that the export boom facilitated the 
expansion of commodity relations in the countryside. This expansion, in its 
turn, propelled private accumulation in commerce and industry. This does not 
mean, however, that all such capital was invested productively.49 
Bevan et al. (1989) provide an analysis of responses of farmers during the 
years of the export boom. Apart from drinking and rather careless 
expenditures, large sums of money were invested in upgrading and planting 
more coffee as well as in purchasing land in Rift Valley Province and buying 
foreign owned coffee estates. People who migrated earlier to Nairobi returned 
to their land. Labour wages and land prices increased during this period. 
Finally, investment in education and housing and contributions to self-help 
projects were noted as significant.50 
How did the export producers respond to the absolute decline in real 
export producer prices. ? Research of Martin (1984) and others, as signaled 
earlier in Chapter 4, section 4.5.2.1, revealed an important consequence of the 
deteriorating terms of exchange for export commodity producers: 
decommoditization (i.e., an increase in the death-rate of coffee trees and 
sloppy maintenance of coffee farms) and farmers ceasing to produce coffee. In 
addition, a decline in the proportion of agricultural income in total household 
income was noted. A more important consequence is that land use and 
cropping patterns changed. Land use shifted from export commodity 
production to livestock and food production either for subsistence or for the 
national market. The proportion of household income from cash crops 
declined.51 
The consequence is that the volume of export commodities from 
smallholders declined. Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 showed the decline of 
smallholder coffee production dearly. The variation in coffee production may 
thus be explained by the declining terms of exchange for coffee producers. 
Furthermore, it appeared that administrative guidelines also induced a drop in 
coffee production. During 1981, interplanting coffee with food crops was 
allowed in order to increase food production in the country. In 1983 the state 
prohibited intercropping with the argument that it was responsible for the 
drop in coffee production in 1982 and contributed particularly to a decline in 
the quality of coffee berries.52 
Tea production by smallholders (Figures 4.1 and 4.2, Chapter 4) showed a 
constant increase, however. That tea producers did not cut back on output 
may be explained by the fact that it only tiny little plots averaging 0.38 ha are 
involved, leaving probably enough room for subsistence production. Recently, 
small-scale tea fanners for the first time in many years expressed their 
discontent about the low tea producer prices and demanded a higher share of 
the prices received on the international market. Simultaneously they urged 
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more producer representation and participation in the KTDA management.53 
These events show some of the other difficulties in the implementation of 
Kenya's export promotion programme. 
7.2JL3. Consumer and national producer prices: the case of milk versus 
maize 
Milk and maize have in common that producer prices are nationally decreed 
and both commodities are important wage goods in workers' budgets. 
Furthermore, as figure 7.5 displays, the demand for milk frequently exceeds 
the supply of milk offered for sale to the KCC. Imports of dried milk from a.o. 
the EEC are consequently necessary to keep up with the growing demand. 
Figure 7.5. Marketed milk and dry milk imports, 1974 -1988 
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Source: Statistical Abstract, 1975-1988 
Contrary to milk prices, maize producer and consumer prices have usually 
(though not always) been increased in line with both maize production costs 
and overall consumer price indices. Figure 7.6 shows this clearly. 
When whole milk producer prices are deflated by the consumer price index 
(1971=100), than it appears that throughout the period 1964-1987 (except in 
1971) contrary to maize producer prices, the whole milk price index never 
exceeded parity. Furthermore the milk-maize exchange rate (calculated by 
dividing milk production prices by the two-year average maize consumer 
price of the Nairobi market^) over the same period shows that maize 
consumer prices has always increased faster than milk producer prices. 
The observed price differentials between milk producer prices and maize 
consumer and producer prices generated two tendencies in Central Province. 
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Firstly, Cowen (1981b, 1983,1986) noted a tendency for smallholders of dairy 
cattle to replace dairying with maize production and to tum pasture into 
arable land. The consequence of a reduction in the volume of marketed milk, 
while at the same time the demand for milk increased a.o. induced by 
Figure 7.6. Deflated maize and milk producer prices and the milk-maize 
exchange rate, 1964-1987 
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1965-1989 
president Moi's order that free school milk should be available, has been a 
dramatic increase in imports of dried milk (see figure 7.5). 
Secondly, Cowen noted the tendency to reduce maize expenditure when 
maize consumer prices rose, while expenditure on maize increased as prices 
fell. This is particularly the case in areas were commodity specialization for the 
internal and international market is well developed (particularly in Central 
Province). In these areas, food expenditure accounts for over one-half of 
smallholder consumption.55 
Milk farm-gate prices, however, have been raised (although still less than 
the maize production price and still less than consumer price rises) 
considerably since 1981 in favour of milk producers. Between 1983 and 1987, 
KCC payout prices to milk producers increased by 65 %.56. The direct effect 
was as noted in Figure 7.5 an increase in the marketed volume of whole milk. 
It is unknown on what kind of holdings, whether on the small holdings or on 
the large, capital intensive dairy farms, the increased milk supply for the 
market is realized. 
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7.Z2.4. Domestic terms of trade: industrial versus agricultural sector 
Figure 7.7 summarizes much of the aspects of state price fixation discussed 
above. The figure discloses that purchased input prices and the consumer 
index for the rural areas increase at more or less the same rate, but faster than 
the general index of output prices. It clearly shows that the general terms of 
trade between agriculture and the rest of the economy have deteriorated 
permanently over the last decades.^7 Particularly oil prices increased 
considerably since the world-wide oil crises of 1979 and 1982. Moreover, over 
the past 15 years, the price of widely used purchased farm inputs (notably 
seeds and fertilizers) increased by more than 400 %, while output prices have 
increased by slightly under 200 %.58 
Figure 7.7. Agricultural terms of trade, 1976 -1988 
Source: Economic Survey, 1980,1985,1989 
A relevant conclusion from figure 7.7 is that the economic position of farmers 
is worsening on two fronts: Öle index of purchased consumer goods in the 
rural areas is rapidly increasing; the same holds true, to a lesser extent, for the 
price index of purchased inputs. A second conclusion, perhaps a more 
important one, is that the state's method of fixing producer prices for 
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agricultural commodities in relation to production inputs and consumer goods 
is founded upon a policy to protect die domestic industrial and commerce 
sector rather than the agricultural sector. Local manufacturers of agricultural 
inputs (seeds and tools), such as KSC and Ideal Casement Ltd, and other local 
manufacturers are heavily protected by the state by a monopoly status, tariff 
protection, quotas and the maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate. The 
maize processing industries (of which Unga Ltd is the largest) can operate on a 
cost-plus basis and pass on higher buying prices to consumers through 
controlled selling prices.59 The same holds true for the wholesale and retail 
sector. 
Apart from having a negative impact on the volume of export commodities 
produced by smallholders, the deteriorating terms of trade have serious effects 
on food production in the country. 
In the first place, it may be deleterious for Kenya's estate producers who 
provide 70 % of total marketed maize volume. Data on maize-cultivated area 
in the estate sector may be indicative that the conditions for maize production 
on estates are deteriorating. Figure 7.3 indicates that, despite increases in 
certain years, the overall trend is one of decline. The trend towards land 
underutilization and inefficient farming on estates (which is not revealed by 
the statistics on land use in the large farm sector) may be linked to lack of 
capital due to diminished access to agricultural credit. A major credit scheme 
(GMR) was abolished in 1979 on the grounds of misappropriation of public 
funds, although the GMR scheme was rehabilitated in 1986 with the 
immediate effect of an increase in maize area. On the other hand, the 
restrictions placed upon imports of agricultural machinery and spare parts, 
and the currency devaluations which make these imports more expensive, hit 
the estates producers the most. Lack of enough cheap operating machines 
results in underutilization of prime agricultural land in the major maize 
producing regions.60 The government is aware of this problem. In 1986, it 
promised to take steps 'to induce landowners to put underutilized land to 
more productive use'.61 
In the second place, the deteriorating terms of trade of the agricultural sector 
negatively affects the uptake of new agricultural technologies, such as fertilizer 
and improved seed. The price of imported fertilizers is frequently raised and 
fertilizer prices rise faster than producer prices. The relationship between the 
increase in fertilizer prices and the net return from fertilizer application in 
maize production is estimated as negative. It is approximated for 1983/84 that 
returns per shilling spent on fertilizer for maize was Ksh 3/-. Based on FAO 
data from 1972, it was estimated that the return was between Ksh 4/50 and 
Ksh 7/-. The returns have fallen since 1972 primarily due to the rapid rise in 
fertilizer costs since the oil price rises in the 1970s.62 
The use of hybrids and the marketed maize output levelled out somewhat 
between 1978 and 1981 as is shown in Figure 7.1. Apart from the severe 
drought Kenya suffered during 1971, 1979, 1980 and 1984, the deteriorating 
terms of trade for the agricultural producers can be held accountable for this 
drop. The exact effect of the frequent increases of hybrid maize seed prices on 
adoption are unknown. Since 1979 the purchase price of maize seed have more 
than doubled, from Ksh 40/- per 10 kg bag to Ksh 104/- in January 1988. It is 
reasonable to assume that the smallholder in particular will experience these 
price rises for seed (and fertilizers) as a negative. The poor peasant farmers in 
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Nandi district reacted in this way when they were informed about the 
proposed price increase. Buch-Hansen & Kieler (1983), for instance, discovered 
that farmers retreated from hybrid maize commodity exchange circuits 
because the production costs were too high.63 
There has been criticism of the pricing policy because it in effect 
discriminates against the agricultural sector in favour of the industrial sector. 
It has harmed the agricultural sector by implicitly taxing agricultural exports 
through the maintenance of an artificially low exchange rate, while the 
manufacturing sector was protected with tariffs and quantitative trade 
restrictions.64 Meilink (1985) detects a gap between policy objectives and 
implementation. The agricultural sector cannot be expected to fulfil its difficult 
threefold task of providing food and employment for a rapidly growing 
population and producing export commodities, while simultaneously, 
persistently loosing the economic strength to do so.® Hopcraft (1979) 
concluded that virtually everything the farmer buys that is locally 
manufactured, involves a large transfer element, taxing the mass of farmers 
and subsidising a few protected manufacturers.* 
Seen in this policy environment, it is not surprising that capital 
accumulated in the agricultural sector is increasingly channelled into the 
circulation sphere of the economy, into transport companies, petty business, 
taxis, hotels and private tractor-hire enterprises. This trend is noted in Nandi 
district as well as all over Kenya.67 
7.3. The role of agro-institutions 
Besides land transfer programmes and land tenure reforms implemented after 
independence (Chapter 4), policies to extend credit and extension services to 
the farming population were an essential element of the 'agrarian revolution'. 
One of the reasons why the state implemented land tenure reform was that 
private land tenure would facilitate the uptake of new technology by the 
provision of credit and extension services to the farmer. Agricultural R&D was 
given the task of developing ways to enhance production by land- and labour-
saving technologies. The discussed hybridization of maize was one major 
achievement of Kenya's R&D system. These matters are perceived by state 
policy makers as crucial ingredients of an technological and administrative 
foundation upon which commodity production could expand. The role of the 
agro-institutions is discussed below. 
7.3.1. The orientation and role of agricultural research 
Agricultural research in Kenya has a long history. The first research 
institutions originate from the beginning of colonial rule. The majority of 
initiatives came from the colonial administration^ but settlers too were active 
in this field.69 One of the outcomes of colonial agricultural policy was 
invariably an effort to enhance plant and livestock breeding in order to raise 
productivity in the agricultural sector. The structure of the seed industry, 
based on plant breeding programmes, has been influenced by the co-evolution 
of public and private sector breeding activities. A number of research 
institutions were established in the early days when large numbers of settlers 
were attracted to Kenya. 
Agricultural R&D in Kenya receives the greatest share of research funds in 
the country. A World Bank report estimates that per year 70 % of the total 
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research budget is directed to agricultural research. The government and 
foreign aid agencies together fund the research budget. Most foreign aid 
support in research is provided through development projects, and the bulk of 
funding goes to meet personnel costs and expatriate technical assistance. The 
target spending level is set at 1% of the gross agricultural domestic product. 
Coffee and tea receive the largest single share of the total budget, 27 % and 5 % 
respectively (reflecting their importance for the national monetary economy). 
Livestock receives about 20% of total research resources and food crops about 
25%.70 
Agricultural research, and plant breeding programmes in particular, have a 
local and international component.Tl Internationally, Kenya is today a 
beneficiary of regional and national programmes of international agricultural 
research centres co-ordinated by the Consultative Groups for International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR). This network includes a.o. CIMMYT (Mexico, 
maize), ICLA (in Ethiopia, livestock), ILRAD (Kenya, animal diseases), CIP 
(Peru, potatoes). 
Nationally, research is carried out by a number of ministries and 
institutions in Kenya (see Chapter 3, Figure 1). Various stations conduct 
research in certain specific crops and are situated in the major agro-ecological 
zones. Maize and pasture seed research is mainly concentrated in the estate 
areas around Kitale and carried out by the National Agricultural Research 
Station (NARS). Crop research for adapted varieties of maize, cassava, grain-
legume, millet and sorghum is also taking place. The stations are located in the 
coastal zone and semi-arid areas (in Mtwapa in Coast Province and in 
Katumani, Eastern Province, respectively). The seeds bred by NARS are 
released for commercial seed production after testing, certification and 
registration by the National Seed Quality Control Service (NSQCS) in Lanet. 
Wheat, barley, oil seeds and oats research by the National Plant Breeding 
Station is taking place in Njoro. Coffee research by the Coffee Research 
Foundation is located in the coffee zones (Kisii, Meru, Koru and Ruini), while 
tea research is conducted in Kericho by the Tea Research Station. Co-
ordination among these institutions has proved to be a major problem. The 
enactment of the Science and Technology Act in 1977 was meant to resolve 
these difficulties. One immediately result was the establishment of the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) in 1979 under MOALD.72 KARI's main 
objective is to co-ordinate, execute and manage agricultural research in Kenya. 
World Bank reports and ISNAR reports reviewing Kenya's agricultural 
research system claim that agricultural R&D has an outstanding record. Coffee 
and tea research, the introduction of hybrid maize and the breeding of rust 
resistant wheat varieties had a significant impact on agricultural development 
(see abo section 7.1). In addition, a widespread and diversified institutional 
network has been established over time. 
Prior to independence, research had been primarily focused on the needs of 
large-scale settler farmers and upon the fertile areas, where most of the settlers 
were located. Both ISNAR and the World Bank have noted, however, an 
increasing interest in problems of smallholder agriculture and in production 
systems for medium potential and semi-arid areas. But there is much left to do. 
Both agencies mention in their reports that more research needs to be carried 
out at farm level on specific problems of food production under smallholder 
conditions. Research on millet and sorghum has been limited, in part due to 
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the orientation of the research system towards serving the needs of larger 
farms. Horticultural crops too receive less attention than they should have. 
Both reports are highly critical for a number of reasons about the 
commitment of the state to fund research programmes. R&D in general is 
constrained by a limitation of funds received from the state. Consequently, 
foreign aid agencies are the major providers of funds and personnel. The 
reports noted, furthermore, a dear tendency towards maintaining existing 
programmes and that new and urgent initiatives are neither developed nor 
implemented. In addition, because KARI does not function properly, allocated 
funds are spread over a large number of institutes and research projects, some 
of which may be irrelevant to national needs and many of which cannot be 
funded at a level sufficient to achieve results. A second major constraint for 
research in Kenya is staffing. ISNAR in particular noted a critical shortage of 
adequately trained personnel.73 
ISNAR and World Bank aside, the state itself is aware of the limited effects 
of R&D programmes. The Development Plans 1979-1983 and 1984-1988 
acknowledge that research should be oriented towards the needs of 
smallholders and less potential areas in Kenya. The fourth Development Plan 
states clearly that the creation of appropriate technology for the smallholding 
sector is one of the greatest challenges for Kenya's research system (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.). 
But to what extent there has been a reorientation in policies concerning 
agricultural R&D is rather questionable. Several authors speak in this respect 
of rigidity of the state institutions involved in R&D policy formulation.74 The 
gap between objectives and implementation is critical and there appears to be 
no commitment to close the gap. 
A good example to show the lack of commitment of the state is the 
situation in many research stations. While the government stresses the 
importance of agricultural research for enhancing food production, the 
research station responsible for maize research (NARS, in Kitale) has 
deteriorated to the point where an extension worker wishing to consult project 
reports from the early 1970s in the library at Kitale can no longer do so. Lack of 
funding due to withdrawal of donor support (from Britain) and lack of state 
funds can be held responsible for this decline75 
Although the state emphasizes genetic diversity and the maintenance of 
gene banks to conserve the nation's natural resources, genetic resources and 
germ plasma accessions have been reportedly lost due to poor gene bank 
management.76 Here again we see a critical gap between objectives and 
practice. 
Other critical assessments go beyond the lack of funds and institutional 
formats and point more at the social and technological orientation of R&D 
programmes in Kenya. Agricultural R&D is still oriented towards the needs of 
large farmers. Research on farm implements is only one example of this bias. 
There is a well-established programme to test farm implements for large-scale 
farming, but there is nothing comparable for smaller machinery suitable for 
small farms.77 There has been very little attention paid to the promotion of 
cultivation with the help of oxen. Policy makers and researchers apparently 
held the view that farmers should shift directly from hoe cultivation to 
tractors.TS 
228 
A second example is agronomic research. Research findings are based upon 
pure and row-planted crops. The achievement of maximum biological yields is 
the goal of the implementation of R&D. Little research, apart from some 
isolated events, has been done on major smallholder problems, such as the 
time of planting, the availability and price of labour, competition among crops 
for labour, intercropping, and less than optimal husbandry and input use79 
Technological solutions are presented and introduced as one-dimensional, as a 
package to the smallholder fanner, though farmers, because of many of the 
constraints analysed earlier in Chapter 6, rarely adopted all the components of 
the package. 
Testing of results is rarely carried out on smallholdings under conditions 
actually faced by farmers. The researchers tend to have very little contact with, 
and very little understanding of, small farm conditions.80 And as fanners do 
not see their local research stations as relevant to their own situations, they in 
tum make no attempt to exert any pressure on the agricultural research 
programme.81 
Agricultural research is, in other words, still more tailored by the needs of 
the larger farmers and by optimum technological conditions for mono-cultural 
production, than by the needs of small farmers and the low potential areas. 
There has been no attempt to relate technical solutions for problems in 
agriculture to the needs of farmers. Research is an isolated event and not 
supported by a socio-economic and farm enterprise analysis.82 
In Chapter 6 we went into detail on the socially differentiating effect of 
hybrid maize technology at regional level. The path diagram showed dearly 
that hybrid maize technology is biased toward the large farmers and 
favourable ecological zones. Despite the bias in R&D, fanners achieved 
extremely good results as is shown in the path diagram. Farmers appeared not 
to be passive receivers in the process of technology transfer. 
A third component of the orientation of agricultural R&D is that plant and 
livestock breeding programmes clearly remain a product of colonialism. 
Colonialism, traders and missionaries brought new plant and livestock species 
to Kenya. Maize varieties have been cultivated in Kenya already since the 
1500s when they were introduced by Portuguese traders who probably 
brought them from the West Indies.83 The same holds true for livestock 
species. The settlers brought 'exotic' stock when they settled in Kenya. 
Over the years, Kenya continued to import as well as to collect local genetic 
resources for breeding purposes. Over the 1964-1985 period, Kenya imported 
nearly 64 % of all germ plasma accessions for breeding programmes. The 
corresponding figure for cereals was 49 % of all the accessions, while maize 
breeding programmes the figure for imported plasma was 88 %№ 
Similar trends can be noted in forest and livestock species. In 1985 nearly 95 
% of Kenya's planted forests were exotic, and nearly 93 % of the germ plasma 
used in artificial insemination programmes was from exotic dairy breeds 
(Ayrshire, Friesian, Guersney and Jersey).85 The reduction of the genetic 
diversity of local livestock breeds was effectively undertaken in the colonial 
period, although ownership of graded cows was restricted to the settler 
community (see Chapter 5 for livestock programmes in Nandi district). 
Juma (1989) stresses that 'by emphasizing increased food production as the 
main focus of breeding programmes Kenya has tended to drift towards a 
narrower genetic base in major commercial food crops.'"* This shift does not, 
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however, reflect the preferences of the consumers, who tend to opt for greater 
variability in their food resources as well as in taste and colour of varieties.87 
Beans and local maize varieties have been gradually adapted to 
producers/consumers preferences since their introduction into East Africa. 
This kind of taste and colour preference and local knowledge about local 
varieties is not the kind of knowledge that informs R&D policy makers. The 
R&D industry in Kenya dearly follows a different path as it is oriented 
towards mono-cultural production, mechanization and genetic uniformity. 
Research on maize has always neglected local varieties and concentrated 
instead completely on hybrids and synthetics. The starting point has always 
been the technological superiority of hybrids over local varieties. It may be 
questioned whether hybrid maize varieties really produce higher yields than 
local varieties or whether they have contributed to an increase of food security 
at household Ie vel.88 Hybrids are generally less drought resistant than local 
varieties. Perhaps this is also an explanation for the fluctuations in the 
marketed volume of maize. Drought resistance is a favourable feature for 
maize in a country of which more than 80 % of the area is considered as arid 
and semi-arid, but even the hybrid variety with drought resistant features, 
Katumani maize which is particularly developed for arid regions, appears to 
fail once in three years.89 
Due to the great emphasis on maize (and wheat), other important food 
crops such as beans, millet and sorghum have been neglected. Heyer (1975) 
noted that if agricultural R&D was more concerned with sorghum and millet 
the situation in the arid and semi-arid areas would have been far better than it 
is now. Agricultural research on these crops is severely practically nil.90 
To conclude the overview of agricultural R&D. It mus be said that despite 
outstanding and glorified achievements in certain crops, it is hampered by 
institutional weakness and a general lack of orientation to the needs of the 
small producers in Kenya and genetic diversity. The gap between policy 
objectives and concrete implementation is, however, critical. This conclusion 
goes beyond the institutional weakness and ineffectiveness due to lack of 
funding detected by the World Bank. The World Bank's recommendation is to 
redirect research orientation from a large-scale towards smallholder bias, from 
a fertile areas bias towards dryer areas. The staffing and funding constraints 
must be solved in the order to improve the organization of research.9l The 
Bank does not make clear what kind of agricultural researchers are needed to 
close the gap. 
7.3.2. Extension services 
Closely connected to agricultural R&D is the dissemination of results to the 
farming population. Institutional weakness, too many administrative tasks to 
fulfil and understaffing are generally pointed out as the weak parts of 
extension in Kenya. The actual knowledge of extension field-workers appears 
to be low. In Kenya in the late 1970s, only a third of the field staff were 
considered to have adequate knowledge of both technical matters and 
extension methods. 
An examination of extension involves two critical and highly interrelated 
components. One is the nature and contents of the extension message; the 
second is the nature of linkages between extensionists and the farming 
population. 
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7.3.2.1. The nature of the message 
It is obvious that the extension service as an off-shoot of the agricultural R&D 
system is organized rather similar lines. Extension is primarily concentrated 
on the adoption of packages and the use of purchased inputs only (see Chapter 
6). Crop recommendations have been largely oriented towards maximizing 
production, based on research findings relevant for large farms. This work 
may be considered, as the World Bank does, as of little relevance for 
commerdally-oriented small farms and as having tending to ignore 
subsistence farmers.92 
The Bank criticizes the concept of crop 'packages'. Crop packages have 
tended to focus on applications of fertilizers and use of hybrid seeds, giving 
little consideration to crop husbandry or the risk element. Moreover, as the 
Bank notes, packages have usually been presented on an 'all or nothing' basis, 
leaving little room to adjust fertilizer recommendations to farmers' ability to 
pay and husbandry methods. Limited attention has also been paid to the 
economic attractiveness of these packages. Because of input prices rising faster 
than output prices, many packages that were viable in the past are not viable 
now.93 
This line of thinking touches, however, only a small part of the problems 
related to technology transfer which is part and parcel of extension messages. 
The tendency in the practice of extension is to advise uniformly. The 
extension worker is inclined to introduce and to present new technologies as 
scale neutral, applicable to all holdings irrespective of size. The extension 
message is increasingly standardized. The effect of hybrid maize technology 
has been examined in detail in Chapter 6. Hunt (1984), too, emphasizes that 
crop package recommendations centred on improved husbandry (i.e. correct 
time of planting, row planting, optimum spacing, dean weeding, fertilising, 
improved seeds) necessitate, at specific points in time, increased labour inputs 
which may have to be withdrawn from other productive activities.'* Labour 
constraints and limited cash sources influence the farmers' response to 
innovations and reduce their willingness to adopt risky innovations. Hunt 
(1984) claims that for these reasons the poor peasant farmer is only adopting a 
part of the recommended crop package and predsely that part which is 
consistent with the resources available to them. Packages, however, are 
designed to apply as a whole: only then will technology work, and will a 
higher yield be the result. This means that the likely adoption of the package 
by the farming community as a whole is restrained severdy.'S 
7.3.2.2. The nature of the linkages 
Statistics and research on the extension service and the extent to which it 
reaches the smaller farmers give evidence of the fact that, in absolute numbers, 
the larger farmers and the so-called 'progressive' farmers among the 
smallholder community, were reached and being served better than the poorer 
smallholder.96 Several studies have concluded that the impact of extension 
services on production has been rather small and ineffective. Farm visits are 
limited and infrequent. Moreover, more than half of these visits have tended to 
be to 'progressive' or 'receptive' farmers (i.e. middle peasant and capitalist 
farmers) and to neglect the 'non-progressive' or non-innovating farmers (i.e. 
poor and subsistence farmers). Women fanners also receive less than their 
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share of extension visits while food production is largely the produce of 
women farmers.97 
A detailed study by Leonard (1977) revealed that the extension service was 
inefficient in terms of stated objectives and, more importantly, the institutional 
relations between extension service and target group was severely biased. 
Leonard argued that 'current extension practice is accentuating the gap 
between the wealthier minority and the poor majority of farmers.'98 Another 
study maintained that 'extension creates poverty' in Kenya." The extension 
service made the so-called 'progressive' or 'receptive' farmers focal points of 
attention and tended to neglect the poor farmer. The service was biased in 
economic terms towards the successful fanners. 
Leonard's research offers several explanations for this uneven distribution 
of service.К* It is partly explained by the fact that MOALD focused more on 
the distribution of services among ethnic groups and regions,101 and partly by 
the fact that MOALD did not exert pressure on the extension apparatus to 
redistribute state services and to produce equity between socio-economic 
groups. On the contrary, policy guidelines were directed at increasing 
productivity in agriculture, and the 'progressive' farmers appear to be the 
most likely group to promote this. Emphasis on the 'progressive' farmer is the 
easiest way of securing demonstrable results. 
A second explanation suggested by Leonard is hidden in the social 
organization of the extension service. The extension bureaucracy comprises a 
hierarchy of senior and junior staff at district level who transmit an extension 
message propagated by MOALD to the agricultural population. The system 
does not only reflect a 'top-down' pattern, it contains different positions for 
senior and junior field staff. Senior staff enjoy better working conditions, fine 
houses and have promotion opportunities; the junior staff are paid much less 
and have slim promotion opportunities. The field-workers are, as Leonard 
stipulated, loyal and likely to follow ministerial orders. The top-down 
organization in which the often authoritarian senior supervises the junior 
official, programmes the latter to do his work according to the norms of the 
service. Junior officials found shelter under MOALD's extension guidelines for 
a progressive farmer strategy, and tended to adopt, collectively, own work 
norms which often led them to restrict their 'outpuf (i.e. farm visits) and 
perform superficially. 
A third factor for an explanation of the perseverance of the 'progressive' 
farmer strategy is that these farmers have more political awareness and 
influence than the rest of the farming community: they are able to command 
delivery of the services needed.UK 
Leonard emphasized that although the extensionist is used to working in a 
progressive farmer strategy, it is safe to assume that, if such a strategy is 
abolished by MOALD, the extension worker will follow almost automatically. 
Leonard explains this by the fact that he did not discover any 'class' alliance 
between ridi progressive farmers and extension workers, at least at field level. 
Although the providers of services are part of the local elite, by the same token 
supporters of the existing rural, social order, the extension worker is primarily 
responding to the character of demand, not the social class of the 'clienf as 
such. Steeves (1978) pointed out that extension workers are by per definition 
'progressive' fanner minded. Steeves conducted research on extension service 
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in tea schemes under control of the KTDA. He found that the lower ranks of the 
extension service of KTDA expressed a bias in favour of the small fanner.lCO 
These situations suggest that if MOALD is dear about the target group of 
extension, the extension field worker at least will accept these guidelines and 
work according to the norms set by MOALD. The fourth Development Plan 
1979-1983 stated dearly that agricultural extension work should depart from 
the progressive farmer strategy in favour of group extension programmes 
designed to reach more farmers, i.e. induding small fanners. The Nandi 
survey, however, revealed that the bias in agricultural extension service in 
favour of 'progressive' farmers continues to exist (Chapter 6). This suggests 
that MOALD is not clear about its extension policy guidelines. The adoption of 
the T&V system in 1982 did not modify the bias in extension policy in Kenya. 
Neither the top-down organizational pattern, nor the perception of the 
provider of services and the technological commodity package nor the class 
structure in the countryside changed dramatically. Leonard's critique, and that 
of other researchers, that the uneven distribution of extension services widens 
inequality remains accurate. 
The implementation of the National Dairy Development Programme is a 
positive or rather counter-example. DDP is indicative of a situation whereby 
extension is organized to deliver services and a diversified technology package 
for dairy fanning specifically for small-scale fanners. The implementation of 
DDP created tensions within MOALD, partly because DDP-extensionists did 
not want to work within the 'progressive' farmer strategy which continued 
also under the T&V system. Since 1981, MOALD has split into MOA and MLD 
mainly because of this argument. DDP consequently established different 
extension linkages with dairy fanners outside the realm of the district level 
extension departments of MOA and the local Farmers Training Centres.104 
The World Bank's recommendation to overcome the prevailing tendendes 
in extension is more funding for extension work and to increase training and 
the motivation of the extension workers in order to establish closer links 
between research institutions and the farm. The Bank does not make dear how 
it perceives 'motivation' of extension field-workers. It hints only at increasing 
promotion opportunities for qualified officers, better housing conditions and 
soon. 
7.3.3. Distribution of agricultural credit 
State-managed credit schemes are administered by the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC). The creation of such a state institution was envisaged in 
the Swynnerton Plan in order to facilitate the expansion of African agriculture. 
Together with Cooperative Bank of Kenya (CBK), AFC provides most of the 
credit. Much of that capital is obtained through foreign aid relations 
established with multilateral aid institutions and laid down in bilateral 
agreements. Through direct and indirect regulations issued by the Central 
Bank on the provision of credit, the state controls the flow of credit from 
commercial banks and non-fínandal institutions to the agricultural sector. 
Private finandal institutions and commerdal banks are required to allocate at 
least 10 % and 17 %, respectively of their capital loans for agricultural 
purposes. 105 
The history of Kenya's agricultural credit system is featured by partiality 
and crippling debts as a result of which many credit schemes were abolished. 
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Research on the provision of credit and who actually gained access to 
agricultural credit suggests that credit schemes administered by the state or by 
private commercial banks favoured the already better-off in rural society and 
particularly those farmers located in regions where agriculture production is 
highly commercialized and where production involves high value crops 
(coffee, tea, pyrethrum). The Nandi survey as well the literature indicate that 
access to agricultural credit by smallholders is limited. Besides that, poorer 
smallholders have difficulties in gaining access to state-financed credit 
schemes due to discriminatory regulations. 
The IRS-I survey revealed that smallholders earning below Ksh 2,000/- per 
annum obtained fewer loans from banks than those smallholders with incomes 
above Ksh 4,000/-.10б ц is estimated, that between 1952 and 1972, only 65,000 
of Kenya's more than 1 million smallholders gained access to formal credit.107 
The Kenya government estimated that, in 1972, the AFC had loans outstanding 
to 14,500 small-scale farmers which was little more than 1 % of all 
smallholders.108 Heyer (1976) notes that smallholders receiving credit were 
exactly the upper quartile of smallholders in terms of income and holding 
size.109 in addition during the immediate independence period, smallholders 
in settlement schemes were favoured over those outside settlement 
schemes. HO 
The colonial state's credit policy bias in favour of white settler farmers 
continued after independence, especially through the Guaranteed Minimum 
Return credit scheme (GMR). The GMR programme, the backbone of the credit 
system for the large farm areas since the early 1940s, provided credit to 
farmers with a minimum holding of 40 ha., which was reduced to 6 ha. in 
1966. The reduction of the minimum size of the holding to 4 ha. signifies the 
trend for the advantages for large farmers to be extended to the 'larger small-
scale' farmer in the country.m 
The GMR scheme was terminated in 1979 due to its bad repayment record 
and misappropriations of public funds. The AFC, the administrator of GMR, 
was crippled by debts totalling more than Ksh 800 million. GMR was therefore 
replaced by the Seasonal Loans Credit Schemes (SLCSs). 
The termination of GMR must have been negatively viewed by Kenya's 
estate producers. The dissolution of the programme coincided with a severe 
drop in marketed maize production in 1980. Recently, the state scrapped the 
follower of GMR, SLCS, and rehabilitated the GMR-scheme. The major reason 
for scrapping SLCS was again loan recovery problems. More than Ksh 165 
million was, at that time, still outstanding. The rehabilitation of GMR was 
accompanied by directives which would prevent the previous abuses. Loans 
would be restricted to farmers who had no outstanding loan arrears under 
their repayment schedule for loans made in the 1984/1985 season. Earlier that 
year. President Moi ordered a fierce crack-down on loan abusers. The Kenya 
National Farmers' Union (KNFU) has come to the defence of the farmers.HZ 
The GMR-scheme can be evaluated as a generous state subsidy for large 
fanners and estate producers. Amongst the worst abuses of the GMR-scheme 
were prominent politicians and high ranking civil servants who used their 
influence to gain privileged access to AFC-loans.113 Leys (1975) pointed out 
that Kenya's large farmers have always commanded considerable political 
power to gain privileged access to state financed credit.!14 This can be 
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compared with the 'bulldozing' practice of large fanners reported in Nandi by 
an AFC-official (Chapter 6). 
Recent data on credit reveal that this pattern of distribution of state funds 
has changed somewhat: the share of capital loans to small scale farmers in 
relation to loans to large scale farmers has increased, although, the data 
indicate that long-term credit (for 10 years and over) continues to flow more to 
large fanners, and short term (for 1-3 years) flows to small-scale farmers.115 
One explanation for the diminishing of credit flows to large farmers is the 
withdrawal of the GMR-credit scheme, although it was re-established in 1986. 
Besides state-financed credit schemes, large farmers have also been well 
accommodated by private commercial banks, access to which is generally 
denied for small scale producers due to a jungle of discriminatory regulations 
in these commercial banks (see also Chapter 6 for an example of these 
regulations applied by private banks in Nandi district). Lending by 
commercial banks typically goes to farmers with over 50 ha. of land.11^ 
Large farmers and rich smallholders often have greater and easier access to 
credit, and not only because their non-farm income is used to secure loans. 
Credit institutions and particularly private banks prefer not to extend credit 
using land as collateral because of uncertainties of repossession. Private 
commercial banks tend to favour those who already own large holdings. One 
obvious reason is that this involves fewer loans and thus much lower 
transaction costs.117 As a result of the regulations attached to the provision of 
credit, state-controlled agricultural credit resources have found their way onto 
farms of better-off fanners and particularly estates. Okoth-Ogendo (1981) 
showed that the share of AFC-loans to large fanners tripled between 1974 and 
1978, while the smallholders' share increased only by 23.2 %Д18 
The AFC illustrates the institutional weakness of the financial system in 
assisting the smallholder. Okoth-Ogendo suggests that AFC loans extended to 
smallholders represent merely a cosmetic exerdse. There is a preoccupation 
with ability to repay rather than with the farmer's real need for credit.11' 
Moreover, the landless are virtually excluded from credit. Mortgages for land 
purchases are extremely rare. 
The limited coverage and relatively poor performance of Kenya 
smallholders' credit programmes in contrast to the their large share in 
marketed production, raises serious doubts about the role of credit as an 
instrument to foster agricultural growth. Von Pischke (1977) found for instance 
that self-financing has been more important than formal credit as a motivating 
force in increasing land productivity. It involves fewer financial risks and it 
leaves the farmer in greater control of his or her activities.^O This risk 
avoiding strategy was also noted among the farmers in Nandi district. 
The poor performance and bad repayment records of many agricultural 
credit schemes in Kenya is not only based on privileged access to the schemes 
or due to the regulations which accompany the issuing of credit. It should be 
noted that the agricultural terms of trade have deteriorated markedly over the 
past 15 years, resulting in a loss in purchasing power by the farming 
population. Agricultural profitability declined both as measured by the index 
of agricultural prices received relative to input prices, and when compared 
with other economic sectors' terms of trade. Capital accumulated in 
agriculture was consequently increasingly channelled into circulation.121 
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Apart from the fact that the performance of public-sector credit 
programmes is disappointing, it appears to have deteriorated in recent years. 
WhUe total lending in agriculture has increased more than four times over the 
last decade (from an estimated K£ 47.5 million in 1972 to an estimated K£ 225 
million at the end of 1982), growth has slowed dramatically in the last decade. 
It has declined steadily in real terms since 1979 - 1983.122 One reason for the 
decline is that the target of 17 % lending to agriculture imposed on private 
commercial banks by the state is only being met by less than a third of 
banks.123 
Kenya's agricultural credit policy is, as the literature suggests, severely 
biased and frequently crippled by bad repayment records. Due to the 
institutional weakness of the credit institutions and unfavourable economic 
conditions, many credit schemes were inefficient and ineffective. With respect 
to economic conditions, both unfavourable terms of exchange and the 
operation of the market ar involved. Many smallholder-designed input-supply 
credit schemes failed because either inputs were not available at the right time 
or the marketing boards failed to pay farmers in time.124 The existing credit 
schemes also tend to favour farmers producing high-value crops (the so-called 
'cash crop bias'). In many of these cases, single crop authorities (such as 
KTDA) and private companies (BAT, Kenya Breweries, etc.) are involved; 
these credit schemes can be labelled as successful. The overall conclusion on 
Kenya's credit policy is that it most certainly has facilitated commodity 
production in the country and, more importantly, current credit policy has 
favoured economic growth over equity. 
7.4. Conclusions 
This chapter examined the major technological and administrative 
components of Kenya's agrarian structure in relation to the implementation of 
the national Food Policy. The created instruments are intended to lay down an 
structure (institutionalization) to commoditize the agricultural economy. The 
instruments of state intervention examined became thereby increasingly part 
of the life world of the farming population and their dedsion-making process 
to arrange their own farming strategy. 
The Kenya case indicates that farmers respond dearly and quickly to 
changes in the terms of exchange which are essential conditions for production 
and reproduction. Correct pricing for inputs and consumer needs appear to be 
necessary conditions for increasing agricultural commodity production in 
congruence with national policy objectives. 
The overview of state intervention in marketing and pricing indicates that 
these instruments of intervention are rather ineffectively applied. Prices and 
marketing structures appear, apparently, to foster particular economic and 
political objectives. The objectives of the state to be achieved through the 
NCPB and its forerunners and the Annual Price Review undertaken jointly by 
the OP and Treasury, to establish controls in favour of consumers, controls 
which would foster maize production and which would evade black markets, 
have often not been met. Prices for maize have not been stabilized (objective 
number one, since 1942). On the contrary, prices varied widely by regions and 
seasons. Moreover, producer price fixation in relation to inputs and consumer 
goods has harmed the position of smallholder producers. The pricing system 
has tended to open up a large gap between producer and consumer prices for 
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maize. The logical consequence was, a reduction of marketed volume of other 
commodities, since fanners - as consumers - have found it cheaper to grow 
maize or other commodities themselves for home consumption. 
It is dear that the state institutions involved in all kinds of price-fixation 
processes (notably OP and Treasury) are not able to perceive the main 
rationale behind the fanning strategies of the smallholder population. 
Producer prices are not tied to consumer prices of food. There is a clear 
tendency to separate the subsistence element of production from the exchange 
components of production. This evoked not only (unforeseen) responses from 
small-scale farmers but also reactions from Kenya's estate producers. Because 
of the deterioration in the conditions of estate maize production (withdrawal 
of credit schemes, import restrictions and currency devaluation), the marketed 
volume of maize from estates dropped significantly. Less maize was available, 
and farmers responded by growing more maize for subsistence and cut back 
on export production. The impact of the inefficient maize marketing system 
and related price regulations has affected not only the welfare of rural 
households, but also the state's objective of maximizing foreign exchange 
earnings and reducing government spending on food (maize and milk) 
imports. 
It seems that the state instruments to deal with the deficits on the balance of 
payments account - import restriction, currency devaluation, preventing 
abuses of public funds - are detrimental. The opposite of what is intended is 
most likely the result, with the immediate effect that the influence of foreign 
aid agencies (notably of IMF and World Bank) on policy implementation is 
increasing. The intervention of the World Bank in the maize marketing system 
is a clear example. The Nandi survey indicated, however, that the problems of 
maize marketing are still not solved. 
Inefficiency of state intervention is, however, only one component. This 
chapter has brought forward the selective nature of intervention. The logical 
interaction of agricultural R&D, dissemination, the biased nature of the 
linkages between various institutions, produces the unequal distribution of the 
possible benefits of commoditization of the agricultural economy. An agrarian 
structure emerged upon which economic growth is founded, but which 
reproduces simultaneously heterogeneity in agriculture as well as creates 
tensions inherent in the structure which might be deleterious to the state's 
objective of maximizing output. 
The agrarian structure in Nandi district as well as at national level revealed 
serious partialities in the part of these institutions. Nandi fanners, in particular 
the poor, are hesitant to sell maize to the NCPB, were denied credit and did 
not receive visits from extension officers. The issue of credit and the access of 
Nandi's capitalist and rich farmers to it, widened the gap between the rural 
strata as well as between the Nandi and the Luhya. Nandi appeared not to be 
an exception to the rule. Credit, extension, marketing arrangements and 
agricultural R&D have been among the mechanisms which govern the process 
of differentiation in Kenya. 
Technology transfer is only one element of this process but has far reaching 
consequences. The commoditization of the economy which is the logical 
accompaniment of the hybridization of maize causes severe constraints for the 
fanning population, particularly for the poorest among them. The crudal 
physical production inputs, hybrid seeds and fertilizers, appear increasingly as 
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commodities in the production process and not every farmer can afford to 
purchase these requirements for hybrid maize production without creating 
other constraints. Due to the emphasis of the state on hybridizing the 
production of the staple food maize, land-poor farmers, in particular, are 
forced either to increase their rate of commercialization of agricultural 
production as a consequence of which they appear later in the season as food 
purchasers on the market, and/or are compelled to straddle agriculture with 
off-farm work. 
When seeds, fertilizers, family or wage labour are not available at the right 
time and/or when payments for that part of the harvest which is marketed to 
the NCPB are delayed, production will be curtailed and fanners can only plant 
late the following season. The state has assigned itself with the important task 
of regulating the output market, but showed to be incapable in fulfilling it. 
Based on a quantitative analysis, it was shown that the total effect (within a 
wide range of other variables) of a particular component of the state 
technology policy on yield, hybridization of maize, was rather disappointing. 
More importantly, technology transfer to agriculture appeared to be biased 
towards favourable ecological areas and appeared to be a basic component in 
large farmers' entrepreneurial strategies. Commoditization and 
institutionalization in Nandi, governed by the state, clearly have a selective 
character. The almost logical outcome is that social differentiation of the 
agricultural population will be reproduced constantly. This raises some doubts 
about the prevailing technology policy of the state in the agricultural sector, 
doubts about the standardized crop package recommendations and the 
distribution of the benefits among the agricultural population. Chapter 6, 
however, indicated the ability of farmers to transform the standardized 
commodity package to their advantage on an unplanned way. They are able 
produce considerable yields. An enormous capacity and knowledge is lying 
idle in the rural areas of Kenya, a knowledge not of the kind that generally 
informs policy makers. Agricultural R&D organizations persist in ignoring 
these potentials of development. 
A particular aspect of technology transfer involves the time of planting and 
the creation of labour peaks. The Nandi survey indicated that as the time for 
planting hybrid maize becomes a conditioning factor for obtaining high yields, 
mechanization is, as noted, the response. The employment-generating effects 
of hybrid maize, one of the claims of success, is therefore also ambiguous. 
Agricultural labour input and wage-labour demand is only required during a 
few months of the year and thus primarily casual. This implies, too, that there 
are periods were when labour power is severely underutilized. Additionally, 
when the conditions for off-farm work during periods of low labour demand 
are absent, it is rather difficult to make productive use of the free labour time. 
The noted trend towards mechanization indicates that employment 
opportunities are not created and that rural labour is severely underutilized, 
leaving potential for development unexplored. 
The positive effect of increased labour demand put forward by Gerhart 
(1976) and the state can easily be turned into a negative effect. In addition, the 
degree to which the higher yields in hybrid maize production are reached by 
increased employment of new technologies and husbandry practices depends 
largely on the location of the farm in favourable agro-ecological zones. To 
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make matters worse, the inefficient marketing and pricing system tends to 
reinforce this pattern. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN RETROSPECT: THE STATE AND 
STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN KENYA 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters examined various components of agricultural policy, 
how these were implemented by the state and the general effect on agrarian 
change since independence. Chapters 4 to 7 elucidated the thesis that there 
exists in Kenya a deviation between policy objectives and implementation. 
Various instrumentalities of the state either were inefficient, and therefore 
characterized as ineffective, and/or were distorted during the implementation 
phase. Institutionalization on the part of various state institutions in Kenya 
was for this reasons seen as maintaining selective and severely biased relations 
with the various classes and groups in the agrarian society. The backbone of 
agricultural policy, institutionalization and commoditization, generated 
various rhythms of agrarian change generating and reinforcing economic and 
social differentiation in the rural areas. 
In this chapter we shall attempt to construe why the effect of the various 
means and instruments of state intervention in agriculture deviates from the 
alleged objectives. The point of reference is the processual level. Chapter 1.4.1. 
indicated that policy development does not take place in a political vacuum; 
decisions regarding state intervention in agriculture are made and 
implemented within a socio-political framework in which many interacting 
relationships are at play . An important question in this respect is 'who is in 
command of the state in Kenya ?', and 'what have they done with that power ?'. 
An answer to these questions involves several components. The first 
section focuses on a politico-economic framework for analyzing state 
intervention. We also attempt to identify the way the state bureaucracy 
categorizes the farming population. The second section elaborates on state-
society relations since the late 1950s. In the third section we return to the 
effidency and effectiveness of state intervention in agriculture and bring state-
sodety relations in the implementation of policy back into the picture. 
8.1. An analytical framework 
An analytical framework must encompass at least five aspects. The first is that 
the state apparatus has not been built overnight, neither were the functions of 
the state. The state, during the colonial period and ever since, tremendously 
expanded its functions and power in the rural sector with object of gradually 
creating the essential preconditions for commodity production and 
commodity relations which could ensure its expansion. For reasons dealt with 
in Chapter 2, however, more than 60 years of colonial rule had elapsed before 
the real boom in commodity production occurred with extremely high growth 
rates, although growth stagnated significantly again since in the late 1970s. 
The main instrumentalities of the state in Kenya have been examined in 
Chapter 3, sections 3.2.and 3.3 Important for the Kenyan context is that 
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instead, of constituting itself as a large producer of agricultural commodities, 
the state preferred to leave commodity production to be organized by 
numerous household producers and a limited number of estate producers and 
plantation owners. The economic functions of the state in agriculture are thus 
primarily oriented towards facilitating accumulation, rather then 
accumulating capital itself.· State revenue derives, therefore, to a large extent 
from taxes levied on the marketing of agricultural production, export and 
import trade. State control over marketing is viewed as essential to maintain 
the income position of the state in order to pay the wage bill, to expand its 
investment funds for industrial and agricultural development and gain access 
to and maintain foreign exchange reserves.2 
A second aspect of the state is that the basic state functions created in the 
colonial context by the colonial administration were also incorporated into the 
post-colonial state apparatuses. The newly independent state inherited the 
branches of governance and instrumentalities of the colonial state. The post-
colonial state extended - geographically as well as in terms of an increase of 
state institutions and state bureaucracy - its economic and political functions in 
relation to the creation of conditions for extended accumulation of capital by 
the indigenous capitalists in agriculture and other sectors of the economy. It 
also opted for the integration and mobilization of numerous household 
producers in a nation-wide project to enhance commodity production for the 
internal and international market, Chapter 4 has shown, however, that the 
benefits of such policy were restricted to only a few regions, about 60 % of the 
smallholder population and the large farm sector. 
In that sense, the post-colonial state continued to facilitate the two rhythms 
of agrarian change in Kenya which emerged after the 1950s and to mediate 
between the interests of the dominant classes and groups in the power bloc of 
the state and other sectors of Kenya's society. Thus an understanding of state-
sodety relations is essential for an understanding of agricultural policy 
formulation and implementation. 
A third aspect is that the state performs its functions with much vigour. The 
state was first of all forced by certain interests groups in the country to 
perform these functions. In chapter 2 it was indicated that, during the first 
period of colonial rule, foreign estate companies and white settlers represented 
the dominant political and economic forces in Kenya. The state was forced to 
take several measures creating the conditions for new forms of commodity 
production: to supply land and labour to the settler community and foreign 
estates and to force the African population into the wage-labour market and 
into the monetary economy. After independence when the state was 
Africanized, state power was used by indigenous capitalists to gain access to 
settler-owned land. 
Secondly, the state performs these functions because of the absence of 
others who might be in a position to perform them. The state uses its legal and 
executive powers to guarantee the operation of various commodity markets, 
not only to protect its own income position but also because it saw the 
necessity of guaranteeing producer benefits and to protect consumers. Perhaps 
more importantly, the state has the objective of preventing the concentration of 
essential food trade in the hands of private Asian traders. The latter point is, 
however, rarely voiced officially in state circles.3 
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The state performed these functions because, in the state's perception, 
society is inadequate to do so. The legal power, as well as the knowledge and 
capital funds to perform crucial tasks in establishing the administrative and 
technological environment for agricultural production, became therefore 
concentrated in the state. Road and railway construction and the organization 
of agricultural research was, and still is, taken care of and funded by the state. 
Finally, and although there is an active local trade in food commodities, many 
state officials believe that the private sector has inadequate experience and 
funds to organize and expand trade on a national and rational scale. 
The fourth aspect is related to the state bureaucracy and to the classification 
schemes they use to identify the social elements of the agrarian structure. Any 
one reading agricultural or national development plans will recognize or 
discover a touch of egalitarianism in policy objectives. These plans point out 
clearly that state intervention is needed to create solid economic conditions for 
growth as well as to create legitimate social conditions for commodity 
production. Apart from price incentives and productivity increases, the state is 
particularly committed to protecting individual property rights to land, to 
avoiding land speculation and ensuring that production inputs, markets, 
capital and extension services are available to every farmer in Kenya. 
Irrespective of whether the farmer is large or small, rich or poor, they should 
all have their fair share of resources and of state services and funds. Leys 
(1978, 1979b) noted that current policy thinking within the Kenyan state 
bureaucracy favours the expansion of small-scale production based on high 
output and high labour inputs.4 
These more or less egalitarian objectives seem to be in contrast, however, to 
concepts or categories used by policy makers to order the agricultural 
population. They comprise implied, but not always plainly expressed, twofold 
and sometimes manifold criteria: large farm sector-cooperative sector-small 
farm sector; large-scale farms-smallholdings; large farmers-smallholders-poor 
farmers-landless rural workers-pastoralists; progressive farmers-non 
progressive farmers; farmers cultivating high potential land-farmers 
cultivating low potential land; (labour)intensive-(labour)extensive. 
Although these classifications contain a wide range of farms and farming 
styles, they have a few characteristics in common. To start with, the quantity 
and quality of the economic resources of the agricultural population are the 
starting point for classification. Secondly, the options for economic growth are 
reflected in the classification and appear as the structuring and guiding 
element for policy making and implementation. Policy makers in Kenya, like 
their counterparts all over the world, use economic rationales for their 
programmes, economic rationales which are mirrored implicitly in their 
classification schemes. While the resulting plans increasingly highlight the 
need for policy re-orientation and while simultaneously more data (collected 
by the state itself and by independent research reports - on estate production, 
small-scale agriculture, household production and rural poverty issues which 
could function as a basis for policy alternatives) become available, the 
underlying classification criteria are not modified. There has been little or no 
attempt by policy makers to go beyond the large farm - small farm 
categorization. This is not only rampant in Kenya's policy papers, but also in 
policy papers and project and evaluation reports of foreign aid agencies. 
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The fißh aspect of state functions in the realization of the concrete 
conditions for commodity production is that Kenya, like almost all other 
African countries, is an import-dependent economy. Kenya is firmly 
integrated into the international capitalist division of labour as an exporter of 
agricultural commodities and an importer of production inputs, capital funds 
and agricultural technology. 
The majority of agricultural production inputs are imported. This holds 
true for fertilizers, mechanized equipment and agro-chemicals. The only 
exceptions are (improved) seeds, hand tools and ploughs which are produced 
locally. Agricultural R&D depends largely on participation in international 
agricultural research networks. Capital hinds for investment in R&D, road 
building and infrastructure, for development projects and securing imports 
(obtained through balance-of-payments support) as well as capital needed for 
investment in agricultural production are partly but increasingly procured by 
financial assistance from multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. This implies 
that the establishment as well as the maintenance of commercial, financial and 
foreign aid relations are relevant for the measure of success of state policies. 
The securing of the continuous integration of Kenya into the capitalist division 
of labour ('the world system') should also be considered as a function of the 
state. 
8.2. Political intervention and state-society relations after independence: 
the nature of state power 
An analysis of the demarcation the state's economic functions cannot be 
carried out without examining the society upon which the state as a concrete 
matrix of institutions rests. 
This requires, first of all, an answer to the question 'who came to power' 
after independence was achieved in the early 1960s. This is illuminated by a 
retrospective view on the characteristics of pre-independence politics. An 
understanding of leadership is an essential ingredient for the interpretation of 
African politics. African politics had been organized from 1919 around 
associations, although the LNCs provided the real and effective arenas for 
articulating discontent between 1924 and 1957. The LNCs were the arena 
where much anti-colonial radicalism was articulated by the watu im mission, 
the educated strata of the African population. The national political 
movements, in formation after the major policy reforms were implemented in 
the 1950s and when the need for a long-term solution became increasingly 
overt, can be seen as the heirs of this nationalist ideology. These political 
movements (Kenya African National Union [KANU], Kenya African 
Democratic Union [KADU] and the later formed opposition party, the Kenya 
Peoples' Union [KPU]), can at best be portrayed as movements trying to 
mobilize regional political leaders into working political alliances. The parties 
were arrangements of local leaders established for the purpose of capturing 
and retaining state power. Coalition building by leaders was the basis of party 
organization. There were the leaders of the factions who had considerable 
experience with political representation in LNCs and in the Legislative 
Council during the colonial period. There were also leaders whose leadership 
was, above all founded on articulation of local interest groups.5 The first grew 
out of the official political arena, the second type of leadership emerged out of 
representation of interests. 
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The KANU-coalition and the KADU-coalition, which contested each other 
in the pre-independence elections of 1962, were accordingly mixtures of 
several ideologies with one objective in common: Uhuru (independence) 
through the maintenance of the free enterprise system. Despite this shared 
objective, KADU and KANU were rival parties. KANU, led by Kenyatta and 
Odinga, was in favour of a unitary government after independence. KADU, 
led by агар Moi, advocated a federalist government. Furthermore, KANU was 
primarily a party of the Kikuyu, Embu, Mem, Luo and the Kamba. KADU was 
a grouping of notables of the Kalenjin people of the Rift Valley and some of the 
neighbouring Luhya, of the Maasai, of the Taita and of the various peoples of 
the CoasL Although the latter were less numerous, they had more land and 
livestock but less education and less experience of wage labour, cash-crop 
agriculture or trade than those whose leaders formed KANU. KADU was a 
defence coalition to counter ethnic and political domination KANU after 
independence. They particularly feared Kikuyu acquisition of land in the Rift 
Valley under a KANU govemment.6 Anyang7 NyongO (1989) stresses, 
contrary to Leys' (1975) view on this issue, that both KANU and KADU 
contained elements of radicalism as well as conservatism. The land issue 
makes this dear: 
'(...) on both sides there were those who represented very poor 
constituencies, very land hungry constituencies, who felt that neither 
the KADU approach (i.e. regional authorities in control over land 
transactions after independence, p.h.) nor the settlement scheme 
approach (of some sections within KANU) would satisfy their 
supporters. There were also those who, for ideological reasons, believed 
that a land policy based on the regulation of market forces was unjust to 
the poor and landless and that the government had to take a much more 
radical posture after independence in acquiring land and distributing it 
free to me landless.'^ 
Both parties were in an arena of politics where faction leaders 'collide' and 
'collude' in their enduring struggle for power. The political basis of 
competition has been the hierarchy of patrons and political parties established 
in the rural areas since the mid-1950s. Not only did factionalism and patronage 
over their followers ('constituencies') determine the fortunes of individual 
leaders, but they have also been the foundation for ethnic and regional 
competition and tribalist ideology which have been the primary mechanisms 
of political control over the countryside.8 The nationalist coalition of leaders 
who came to power after independence was thus a fragile alliance with 
different ideological factions taking part in that alliance. The fragile nature and 
loose structure of the 'historical bloc1 explain the ease with which individuals, 
interests groups and even whole parties shifted their affiliations from one 
party to another in the period immediately prior independence.' But the 
factional and ideological divisions did not emerge until after independence. 
Apart from the material and ideological differences it is for the Kenyan 
context very significant to recapitulate that members of the ruling class -
nascent and transformed during the pre-colonial and colonial episode to 
become a group of embryo-indigenous capitalists - were the initiators of a 
political process to gain independence and the leaders of nationalist 
movements. 
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This position placed them in a strategic position for taking control of the 
state after independence. Leys (1979b) stresses that 
'What is crucial to an understanding of the development strategy of the 
1960s and 1970s is that it is not inspired by the interests of (a petty-
bourgeois, p.h.) class, but by a class of African capitalist proper, 
however modest and economically weak, relative to foreign capital, it 
may have been at independence.'lo 
The indigenous capitalists became a ruling class who had access to the power 
functions of the state and whose interests were reflected in the state 
apparatuses. Apart from economic power as a consequence of the relatively 
large scale of capital accumulated by the indigenous capitalists before and 
shortly after independence. Leys pointed out that it had a further highly 
significant asset: accumulation of capital 
'was heavily concentrated not only in the largest ethnic group (the 
Kikuyu, p.h.) (...) but also in the economic and political centre of the 
country (Central Province, p.h.). Combined with its strong 
representation in the state apparatus (due to its heavy investment in 
education in the colonial period, p.h.) the indigenous bourgeoisie was 
exceptionally well placed to convert its natural dominance in the 
nationalist movement into a position of strategic control over the post-
colonial realignments needed for the next phase of accumulation. By 
mid-1966 (...) these realignments (i.e. the merger of KANU and KADU, 
and the formation and subsequent banning of the opposition party KPU, 
p.h.) had been completed and the framework for an effective power 
bloc" under the hegemony of the Kikuyu bourgeoisie was dearly 
established.'! 1 
Although elements of the intermediate strata were part and parcel of the 
nationalist alliance for independence, they never became - at least during the 
immediate post-independence period - firmly entrenched as a political force in 
the power bloc. The {jetty-bourgeoisie was subject to the hegemony of the 
ruling class. 
The major events after independence which structured the formation of 
Kenya's agrarian (infra)structure centred around ideological and political 
disputes between these two factions of the nationalist alliance for 
independence. Gaining full political and economic control over state power 
was the essential stake for the struggle. This happened after KANU became 
the only political party. KADU was dismantled in 1964, integrated into the 
KANU-party structure and leadership, and KADU-leaders took part in the 
KANU-govemment led by President Kenyatta and vice-President Odinga. One 
faction, i.e. the predominant one within KANU, was led by Kenyatta and 
Mboya, minister of Economic Planning in the cabinet, a former trade unionist 
and Secretary General of KANU, who represented the interests of the 
indigenous ruling classes. Their ideology was 'right-wing' and capitalist 
Kenyatta served as a role model to the first faction: the cabinet and the inner-
president circle (the so-called 'Gatundu Courtiers'), who proceeded like 
Kenyatta to acquire vast urban property and estates in the former White 
Highlands, the Coast. For this group, as one cabinet minister has put it in 1982, 
'Uhuru is sweef. Straddling was legalized by a government commission in 
1972.12 This could only occur, however, when Mboya was literally removed 
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from his position since he had argued that the state should manage capital 
accumulation but not to be used as a means of private accumulation by those 
who held positions in state institutions. Mboya differed greatly in this respect 
from Kenyatta while they shared the ideology of capitalist development 
Mboya was murdered in 1969 as a result of a conspiracy involving people who 
were very dose to the President.13 
The other faction expressed a more 'left-wing' and typically petty-
bourgeois, populist ideology. This faction was also active within the KANU 
party structure. Odinga, the supreme leader of the Luo community was the 
central man of this faction. They called in public and in parliament for a 
general redistribution of resources. Odinga frequently accused Kenyatta of 
being a 'land grabber*. 
In the ideological sphere the right-wing faction, though it is better to speak 
of the Kenyatta-Mboya faction, took a lead over the populist faction in Kenya. 
They increasingly used the state media to assert that they were for progress 
while the others were anti-development. More importantly, they attempted to 
impose political hegemony by the publishing of the White Paper entitled 
African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. This paper became the 
ideological cornerstone of future economic developments in the country. The 
paper was not only a blueprint for capitalist development and controlled state 
participation and intervention in the economy; it took the wind out of the sails 
of the populist faction.!* 
These ideological disputes, which were nothing more than a political 
struggle for control of the state, reached a culminating point in 1966 when 
Kenyatta-Mboya succeeded in their attempts to manoeuvre their rival faction 
out of KANU leadership. Odinga's faction replied by forming an opposition 
party, the Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU). KPU became the political party in 
which petty-bourgeois interests were largely organized. KPU was a party of 
populists who derived their political legitimacy from the support of the 'small 
man'. The KPU was also the party of those who continued to disagree with the 
economic policies pursued by the Kenyatta-Mboya faction. KPU was, 
however, politically marginalized and banned in 1969. Most of the leaders 
were not allowed to re-enter the national political arena. 
KPU's banning was accomplished by Kenyatta-Mboya commanding state 
power to intervene in the political organization of Kenya's civil society. Atieno 
Odhiambo (1988) points out the two consequences of state intervention in the 
political sphere. The state tacitly made political expression outside its own 
chosen agenda a criminal offence rather than a political difference of opinion. 
Secondly, following from the first, it is the state that initiates political dialogue, 
and public discourse has become a monopoly of the state.i» Those who from 
time to time raised other political issues (such as Odinga did during the 1960s 
and in 1982 and the more recent events on the political scene in Kenya) 
continually run into difficulty with the state. These events represent for Atieno 
Odhiambo a watershed in the political organization of Kenya's society: 
competitive politics was replaced by political detentions and political 
assassination.16 
The political weight of the indigenous bourgeoisie in the state apparatus 
was strengthened during the Kenyatta presidency by the fact that the higher 
echelons of the state bureaucracy, ministers and assistant-ministers and senior 
presidential advisers were straddling political positions and private 
249 
accumulation The majority of these bureaucrats, together with the Kenyan 
senior managers of foreign firms, became partners and directors of new 
companies 17 Swainson (1980) pointed out that, m addition to that, numerous 
networks of interlocking directorates came mto being between members of the 
ruling classes, high ranking avil servants and persons occupying important 
positions in foreign companies 18 This development nourished the formabon 
of strategic alliances between the state, the Kenyan bourgeoisie and foreign 
capitalists These alliances had a parbcular nature They were forged by the 
state through its exerbon of control over foreign investment in the mterests of 
indigenous accumulation The state fended off forms of foreign investment 
which would pre-empt local capitalists m estate agriculture and other 
potenhal sources of accumulation 1$ 
A crucial political factor contributing to the coherence of the state was the 
centrahty of state power Administrabve control over the country was 
achieved through the avil service rather than through the ruling party KANU 
KANU declined rapidly as an political agency while the size of the state 
bureaucracy greatly increased The political positions within the KANU-party 
structures which could be identified with petty-bourgeois interests were 
accordingly shunted on to a siding The state became a heavily centralized 
apparatus during Kenyatta's rule as regional assemblies were abolished and 
about 80 % of county council budgets were transferred to technical 
ministries 20 
Kenyatta and the ruling group surrounding him, which remained 
remarkably constant up to 1978 (the year Kenyatta died), exercised full control 
over district and provincial affairs through the technical minist nes, and 
particularly through the Office of the President (OP) Moreover, with the 
revitalization and creation of new parastatale, there was a tendency for the 
president to staff top posts mainly with people of Kikuyu ongin This 
contributed to direct loyalty of the state bureaucracy to the president, himself a 
Kikuyu, and to increased political stability and patronage The final result was 
a concentration of economic and political power and the direct affiliation of 
the real political power of the ruling classes with the presidency and the OP 21 
A second, but nonetheless equally crucial political function of the state and 
Kenyatta's leadership was the political integration of the 'masses of the 
population' or the pleasantry or the 'non-capitalist classes' Lamb (1977a, 
1977b) has shown this process m great detail KANU leadership was cruaal for 
the political integration of the peasantry Control over local resources was 
transferred out of the hands of local politicians into the hands of the central 
state bureaucracy, thereby depriving the local government of its sources of 
patronage Patron/client relations were substituted by direct relations between 
the peasantry and state institutions It involved the energetic propagation of an 
ideology of tribal competition, rural development and authoritarian menace 
with political and administrative practices The state and the ruling class 
would like peasants to believe that improvements in their lives depend on 
competition for scarce resources which are all m the hands of the state The 
state was m a position to reward 'good' performing districts with government 
finance for development projects and to punish 'bad' performing districts with 
deprivation of resources These messages were expressed in many of 
Kenyatta's speeches 22 
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Lamb and Njonjo (1977) correlate this with the establishment of an ethnic 
and class alliance which facilitated an obstruction of the organizing work of 
the opposition party, KPU, in the rural areas, and particularly in Central 
Province during the late 1960s. When KPU leaders tried to activate peasants in 
one of Central Province's districts, Murang'a, on the land issue, the moves 
were immediately neutralized by Kenyatta distributing tiny pieces of land to 
the peasantry in the district.23 Njonjo argued that the stability of the Kenyatta 
period is to be explained by Kenyatta's ability continually to give priority to 
property rights above any other right. When independence made room for 
redistribution of white-owned land, large numbers of individuals acquired, 
and demanded, the right to private property, to own estates and the right to 
form family plots.M 
The political alliance between the ruling classes and the peasantry was 
cemented by an ideology of property ownership held by both parties involved. 
The alliance contained specific redistributing elements. Self-help programmes 
{harambeelS) were encouraged by Kenyatta and his allies.26 Frequently, 
Kenyatta urged members of the bourgeoisie to forge relations with the masses 
of the people. Financial donations by them and their 'friends'27 to harambee 
projects undoubtedly spawned the idea that the 'big men' (members of the 
ruling elite) contributed to the well being of the 'small men', that is, the masses 
of the people living in the countryside and urban squatter settlements. 
Harambee, however, also involved popular involvement and has been no 
small political and economic resource to the peasantry. Holmquist (1984) and 
Barkan & Holmquist (1986) maintain that it is a mistake to view self-help 
simply as a tool of any particular segment of society. He stresses that, through 
the mechanism of self-help, there exists within the framework of top-down 
patronage relations a certain political space and leverage for the peasantry. 
Harambee was a asset available to the peasantry, forcing the state's hand into 
areas and economic sectors that it did not find optimal. Holmquist iterates, 
however, that despite local initiative, leadership and latitude for a great deal of 
local dedsion-making - although it appears that community participation in 
projects tends to be uneven^ -, there is often also external leader ideas, 
guidance, financial assistance and occasional control. Self-help is, furthermore, 
constrained to fit into a broad outline fixed by the state of what constitutes a 
'proper projecf in order to receive investment funds from the state for schools, 
dips and dispensaries. And, when the state is funding, a good deal of local 
control is lost in the process. There is also evidence that self-help projects are 
extremely viable elements of the strategies of politidans to establish and 
maintain their legitimacy in 'their' district. The survival of MPs and local 
politidans often depends on the support they arrange for state funds for local 
self-help projects.29 Self-help is thus not completely dependent on the local 
community, nor on outside sources. In this sense, self-help is contradictory.30 
The functions of the state, designated in Chapter 1 as the integration of the 
different sections of the ruling dass and the political and economic integration 
of the peasantry, are reflected in the state's economic strategy. Chapter 4 has 
demonstrated this dearly. 
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8.2.1. The politico-economic determinants of state intervention: state-
society relations 
The transfer of state power after independence to an independent government 
was thus accompanied by many fundamental changes. The European exodus 
after independence facilitated by the British state made room for land 
redistribution programmes. These were implemented to give landless and 
unemployed Africans, smallholders and the indigenous capitalist class access 
to settler-owned land. The drive to maintain a bimodal agrarian structure, that 
is, in the state bureaucracies vocabulary, to maintain the large farm and small 
farm sector, was a central issue of state рюіісу. The first Development Plan 1966-
1970 provides an extremely clear example of this. Large- and small-scale 
fanners and landless people should have a fair share of resources and of state 
agricultural services.31 Political as well as financial-economic considerations 
underlie the formulation and implementation of various redistributing 
programmes. 
The transfer of state power was almost immediately followed by the 
Africanization of the state apparatuses. The state bureaucracy turned out to be 
highly responsive to political pressure exercised by the indigenous capitalists. 
The political domination over the state in the period immediately after 
independence by interests groups and individuals with aspirations to became 
large land owners, induced a strategy of 'transfer intacf of the White 
Highlands. Swainson (1980), Leys (1975, 1978, 1979b) and Cowen (1986) and 
many others have shown that state power was increasingly used to dismantle 
the existing barriers for the accumulation of capital by the indigenous 
capitalist class in agriculture, industry and commerce, and to restrict foreign 
investment. 
The transfer of state power and land redistribution was dominated by a 
concern shared by both the British and the new state, as well as by the 1963 
World Bank mission, to avoid a collapse of the large farm sector. At the time of 
independence, the large farm sector produced after all the bulk of marketed 
production. Maintaining this sector was considered as crucial to the Kenya 
economy.32 
The movement of African capital into the White Highlands, which had 
already began in 1959, was an additional concern for the independent state. 
The new occupants of the White Highlands lacked the essential skills to 
manage their new holdings. Underutilization of prime agricultural land in the 
former White Highlands due to lack of capital and skills was detected by a 
consultant report in 1977 as still widespread.33 It was only with government 
financial assistance provided by the Land Bank that many individual Africans 
were able to buy large farms. The AFC later provided them with capital to 
meet capital requirements. The new occupants of the Highlands needed as 
much privileged state support for capital, services and knowledge to manage 
their farm as their predecessors did.34 
Before independence it is accurate to state that foreign and local, Asian 
enterprises dominated the industrial and commercial sector. Since 
independence, however, the African entrepreneurs and the state cooperated 
jointly to break down the barriers to accumulation in industry and commerce. 
The newly independent government asserted the need for it in its 1965 
statement of economic рюіісу. These objectives are fonnulated in the Wfti'fe 
Paper. 
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Indigenous capitalists used the state in a number of ways to gain access to 
the industrial sector. They were assisted financially as well as administratively 
by parastatale (Kenya Industrial Estates, Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation) and the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation, a British financial institution which has operated in Kenya since 
colonial times. Additionally, foreign investment in industry was restricted and 
more difficult than before: from now it had to take the form of joint-ventures 
with indigenous capitalists.35 Coopération with non-African enterprises is 
essential for indigenous capitalists to gain access to technology; and in 
particular it is required for those in manufacturing. 
As a result, investment of local, African capital in industry increased after 
independence. It was partly a result of the purchase of settler shares in 
industry and partly caused by state protection. The majority of industrial 
production is however still undertaken by foreign firms. Leys (1978 estimated 
the figure to 80 % for the year 1977. He stresses, in addition, that by that year a 
significant degree of penetration of indigenous capital in construction, 
financial services, insurance, mining and, most important of all, in 
manufacturing was already set in motion.36 
After independence, the ownership structure in commerce also changed 
radically. The dominant position of Asians in this sector was increasingly 
challenged by African capitalists. Africans obtained better access to political 
means of gaining a foothold in the commercial sector of the economy to the 
disadvantage of other racial groups. The Trades Licensing Act of 1967, for 
instance, excluded non-dtizens from trading in the rural areas (many Asians 
were not registered as citizens). The Kenya National Trading Corporation 
(KNTC), set up as an agency to take over import-export trade, came to be used 
more as the primary agency for the Africanization of distribution in Kenya. 
From 1967 onwards, the KNTC has been used by indigenous capitalist to 
accelerate their move into wholesale and retail trade. The Chamber of 
Commerce became the spokesman of these aspirations. Public investment 
funds were mobilized (o.a. by means of extending business credit to African 
traders) to support the entry into commerce.37 
Leys, Mohiddin and many other commentators on Kenya's development 
strategy after independence portray the White Paper as the ideological and 
political bedrock for a continuation of policy and patterns of development laid 
down since the 1950. They argue that there was no intention at all at that time 
in Kenya to attempt a break from the inherited colonial and capitalist 
economic systems. The term 'reform' is, in Leys view, used to denote that the 
White Paper entailed: 
'maintaining intact all the elements of the colonial economic structures 
except for (a) the conversion of part of the former White Highlands from 
large-scale mixed farming to small-scale households plots for Africans (the so-called Settlement Schemes); (b) ending the restrictions formerly 
imposed on African farming in the former Reserves. (...) For the rest, 
there was a very important change in ownership of all assets: on the 
remainder of the mixed farms in the old 'white Highlands' (not included 
in the settlement schemes) which were sold by their white owners to 
Africans, and in trade, especially retail trade which was progressively 
transferred to Africans from the Asians who had controlled the bulk of 
it in the colonial period.'3« 
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Mohiddin (1981) too is clear about the aims of the White Paper. 
'Far from preventing or eliminating class divisions, African Socialism 
promotes and encourages them in Kenya. It is (...) the individual and 
not the communal virtues of traditional society which are encouraged. 
Its vision of the future society is one of property owning individual 
entrepreneurs, businessmen or farmers. (...) a society which stresses and 
values individual consumption and accumulation.'^ 
Moreover, Africanization of the economy during the first years after 
independence became increasingly identified with 'Kikuyunization' and was 
most certainly identified with ethnic rivalry. 
Nevertheless, despite the large representation of the landed elite, politically 
voiced in parliament as well as in the various state apparatuses, sections of the 
state bureaucracy continued to support the small-farm sector. Heyer (1981) 
argued, however, that 
'the policy changes to the benefit of small farm areas became not very 
evident until the late 1960s after the major reorganization of the large 
farm areas had been completed.'*) 
The support for the small farm sector was undoubtedly facilitated by many 
bureaucrats who were impressed, as some of their European predecessors had 
been, by the high labour productivity on small holdings. There was a growing 
interest of state agronomists, economists, extension officers and other state 
officials to support the small farm sector (see chapter 4). There existed a certain 
space within the state apparatus for such initiatives despite it meaning the 
reduction of the influence of the large farm sector interests on agricultural 
policy development. The marketing of milk, since the 1940s dominated by 
large fanners, was the first example in Kenya after independence of the buying 
over by the state of political opposition to granting smallholders access to the 
fresh milk marketing system.41 
The initiatives of the independent state in relation to the development of 
the small farm areas coincided with increased attention from international 
development agencies and foreign finance institutions to facilitate the 
development of small-scale agriculture in Third World countries. The World 
Bank, particularly since the mid-1970s42, and other donors became heavily 
involved in the implementation of rural development programmes, 
agricultural research and other infrastructural projects. 
State-society relations other than 'the state activated from above' or 
'activated from within' can also be held responsible for the state's smallholder 
expansion programme. The state also became 'activated from below' or as 
Heyer (1981) puts it, responsive to the demands of 'rural Africans'.^ These 
groups and classes, generally not represented at the political level, exerted 
pressure on the state for greater shares of the resources that were becoming 
available. Health and education programmes expanded considerably in the 
rural areas. Although, self-help programmes appears to have forced the state's 
hand, even to the extent of pushing state expenditure into areas that it did not 
find optimal, because the political costs of denying money to ministries and 
policy areas heavily influenced by self-help was too great to bear. 
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Harambee projects, a particular form of self-help, may be seen as a form of 
popular pressure on the state to expand the provision of educational and 
health facilities, roads, water supplies and agricultural infrastructural services 
(cattle dip«) to the small farm areas and former Reserves at a rate far greater 
than the state had intended. They also involve women groups that pursue a 
wide variety of income earning activities. As a result of local initiatives, rural 
development investment has accounted for up to perhaps 30 % of the massive 
construction of infrastructure in the immediate post-independence period and 
after.44 
Popular pressure was also partly accountable for the change of policy on 
the subdivision of large farms. The land reform envisaged in the Swynnerton 
Plan was extended despite the fact that opposition to land consolidation and 
registration was a strong element of the political platform in some areas even 
after independence. The 1965-66 Mission on Land Consolidation and 
Registration was not only appointed to investigate ways to accelerate 
consolidation and registration of land, but also to look into the need for credit 
and extension services, which were regarded as the two essential elements of 
Kenyan agrarian structure.45 As a result, in the late 1960s agricultural credit, 
for instance, became available to the smallholder population more widely than 
before and was officially announced in the first Development Plan 1966-70.*6 
8.2.2. A change in the nature of state power ? 
The period between the 1950s and the early 1970s may be regarded as the 
period during which the basic features of Kenya's agrarian structure were laid 
down. The material base of indigenous capitalists classes, reinforced by 
occupying crudal political positions within the state apparatus, was 
reproduced and subsequently extended. 
The political alliance of the ruling class and the state with the urban and 
rural petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry, which nourished growth, political 
legitimacy and integration began to erode. The particular constellation of 
concentrated economic and political power evoked political opposition from 
the petty-bourgeoisie, particularly among its urban sections. Individuals of the 
petty-bourgeoisie came to the forefront of political opposition because the 
concentration of property inhibited their particular accumulation strategy. The 
concentration of property clearly placed limits on their straddling strategies.*? 
The regime made some concessions during 1975 to extend the basis of 
straddling to its widest possible limits. The state proclaimed measures to 
facilitate the further entrance of small African businessmen into retail trade, in 
particular under a trade licensing programme^; the repayment period for 
commercial loans from the parastatal Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation was extended from 3 to 5 years, and most important of all, local 
manufacturers (which include foreign companies registered as local 
companies with indigenous partnership and joint-ventures) would now be 
required to distribute their products through citizen-owned companies rather 
than do it themselves.^ Despite these concessions, political and ethnic 
opposition remained. 
The political intervention of the state, crowned by the banning of KPU, thus 
did not dispose of the antagonisms between the ruling classes and the 
intermediate strata.50 KPU's 'populisf ideology, developed by KPU-
leadership, continued to articulated in parliament and was further developed 
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by a small number of MPs who survived the elections held in 1969 and 1974. 
MP Kariuki, a former Mau Mau detainee, former Assistant-Minister in the 
Kenyatta cabinet until 1974 and business millionaire, was a prominent 
spokesman of populist ideology in parliament and in public. Kariuki appealed 
to social inequalities in general. Kariuki's famous words, by which he 
criticized state economic policy, are that the Kenyatta regime was building a 
country of '10 millionaires and 10 million poor people".51 
In the rural areas land, ownership was becoming more and more 
concentrated in a few hands, a fact which was, and still is, difficult to deny. 
Nowhere in Kenya was the combination of landed property and state power 
so substantial as in Central and Rift Valley Provinces; i.e., precisely the regions 
which produced the bulk of marketed volume of agricultural production (see 
Chapter 4). These were also the regions upon which the regime's political 
legitimacy was based. Thus, when Kariuki came to the forefront shouting his 
famous words, the ruling class knew exactly where this message would 
probably generate popular action: in Central and Rift Valley Province. Kariuki, 
like Mboya in 1969, was murdered in 1975 under circumstances that strongly 
indicated the complicity of people very high up in government and quite dose 
to the president He became a dangerous man to the Kenyatta regime not only 
because he was obstructing the dominant ideological order in society; Kariuki 
was probably attempting to mobilize a political alliance of the rural landless, 
poor and middle peasants and the urban unemployed and workers.52 The 
emergence of MP Kariuki, and the political crisis he provoked, was an 
expression of how tenuous this political alliance between the indigenous 
bourgeoisie and the peasantry was.53 The ideological cement of the 
bourgeoisie-peasantry alliance became increasingly undermined by the 
concentration of land ownership and the widespread socio-economic 
inequalities within the agricultural sector. This uncovered one of the potential 
dangers and limitations anchored in Kenya's post-independence development 
strategy. 
In the meantime, the external limitations placed upon Kenya's export-
oriented agricultural strategy became increasingly overt. While the exercise of 
state power may have a role in the production of commodities locally by 
providing public investment in agricultural R & D , guaranteeing supply of 
inputs, providing services and capital, the international terms of exchange are 
beyond local state control. As indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, the international 
terms of trade shifted against Kenya during the late-1970s (and later in the 
early and in the late-1980s) and resulted in serious current payments account 
deficits. 
State revenue and household income from export commodity production 
were falling rapidly. Cowen (1986) points out that the adverse international 
determinants of Kenya's development strategy contributed to the fact that the 
potential ideological basis for a political alliance between the state, the ruling 
classes and the peasantry began to fall apart.54 Since the mid-1970s with the 
end of the coffee boom in 1977 and an inflation in energy costs (mainly oil), 
growth in GDP per capita has dropped from 5.1 % in 1976/1977 to 1.2 % in 
1979-1980. With this, the growth of the internal market has sUgnated, thereby 
creating additional problems for indigenous accumulation in commerce and 
industry and for the stability of the political system. In Chapters 4 and 7 it has 
already been pointed out that decommoditization, as a reaction of household 
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producers to the adverse conditions for commodity production, was a 
noticeable phenomena in these years. 
This is the period when Daniel arap Moi came to power. When Kenyatta 
died in 1978, Moi succeeded him to the presidency. Moi, as Cowen (1986) puts 
it, succeeded to power on the wave of opposition to the Kenyatta regime and 
its particular concentration of political and economic power. 'The Moi regime 
encapsulated the opposition as an expression of state power'.SS If Moi was to 
establish, and at the same time legitimate, his leadership and rule over the 
country, he had to deal with the opposition to the previous regime. Moi's 
succession was facilitated because political and economic power had become 
concentrated and centralized within the state apparatus, notably in the OP. 
While during the Kenyatta regime political intervention in the economy 
guaranteed the economic base of the ruling classes and notably the Kikuyu, 
Moi resorts to political intervention to protect the position of classes and 
groups which were part of the nationalist alliance for independence but were 
kept far away from the exerdse of power after the transfer of state power by 
the colonial state.56 
The consolidation of Moi's presidential powers was severely restricted by 
an attempted coup on 1 August, 1982, by sections of the Kenya Air Force. 
More importantly, perhaps, is that it was restricted by his struggle for political 
power with his former ally Njonjo. Njonjo became Moi's most important ally 
during 'Change the Constitution Movemenf campaign. Njonjo, like many 
others, must have believed that Moi's power would become increasingly 
ceremonial and that real economic and political power would be placed in the 
hands of a prime-minister with executive powers. It is widely asserted that 
Moi lacks the charisma to be a powerful president. Although Moi created a 
very influential cabinet post. Minister for Constitutional Affairs, for Njonjo, in 
the end Njonjo lost the struggle for state power. The "Njonjo affair" has been 
spelled out in detail by Curry & Ray (1984). The main thrust of their argument 
is that the background to the ensuing Moi-Njonjo struggle is not only 
explained by ideological differences, 'but also by the confrontation between 
incipient domestic and transnational capital, the eventual outcome of which 
remains undecided'.57 Njonjo represented in their picture that fraction of the 
indigenous ruling class with close links with foreign capital (i.e., the so-called 
compradore bourgeoisie); while Moi attempted to regain the confidence of 
intermediate strata without alienating himself from the ruling classes.58 
The Weekly Reuiew, a fairly independent liberal political magazine, offered a 
different explanation. The Review emphasizes the fact that Njono and his 
machinery wielded so much political power that it threatened the political 
position of the president: 'Power once created can only be redistributed; it 
cannot be destroyed'. Thus the elimination of Njonjo and allies from strategic 
positions within the centralized state apparatus was a necessary component of 
Moi strategy to consolidate his position. In the view of the Weekly Review, there 
has emerged in Kenya, 
'a new crop of politicians who are close to the president and may have 
inherited some of that power. But, by and large, most of the power 
Njonjo wielded has reverted to the president, to whom it rightfully 
belonged in the first place.'59 
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Thus the dislocation of the local and international determinants of state power 
coincided with a change in the nature of state power. The Kenyatta period was 
the period when the 'big men' came to power and stayed in power. Moi 
increasingly moved against the 'big men' in order to remove them from the 
centre of state power, although, as cogently argued by Cowen (1986), the 
change did not signify the end of a state which was bound to the private 
accumulation of capital. The Moi regime continues to sanction and has sought 
to smooth the path of private accumulation.60 Cowen asserts that the regime 
has sought to extend the basis of indigenous accumulation, from its previously 
privileged focal point in Central Province, to encompass accumulation in the 
West of Kenya. The expansion, in particular, of large-scale sugar production in 
Western (Nandi and Kisumu district) Kenya is a relevant development pattern 
in this respect A second aspect is that the Moi government, in its foreign 
policy, put much effort into re-establishing the regional East African market 
for Kenyan based manufacturing firms and to open up other export markets 
for Kenyan manufactured goods. This move may be regarded as an attempt to 
overcome the restrictions placed upon accumulation in industry by the limited 
size and purchasing power of the national market.6l Threatening state 
enterprises with denationalization and effectuating the threats is another 
aspect of Moi's economic policy. The question now is to whom these state-
owned companies will be sold; who is 'the public'? Curry & Ray (1984) 
suggest that the sale of parastatale, without safeguards and limits on 
individual holdings, would benefit most that section of the ruling classes 
which maintains strong links with finance capital.62 
Cowen's argument is that the ideological weight of the Moi regime is directed 
against both the grander of indigenous capitalists and the 'grandees' who 
emerged during the Kenyatta period of govemment.63 Thus what Moi 
attempts is not to attack the material basis of indigenous capitalism, but 
politically to remove indigenous capitalists from direct intervention in the 
economy. This does not imply that they are not capable of maintaining 
political ties to the apex of state power to defend their interests: the ties 
continue to exist but now mainly mediated through politics of representation. 
The indigenous capitalists remain a privileged class by virtue of its history of 
accumulation but no longer controls state power as a representative sector of 
the ruling classes.^ This would suggest that the position of the state 
bureaucracy and institutions vis-à-vis the ruling classes is increasingly 
strengthened during this political process of transformation. 
Moi's moves against the 'big men' can be illustrated by several public 
statements and the style of leadership he is developing. One of his earliest 
pronouncements was, for instance, that 'one can accumulate enough wealth to 
buy a golden bed, but one cannot buy sound sleep with money".** 
In this way. Moi was posing as a 'populisf leader and adopting a populist 
leadership style which would foster the interests of the small man.* The 
Weekly Review wrote shortly after the attempted coup against Moi on August 1 
in 1982 
'At Both Kisumu and Kakamega, the president continued his now 
familiar approach at pubic meetings. (...) he warned the public against 
'big people who were usually behind all the problems of the country 
and whose activities hurt the small man. At Kisumu on Monday, he hit 
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again at the big people, and Nyanza leaders responded by extrapolating 
into the president's remark the probability that some Tng man" was 
behind the August 1 coup attempt'67 
President Moi's public statements constantly proclaim the pre-eminence of 
private property as the criterion on which individual wealth rests The vanous 
development plans and Sessional Papers expressed these views constantly 
Moi's statements were made to attack politically the 'big men' 
'Regrettably some persons in authority, others in responsible positions 
ana even those in middle and lower positions have, out of greed and 
selfishness, exploited the general public through misappropnabons, 
corrupt practices, blackmau and bribery Such people are olatantly 
undermining our objectives The govemmenf has therefore an 
obligation to ensure that there are equal opportunities to all citizens and 
to eliminate such anti-social behaviour '68 
Moi stressed, furthermore, that 'every member of our soaety is important and 
equal' and that 'every Kenyan is entitled to an equitable share of resources' 
and that 'our soaety must therefore be free of exploitation' The context of 
these statements is again the aftermath of the attempted coup in 1982, the so-
called "Njonjo Affair" and the appointment of a working party (the Working 
Party on Government Expenditures, ι e the Ndegwa Commission) to frame a 
national code of conduct, which would revise or abandon the formal approval 
of straddling by the state The fourth Development Plan issued m 1979 had 
already promised to introduce a code of leadership and to re-examine 'safe 
guards intended to ensure the paramountcy of the public interests m the civil 
service '69 
Kenyatta also pronounced, as indicated earlier, the same objectives, but his 
public statements had a different content, namely, primarily acquisition of 
private property for the 'Gatundu Courtiers' through straddling (which was 
approved with state consent in 1971) and simultaneously cementing the 
alliance with the peasantry His famous rhetoncal question asked during the 
KANU-KPU struggle to the vice-chairman of KPU, Kaggia, in 1966, 'What 
have you done for yourself is a dear expression of Kenyatta's ideas about 
property right and acquisition of property *0 
Moi's attempts to abandon, or at least to limit, straddling can be interpreted 
as strengthening the productivity of the state apparatus m order to increase the 
efficiency of state intervention in agriculture?! and/or as an attempt to limit 
straddling by the 'big men' to give room to 'small men's' interests whose 
acquisition of property is restricted because property became concentrated in 
earlier phases of straddling (particularly immediately after mdependence) 72 It 
is the particular concentration of property m a period when the opportunities 
to expand property acquisition are severely limited which makes the 
concentration of property unacceptable During the Kenyatta regime the 
illusion of property nghts was the basis of stability, but when property right to 
land become endangered (or appear hollow because of deteriorating 
conditions of production and exchange) and its distribution highly unequal, 
the illusion of property rights is easily shattered More importantly, its 
shattering creates opportunities for political instability and soaal disorder, a 
situation in which political opposition may gain ground Into this context we 
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must place, for instance, Moi's directive, soon after he became president, to 
suspend all allocations of plots in the country. The decision had been 
prompted, according to the President, by the fact that there were too many 
people with too much land and who were still trying to get more when many 
Kenyans had none.73. A few years later, the press launched in May-June 1982 a 
campaign against the practices of corrupt 'land buying companies'. The 
campaign reached sufficient pitch for Moi to intervene directly and order an 
end to their dealing in some areas.74 Moi on a later occasion, in 1986, 
intervened again in the land issue. This time it involved the practice of a state 
institution, the AFC. Moi banned the auctioning of land belonging to farmers 
who could not repay loans advanced under by AFC. Moi attributed the 
farmers' inability to repay the loans to the devastating 1984 drought.75 
This kind of public denouncing by Moi of companies' land purchases 
asserts the sensitivity of land issues in Kenya. The post-colonial state after all 
derives its legitimacy partly (but still largely) from the property right to land. 
Kenya's history bulges with examples of land conflicts. Mau Mau was 
basically a land conflict and the KPU-KANU conflicts were to a major extent 
focused on the land question. Also recent unrest in some regions (such as in 
Kapkangani sub-location in Nandi district in 1981-1982; see Chapter 6) 
involved fights over land in the countryside. 
Moi's political intervention in the distribution network of agricultural 
inputs in 1985 in favour of the KGGCU at the expense of the KFA may be seen 
in the context of his attempt to assert the state's commitment towards the 
small farm sector, and it was clearly part of Moi's strategy to propose himself 
as defender of 'small men's' interests. The KFA was generally viewed as an 
organization established as to serve the interests of the estate producers and 
the large farm areas. The links between KFA and the smallholder population 
were regarded as neither efficient nor serviceable. 
One obvious reason for Moi to exclude the 'big men' from the apex of state 
power may be that the concentration of property and political power under 
their command is a viable threat to the reproduction of the so-called 'non-
capitalist classes' and thus endangers political and economic stability in the 
country. Despite the economic and political weight of members of the ruling 
class in the politico-economic structures of the country, agricultural land 
policies have also been guided by a desire to prevent a further concentration of 
land and other means of production in the hands of the landed and other 
members of the ruling classes, although, a further redistribution of land or 
large-scale land reforms are still not on the political agenda of the state. 
The Moi regime and Moi's leadership differ also in other aspects from the 
Kenyatta regime. While under Kenyatta, members of the Юкиуи as an ethnic 
group were promoted to the higher ranks in the state apparatus, during Moi's 
rule members of the Kalenjin tribe gained access to these state positions. Moi 
created thereby enhanced opportunities for Kalenjin to straddle private 
accumulation with political positions. A further significant difference is that 
during Kenyatta's time capital was invested productively in agriculture, 
manufacturing and industry. It appears that, under present conditions for 
accumulation of capital in the agricultural sector has deteriorated and capital 
increasingly being siphoned off to the circulation sphere of the economy. 
A second difference is that, under Kenyatta, the ruling party KANU had 
been allowed to decline as a political organization. Moi, on the contrary, 
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revived the role of the party and strengthened its position and organizing 
capacity. It may be argued that Moi's exercise of power was supported by a 
revival of KANU as a political organization and that he used it as a political 
machine to consolidate his power and legitimacy.7^ Moi launched a KANU 
membership recruitment drive to rebuild the party. The response to the appeal 
was modest, however. When the campaign was closed in April 1983, only 22.1 
% of all Kenyans over the age of 18 had registered as members.77 Later in 1985, 
the president ordered that all civil servants must also be party member. 
Candidates for public office must also be member of KANU. In the course of 
this KANU-strengthening process, Moi frequently proclaimed the supremacy 
of the party over Parliament. The functioning of the Parliament became 
subordinated to KANU. This means, as the Weekly Review emphasized, 'the 
assurance that the government has the power to pass any legislative agenda it 
chooses through parliament.'78 The designation of the KANU party as the only 
machinery for wielding political power positions implies that the personal 
political power of the 'big men' also became increasingly founded upon 
district politics. 
The position of KANU was even more strengthened a few months earlier, 
in June 1982, by declaring it as the only political party in the country. Kenya 
became de jure a one-party state having been a de facto one-party state since 
1969. A direct motive for this kind of intervention of the state in the political 
sphere was that Odinga, who was pardoned by Moi and admitted to KANU 
again, started to ventilate his oppositional views against Moi's policy. He was 
expelled from KANU after that. To prevent the formation of an opposition 
party in which Odinga was involved and which would undoubtedly express 
socialist ideas, Kenya was declared a de facto one party state.79 Furthermore a 
determined effort was made to crack down on left-wing dissidents and 
'foreign ideologies' especially at the University of Nairobi.80 At the height of 
this campaign in which the press played a very dubious гоіебі, six university 
lecturers were arrested and detained in 1982. The banning of intellectuals after 
detention, the banning of the Civil Servants Union (in 1980) and the University 
Staff Union (in 1982) and several temporary arrests and detentions of 
politicians are all attempts by the Moi regime to silence discontent.82 In 
December 1984, Moi announced that a civil servants' association could be 
formed but under state supervision^ 
Moi's adoption of a populist leadership style also translates itself in his 
political moves towards the masses of the people. Holmquist (1984), for 
instance, suggests that Moi's rather insecure position during the first years of 
his presidency is a likely explanation for Moi's deep involvement in self-help 
(harambee). Moi realized, to the same extent as Kenyatta did during his time, 
that access to the peasantry is best provided by involvement in self-help or 
harambee fund raising. Moi became increasingly committed to massive fund-
raising meetings with wealthy guests of honour who gave large amounts of 
money from themselves and 'friends'. Another aspect of Moi's political 
strategy is his personal involvement with the 'informal sector' (or the so-called 
jua kali activities) of the economy. He frequently urges state institutions (in 
this case the Kenya Industrial Estates) to pay more attention to the 
development of that sector because its expansion would help to solve the 
employment problem in the country. 
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The control over the political sphere exercised by the ruling party through 
the state is thus considerably strengthened under Moi's rule and appears to be 
a very powerful instrument in the support of his political position. Anti-
KANU is similar to anti-Nyayo which means anti-Moi.86 Being expelled from 
KANU, or the threat of expulsion, is enough to silence discontent. Or as Alieno 
Odhiambo (1988) put it 
'Expulsion from KANU means being politically unpersoned and 
therefore a social outcast. (...) Expulsion is a weapon that is available to 
district political bosses for whipping their rivals, as has been evident in 
the repeated threats of its usage (...) in the last four years.'87 
The above makes it clear that intervention in the political sphere by the state in 
the Nyayo-era is used to silence the opposition from the left, while 
simultaneously relegating the 'big men' to the margins of state power at best, 
and to the margins of representative and factional politics.88 The KANU is the 
essential political machinery for this elimination process. In the last two 
aspects, Moi's regime differs significantly from Kenyatta's regime. The 
magnitude of intervention in political affairs, however, is characteristic for 
both presidencies. 
It seems that Moi intervenes with much more vigour and intensity than 
Kenyatta did. Moi's recent interventions are increasingly directed against any 
form of opposition to him and KANU, whether it is left or right, popular or 
bourgeois opposition. Recent political events in Kenya confirm this. Moi 
persistently maintains the one-party system in the country as the only outlet 
for formal political organization and representation. 
Moi has clearly adopted a strategy since his ascendency to the presidency 
in 1979 to legitimate his political leadership and position as father of the 
nation. His strategy is based on a restabilization of the state by restoring its 
role as mediator amongst the propertied classes. He avoided being associated 
in these attempts with a particular sector of the ruling classes.89 Gaining 
popular support from the wamnchi (citizens) and an identification with their 
interests by distancing himself from the 'big men' in both the civil service and 
the government can be seen as expressions of Moi's drive. The fierceness with 
which various sectors of society (including Moi's former allies in the 
government and KANU) today oppose his regime reflects the bankruptcy of 
his personal political strategy and leadership.90 That Moi's political strategy 
and leadership style may appear to be a failure, does not invalidate the 
argument presented in this chapter, that the nature of state power has changed 
fundamentally. 
8.3. Commoditization, institutionalization and state intervention in 
retrospect 
The main agencies responsible for policy implementation in Kenya are various 
state institutions. Kenya's history revealed that the state was frequently, but 
not always, autonomous in its functioning vis-à-vis the ruling classes. The 
extension of the land reform despite political opposition from the ruling class, 
the provision of service and capital to small-scale agriculture and the buying 
over of large dairy-farming interests are among the examples which point at 
the relative autonomy. 
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The best examples, though, remam the tea, coffee and horticulture 
commodity produchon schemes which incorporate a large number of efficient 
small-scale farmers The agencies of the state - the KTDA, the Coffee Board 
and the numerous marketing cooperatives - facilitating integration were 
singled out by the state itself (Ndegwa Report, 1982) and foreign agenaes 
(World Bank, 1984) as the most promising and efficient institutions among a 
wide range of other state institutions In addition, credit and extension 
schemes administered by these institutions were adjudged successful (see 
Chapter 7) Although the 'export crop' bias was pnmanly successful m terms 
of serviang and marketing, it seems that their responsibility stops exactly at 
this point The determination of export producer prices vis-à-vis mput factors 
and consumer goods, which detenorated dramatically, appears to be an 
exerase beyond their control 
The concentration in state institutions of the infrastructural framework for 
enhancing commodity production in export agriculture nounshed state 
control over the actual conditions of peasant production Through these 
schemes, particularly during the good years, the political dependence of the 
producers on the state may have been reinforced and the political integration 
of the peasantry increasingly secured In a later phase, however, the legitimacy 
of the state was shattered and the option of enhancing political integration 
increasingly diminished This had much to with the deteriorating international 
terms of exchange and with the peasantry's position as producers and 
consumers vis-à-vis other sectors 
The actions of institutions responsible for (i) the marketing and pricing of 
domestic agricultural commodities, (notably maize and milk) and (π) the terms 
of trade for agriculture vis-à-vis industry and commerce, raised many 
quesbons The pricing and marketing regulations of the state institutions 
mvolved (notably OP and Treasury) are used to advance objecbves which are 
often not directly related to economic mechanisms such as domestic market 
supply and domestic demand The examples of inefficient maize marketing, 
domestic agricultural terms of trade as well as maize versus milk producer 
prices made this extremely clear 
Maize marketing (and regulation of consumer and producer prices) has 
always been a cruaal element in colonial and post-colonial state policy and 
politics The ophon to lessen state involvement has always existed there have 
been nine government-installed commissions inquiring about maize marketing 
since 1942 recommending, without exception, less state control Let the market 
determine offer and demand and price was the motto The role of the state was 
to be limited to buyer and seller of last resort The implementation has, 
however, always been constramed by the fact that maize markebng 
arrangements during the colonial and post-colonial period, have been heavily 
influenced by the estate producers They have always commanded substantial 
political support for there interests as producers and traders During the 
colonial period, the maize market and pricing system favoured the white 
settler producers, after independence, the system, as is shown by Leys (1975) 
remamed m tact Moreover, as Cowen (1986) notes, 
'under Kenyatta individuals at the apex of state power were directly 
mvolved in ownership and management of maize production on the 
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basis of large scale enterprise. Maize, indeed, was the most privileged of 
commodities.''1 
As traders, the estate producers made profits out of the persistence of controls. 
Mosley (1986a): 
'their possession of trading licences, for which there is substantial excess 
demand, enables to them to make large profits by shipping maize from 
surplus to deficit areas in times of shortage; these profits are oligopoly 
rems which might flow elsewhere if maize were decontrolled.'^ 
It was not only because they maintained dose personal relations with the 
exercising of state power that the new owners of the White Highlands 
managed to gain state support. Leys (1975), Mosley (1983, 1986a, 1986b) and 
Bates (1981, 1983), for instance, frame the success of gaining state support to 
the effect of pressure groups, such as the Kenya National Farmers Union 
(KNFU) and the Kenya Farmers Union (KFA). These organizations were the 
spokesmen of (large) farm interests lobbying for state support and the creation 
of an economically favourable environment for agricultural producers. The 
leaders of these organizations were primarily large-scale farmers themselves. 
To make the circle of political representation round, these leaders had close 
connections with those occupying powerful positions within the state 
apparatus or were within the centre of state power themselves.93 
There appeared to exist, however, a difference in political influence 
between maize producers and dairy fanners. Leys (1975) states in line with 
Cowen (1986), that the politics of representation worked out rather differently 
for milk and maize producer prices, as is shown by Figure 7.6 in Chapter 7. 
The existing producer price differentials between milk and maize, as well as 
between milk production versus maize consumption prices, may be explained 
as follows. Despite the fact that maize and milk are both important wage 
goods in the urban worker's budget, milk producer prices have been kept low 
because an increase might provoke demands for higher wages. Maize 
producer prices, contrary to milk prices, were frequently raised. Maize 
consumer prices have been kept low because of state subsidies (see Chapter 7, 
sections 7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2 3). The difference between these two commodities is 
that contrary to maize, milk has primarily been produced by small-scale dairy 
farmers since independence. Milk prices were seemingly easier to control than 
maize prices. This happened despite that due to the relative pricing system 
necessitated imports financed by the state. 
The milk producer price rises after 1981 (although still less than the 
increase in maize producer prices) and the implementation of the Dairy 
Development Programme (DDP) suggest that the state is determined to 
continue to implement its pro-small farm strategy in the dairy sector, to 
increase the marketed volume and reduce the need for imports. That this has 
been a successful operation is displayed in Figure 6.5 of Chapter 7, although it 
is unknown who exactly realized the increasing supply of milk for the market. 
The milk and other producer price increases raises, however, two questions. 
The first is who induced these price rises ? The government itself or IMF and 
World Bank officials who sit in the Ministry of Finance demanding the 
elimination of subsidies and higher producer prices ?*· The restructuring of 
the maize market in favour of private traders was, after all, triggered off by 
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World Bank intervention and not by actions of the state. Despite this external 
intervention, the Nandi survey indicated, however, that the characteristics of 
the maize marketing structure, late payments and difficulties of small-scale 
farmers in selling maize to the NCPB, continued to exist. 
The second question concerns the appropriateness of the milk producer 
price fixation in relation to maize consumer prices. As is shown in Figure 7.6, 
milk producer prices are still not related to the subsistence component of small 
scale dairy fanners, which generated tendencies with the opposite effect: a 
reduced supply of milk instead of an increased supply. The knowledge which 
informs price policy makers is obviously not based on a thorough awareness 
of strategies of small scale dairy farmers. 
Maize indeed is a privileged commodity in Kenya. Social forces that spawn 
the maize sector occupy crucial positions, either politically and/or 
economically. This is an undeniable fact. The reactions of Kenya's estate 
producers, who produce 70 % of the marketed volume of maize, to the 
deteriorating conditions for estate production are proof of such a statement. In 
addition, the estate producers and the larger farmers were advantaged in their 
transport facilities to NCPB depots and gained privileged access to credit and 
extension services rendered by the state. Agricultural R&D efforts were mainly 
concentrated on their demand for land and labour saving technologies. 
The fact that maize is a staple food, and, above all, widely consumed by 
households producing export commodities only makes maize a more 
important asset in Kenya's political economy. That the state reinstated the 
previously abolished GMR credit scheme, which has been primarily oriented 
towards the estate producers since the colonial period, is indicative о their 
relatively strong economic position. This happened despite the fact that there 
have been attempts by the Moi regime to reduce the big men's political 
influence. This suggests that the state is forced to continue to carry the load of 
indigenous accumulation in the estate sector by controlling prices and 
privileged access to marketing facilities, credit and extension services. 
The same may be argued if we consider the deterioration of the position of 
the agricultural sector as a whole vis-à-vis other economic sectors and 
branches. This raises questions about the ability of the state to assist the 
agricultural sector in performing its threefold task in the economy. The relative 
pricing instruments of the state had the effect of worsening the position of 
farmers on various fronts. The responses to this situation have been examined 
in Chapter 7. Both the efficiency and the effectiveness of these policy 
instruments are thus ambiguous. The price reviews undertaken by the OP and 
Treasury apparently favour interests in manufacturing and commerce sectors 
of the economy above those in agriculture. Increases in retail and 
manufacturing prices have been asked for by the local manufacturers and 
distributors as well as recommended by World Bank officials. While seed 
producer prices and retail prices of fertilizers, seed and implements have been 
raised in order to cover increasing manufacturing and distribution costs, prices 
paid to producers have been increased, but the domestic agricultural terms of 
trade vis-à-vis other sectors of the economy have never exceeded parity. 
Besides that, state intervention in the importation of fertilizers through an 
import licensing system is frequently disorganized and inefficient. The effect 
was that fertilizers were not widely available and yields went down 
considerably. This is partly explained by a lack of donor coordination. (Donors 
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supply 50 % of Kenya's fertilizer needs). Fertilizers arrived either too late, i.e., 
after the planting period, or were sold by the government to the fanners at 
different prices.» The inefficiency can be partly attributed to corruption and 
patronage. The World Bank noted, for instance, that some firms who entered 
the fertilizer distribution market had no capacity to import and distribute the 
fertilizers.9* In addition, the major distributor, KGGCU, had been approached 
several times by importers willing to sell their licences for a profit.97 
The above suggests that commoditizatíon and institutionalization in 
agriculture, triggered off by state intervention, is moulded primarily by the 
interests of estate producers, 'progressive farmers' and the manufacturing and 
commerce sector of the economy. Despite this, Kenya is a perfect example of a 
country experiencing a steady increase of agricultural commodity production 
by two social forms of production, identified in this book as the household, 
and estate and capitalist producers. 
Household production clearly survived as a unit of production alongside 
capitalist commodity production. This is the major element of Cowen's (1974, 
1981a, 1981b, 1986) contribution to the discussion 'what is happening to the 
Kenyan peasanhy.'S The perspective that the development of capitalism in 
the countryside in Kenya did not proceed through the capitalist differentiation 
of the peasantry is confirmed by many research results including the Nandi 
survey. 
This view contradicts the classic Marxist-Leninist view that the peasantry is 
vanishing and that polarization of the agricultural population between a 
capitalist class and a class of near-landless and/or landless labourers is the 
most likely result of commoditization. The emergence of a landed ruling class, 
taking over the White Highlands and wielding political power on the basis of 
its position in the highly centralized state apparatus, was to the detriment of 
the peasantry. This view is strongly defended by Njonjo (1981) and Swainson 
(1980). 
The survival of the middle peasantry has been attributed largely to state 
intervention in agriculture. The analysis inferred, however, that institutional 
relations are severely biased. The provision of credit and extension services 
and the orientation of agricultural R&D are seriously flawed by being merely 
focused on the needs and resources of the large farmers and the richer sections 
of the smallholder population (the so-called 'progressive' farmers). The web of 
relations between the state institutions in Kenya's agrarian structure and the 
farming population in Kenya shows a considerable variation. These relations 
are not always equally intense with all sectors of the farming population and, 
accordingly, the benefits from the set of relations are not equally shared. 
The bias towards large farmers and the 'progressive' farmer can be 
explained by the combined operation of political and economic factors: 
politically, by the fact that they can command political power to demand 
services and privileged access to state funds; economically, by the fact that 
policy, as well as policy makers and those who implement policy in the field, 
use economic rationales (growth rather than equity) and have consequently 
targeted specific sectors of the agricultural population: the large farmer and 
'progressive' farmer appear as logical partners in the development process. 
The classification schemes used by policy makers (see Chapter 3) hides this 
orientation and thereby legitimates, for themselves as well as for the privileged 
farmer, the distribution of benefits to these groups. This approach is partly 
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deliberate because of direct economic pay-offs and that it is politically 
productive for the state; it is partly unplanned because specific interest groups 
put pressure on the state on the nature of intervention, and on how and when 
to intervene. The implicit classification schemes have, therefore, a dear 
ideological foundation and focus. 
This approach to state intervention in agriculture generated three general 
development patterns with the reproduction of differentiation as the logical 
outcome of the combined operating processes of commodidzation and 
institutionalization. 
In the first place, a development pattern emerged based on accumulation 
and emichement. The benefits of state policy accrued to a relatively large 
proportion of the smallholder community and has contributed to 
accumulation of wealth and/or capital by capitalist farmer and rich peasant 
households. It was also indicated in Chapters 4 and 6, that this development 
perspective was also founded upon straddling between the agricultural sector 
and other sectors of the economy 
In the second place, the development perspective founded upon a middle 
peasantry whose production and reproduction is mainly based on agriculture 
and on maintenance of commodity relations. This group of farmers, in 
particular, appeared in this process as resilient despite processes of 
commoditization and institutionalization and state intervention tending to 
favour capitalist and large-scale production. 
In the third place, the implementation of such intervention programmes 
resulted also in programmes, however, which are harmful for the poorer 
sections of the agricultural population, or, as policy makers tend to label them: 
non-progressive fanners, poor smallholders and pastoralists. They have only 
partly and indirectly benefitted from state intervention. Moreover, as also 
pointed out in Chapter 4, only a few regions were favoured by state policy. It 
may be argued that the state did little or nothing to alter the patterns of 
regional and social differentiation which had been operating in African 
smallholder agriculture before the beginning of the 'agrarian revolution' in the 
1950s. The poor peasantry and the landless, however, may not be able, at least 
in part, to cope with the concrete conditions for involvement in commodity 
production. 
The negative outcome of commoditization, institutionalization and state 
intervention is clearly reflected in an increase of landlessness, labour outward 
migration to low-paid urban jobs and migration to less fertile arid and semi-
arid lands, widespread poverty and low nutritional status effecting large 
sections of the rural population and, to a certain extent, decommoditizadon. 
An inability to cope with the concrete conditions for commodity production 
has forced rural households to seek alternative strategies; i.e., to diversify 
labour power off the holding into low-paid off-farm employment to take the 
subsistence strain off the holding and perhaps raise the household subsistence 
level a little. By 1952, the smallest and poorest households had already 
adopted this strategy of reliance on off-farm income. The task of the 'agrarian 
revolution' was to lay down an agrarian structure which, as Kitching (1980) 
posed it, if it was genuinely to assist the poorest, was to get that labour power 
back onto the farm; it did not succeed in this respect - quite the contrary. The 
same can be said about the households looking for opportunities for off-farm 
income which they have not yet found. 
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Taking the three development patterns together, we can summarize 
developments in agriculture in Kenya as follows: the technological, 
administrative and political foundation of Kenya's agrarian structure, largely 
created by the state and concentrated in various state institutions, has 
introduced new opportunities and technologies with possibilities of increased 
productivity and prospects for growth and accumulation, but simultaneously 
materialized relations in the agrarian structure which increasingly restrict the 
maximum utilization of these offered opportunities. Not only the first pattern, 
but also the second pattern should be of concern to the state and also to foreign 
aid institutions. 
The current development plans underline the need for alternative 
strategies. Politically, as argued in this chapter, there exists at present more 
room than ever before to develop such strategies. Whether this is bome out of 
restoring the legitimacy of the Moi regime and the state apparatus, and 
economic necessity or out of real commitment towards developing real 
alternatives remains to be seen. But the implementation of these objectives 
boils down to a matter of political and the state apparatus's administrative 
commitment, and particularly whether the state is able to coax consent among 
the dominant interests group in the power bloc which has dominated policy 
development in the past. 
Prices may have changed a little in favour of the agricultural producers as a 
whole, marketing and input distribution improved and the nature of state 
power changed, but the technological core of state intervention remains 
invariably oriented towards the introduction of standardized commodity 
packages of modem, western technology. There have been no attempts by 
policy makers to go beyond small and large farm typologies, nor attempts to 
differentiate the technological recommendations and commodity packages. 
Conventional wisdoms die hard with the effect of leaving a potential source of 
development untapped. The exception to this general rule may be the National 
Dairy Development Programme. DDP is oriented towards the development of 
a differentiated technology package and based on different linkages 
established with the target group outside the 'normal' set of institutional 
relations, although it appears that the real effect of DDP will be limited due to 
the effect of pricing policies implemented by other, apparently more 
influential, institutions. 
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CHAPTER 9. 
EPILOGUE AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Introduction 
In this last chapter, some of the major conclusions will be confronted with the 
theoretical framework worked out in Chapter 1. It is an attempt both to look 
back and stipulate the need for further research. The theoretical fields for such 
a research programme will be briefly reviewed. 
9.1. Looking back 
In the theoretical outline in chapter 1 it was emphasized and promised that a 
different perspective would be opened on the agrarian question in Kenya. The 
research was to reveal under what concrete conditions agricultural commodity 
producers exist, and how these conditions were created by planned 
intervention by the state. The framework within which to conduct research is 
an agrarian structure which is seen as shaped by structural processes -
commoditization, institutionalization and intervention. In addition, the need 
was stipulated that the examination of the agrarian question should be taken 
from an actor perspective, involving struggles between actors. The outcome 
determines the nature of the agrarian structure. 
Drawing upon fieldwork and upon various other sources of information 
(research reports, academic papers, interviews) we arrived at the following 
conclusion. The previous chapters underlined that one of the essential 
properties of Kenya and Nandi's agrarian structure is structural variance or 
heterogeneity: structural variance in terms of differential degrees of 
commoditization, diversity in farming styles and fanning strategies, regional 
differentiation and social differentiation of the Kenyan and Nandi peasantry. 
The conditions, social and technological, under which the Kenyan and Nandi 
peasantry exist, vary thus considerably. The outcome of the apparently 
conesponding and unambiguous structural processes of commoditization, 
institutionalization and intervention in Kenya and Nandi district, is that 
differential conditions of production and reproduction were created in the past 
and present 
In section 1.3.4 of Chapter 1, the assumption was put forward that 
structural variance or heterogeneity of an agrarian structure is reproduced by 
the three underlying structural processes, generating three social dimensions. 
Two of these dimensions have been treated in detail from an historical 
perspective and on different levels: differential degrees of commoditization 
and a differentiation in the quality of life of peasant strata, a differentiation 
which is reinforced by different strategies of farmers to commoditize 
production as well as by actions of bureaucratic institutions to make farmers 
focal points of attention corresponding more closely to their institutional 
perception. It was suggested in the thesis that the development and 
introduction of hybrid maize technology, which is afterall of extemalization, 
was designated for the better-off farmers in the ecologically suitable areas. The 
274 
path-diagram, figure 6.7 of Chapter 6, showed clearly, for instance, that hybrid 
maize did not force a breakthrough in the dependency of agricultural 
production on climatological conditions and sodo-economic differentiation. 
The accompaniment of these processes and decisions of fanners to arrange 
their strategy according to a certain degree of commodi tiza (ion was the 
emergence of distinctive farm styles. Different degrees of commoditization 
clearly coincided with different labour processes in maize farming.in Nandi 
district. One style developed in a land/labour intensive direction; the second 
style was a labour extensive/machinery and capital intensive way of farming. 
The first may be called a style based on a strategy of intensification of manual 
and household labour; the second one clearly has the characteristics of a 
strategy founded upon capitalization of production. The survey indicated that 
the emergence of both styles corresponded with a regional variation in the 
landscape and the pattern of differentiation. The link between farm styles and 
being categorized as belonging to a certain rural stratum could not be dearly 
established. Figure 6.4 is an attempt to resent this variance graphically. 
Attempts to link this with the organization of the labour process in maize 
farming revealed, however, that mode of organization and peasant stratum 
did not coindde so clearly: farmers belonging to different strata could arrange 
the same labour process. 
This conclusion questions the treatment of strata or class categories and the 
validity of their use in theories on agrarian change. Three arguments can be 
put forward in favour of not to analyzing in terms of class categories. 
(1). Membership of a certain class category is douded by the fact that 
perhaps later, due to a variety of sodai and climatological conditions, farmers 
may transfer to another category. The picture of differentiation of the 
peasantry is, however, valid to express the differences in the quality of life and 
the sodai conditions of the Kenyan peasantry, but belonging to a certain dass 
or stratum is not definitive. It is, therefore, hard to speak of rural dass 
formation. 
(2). A second argument against using dass categories is that these belong to 
the discourse ideology or the life-world of a researcher. They may not coindde 
with way farmers interpret their own life-world. These categories, as pointed 
out in the conclusions to chapter 8, are certainly not part of the Kenyan 
bureaucracy's way of identifying the agricultural population. The tendency 
there is to distinguish only between large and small, progressive and non-
progressive. Chapters 4 and 6 indicated that such a categorization scheme is 
inadequate to portray Kenya's agrarian structure. A dassification based on 
different farm styles and strategies would be more appropriate. This could 
lead to a fruitful, and not purely academic, discussion about abandoning the 
predominantly one-dimensional agricultural technology policy, implemented 
by the state since the 1950s and instead, emphasizing viable technologies 
based on a variety of development perspectives, alternatives emanating from 
ideas of farmers themselves. These are alternatives which are practised 
already, but generally are not the ideas which inform Kenyan policy makers. 
(3). Using class categories is not entirely compatible with a theoretical 
framework which prefers to treat human beings as artors. Representatives of 
this tradition, such as Hindess (1986a,b), wam us of the various abuses of the 
connotation 'actor'. Classes do not act; human beings and organizations are 
entities which have the means to reach decisions and to act accordingly. The 
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tendency towards reifica don is clearly visible in many theoretical analyses, 
including this thesis now and then. 
This implies that one of the theoretical presuppositions, that is to study 
agrarian change from an actor perspective rather than from a class or other 
structural perspective, has not been fully met. Chapter 6 is, so to say, more 
guided by a desire to analyse agrarian change in Nandi district in terms of 
structural change - i.e. in terms of commoditizadon, institutionalization and 
intervention by external agencies in the conditions of production - than by the 
desire to portray day-to-day life of the Nandi peasantry. How these structural 
processes open up or constrain their choices has been demonstrated, but 
merely from a structural point of view. The precise way in which peasants 
organize their day-to-day life in terms of socio-culturally defined mechanisms 
and relations (networks, extended family relations, 'discursive means') was 
not established in the survey. By not doing this, we showed the tendency to 
view the Nandi peasantry not as an actor in the real sense of the word, but as 
an entity reacting differently to structural changes, changes which clearly 
affect their decision-making process and narrow their alternatives. The 
quantitative analysis, particularly the interpretation of the path-diagram, 
forced us, however, to argue that the Nandi peasantry cannot be treated as 
puppets on a string. They came across as 'capable' as well as 'knowledgeable' 
in the way they adapted - instead of adopted - new technologies. These and 
other capabilities of peasants lead me to the conclusion that there exists an 
enormous development potential, based on a variety of development 
perspectives, which is not tapped by state policy. 
If we return to the major theoretical question, raised by those - Lenin, 
Kautsky - who applied Marx's analysis of the industrial sector to the 
agricultural sector, whether it will be fully capitalized in the near future: it is 
not 'capital' which resolved the inherent dilemmas of agrarian development in 
Kenya. It is rather the outcome of the Kenya-specific interactions between state 
enterprises (Kenya Seed Company), state institutions (extension department, 
marketing boards, price reviewers, credit suppliers, etc.), local entrepreneurs 
(traders), fanner organizations (KGGCU), capitalist farmers and household 
producers which determine the way the agrarian question is solved in practice, 
in the fields and laboratories. The outcome is, as argued earlier, a development 
pattern which features various rhythms of agrarian change, structural variance 
or heterogeneity. This is in accordance with one of the presuppositions worked 
out at the beginning of Chapter 1, although the analysis is more structured by 
the view from 'above' than from 'below'. 
9.2. Other major conclusions 
This criticism apart, the research brought forward an essential conclusion. The 
analysis of the activities and practices of various key agencies in the field of 
agricultural development, planning and implementation has demonstrated 
that the essence of Kenya and Nandi's agrarian structure has (upto now) not 
been identified by key sectors of Kenya's agricultural bureaucracy staffing 
state institutions, such as the Office of the President, Treasury and the Ministry 
of Agriculture. These institutions all are involved in the Annual Price Review 
and have a great deal of executive power in defining the terms of marketing, 
the orientation of agricultural R&D and credit supply. Producer prices move 
one way, consumer prices move the other way. Agricultural R&D is primarily 
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oriented towards the introduction of 'modem' technologies. Besides that, food 
marketing is highly inefficient and a costly operation, causing more harm than 
good. Two sorts of reasonings were used to put this in the broader perspective 
of political economy. 
In the first place, that certain sectors of the bureaucracy admired the 
efficient mode of organization in smallholder agriculture (high marketed 
output, high labour input and moderate to low external inputs) induced a pro-
small farm sector policy. These features of smallholder agriculture promised 
afterall the implementation of policy objectives, such as maximizing output in 
agriculture and the creation of rural employment opportunities for Kenya's 
rapidly growing labour force. The relatively large share of smallholders in the 
production of tea, coffee, cotton, tobacco and milk is a reflection of their 
success in implementing a smallholder expansion programme. The change of 
attitude on the part of agricultural policy makers can be seen from the 
perspective of state-society relations in which the state is 'activated from 
belov/. This happened despite the fact that immediately after independence 
large fanners were the dominant element in the power bloc of the state and 
also despite the fact that the success of smallholder agriculture created a 
shortage of labour across a wide a range of farms in the so-called large farm 
sector (estates, intermediate farms). The relatively large weight of this section 
of the bureaucracy in the state apparatile is, however, obscured when we 
incorporate other decision-making processes such as pricing involving the 
producer price fixation and consumer prices, and the position of agriculture 
vis-à-vis other economic sectors in general. The annual price reviewers are 
apparently in a much more powerful position than the pro-small farm 
bureaucracy. The effect of price regulations on marketed output in smallholder 
agriculture as well as the trend towards decommoditization and changing 
commercialization strategies of smallholders have been discussed in Chapters 
4 and 7. The result of these decision-making processes has led to the 
conclusion that the annual price reviewers in the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Office of the President and Treasury were not based on a thorough 
understanding of smallholder strategies but more guided by furthering 
interests which have nothing to do with supply or demand. In the interests of 
the financial status of the state, it would have been a wise decision to come to 
terms with smallholder farmer strategies. 
The staple food sector is an example of a structure which has largely been 
moulded by relations between state institutions operating in this sector and 
particular interest group« which command considerable political power in the 
country; the estate producers. The reaction of these producers to a general 
deterioration of their conditions of production on the old settler estates in the 
former White Highlands as a result of the withdrawal of a credit scheme is 
proverbial: they reduced the production of maize destined for the national 
market. The immediate danger has been explained in Chapter 7 and has forced 
the state to re-install that major credit scheme. Apart from favourable credit 
schemes, these kinds of producers have been well served by the country's 
R&D system. Wheat production too is dominated, even more than maize, by 
powerful elements of Kenya's elite (politicians, businessmen, ministers). Even 
in the colonial period, wheat production was predominantly organized on the 
basis of (very) large farms with relatively high inputs of capital and labour by 
influential people such as Lord Delamare. This mode of organization has been 
277 
perpetuated ever since. While other countries, such as Ethiopia and India, 
experimented successfully with wheat growing in small-scale enterprises, in 
Kenya there has been no attempt to implement such an R&D programme. 
The following questions may be raised in this respect about the nature of 
state institution as actors, although, these questions can only be answered with 
some degree of grossness. This is partly because the dedsion-making process 
has not been studied but merely the effects of decisions in practice. 
Are we dealing with a state which is side-tracked in the fulfilment of its 
economic functions by social forces in the power bloc of the state, e.g. the 
ruling elite ? Or are we dealing with a state bureaucracy which is not capable 
of implementing the functions of the state properly. 
The answer to the first question is 'yes'. We may characterize certain sectors 
of the bureaucracy as willing to institutionalize relations with the various 
segments and ethnic groups in Kenya's agricultural sector, but lamed in the 
performance of its tasks by the demands of the ruling elite due to 
representational politics and patronage. The second question may be answered 
with a 'yes' and 'no'. There are sections in the state bureaucracy which may be 
regarded as fundamentally unwilling to materialize relations because they are 
not committed to doing so, and perhaps more importantly, they are incapable 
of doing so. The way they portray the agricultural population and the 
organization of R&D and price fixation is proverbial for the situation in Kenya. 
Other sections of the bureaucracy may be designated as willing and capable 
but occupy marginalized positions within the hierarchy of the state apparatus. 
Common to all these cases is that heterogeneity, so characteristic for 
agriculture, will continue to exist. The differences are reflected, however, in 
the underlying patterns of institutionalization and intervention. 
The first and third case facilitate state-peasant relations which would foster 
a diversified pattern of agrarian change and could spread the benefits of 
commoditization and institutionalization, relations which would be based on 
an understanding of the structural variance in development patterns and 
different development perspectives. By so doing, these relations would create 
possibilities of enhanced production and social welfare. In the second case, the 
bureaucracy fosters relations which reinforce the existing unequal distribution 
of the benefits of commoditization and institutionalization. 
Although there may be a fundamental change in the nature of state power 
vis-à-vis society, the political organization of society greatly obstructs the 
emergence of an atmosphere in which fruitful ideas about technology 
development in agriculture could be ventilated. Hence there is less 
involvement and participation of local communities in agricultural research 
and development programmes. That there is a considerable source of 
development potential, knowledge and capabilities is documented by the 
Nandi survey. There is a significant and diversified growth taking place 
within the niches of the agrarian structure. This too is an element of Kenya's 
'emergent structure' which was gradually laid down since the 1950s. The 
resilience of the middle peasantry despite an often inefficient and ineffective 
state is a paramount expression of local development potential in agriculture. 
9.3. A future research agenda 
The research results of the Nandi survey, supported by other research in and 
outside Kenya, suggest that we should stress the importance of theoretical 
278 
models which contribute to a better understanding of structural vanance in 
agranan economies In these models, we should pay attention to how policy­
makers, institutions, fanners and other key actors operate, deade and act 
accordingly within the confines of an emerging agranan structure The Nandi 
survey concluded that a considerable source or potential of development is 
available but not properly tapped What particular kind of potential, and how 
it should be tapped, was, however, not identified, that was not the objective of 
the exerase Future research should be organized so as to establish that 
potential and should discover the alternatives emanating from ideas of 
farmers themselves 
The way farmers organize their labour process is one promising research 
field The survey established that various types of labour processes, farm 
styles and units of production emerged Each of these types was able, 
obviously in a variety of ways, to raise the productivity of eacn unit of land 
Commoditizabon and institubonalizahon were identified as the shaping 
processes These process were characterized as differential m outcome and 
taking place within Nandi's agranan structure 
How exactly this differential process affects the orgamsabon of the labour 
process and how it is related to certam farm styles requires more systematic 
and comparabve research An important theoretical research field is m this 
respect, the relabon (if any) between mode of production, forms of producbon 
and farm styles In addibon, future research must, despite financial and fame 
constramts, be onented towards establishing the impact of commoditizabon 
and institubonalizahon m a certain bme frame This means that the Nandi-
survey should be repeated within a 5 to 10 year framework and should 
incorporate, if possible, the same farm enterprises as m 1987 
Equally important is how commodibzabon affects intra-household 
relations, ι e, between the farmer and his household (and parbcularly women 
and children) The survey was only marginally oriented towards assessing the 
nature of inter-household relations Data on female and child labour mput, 
whether family and/or wage labour, were recorded, but are not yet processed 
More systemabc data collection is needed across a wide range of farms to 
assess the impact of commoditizabon and institubonalizahon on gender 
relations in agriculture 
A second line of research, closely related to the first, is the way 
commodihzed and non-commodibzed relationships in agriculture are 
interlinked Various researchers point out that the resilience or sustamability 
of peasant farming is not undermined by incorporabon (see Chapter 1), 
although it is often simply assumed to be m many theories on agrarian 
development Economists tend to interpret it as bmely, a charactensbc which 
will disappear m the course of commodibzabon Instead, as the survey 
mdicated although it was only a snapshot taken m 1987, commodity- and non-
commodity relabons are an essential, structural feature of Nandi's agncultural 
economy In Chapter 1 it was pointed out that this may be seen as a strategic 
defence line of peasants against capital and the state How this defence line is 
exactly organized could not be established by the survey 
Hindess (1986a,b) and Long (1984,1989) suggest the investigation of this in 
the framework of the 'discursive means' of acbon available to peasants These 
discursive means vary considerably and form part of the differentiated stock 
of local knowledge and resources available to peasants and other key actors In 
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this line of research, it is important to appreciate the society's cultural accounts 
that, on the one hand, guide the orientation of farmers" strategies as well as 
those of agricultural bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, and on the other hand, 
structure the social relationships between the actors in an agrarian structure. 
We should understand and assess how these accounts open up or constrain 
choice. 
Twenty years ago, Mendras (1970) suggested with his 'l'art de la localité', 
which embraces more than just agronomic knowledge of farming, soils and 
genetic varieties but also incorporates the cultural identities of communities, 
that the converse-side of scientific knowledge is not ignorance. On the 
contrary, Mendras pointed out that within local and socio-culturally defined 
agricultural knowledge system, useful knowledge is generated. Extending 
Mendras' argument to a technology development policy, this implies that 
development institutions (the local state, international agencies, non-
governmental organizations) should build on the stock of local knowledge to 
develop a more diversified technology package. The National Dairy 
Development Programme is more or less based on this starting point. The 
validity of this question has already been raised in the Kenyan context in 
Chapter 7. The theoretical foundation for such an analysis is rooted in the 
diversity of farm styles and related strategies which can be recognized in the 
fields. 
This question leads us to a third field of research. Agrarian change must 
also be analyzed within the larger context of changing politico-economic 
conditions, such as the effect of state-sodety relationships which are an 
intrinsic element of the interaction between state institutions and the farming 
population. Chapter 8 has emphasized this on the national level. As indicated 
in the previous section, this kind of research should take account of the 
existing hierarchy within the state apparatus and how decisions are made. 
That this is a rather difficult project does not need to be stressed, since it is 
hard to get access to the key institutions in the decision making process. 
Future research should, however, also take place in the regional context of 
the local state (district authorities) vis-à-vis farmers and other key actors. This 
research field entails a study of negotiations between the key actors in an 
agrarian structure, their respective life-worlds and the existing power 
differentials. This implies that a part of the Nandi survey should be brought on 
to a higher level and encompass the life-world of extensionists, credit officials 
and other local administrators. 
This research field entails also the question of the countervailing power of 
local farmer groups and national farmer organizations. Democratization 
processes must be nurtured, not only to correct existing power differentials, 
but also in the context of correcting agricultural technology development. As 
Mendras (1970) and Richards (1985, 1987) suggested, farmers knowledge 
contributes to development and must not be negated. The essential socio-
political condition needed to incorporate this kind of knowledge does not exist 
in Kenya. The existing trend towards extemalization is founded upon a 
negation of local agricultural knowledge and that the exclusion of farmers 
from formal agricultural R&D decision-making processes. Because of that, 
farm labour is continuously expropriated, and farmers increasingly lose 
control over their labour process. 
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Research carried out along these analytical lines may contribute towards a 
better understanding of structural variance and particularly towards an 
understanding of 'what is happening to the Kenyan peasantry'. 
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APPENDIX I. 
THE NANDI SURVEY 
The questionnaire was built up to gather empirical data to assess the socio­
economic nature of development m the district Particular emphasis was 
placed on the degree of commoditization m the district and the nature of 
institutionalization m the district These issues were covered by questions 
about the productive and consumptive reproduction of farm enterprises and 
the farming community m Nandi Because the research project was merely 
confined to gaming insight into the trends in commoditization of staple food 
producbon, ι e of maize (Bandek in Nandi or Mafundi in Kiswahili), the 
questionnaire concentrated on a agricultural input and output analysis geared 
towards understanding maize production The quesbonnaire contained, 
therefore, questions about the organization of the labour process way of land 
preparation, time and durabon of preparabon and planbng, how and what 
kind of seeds are planted and purchased, quanbties and method of fertilizing, 
use of pesbades, method of application, bme and manner of weeding and 
harvesbng and yields of maize The output level was covered by queshons 
about the allocation of the harvest between home consumption and formal 
marketmg outlets m the district for all agricultural activities 
The third basic element m the questionnaire was labour input, whether it 
was household labour, hired (casual or regular) or exchange labour The 
sexual division of labour on the farm was also part of the survey, but the 
results are not incorporated in Chapter 6, because I decided to focus the 
analysis on the enterprise level only The fourth element concerned the 
important process of straddling and access to off-farm jobs The fifth, but less 
important, element was the food purchase and consumption pattern of the 
household this in order to assess the rate of integration of consumptive 
reproduction into the market 
The questionnaire enabled us to gather information on land distribution, 
bme of sale and purchase of land, soil conservation measures applied, 
household composibon, distances to market centres and depots, transport 
costs, frequency of visits by extension officers and the efficiency of the formal 
marketmg structures as well as the availability of agricultural inputs On the 
basis of this survey we were able to indicate what kind of households are 
advantageously incorporated into the commodity economy and to assess the 
nature of rural differentiation patterns m the district 
The survey was held at farm level during August, September and October, 
1987 Two basic methods were employed as selection entena which enabled us 
to draw a stratified sample according to plot sizes and their location in 
Nandi's agro-ecological zones 
First, in order to gain insight into the impact of the different ecological and 
natural conditions in the district on farming, we started the process for 
selecting sub-locabons for research with reference to the six main agro-
ecological zones were maize producbon is common The agro-ecological zones 
are identified by the famous Farm Management Handbooks for Kenya (1982) 
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The identification of AEZs are based on altitude and rainfall patterns and to a 
lesser extent on soil quality. We chose, in consultation with the Assistant 
District Agricultural Officer, Mrs Kilel, six sub-locations each positioned in a 
different zone. The following sub-locations were selected for field work: 
Kapkangani, Kibwareng, Kipsigak, Mosombor, Ndalat and Ndulele. For their 
location see Map 2. 
Secondly, for these sub-locations we classified the farms according to plot 
sizes. The following categories were constructed: 0-1,1-2,2-3,3-4,4-5 and 5 ha. 
and over. The land registration records in Nandi district are, as in any other 
district, made up by plot numbers, sizes and the name of the plot holder(s). 
We placed every plot number in a size category and we counted all the plot 
numbers. We decided to draw a 2-3 % sample which gave us 95 plot numbers 
and the consequent names of plot holders. Before we drew our stratified 
sample we excluded all the County Council plots, etc which are mainly for 
general purposes, such as marketing centres, schools, dips, churches, etc. 
Table A.l gives the farm sizes and distribution for the six selected sub-
locations. Table A.2 is the result of the stratified sample and gives the number 
of interviews we held per farm size and sub-location. 
Table A.l. Number of plots according to holdmg sizes in six selected sub-locations 
(%) 
Sub-location 
Kapkangani 
Kibwareng 
Kipsigak 
Mosombor 
Ndalat 
Ndulele 
Total 
Plot 
0-1 
472 
35.9 
63 
15.7 
128 
14.6 
67 
16.7 
39 
9.1 
82 
13.0 
851 
21.0 
size categories (ha.] 
1-2 
333 
25.4 
90 
22.4 
152 
17.3 
101 
25.3 
46 
10.5 
75 
11.9 
797 
29.7 
2-3 
209 
15.9 
76 
19.0 
149 
17.0 
87 
21.7 
45 
10.4 
94 
14.8 
660 
16.3 
1 
3-4 
88 
6.7 
45 
11.2 
121 
13.8 
53 
13.3 
42 
9.7 
69 
10.9 
418 
10.3 
4-5 
68 
5.2 
36 
9.0 
116 
13.2 
35 
8.7 
51 
11.8 
68 
10.8 
374 
9.2 
5 and total 
over 
143 1313 
10.9 100/32.4 
91 401 
22.7 100/9.9 
211 877 
24.1 100/21.6 
57 400 
14.3 100/9.8 
208 431 
48.3 100/10.6 
244 632 
38.6 100/15.6 
954 4054 
23.5 100/99.9 
Source: Ministry of Lands and Settlements, Land registration Department, 
Nandi District, October 1987 
In practice the stratified sample implied that, in every farm size category, we 
had to sample every forty-first plot number. This method gave us 95 plot 
numbers; the land registration records gave us names and the situation of the 
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plots. The land registration also provided sheet/map numbers. This 
information enabled us, though not without complications, to locate the plots 
on the excellent topo-cadastral maps of the Survey of Kenya. Table A 2 shows 
the distribution of plots per size category after sampling. 
Table A.2. Distribution of plots after sampling 
sub-location plot size category 
Kapkangani 
Kibwareng 
Kipsigak 
Mosombor 
Ndalat 
Ndulele 
total 
0-1 
11 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
21 
23 3% 
1-2 
5 
3 
2 
4 
1 
1 
16 
17 7% 
2-3 
6 
-
3 
1 
3 
2 
15 
16 6% 
3-4 
3 
1 
2 
2 
-
1 
9 
10 0% 
4-5 
1 
1 
2 
1 
-
3 
8 
8 8% 
5-
over 
3 
2 
4 
1 
5 
6 
21 
23.3% 
total 
29 
32.2% 
9 
10 0% 
16 
177% 11 
12.2% 
10 
11.1% 15 
16.6% 
90 
99.8% 
Table A.3 displays the distribution after the survey was held. It appeared that 
households owned more than one plot The sample became accordingly over-
biased towards the larger holdings This is in congruence with the 'normal' 
distribution of land pattern in Nandi district which clearly has a tendency 
towards larger farms 
Practical problems 
The practical problems attached to this method of selecting farms or plots were 
twofold. One is that the Land Registration Records were not completely up to 
date In many instances a plot had already been sold a long time previously 
and not reported to the Registration The new owner was known but the 
former owner, whose name we found in the Registrahon, was unknown. But 
in the end we managed; we knew the exact location of the plot and in many 
cases old people or village elders were aware of the particular land 
transaction. This situation occurred especially in Kapkangani sub-location 
where a lot of land was sold by Nandi people to Luhya from the neighbouring 
district m the early seventies. The other complication was that some farmers 
owned more than one plot and in some cases more than we could anticipate 
on Some plots we selected, although cultivated, were not inhabited by the 
owner, he or she was living on another plot This was frequently the case m 
Kipsigak, Ndalat and Ndulele sub-location Another minor problem was that 
people went under a different name than the one registered in the Land 
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Table A.3. Distribution of plots after survey 
sub-location plot size category 
Kapkangani 
Kibwareng 
Kipsigak 
Mosombor 
Ndalat 
Ndulele 
total 
0-1 
5 
-
1 
-
-
~ 
6 
6.6% 
1-2 
7 
2 
2 
3 
1 
" 
15 
16.6% 
2-3 
7 
1 
2 
1 
-
" 
11 
12.2% 
3-4 
11 
12.2% 
4-5 
2 
1 
1 
-
-
3 
7 
7.7% 
5-
over 
4 
4 
10 
3 
8 
11 
40 
44.4% 
total 
29 
32.2% 
9 
10.0% 16 
17.7% 
11 
12.2% 
10 
11.1% 
15 
16.6% 
90 
99.8% 
Registration Records in Kapsabet. Furthermore, in some cases, land disputes 
among farmers and between farmers and the Land Registration Department 
about plot sizes and/or prices were encountered during the field work. 
Checking and re-checking of plot sizes were frequently undertaken in the 
Land Registration Department. This is required a.o. because some farmers 
cannot show their title deed(s) partly either because they had not collected 
them or because the title deed(s) were handed over to banks as security for 
loans. 
In the event of an owner being untraceable, the only solution we found in 
order to deal with these immediate problems in the field, was to select spare 
plot numbers and plot holders beforehand for every sub-location and holding 
size category. In practice it meant that the forty-second and/or forty-third in 
the size category was selected for interviewing. Because of these practical 
problems, the final result was 90 interviews Two plot holders were completely 
untraceable and two plot holders owned more than one plot but both plots 
were selected already. The spare plots selected before hand were already used. 
Selecting more spare plots than foreseen was not undertaken, because their 
certainly is a dear limit in this spare-plot selection procedure. The last 
interview, it was exactly the last one, was simply lost somewhere in between 
Ndalat sub-location and our little cramped for space hotel room in Kapsabet. 
The interviews were conducted by the author and a student assistant, with 
the excellent help of two female interpreters who were living in Nandi district. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Deze studie behandelt de landbouw ontwikkelingen m Kenia In deze analyse 
staat de regionale en nationale agransche struktuur centraal Welke 
eigenschappen kunnen we toedichten aan deze struktuur toedichten ' De rol 
van de staat is hienn essentieel Waarom intervemeert de staat in de 
landbouw, en hoe, met welke daarvoor speaaal gecreëerde instrumenten en 
instituties ? Hoe probeert zij de ontwikkelingen in deze belangrijke 
ekonoirasche sektor te sturen 7 Hoe suksesvol was zij daarbij ' Een belangrijke 
vraag is hierbij m hoeverre de staat de eigenschappen van de Kema's 
agrarische struktuur adekwaat onderkent Teneinde deze evaluatie-studie uit 
te voeren werd een regionaal onderzoek uitgevoerd om de effekhviteit en 
doeltreffendheid van overheidsbeleid ten aanzien van de landbouwsektor in 
beeld te brengen Tevens word uitgebreide literatuurstudie verricht 
In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt het theoretisch kader uitgewerkt voor deze 
analyse Daarmee wordt tegelijkertijd het onderwerp van de studie 
afgebakend Relevante concepten worden m dit hoofdstuk uiteengezet In dit 
theoretisch raamwerk zijn de staatmshtuties, het boerenbedrijf, de 
boerenbevolking en andere aktoren in het ontwikkelingsproces van de 
landbouw uitgangspunt van analyse Gesteld wordt dat een analyse van het 
funktioneren van een boerenbedrijf alsmede het wel en wee van de 
landbouwbevolking met los gezien kan worden van een netwerk van relaties 
dat zich ontwikkelt tussen boerenbedrijven, instituties en markten Het proces 
waarin bedrijven en mensen geïntegreerd worden in een dergelijk netwerk, 
heeft noodzakelijkerwijs een historische grondslag maar is ook diskonbnue 
Afhankelijk van de historische context leidt dat proces tot verschillende 
patronen en cycli van agransche ontwikkeling 
Twee belangrijke vooronderstellingen hebben de zoektocht naar een 
geschikt theoretisch kader voor deze studie gestuurd De eerste 
vooronderstelling was dat er een incorporatie van boerenbedrijven, de 
landbouwende bevolking, landen en regio's in een groter (soms wereldwijd) 
politiek, ekonomisch en ¡cultureel geheel De ontwikkeling en expansie van het 
kapitalisme dat geleidelijk de landen, regio's, bedrijven en mensen integreert 
m de internationale kapitalistische arbeidsverdeling, wordt gezien als een 
onderliggende rationaliteit De tweede vooronderstelling was dat een 
nauwkeung onderzoek van incorporatie-processen het eerder genoemde 
historisch specifieke en het diskonbnue van dit proces blootlegt Bovendien 
dat achter die incorporatie - een regionaal en sociaal-ekonomisch 
gedifferentieerd ontwikkelingspatroon schuilgaat Anders gezegd, 
incorporatie-processen verlopen met volgens universele wetten en kennen 
geen van te voren vastgelegde, lineaire ontwikkelingspatronen. Het 
onderkennen van heterogeniteit en variatie m ontwikkelingspatronen m de 
landbouw en dus het onderkennen van tal van ontwikkelingsperspekbeven, is 
essentieel voor het analyse-kader van dit proefschrift 
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Dit houdt meteen ook in dat de uitgangspunten van veel Marxistische en 
neo-Manashsche theoretische kaders ter diskussie gesteld dienen te worden 
Het 'Agrarische Vraagstuk', onderwerp van veel klassieke studies, dient 
opnieuw geformuleerd te worden Terwijl de klassieken zich bezig hielden 
met de vraag hoe het gezmsbednjf overleeft binnen het kapitalisme, is het nu 
relevanter en aktueler de vraag te stellen onder welke omstandigheden er m 
de landbouw geproduceerd wordt en hoe, en door wie deze produkite 
voorwaarden gecreëerd worden De theoretische achtergrond voor een 
dergelijke herformulering is dat andere 'wetten' dan die van de klassenstrijd 
en de bewegingswetten van het kapitaal uitgangspunten voor analyse dienen 
te zijn Met referentie naar het ideeen-goed van de aktor-genchte benadering 
van de ontwikkelmgssoaoloog Long dient er eveneens rekening gehouden 
met politieke en culturele 'wetten' De leefwereld van boeren, de manier 
waarop zij deze interpreteren, de invloed van andere aktoren daarop en de 
perceptie die zij hebben van ontwikkelingen m de landbouw, moeten in de 
beschouwing worden meegenomen Aktoren als handelaars, 
overheidsambtenaren, industriëlen, bankiers, boerenorgamsabes, 
ondememerorganisabes, multilaterale en bilaterale ontwikkelingsinstituten 
oefenen allen hun mvloed uit op de ontwikkelingen m de landbouw, of 
proberen dat althans Zij proberen onderlinge relaties te bemvlœden en 
specifieke (technologische, sociale, ekonomische, kulturele) voorwaarden te 
scheppen voor produkbe en reproduktie Slechts bezien vanuit een dergelijk 
kader kunnen ontwikkelingen in de landbouwsektor worden begrepen Van 
uit de zo ontstane kennis of wetenschap kan worden gediskussieerd over de 
uitgangspunten van het 'hoe, waar en waarom' van het ingrijpen in de 
landbouwsektor 
Het centrale concept voor een dergelijke analyse is een agrarische 
struktuur Een agrarische struktuur is kortweg een regionaal of nationaal 
produktiesysteem bestaande uit verschillende vormen van produkhe welke 
ondersteund en/of gekonditioneerd worden door een complex en dynamisch 
netwerk van technologisch-admuustratieve instituties, de natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen en andere produktie faktoren Tevens omvat een agrarische 
struktuur de onderlinge relaües tussen ekonomische sektoren, de wetgevende 
en politieke instituties en de verschillende sociale klassen en kategoneen m de 
regio Een agrarische struktuur wordt vorm gegeven door een drietal 
strukturele processen 'commodibsenng', institutionalisering en interventie, 
alsmede door de politieke, ekonomische en ideologische strijd tussen 
verschillende aktoren 
Onder 'commoditisenng' wordt verstaan het proces waarbij de ruilwaarde 
een toenemende mvloed gaat uitoefenen op de ekonomie, op de organisatie 
van de produkbe en reprodukbe 'Commoditisenng' omvat zowel 
commeraaiisermg (produkbe wordt m toenemende mate marktgencht) als 
kapitalisenng (landbouw inputs nemen steeds meer de vormen aan van 
waren) van de produkbe Een korte makro-analyse van de geschiedenis van 
incorporahe in Afrika leert dat deze m twee fasen kan worden verdeeld De 
eerste is er een van een toenemende commercialisering van de produkbe 
Marktgerichte produkbe werd geshmuleerd door maatregelen van de 
koloniale staat, alsmede door akbviteiten van agro-industnele bedrijven, 
handelaars en de Afrikaanse boerenbevolking zelf De tweede fase kenmerkt 
zich door een toenemende kapitalisenng van de produkbe Als gevolg van 
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landbouwkundig onderzoek en ontwikkeling (R&D), die op een verhoging 
van de produktiviteit in de landbouw waren geënt, kwam de introdukde van 
nieuwe technologieën in de landbouw op gang. Deze nieuwe mogelijkheden 
werden aktief door de boeren in het arbeidsproces geïntegreerd; ondanks dat 
dit een vergrote afhankelijkheid van de markt met zich mee bracht. 
Institutionalisering is het historische proces van een arbeidsverdeling en 
een zekere mate van specialisatie tussen sektoren van de ekonomie alsmede 
tussen producenten en produktieve eenheden. Verschillende aktoren nemen 
gedurende dit proces een bepaalde plaats in binnen deze arbeidsverdeling. 
Het geheel van aktoren en hun onderlinge relaties wordt ook wel de 
technologisch-administratieve taakomgeving van de landbouw genoemd. 
Deze taakomgeving berust op de eerder genoemde processen van 
commercialisering en kapitalisering van de produktie in de landbouw. Vanuit 
een historisch perspektief bezien, wordt de taakomgeving van de landbouw 
steeds complexer: het aantal aktoren neemt toe en hun onderlinge relaties 
worden steeds intenserver en gevarieerder. 
Het begrip interventie is een begrip met een weidse strekking. Onder 
interventie wordt hier verstaan, het politieke en ideologische proces waarbij de 
verschillende aktoren, involge eigen percepties en mogelijkheden, invloed 
proberen uit te oefenen op de voorwaarden van produktie in de landbouw. 
Deze aktoren kennen verschillende motieven om te interveniëren. Essentieel is 
dat de aktoren vanuit verschillende machtsposities opereren. In deze zin 
opgevat, omvat interventie zowel het ingrijpen van van individuen, 
organisaties, bedrijven en van dat de staat; tegelijkertijd vervat het sodale, 
ktdturele, ekonomische en ekologische aspekten. Het meest bekende 
interventie-programma is de Groene Revolutie, een externe interventie in de 
landbouw met als doel om via 'commoditisering' en institutionalisering te 
komen tot een produktiegroei in de landbouw in de Derde Wereld. 
Een analyse van een agrarische infrastruktuur laat een essentieel kenmerk 
zien: een strukturele verscheidenheid of heterogeniteit. Heterogeniteit in de 
landbouw is noch een toevallig verschijnsel noch een tijdelijk verschijnsel. 
Heterogeniteit wordt in dit proefschrift gezien als uitkomst van drie 
strukturele complexen die konstant, door interventie, 'commoditisering' en 
institutionalisering, worden gereproduceerd. Heterogeniteit is, in de eerste 
plaats, inherent aan de landbouw, immers elk landbouwstelsel kent zijn eigen 
'l'art de la localité'(deze term is afkomstig van Mendras (1970)). Dit omvat 
meer dan alleen maar landbouwkundige kennis van de bodem, gewassen en 
klimaat, maar tevens ook de kulturele identiteit van boeren. In de tweede 
plaats, is heterogeniteit een struktureel kenmerk van de landbouw. 
Boerenhuishoudens en -bedrijven onderhouden verschillende relaties met 
markten en instituties als gevolg waarvan diverse bedrijfsstijlen zich 
ontwikkelen elk met een eigen rationaliteit. In de derde plaats, worden 
landbouw ekonomieën gekenmerkt door het bestaan van enorme sociale 
verschillen in rijkdom en macht. Bovendien onderscheiden landbouwregio's 
zich van elkaar doordat ze op verschillende wijzen geïncorporeerd zijn in de 
markt. 
Van groot belang is het daarom vast te stellen hoe een dergelijke agrarische 
infrastruktuur tot stand is gekomen, hoe daarbinnen de relaties tussen boeren 
en staatsinstituties zich uit kristalliseerden, en hoe, als gevolg van 
'commoditisering', institutionalisering en interventie, de strukturele 
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verscheidenheid bestendigd wordt en verdiept. Dit heeft tevens tot de 
formulering van de centrale onderzoeksvraag van de studie geleid. Deze luidt 
"hoe is in Kenia de agrarische struktuur tot stand gekomen en welke aktoren 
geven vorm aan deze struktuur." 
In de Afrikaanse en in het bijzonder in de Keniaanse context, bezit de staat -
de koloniale en post-koloniale - de uitvoerende macht en beschikt eveneens 
over de fysieke mogelijkheden om een fundament te leggen voor een 
agrarische struktuur. Op basis daarvan vinden produktie en reproduktie 
plaats en wordt ontwikkeling gegenereerd. Daarom is het niet verwonderlijk 
dat het landbouwbeleid van de Keniaanse staat centraal gesteld is in dit 
proefschrift. Landbouwbeleid wordt gezien als een specifieke vorm van 
interventie die naast de landbouw ook verschillende andere ekonomische 
sektoren en sub-sektoren treft. 
Een begrip van de staat en zijn funktioneren is aldus vereist. De staat wordt 
hier gezien als een ensemble van verschillende instituties die 
beleidsdoelstellingen formuleren, diensten verlenen, nauw betrokken zijn bij 
landbouwkundig onderzoek, produktieaktiviteiten reguleren door middel van 
kontrole over markten en prijzen. De staat is in de uitvoering van zijn funkties 
nauw betrokken bij het creëren van de technologische en ekonomische 
voorwaarden van produktie en reproduktie in de landbouwsektor. 
Machtsverhoudingen en relaties tussen staat, staatsburokratie en samenleving 
zijn van grote invloed op de wijze waarop de staat beleidsdoelstellingen en 
beleidsinstrumenten alsook de interventie in de landbouw vorm geeft. In het 
onderzoek naar het funktioneren van de staat moet een relatieve autonomie 
van de staat ten opzichte van de heersende klassen niet worden uitgesloten. 
Evenals boeren worden staatsburokraten in dit proefschrift gezien als aktoren 
die naar eigen normen en waarden ontwikkelingsprocessen kunnen 
stimuleren en trachten te beheersen. Daarnaast moeten externe relaties -
internationale markten en bilaterale en multilaterale hulp - bij de analyse van 
de staat in Derde Wereldlanden worden betrokken. Immers, sinds de 
Afrikaanse staten onafhankelijk zijn geworden spelen externe 
ontwikkelingsinstituties een belangrijke rol bij het tot stand komen van 
technologische en administratieve kaders waarbinnen produktie en 
reproduktie in de landbouw zich afspelen. 
De tweede centrale onderzoeksvraag richte zich dan ook op de effektiviteit 
en doelmatigheid van het staatsingrijpen in de landbouw. Dit heeft zowel 
betrekking op de instrumenten (prijs- en technologiebeleid bijvoorbeeld) als 
op het effekt ervan. Als test-case voor die effektiviteit en doelmatigheid dient 
Kenia's National Food Policy. Dit beleid omvat behalve overdracht van 
nieuwe technologie en kennis, een veelvoud van overheidsmaatregelen zoals 
op het terrein van markt- en prijsbeleid. Welke belangen zijn met dit ingrijpen 
gediend en welke resultaten zijn er mee behaald ? Zijn deze uitkomsten van 
staats ingrijpen bedoeld dan wel onbedoeld ? 
Beide onderzoeksvragen worden op twee nivo's uitgewerkt: het nationale 
en regionale nivo. Voor dit doel is sinds 1984 relevant materiaal verzameld, 
aangevuld met diverse bezoeken aan belangrijke overheidsinstituties in 
Nairobi. In het Nandi Distrikt is gedurende de tweede helft van 1987 een 
onderzoek onder boerenbedrijven verricht. Bovendien zijn de aküviteiten van 
belangrijke lokale staatsinstellingen en andere aktoren in kaart gebracht. 
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Hoofdstuk 2 is een rekonstruktie van de ontwikkelingen in de landbouwsektor 
in Kenia in de voor-koloniale en koloniale periode. De koloniale staat heeft na 
de inlijving van Kenia in 1895 in het Britse imperium een enorm belangrijke rol 
in de landbouw gespeeld. De Keniaanse geschiedenis van de landbouw wordt 
gerekonstrueerd aan de hand van een periodisering van de historie van de 
staat in Kenia. In verschillende perioden zijn verschillende staat-burokratie-
maatschappij-verhoudingen te signaleren. De ontwikkelingen gedurende de 
koloniale periode zijn van essentieel belang voor een begrip van huidige 
ontwikkelingen. Immers de koloniale geschiedenis laat niet alleen een toename 
in de relatieve autonomie van de staat ten opzichte van een sektor van de 
toenmalige heersende klassen (de blanke kolonisten) zien. Daarnaast komt er 
ook een kapitaalbezittende klasse in met name de landbouw- en 
handelssektor, op vanaf de jaren dertiger wanneer de warenproduktie in de 
landbouw en warenrelaties op het platteland (in de zgn. Reserves) 
expanderen. De wortels van Kenia's huidige heersende klasse liggen in deze 
periode. Politieke en vooral ekonomische onrust leiden in de jaren vijftig tot 
massale hervormingen in de politieke en ekonomische sfeer. De politieke 
macht van de blanke kolonisten, tanende sinds de wereldwijde depressie in de 
jaren dertig, wordt in toenemende mate aangevochten door zowel de koloniale 
staat en de Britse staat alsmede door internationale en Afrikaanse 
belangengroepen. Een vergrote deelname van zowel kleine als grote 
Afrikaanse boeren en een niet meer te stuiten politiek proces ter verkrijging 
van de onafhankelijkheid, zijn de belangrijkste uitkomsten van het 
hervormingsproces. Kenia wordt in december 1963 een onafhankelijke staat 
onder leiding van een Afrikaanse regering. 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden het overheidsbeleid, de doelstellingen en de 
beleidsinstrumenten op het terrein van de landbouw na de onafhankelijkheid 
uit de doeken gedaan. De leidende rol van de staat in het ontwikkelingsproces 
wordt politiek en ekonomisch gelegitimeerd met de frase dat van nu af aan de 
ontwikkelingen geleid worden door en ten goede moeten komen aan 
Kenianen. Diverse instrumenten en instituties worden geërfd van de koloniale 
staat en nieuwe worden gecreëerd. De wortels van het huidige 
landbouwbeleid liggen bij de hervormingen van de jaren vijftig en bij de 
uitvoering van het toenmalige koloniale ontwikkelingsbeleid (verwoord in het 
zogenaamde Swynnertonplan). 
Bij alle bevolkingsgroepen zijn er hooggespannen verwachtingen over het 
landbouwbeleid van de nieuwe staat. Gedurende het eerste decennium 
droegen een fenomenale groei in de produktie van waren en buitengewoon 
gunstige exteme faktoren (hoge wereldmarktprijzen voor de voornaamste 
exportgewassen) bij tot politieke rust en ekonomische vooruitgang. Als in het 
midden van de jaren zeventig de exteme faktoren ongunstig worden, worden 
de mogelijkheden van de staat voor het voeren van een effektief 
landbouwbeleid ook geringer. S taats inkomsten dalen sterk waardoor diverse 
beleidsdoelsstellingen bijgesteld dienen te worden en diverse aanspraken op 
overheidssteun niet langer gehonoreerd kunnen worden. Anderzijds wordt de 
afhankelijkheid van Kenia van buitenlandse hulp steeds groter en daarmee de 
verhoogde externe bemoeienissen met nationaal beleid. 
De centrale kenmerken van het landbouwbeleid zijn allereerst dat door een 
gericht technologie-overdracht-, markt- en prijsbeleid (dat wil zeggen 
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'conunoditísering' en institutionalisering door middel van 
overheidsinterventie) de produktie van voedsel voor de binnenlandse markt 
en van exportgewassen wordt gestimuleerd. Ten tweede, moet de 
landbouwsektor zich dusdanig ontwikkelen dat de werkgelegenheid van de 
sterk groeiende plattelandsbevolking wordt verzekerd. Ten derde, wil de staat, 
meer dan voorheen het geval was zo blijkt uit de overheidsplannen, 
gemarginaliseerde groepen integreren in het ontwikkelingsproces. Planners 
onderkennen dat bepaalde sektoren van de landbouwbevolking niet of 
nauwelijks of profijt hebben gehad van het landbouwbeleid. Ten vierde, moet 
de effektiviteit van het staatsingrijpen worden verbeterd in het licht van haar 
verslechterende financiële positie. Hiermee wordt onderkent dat een aantal 
beleidsinstrumenten, zoals het overheids toezicht op de opkoop van voedsel, 
niet of nauwelijks effektief en doelmatig zijn. 
In hoofdstuk 4 komen in detail de ontwikkelingen in de landbouw sinds de 
onafhankelijkheid aan de orde. In die landbouw deed zich een enorme groei in 
produktie en inkomens voor. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien welke 
ontwikkelingspatronen de landbouw vertoonde, mede bepaald door 
overheidsingrijpen. Deze patronen kunnen kortweg worden aangeduid met de 
twee-deling grote-boeren en kleine-boeren landbouw. Beide 
landbouwsystemen ontwikkelen zich op eigen wijze. De eerste met veel 
overheidssteun, de tweede met veel minder steun maar veel kontrole. De 
kenmerken van Kenia's agrarische struktuur worden in dit hoofdstuk 
uitvoerig behandeld: landgebruik, de relatie voedsel produktie door grote 
boeren en exportproduktie door kleine boeren, 'commoditisering' van de 
produktie, kontrakt-teelt, etc. De enorme expansie van de warenproduktie 
verbergt echter een toenemende regionale ongelijkheid als gevolg van een 
gedifferentieerde integratie in de nationale markt en een sodaal-ekonomische 
differentiatie binnen de kleine boerenlandbouw als gevolg van enorme 
verschillen in inkomen en landbezit Op basis van veel statistisch materiaal, 
verzameld door onafhankelijke onderzoekers en door de staat zelf, wordt 
geprobeerd een eerste inzicht te krijgen in het effekt van overheidsingrijpen in 
de landbouw. Tevens wordt aan de hand van dit materiaal de traditionele 
twee-deling van de agrarische struktuur in een kleine- en een grote-boeren 
landbouw van vraagtekens voorzien. De Keniaanse landbouw wordt door 
meer ontwikkelingspatronen en meer ontwikkelingsperspektieven 
gekenmerkt dan de kategorisering van de boerenbevolking in termen van 
'groof en 'klein' aangeeft. 
In hoofdstuk 5 maken we kennis met de regionale kontekst het Nandi Distrikt. 
Doelstelling van dit hoofdstuk is om het historisch specifieke van regionale 
ontwikkelingen en patronen te laten zien. Het overgrote deel van dit 
hoofdstuk heeft daarom een historisch karakter. Het poogt op distriktsnivo de 
sociaal- en politiek-ekonomische ontwikkelingen te rekonstmeren. 
Allereerst worden de specifieke kenmerken van de Nandi als volk, hun 
geschiedenis, het langdurig verzet tegen kolonisatie en incorporatie, en 
vervolgens een geleidelijke incorporatie in de koloniale politieke en 
ekonomische systmen geanalyseerd. Dankzij een kombinatie van gunstige 
natuurlijke voorwaarden (klimaat, bodem), de verhoudingsgewijs grote 
boerenbedrijven en de relatief lage bevolkingsdichtheid kan de Nandi-
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samenleving (relatief bezien) rijk worden genoemd. Nandi Distrikt is één van 
de regio's in Kenia die profijt kon trekken uit het zich wijzigende 
landbouwbeleid van de koloniale overheid in de jaren vijftig. Landbezit werd 
geprivatiseerd en de overheid nam tal van maatregelen om de groei van de 
produktie en kapitalisering te bevorderen. Nieuwe technologische 
mogelijkheden (hybride mais) en nieuwe gewassen (thee, koffie) werden 
geïntroduceerd. Deze werden aktief door de boeren in hun arbeidsproces 
geïntegreerd. De commercialisering van de produktie nam een grote vlucht. 
De maatschappij, in het begin een zogenaamde 'gelijke' maatschappij, werd 
echter naarmate de 'commoditisering' van de ekonomie voortschreed, steeds 
ongelijker. Er begonnen zich grote verschillen in rijkdom, land en macht 
tussen groepen Nandi alsmede tussen Nandi en Luhya voor te doen. Net als in 
andere regio's in Kenia, krijgen bepaalde groepen binnen de Nandi-
samenleving een bevoorrechte toegang tot staatsfondsen (kapitaal), diensten 
(voorlichting) en kennis (technologie). Op basis van schaarse schriftelijke 
bronnen, onderzoeks-rapporten en Jaarverslagen van de District Agricultural 
Officer, worden de kenmerken van de opbloeiende agrarische struktuur van 
dit distrikt gekenschetst. 
In het zesde hoofdstuk wordt de dynamiek van de agrarische struktuur in 
Nandi-distrikt beschreven. Gewapend met de methodologische concepten die 
uitgewerkt zijn in hoofdstuk 1 (paragraaf 3), wordt deze ekonomie onder de 
loep genomen. Het empirisch materiaal is afkomstig uit een enquête onder 
boerenbedrijven, gehouden in de tweede helft van 1987. De enquête heeft zich 
voornamelijk gekoncentreerd op de produktie van mais. Onder welke 
omstandigheden wordt er geproduceerd, wie zijn de producenten , hoe zien 
hun bedrijven eruit, welke relaties onderhouden zij met de markt en in 
hoeverre is de reproduktie van boerderij en boerenhuishoudens gericht op 
alleen maar landbouw ? Het aldus verzamelde empirisch materiaal geeft 
inzicht in de diverse produktievormen, verschillende boerenstijlen, 
arbeidsprocessen en boerenstrategieën in het distrikt. Het onderzoek 
onderstreept dat sodale ontwikkelingen in de landbouw niet gekenmerkt 
worden door polarisatie binnen de boerenstand tussen kapitalistische boeren 
enerzijds en een klasse van landloze en bijna-landloze boeren anderzijds. 
Binnen deze extremen heeft zich in Nandi-distrikt een midden-klasse 
ontwikkeld die niet alleen springlevend is, maar ook zeer inventief en die wel 
degelijk in staat is eigen strategieën uit te stippelen conform eigen inzichten en 
mogelijkheden. Tevens onderstreept het onderzoek de stelUng dat sociale 
ontwikkelingen in de landbouw gekenmerkt worden door een proces van 
verarming en verrijking. In dit proces speelt niet alleen de landbouwsektor een 
rol. Ook de relaties van boeren met staats instituties, andere sektoren van de 
ekonomie en de relaties tussen produktieve eenheden in de landbouw spelen 
hierin een belangrijke rol. Mede als gevolg hiervan is een groep bestaande uit 
arme boerenhuishoudens en een groep rijke boerenhuishoudens te 
identificeren. 
Met behulp van een kwantitatieve analyse kan tevens het effekt van nieuwe 
technologieën op agrarische ontwikkelingen worden onderzocht. Ten tweede 
kan de bijdrage van deze technologieën in een samenspel met tal van andere 
onafhankelijke variabelen (zoals de arbeidsintensiteit, de organisatie van het 
arbeidsproces, sodale differentiatie, en de ligging van de boerderij in de agro-
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ecologische zones die in het distrikt te onderkennen zijn) aan de 
produkbeverhoging van maïs worden gemeten Deze kwanhtaheve analyse 
laat onder meer zien dat de bijdrage van zogenaamde Groene-
Revolubetechnologieen aan de verhoging van de produküe slechts 
betrekkelijk is Bovenal laat het zien dat de hybnde-mais-technologie geen 
doorbraak heeft kunnen forceren in de afhankelijkheid van de 
landbouwbeoeferung van klimaat en bodem en geen einde heeft kunnen 
maken aan de sociaal-ekonomische verschillen tussen boeren 
De vooronderstellingen uitgewerkt m 1 3 ten aanzien van heterogeniteit m 
de landbouw worden zo verklaard Het onderzoek onderstreept dat agrarische 
ontwikkelingspatronen gestuurd en bemvloed worden door 'commoditisenng' 
en institutionalisering en dat heterogeniteit m de landbouw m Nandi-distrikt 
geen toevallig verschijnsel is 
Een aantal van de uitkomsten van de voorgaande dne hoofdstukken wordt in 
hoofdstuk 7 naar een hoger mvo gehld het nationale nivo Op dit ruvo wordt 
onderzocht of het overheidsingrijpen in de landbouw via tal van maatr-gelen 
(technologie-overdracht, markt- en prijsbeleid, toegang tot krediet en 
voorlichting, de orientati e van landbouwkundig onderzoek) effekbef en 
doelmatig is Mede gebaseerd op een grote hoeveelheid literatuur wordt een 
beeld gegeven van het karakter van het staatsingnjpen en het karakter van de 
relaties tussen instituties en boerenbedrijven Tevens wordt bekeken of de 
verschillende instrumenten waarmee de staat mtervemeert, afgestemd zijn op 
de realiteit 
Een tweetal konklusies wordt getrokken In de eerste plaats de 
doelstellingen van de staat voor het ingrijpen in de landbouw via het markt-
en prijsbeleid zijn bij lange na met gehaald Het ingrijpen is in twee opzichten 
ondoelmatig en zelfs mefftaent Zeker wat betreft het mais-opkoopbeleid, kan 
gesteld worden dat er eerder chaos dan een stabiele markt is ontstaan Slechts 
door het uitoefenen van druk door de Wereldbank en bilaterale donors op de 
Kemaanse overheid is de mate van staatskontrole over de maïs handel 
beperkt Deze hervormmg heeft er echter nog met toe geleid dat er nu wel 
effektief wordt ingegrepen in de mais-markt Het beleid van de 
staatsinstituties verantwoordelijk voor het vaststellen van pnjzen, kan 
eveneens ondoelmatige genoemd worden Het prijsbeleid is met gebaseerd op 
een goed begrip van kleine boerenstrategieen Het beleid vertoont zelfs de 
neiging het subsistentie-element in boerenstrategieen te scheiden van de 
marktgerichte komponent waardoor kleine boeren er toe neigen eerder 
voedsel voor zichzelf en hun huishouden dan voor de markt te produceren 
Mede door dit beleid, fluktueert het aanbod van agrarische produkten op de 
markt sterk en zijn in sommige penoden dure importen noodzakelijk om de 
tekorten aan te vullen 
In de tweede plaats, kenmerkt het overheidsingrijpen in de landbouw zich 
door een ongelijkheid in de institutionele relaties tussen boeren en staat De 
interakbe tussen landbouwkundig onderzoek en ontwikkeling (voornamelijk 
georiënteerd op Westerse, moderne kennis) en het selektieve karakter van 
krediet- en voorlichtingsbeleid (ten nadele van kleine boeren en tengunste van 
grote boeren), versterken de ongelijke verdeling van de matenele effekten van 
het staatsingnjpen in de landbouw 
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Het achste hoofdstuk is een retrospectief op staat, staatsbeleid en samenleving. 
Centrale vraagstelling in dit hoofdstuk is welke staat-
samenlevingverhoudingen zich hebben ontwikkeld sinds de 
onafhankelijkheid in 1963. Ten einde dit te onderzoeken wordt terug gegaan 
naar de periode vlak voor de onafhankelijkheid om te analyseren welke sociale 
krachten de onafhankelijkheid nastreefden en welke sociale krachten de staat 
bemanden en de staats-macht kontroleerden. De politiek-ideologische 
verhoudingen tussen staat-samenleving worden gekenmerkt door een 
essentiële verschuiving. Deze verhoudingen worden in de periode direkt na de 
onafhankelijkheid gekenmerkt door de een toeëigening van de politieke macht 
door Kenia's heersende klassen. Deze macht reflecteert zich ondermeer in het 
landbouwbeleid van de staat: in markt- en prijsbeleid alsmede in het 
landbouwkundig onderzoeks- en ontwikkelingsbeleid en in de 
kredietverschaffing. Tevens wordt de staatsmacht aangewend om een politiek 
klimaat van sociale orde en rust te creëren, middels co-optatie en een 
ogenschijnlijke herverdeling van de rijkdom. Als, echter, door een kombinatie 
van negatieve externe faktoren (dalende wereldmarktprijzen voor de 
voornaamste exportprodukten) en interne faktoren (toenemende sociale 
ongelijkheid en politieke oppositie (tegen het Kenyatta-regime) de legitimiteit 
van de staat ondergraven wordt, is er een kentering waar te nemen in staat-
samenleving verhoudingen. Deze kentering leidt tot nieuwe verhoudingen 
waardoor de Keniaanse heersende klassen in politiek opzicht steeds vaker aan 
de zijlijn komen te staan. Hun mogelijkheden om invloed uit te oefenen op 
beslissingen van de staat zijn aanzienlijk verminderd. Dat zij echter in staat 
zijn op een andere wijze het staatsbeleid te beïnvloeden wordt duidelijk als de 
overheid in 1979 een krediet-verschaffingsprogramma dat voornamelijk ten 
goede is gekomen aan de grote boeren, afschaft. Een dalende produktie van 
mais voor de binnenlandse markt is het direkte gevolg van een verslechtering 
van de produktievoorwaarden in deze belangrijke voedselsektor. De overheid 
ziet zich gedwongen het kredietprogramma wederom in ere te herstellen. Het 
huidige regime probeert manhaftig van begin af aan zijn legitimiteit ten 
opzichte van de lagere klassen te versterken. Het sukses is echter minimaal 
gezien de sterke politieke oppositie, van rechts en links en van de kerk tegen 
de hardnekkige pogingen van president Moi de één-partij-staat te handhaven. 
Een analyse van deze maatschappelijke krachten vormt tevens de basis 
voor een inschatting van de effektiviteit en doelmatigheid van het 
staatsingrijpen in de landbouw. Effektiviteit en doelmatigheid daarvan zijn 
gering omdat dominante maatschappelijke groepen de staat blijken te kunnen 
gebruiken ten eigen voordeel. De noodzakelijk geachte herstrukturering van 
de mais-opkoop wordt teniet gedaan door invloedrijke boeren en handelaars, 
een groep aktoren die tot het 'blok aan de machf behoort. Tevens heeft het 
landbouwkundig onderzoeks- en ontwikkelingsbeleid tot op heden 
voornamelijk ten dienste gestaan van de belangen van de grote-boeren sektor. 
Een tweede verklaring voor ondoelmatigheid en ineffektíviteit van 
staatsingrijpen is dat de staatsburokratie niet bij machte is de behoeften van de 
landbouwende bevolking te identificeren. Deze onmacht van de 
staatsburokratie blijkt ondermeer uit het door haar impliciet gehanteerd 
klassifilcatie-schema van kleine- versus grote boeren. Dit eenvoudige 
klassifikatie-schema vormt echter wel uitgangspunt voor beleid en vuur de 
indentifikatie van behoeften. Voorgaande hoofdstukken hebben laten zien dat 
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er een veelvoud van boerenstrategjeën en boerenstijlen is. Het niet-
onderkennen van deze verscheidenheid zorgt telkenmale voor het uniforme 
technologie-beleid van de Keniaanse overheid. Een gemiste kans zoals met 
name uit hoofdstuk 6 en ander onderzoek blijkt: er zijn meer 
ontwikkelingsperspektieven te identificeren die niet door de tweedeling 'klein' 
of 'groof kunnen worden gevangen. Bovendien is er meer 
ontwikkelingspotentieel onder boeren aanwezig dan wordt verondersteld; een 
potentieel dat echter niet systematisch aangeboord wordt door de overheid. 
In hoofdstuk 9 worden de belangrijkste konklusies geplaatst tegenover de 
theoretische uitgangspunten zoals die zijn uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk 1. Aan de 
hand van een kritische evaluatie wordt de noodzaak aangegeven voor verdere 
theoretische uitwerking van het begrip strukturele heterogeniteit in de 
landbouw. 
In Appendix I worden de methode en de steekproefgrootte van het Nandi-
onderzoek nader uitgewerkt. 
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STELLINGEN 
behorende bij het proefschrift 
The Agrarian Structure in Kenya: 
State, Farmers and Commodity Relations 
van Paul Hebinck 
1. 
Het is toe te juichen dat de wetenschappelijke diskussie over ontwikkelings-
theorieën, in tegenstelling tot het verleden, niet meer bepaald wordt door 
meta-theoretische uitgangspunten maar door empirisch onderzoek op meso-
en mikro nivo; daarbij mag men hopen dat de ontwikkelings-theorieën uit een 
impasse komen doordat er een interaküe ontstaat tussen theorieën en 
empirisch onderzoek. 
2. 
De leverantie van kunstmest in het kader van betalingsbalanshulp zorgt bij 
donors voor minder geworstel met bestedingsproblemen en stelt tevens het 
ontvangende land in de gelegenheid om het formuleren van een alternatief 
bodembemestingsbeleid uit te stellen. 
3. 
De oprichting van de Moi Universiteit in Eldoret tesamen met de ongekende 
repressie tegen linkse intellektuelen in het algemeen en op de Universiteit van 
Nairobi in het bijzonder (zie o.a. Overzicht, juni 1989), verzwakken de positie 
van de Universiteit van Nairobi die vanaf haar oprichting een cruciale rol in 
het maatschappelijk veranderingsproces heeft vervuld; elke vorm van 
medewerking aan het totstandkomen van de Moi Universiteit van de kant van 
donoren en universitaire instanties is vanuit dit perspektief uit den boze. 
4. 
Indien men het er over eens is dat het bereiken van een maatschappelijke 
consensus een noodzakelijke voorwaarde is voor rurale ontwikkeling in Afrika 
(World Bank, 1989) dan zouden in het kader hiervan lokale ontwikkelings-
perspektieven zoals die leven onder boeren en door hen onder uiteenlopende 
voorwaarden in de praktijk worden gebracht, betrokken moeten worden in de 
diskussie over het thema 'wat is ontwikkeling'. Ook zouden demokratische 
'grassroof organisaties de politieke ruimte moeten krijgen om het discours 
van de rurale bevolking (de 'doelgroep') te ondersteunen. Tenslotte zouden 
overheidsburokratieën hun kennis van de regionale/lokale agrarische 
struktuur en lokale ontwikkelingsprocessen moeten vergroten en verdiepen. 
5. 
Indien we de konklusies van empirisch onderzoek naar de organisatie van het 
arbeidsproces in de produktie van hybride maïs in Nandi distrikt vertalen 
naar de organisatie en oriëntatie van Nederlandse hulp aan Derde 
Wereldlanden, zou dat voor de Nederlandse bijdrage inhouden dat naar een 
meer sporen beleid op het terrein van landbouwtechnologie ontwikkeling en -
overdracht moet worden gestreefd. 
6. 
De belangrijkste konklusies van verschillende Nederlandse evaluatie-missies 
en -rapporten ten aanzien van de bijdrage van de aktiviteiten van de National 
Seed Quality Control Service aan de verhoogde produktie van maïs en aan de 
verbetering van de inkomenspositie van kleine maïsboeren in Kenia op basis 
waarvan telkenmale weer werd besloten het projekt te verlengen, zijn enkel 
staande te houden bij de gratie van onwetendheid omtrent de konkrete 
organisatie van de maïsproduktie in Kenia. 
7. 
Het veelal gepresenteerde beeld dat landbouwopbrengsten in Afrika eerst en 
vooral dalen en stijgen door klimatologische omstandigheden, verduistert de 
zeer belangrijke rol van politiek-ekonomische oorzaken voor die daling of 
stijging. 
8. 
Het alom levende idee dat integratie in de geld-ekonomie bij voorbaat negatief 
beoordeeld moet worden, veronachtzaamt ten eerste dat kleine boeren zelf 
deze integratie nastreven, en ten tweede dat een negatieve evaluatie pas 
waarde heeft op basis van een konkrete analyse van de sodaal-ekonomische 
omstandigheden waaronder kleine boeren wonen, leven en werken. 
9. 
De redaktie van het tijdschrift Derde Wereld zou in het licht van vallende 
muren en verschuivende paradigma's in de ontwikkelingstheorieën ten 
aanzien van het bestaan en ontstaan van een Derde Wereld, zich moeten 
bezinnen op een naamsverandering, ondanks dat marketing-overwegingen, 
zoals naamsbekendheid, een dergelijk besluit bemoeilijken. 
10. 
Als de bekende Keniaanse muziekgroep Simba Wanytka zich in haar liedjes wat 
minder zou concentreren op geld en liefde zou het kunnen bijdragen aan de 
verheffing van de boerenstand in Kenia, zoals de boeren-rockgroep Normaal 
dat doet met betrekking tot de boerenstand in de Achterhoek. 

This study analyses the effectiveness and efficiency of state 
intervention against the background of the emerging heterogeneous 
agrarian structure in Kenya. Since the colonial period the state 
established itself as a major force to ensure the commoditisation of 
the agricultural economy. State power, exercised through several 
institutions, is increasingly used to guarantee the operation of the 
market through various marketing and price regulations as well as 
to influence the trajectory of agricultural development by its 
involvement in agricultural Research and Development. 
Using the extensive body of literature dealing with the agrarian 
structure in Kenya and by incorporating the results of a survey 
carried out on the farm-level in Nandi District, the author argues that 
state policy has become side-tracked by political manoeuvres of 
Kenya's 'big men' as well as by incompetence of the state 
bureaucracy itself. The inability of bureaucrats to grasp the structural 
variance of Kenya's agrarian structure and the resulting bias in the 
relations between state apparatuses and the peasantry are indicative. 
This did not prevent, however, that within the niches of the emerging 
agrarian structure a significant and diversified growth is taking 
place. The Kenyan middle peasantry in particular represents a 
considerable source of endogenous development potential which is 
left untapped by state policy. 
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